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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1970s, the international disability movement has galvanised around the "social 
model" of disability, as an adversarial response to traditional, individualising "medical" 
accounts of disablement.  The model foregrounds "disablist ideology", identifying systematic 
exclusion and discrimination as central mediators of disabled life.  Latterly, feminist authors 
within disability studies have problematised the "arid" materialist orientation of the social 
model, for its eschewing of personal and psychological aspects of disability, and poor 
theorising of embodiment.  Social model orthodoxy construes the psychological as 
epiphenomenal, diversionary, and potentially misappropriated in the buttressing of 
pathologising accounts of disablement.  A legacy of "traditional" psychoanalytic theorising on 
disability implies causal links between bodily difference and psychopathology, eliding a 
critical interrogation of oppression in mediating the severely marginal social and economic 
destiny of the disabled minority.  The new "critical" psychoanalytic approach to disability 
interprets broad social responses to disablement as the enactment of defences engaged in 
reaction to the universal unconscious existential conflicts evoked by disability images.  The 
present work seeks to elaborate the integration of psychoanalysis into disability studies, 
towards development of a politically situated psychology of disability oppression, which 
creates theoretical links connecting ideology with the nature of individual subjectivity.  
Conceptual ideas to begin describing the psycho-emotional aspects of disablist oppression and 
impairment were developed via an integration of clinical data with a renewed, 
psychoanalytically informed critical synthesis of disability-related research from a range of 
disciplines. Clinical data was gathered via psychoanalytically oriented group psychotherapy 
with severely physically impaired university students.  Full transcriptions and in-depth field-
notes were utilised as a record of data, which was then analysed via interpretive, 
psychoanalytic and "interpretive auto-ethnographic" methods.  Follow-up interviews were 
held to assess the resonance and utility of new concepts.  A range of theoretical contributions 
was combined in illuminating the modernist cultural and political underpinnings of oppressive 
responses to the impaired body, and integrated with accounts of the psychological and 
relational predicaments of disablism gleaned from the clinical record.  Topics drawn from 
literature, critically evaluated, developed and re-synthesised included narcissistic culture, the 
family, "medicalisation", social mirroring, internalised oppression, liminality, and 
representations of disability in charity, art and modern bioethics. The nature of 
countertransference dynamics in therapeutic work with disabled people was considered.  Key 
concepts from the clinical data were developed and progressively reformulated; these included 
the distortion of boundaries, the discourse of loss, control, independence, identity, complicity, 
trauma, and the imperative to silencing the subjective experience of disabled life.   
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OPSOMMING  
Die internasionale gestremdheidsbeweging mobiliseer sedert die 1970’s rondom die “sosiale 
model”  van gestremdheid - in afwysende reaksie op tradisionele individualiserende, 
“mediese” diskoerse. Dié model plaas die kollig op “gestremdheidsideologie”, en identifiseer 
sistematiese uitsluiting en diskriminasie as die sentrale bemiddelaars van die gestremde lewe. 
In die laaste tyd word die “droëe” materialistiese benadering van die sosiale model egter deur 
feministiese outeurs binne gestremdhiedsstudies geproblematiseer, spesifiek as synde 
ontwykend van die persoonlike en sielkundige aspekte van gestremdheid, en vanweë die 
model se swak teoretisering van beliggaming. Die ortodokse sosiale model beskou die 
sielkundige as ‘n epifenomeen, ’n afleiding, en potensieël kaapbaar in diens van 
patologiserende narratiewe oor gestremdheid. ‘n Nalatenskap van “tradisionele” psigo-
analitiese teoretisering oor gestremdheid impliseer kousale verbande tussen liggaamlike 
alteriteit en psigopatologie, wat lei tot die weglating van ‘n kritiese ondervraging van 
verdrukking in die bemiddeling van die uiters marginale sosiale en ekonomiese 
lotsbestemming van die gestremde minderheidsgroep. Die nuwe “kritiese” psigo-analitiese 
benadering tot gestremdheid interpreteer breë sosiale response op gestremdheid as die 
aktivering van verdedigingsmeganismes in reaksie op universele onbewuste eksistensiële 
konflikte wat deur beelde van gestremdheid na vore geroep word. In hierdie verhandeling 
word daar gepoog om die integrasie van psigo-analise binne gestremdheidstudies uit te dy, en 
‘n aanset te lewer tot die ontwikkelling van ’n polities-gesitueerde sielkunde van 
gestremdheidsverdrukking, waardeur teoretiese verbande tussen ideologie en die aard van 
individuele subjektiwiteit gelê word. ‘n Aanvanklike begripsapperatuur ten einde die 
beskrywing van die psigo-affektiewe aspekte van gestremdheidsverdrukking en –benadeling 
aan die gang te sit, is deur middel van ’n integrasie van kliniese data met ’n hernude, psigo-
analities skatpligtige kritiese sintese van gestremdheidsgeoriënteerde navorsing in ‘n 
verskeidenheid van vakdissiplines ontwikkel. Kliniese data is met behulp van psigo-analities-
gerigde groepspsigoterapiesessies met fisiek swaar gestremde universiteitstudente versamel. 
Volledige transkripsies en uitgebreide veld-aantekeninge is gebruik as data-rekord, wat dan 
vervolgens deur middel van interpretatiewe, psigo-analitiese en “interpretatiewe auto-
etnografiese” metodes geanaliseer is. Opvolg-onderhoude is gehou ten einde die mate van 
weerklank en bruikbaarheid van die nuwe konsepte te evalueer. ’n Verskeidenheid teoretiese 
bydrae is gekombineer ten einde die modernistiese kulturele en politieke stutte van 
verdrukkende response tot die belemmerde liggaam te belig, en is voorts geïntegreer met 
beskrywings van die sielkundige en verhoudingsmatige verknorsings van gestremdheid wat uit 
die kliniese rekord vergader is. Onderwerpe wat uit die literatuur ontleen, krities geëvalueer, 
ontwikkel en hersintetiseer is, sluit in die kultuur van narcisme, die gesin, “medikalisering”, 
sosiale spieëling, geïnternaliseerde verdrukking, liminaliteit, sowel as uitbeeldings van 
gestremdheid in barmhartigheidsdiens, kuns en bio-etiek. Die aard van teenoordrag-dinamieke 
in terapeutiese werk met gestremdes is ook in oorweging geneem. Sleutelbegrippe ontleen aan 
die kliniese data is ontwikkel en vootdurend herformuleer; hierdie sluit in die verwringing van 
grenslyne,  die diskoers van verlies, van beheer, onafhanklikheid, identiteit, medepligtigheid, 
trauma, en die imperatief tot stilswye oor die subjektiewe ervaring van die gestremde lewe.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and opening reflections 
 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like 
hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that 
roar which lies on the other side of silence. 
      (Middlemarch – George Eliot)  
 
Introduction 
The history of the social phenomenon of disability is probably as old as humankind itself, 
incorporating a myriad of cultural representations and societal responses to the "marked 
body".  The propensity of images of bodily difference to evoke psychic responses of an 
especially visceral, even primitive order has, over at least the course of modern history, 
translated into the manifesting of social forces which have driven disabled people to the 
margins of society, denying such individuals an equitable stake in the production of a shared 
culture (Marks, 1999a; Watermeyer, 2006).  Modernity has witnessed an unprecedented and 
subduing mass socio-political offensive upon the disabled minority, rendering a host of 
systematic exclusions from social process, operationalised via biomedical measurement, 
bureaucratic categorization and cultural "othering" (Davis, 2002; Stiker, 1982).  Around the 
globe, the hallmarks of the social predicaments of disabled persons are poverty, mass 
unemployment, discrimination and the indignity of denigrating social prejudices (Barnes, 
Oliver & Barton, 2002a; Coleridge, 1993).  The silencing and disregard of disabled people is 
woven deeply into the structural and functional nature of societies which have been designed 
and developed with the needs of only a proportion of the population – the "nondisabled" 
majority – in mind.   
 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the rise of the biomedical model of health care 
within Western nations saw theoretical understandings and institutional responses to 
disablement becoming ever more dominated by medicine (Abberley, 1996; Barnes, 1990; 
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Marks, 1999a; Oliver, 1990).  Critics of the medical "establishment" pointed to its systemic 
inattention to social factors in mediating the experience of illness or disability, which was, 
instead, viewed purely as a phenomenon of "diseased bodies".  For the disabled population 
the power and influence of biomedicine was to hold particular and oppressive implications, 
via the reductive ascribing of social and economic marginality to individual, rather than socio-
political factors (Oliver, 1996).  What came to be pejoratively described as the "medical 
model of disability" effectively placed responsibility for the poverty and exclusion of disabled 
persons at their own door, viewing this social predicament as an unavoidable outcome of 
functional flaws of the body or mind.  This critique led to the early galvanising of the disabled 
minority as a political movement, which sought redress based upon the view that it is 
discrimination and systematic exclusion, not bodily frailty, which is at the heart of the 
appalling social suffering of disabled persons (Barnes et al., 2002a).  As an adversarial 
response to the maligned medical view, a group of disabled scholars and activists in Britain 
proposed a radical new approach, which came to be known as the "social model" (Barnes, 
1990; Oliver, 1990; 1996; Swain et al., 1993).  This political device reformulated the 
marginality of disabled persons as a product of social oppression, which selectively inflicted 
the "disabled identity" upon certain citizens, as a means whereby the state may absolve itself 
from responsibility for the fulfilling of citizenship rights.  The architects of the social model 
were located in disciplines such as sociology and social policy, and of a largely materialist or 
Marxist orientation (Thomas, 1999a).  True to this paradigm, it was the materiality of access 
to economic participation which was foregrounded as a fundamental priority in the 
emancipation of their constituency.  The diagnostic and "rehabilitative" aims of medicine in 
the lives of disabled people were vehemently eschewed, as instruments of silencing and social 
regulation, rather than upliftment (Barnes, 1990).  But the social model was to bring its own 
silences, based upon its deliberate materialist elision of the uniqueness of individual 
experience and psychology.   
 
To the political vanguard of the social model, psychology (including psychoanalysis) had 
been at the forefront of medicalising and pathologising control in the lives of disabled people, 
which had contributed to the construction of disability as chance "personal tragedy", rather 
than heinous social injustice (Finkelstein & French, 1993; Goodley & Lawthom, 2006a).  
Exploration of psychological aspects of disability, to these critics, would only divert attention 
from the real, material issues of deprivation, whilst perpetuating the cycle of "victim-
blaming" (Finkelstein, 1996).  Over more recent times, however, mainly feminist voices from 
within the discipline of disability studies have come to object to the materialist orthodoxy of 
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the social model, asserting that its exclusive focus on the "public" world of economic 
participation has sidelined the equally politically salient world of the personal, the bodily, and 
the psychological (Morris, 1992; Thomas, 1999a; Wendell, 1996).  The social model's 
disabled subject was a disembodied, homogeneous phantasm, devoid of feeling or unique 
agency, and bearing a psychological identity mysteriously unaffected by lifelong oppression 
(Hughes & Paterson, 1997; Shakespeare, 2006).  The political expediency of such a figure 
was clear, yet this meant that the social model framework left much of the real-life experience 
of the disabled population unseen, un-mirrored, and uninterrogated.  Whilst it is true that 
much psychological theory pertaining to disability is profoundly uncritical, and lacking in any 
rigorous analysis of the typically definitive influence of oppression in disabled lives (Asch & 
Rousso, 1985; Goodley & Lawthom, 2006a; Thomas, 1999a), this does not mean that a 
critical, contextual psychology of disability is, by nature, unfeasible.  Such a psychology 
would take care not to become ensnared in the oppressive delineation of the 
"psychopathology of disability", but rather would aim to use psychological concepts to 
illuminate the intra-psychic and intersubjective mechanisms of prejudice, as well as tracing 
the psychological positioning of disabled persons within a disablist social milieu (Watermeyer 
& Swartz, 2008).    
 
A legacy of psychoanalytic research and theory regarding disability has tended to imply 
causative links between bodily impairment and pathological mental states, via the necessarily 
distorted nature of the "body ego" (Asch & Rousso, 1985; Thomson, 1997a; Watermeyer, 
2006).  Such theorising neglects the often immense impact of bodily difference in perverting 
the social mirroring and socialisation to which disabled persons are subject, and thus 
circumvents a critical analysis of the role of ideology in shaping both the manifest and 
internalised oppression of disabled people (Watermeyer, 2002).  Latterly though, a new 
"critical psychoanalytic" approach to disability oppression has emerged, which seeks to use 
analytic concepts for the interrogation of prejudice and exclusion, which are viewed as 
manifestations of defensive intra-psychic responses to the unconscious existential threats 
which the impaired body has come to symbolise (Marks, 1999a).  This is a psychoanalysis 
which is as preoccupied with social critique as it is with the intra-psychic states of the 
individual.  In particular, the appropriation of disabled persons as projective containers for the 
disavowed psychic material of a control-oriented, narcissistic modern world (Lasch, 1978; 
1984) is foregrounded, posing questions regarding the need for the consistent re-creation of 
the disabled minority as helpless, dependent, damaged and incapable (ibid.).   
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Meanwhile, within the ranks of materialist-orientated disability studies, calls for the 
integration of personal, psychological and bodily aspects of disability experience had led to 
the fashioning of an "extended" social model, in an attempt to make provision for aspects of 
disability not reducible to the material nature of "disabling barriers" (Thomas, 1999a).  The 
social model, however, is based upon a "fatal" conceptual paradox (Hughes & Paterson, 1997; 
Shakespeare, 2006).  Due to the pressing political imperative to identify "discrimination" as 
paramount in disabled lives, the social model elides impairment altogether, effectively 
surrendering disabled embodiment to the depersonalising taxonomies of medicine (ibid.).  As 
is often the case with revolutionary movements, the social model orthodoxy relied upon 
irreducible binaries, including the splits between "medicine" and "politics", "nature" and 
"culture", and, most especially, "disability" and "impairment" (Shakespeare, 2006).  Attempts 
at forging a psychological framework with which to make sense of disability oppression from 
within this paradigm seem destined to prove fruitless, due to the persistent disdain and 
suspicion with which research concerned with the subjectivity of disability is viewed from 
social model quarters.  In addition, the materialist basis of the disability studies academy 
renders a paucity of psychological knowledge with which to undertake new theorising.  A key 
point of departure of the current work holds that achieving a satisfactory theoretical 
understanding of oppression of any sort must make adequate conceptual provision for the 
intra-psychic.  As corollary to this position, "oppression" is not viewed as a simple, 
unidirectional "force" which emanates from the dominant group; instead, it is viewed as a 
dynamic social process, which notably involves the internalisation amongst members of the 
subordinated group of denigratory meanings (Frosh, 2006).  By consequence, social change is 
regarded as only being possible when all participants in oppressive relating are brought to a 
point of insight regarding specific roles in the cycle of domination.  A conceptual frame for 
understanding the internal, psychological environment of the subordinated is, consequently, 
indispensable.   
 
A key question thus emerges regarding whether it is feasible to create a socially situated, 
ideologically critical psychological framework to describe disability oppression.  
Psychoanalytic social theory has often been criticised for a propensity to reduce the real-world 
drama of political conflict to the intra-psychic realm of the personal and symbolic, thus 
tending to depoliticise the individual, rather than subvert the societal status quo (Gordon, 
1995).  The key difficulty surrounds the forging of meaningful connective threads between 
the world of ideology and the realm of the subjective, in a manner which tracks back the 
marginal positioning of oppressed minorities to the internalisation of perverse and oppressive 
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socialisation (Davids, 1996; Marks, 1999a; 1999b).  The current work aims to begin a process 
of developing psychoanalytically informed concepts which make sense of disablist 
discrimination in relational terms, whilst also remaining rigorously cognisant of the broader 
contextual (that is, material) nature of disability oppression.  Typically, analyses which are 
preoccupied with intra-psychic phenomena tend to "mislay" the political, instead attributing 
subjective distress to individual, neurotic origins.  What is required is a psychological account 
of the trauma of socially situated disability, which manages to avoid such snares through the 
careful and deliberate connection of subjective struggle to the distortion of social formations 
which surround the disabled body.   
 
The present study is based upon a psychoanalytically oriented group psychotherapy process 
involving severely physically impaired university students.  Using a non-directive group 
analytic approach, clinical material regarding the subjective nature of social life with severe, 
visible impairment was collected, with a view to the development of conceptual ideas 
regarding the psychological underpinnings and effects of prejudicial treatment.  Particular 
attention was paid to countertransference phenomena within this process, with a view to 
illuminating the often distorted interpersonal dynamics which emanate from the extraordinary 
evocativeness of visible bodily difference.  An interpretivist qualitative methodology was 
applied to the data, with ongoing field-notes being used to incrementally develop theoretical 
ideas regarding the lived psychological and relational nature of disablism.  After completion 
of the therapeutic process, the resultant conceptual ideas were re-presented to group members 
in individual interviews, in order to establish the degree of resonance which these carried.   
 
The intended contribution of this dissertation lies not only in the clinical data, but more 
broadly in a renewed, critical and interpretive synthesis of the literature.  As noted above, a 
history of psychological theorising on disability has been (largely justifiably) rejected by the 
social model disability movement, due to its uncritical, individualising – and hence effectively 
victim-blaming – stance.  The current work aims to re-introduce psychological – in particular, 
psychoanalytically informed – concepts into disability studies, within a renewed vision of 
socially situated and critical analysis of individual psychic experience.  This is a new 
amalgamation, born of useful ideas salvaged from the debris of discarded psychological and 
psychoanalytic work, in combination with an original, psychoanalytically oriented critical 
synthesis of existing disability studies theory.  Thus, existing literature, as well as clinical 
material, is regarded as "data" within the study.  The approach is unconventional. Since the 
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primary aim of the work is the development of new conceptual ideas, the dissertation is 
largely theoretical, with clinical material used more to exemplify and enliven than "create" the 
suggested concepts.  The implementation of the psychoanalytic method in research is, by its 
nature, interpretive, as it involves the positing of descriptions of unconscious phenomena not 
fully falsifiable by empirical means (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).  The utility (or otherwise) 
of the conceptual ideas regarding the psychological nature and effects of disablism presented 
here will  be determined by the extent to which these are experienced by disabled individuals 
as resonant, and illuminating of the often obscure (and internalised) modes of oppression 
inflicted upon this group.  The dissertation proceeds as follows: 
 
In the balance of this chapter, I present a consideration of the cultural phenomenon of bodily 
symbolism; that is, the resilient logic that the nature of the soul, or the self, is "written on the 
body".  Thereafter, a brief orientation to the worldwide development challenges facing the 
disabled community is presented, with a view to familiarising the reader with the appalling 
gravity and pervasiveness of disablist oppression (Disability:  The international development 
context).   
 
Chapter Two (The body, ideology & society), the first of three purely theoretical chapters, 
opens with an account of the ideological contrasts between the so-called "medical" and 
"social" models of disability, followed by a consideration of burgeoning criticisms directed at 
the latter.  Central aspects of this critique pertain to the model's stubborn rejection of the 
assertion that personal and psychological aspects of disability carry political significance 
(Prohibiting the personal), as well as the neglect of the subjective reality of disabled 
embodiment (The vanishing –  and re-appearing – body).   
 
We turn in Chapter Three (Psychoanalysis, social constructionism and the contextual 
phenomenology of disability) to psychoanalysis; in particular, the potential of the paradigm as 
a framework for subversive social critique.  This assessment is made in preparation for the 
following section, which recounts the largely oppressive, individualising history of 
psychoanalytic work regarding disability (Psychoanalysis and disability:  A brief history).  
The new, critical psychoanalytic approach to the disability phenomenon is then outlined, 
leading into a consideration of the role of particular defence mechanisms in (destructively) 
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mediating the social treatment of disabled persons.  Three related concepts, stigma, liminality 
and monstrosity are thereafter examined, in order to assess their potential utility in 
illuminating the symbolic as enacted within cultural formations surrounding impairment.  In 
the following section, entitled Disability and bioethics, we explore how the unconscious 
meanings and evocations surrounding disability may be socially (that is, medically) enacted 
through debates within modern bioethics to do with how "worth living" life with impairment 
may be.   The dark history of eugenic extermination and forced sterilisation inflicted upon the 
disabled population (in Eugenics) are viewed as lending credence to the so-called 
"expressivist critique" of bioethics policies which seek to eliminate impaired bodies from the 
human population.  Finally, we explore the specific salience of elements of the critique of 
biomedicine in the lives of disabled persons (Disability and the medical encounter).   
 
In Chapter Four (Impairment, culture and identity) an attempt is made to broadly sketch the 
cultural backdrop to disablist othering, and the distortions of socialisation suffered by 
impaired persons.  The influence of the acquisitive and autonomous imperatives of narcissistic 
modernity on out-group denigration has special, pernicious salience to the disabled minority 
(in Narcissism, normalcy, modernity and the market).  In addition, artistic, literary and charity 
representations of disability "damage" (explored next) serve to reproduce the disabled imago 
of dependency, damage and abjection.  In narrowing the focus of cultural influences upon the 
disabled self, we consider issues within the family regarding impairment-difference 
(Attachment and infancy), the striving for normalcy (The body, ideology and surgery), and the 
unconscious psychic concomitants of "bodily defects" (Guilt).  In Identity politics and the 
movement the complexities of political mobilisation surrounding a maligned, deeply devalued 
social identity are explored, locating the disabled individual – unlike members of other 
political minorities – as typically isolated in the face of oppression.  The four subsections of 
the following segment (entitled Psycho-emotional aspects of disability) are concerned with an 
examination of psychological concepts relevant to the shaping of the disabled self, including 
the Winnicottian notion of mirroring, the contested and under-developed concept of 
internalised oppression, and the question of what disabled persons "need" in psychological 
terms in order to overturn (internal) relations of subordination (in Disability:  What is 
development? and Disability and psychotherapy).   
 
Chapter Five (Research methods and issues) begins by outlining the origination and nature of 
the empirical study which buttresses the balance of the dissertation.  An account is provided 
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of how the psychotherapy group for physically impaired students came into being, what the 
intentions of the intervention were, and the nature and recruitment of participants.  Power 
relations, and a history of severe exploitation, are key concerns within research methodology 
in disability studies.  A section is therefore devoted to these very significant ethical issues 
(Disability studies:  Research and emancipation), which takes the narrative temporarily away 
from the research story of the present work.  In the section headed Qualitative and 
interpretivist, the essential philosophical position from which the research study was 
undertaken is described, leading thereafter to a declaration by myself (the author) of my own 
subjective position in relation to the issues at hand (Researcher's orientation to data).  As a 
disabled person (partially sighted), a disability studies researcher and a clinical psychologist, 
my multiple identities and personal standpoint surrounding the field of study are of direct 
relevance, particularly as I assume an openly interpretive (interpretivist and psychoanalytic) 
position with regard to the data.  In part, I locate myself as shaping the data analysis via an 
"interpretive auto-ethnography", in which I draw upon my own history as a disabled person, 
and disability studies researcher, in making (interpretive, unconscious) sense of the accounts 
of the research subjects.    
 
After conclusion of the research methodology narrative, the following chapter presents 
aspects of the clinical material, synthesised with relevant disability-related research from a 
range of fields. In this segment (Chapter Six – Group psychotherapy with severely physically 
impaired adults:  Conceptualising aspects of clinical material) incorporates the major 
conceptual contribution gleaned from the clinical intervention.  Here, concept clusters 
regarding the relational-psychological nature of the social positioning of disabled persons are 
presented, exemplified with direct quotations from data, and (critically) integrated with 
theoretical contributions from the research literature.  The first section introduces the 
relationship, in common cultural discourse, between images of disability and anxiety within 
the observer.  This relates closely to the topic of the following section, which deals with the 
ubiquitous social forces of silence enacted upon disabled subjectivity by an anxious and 
defended world (Imperative to silence).  In Trauma and its re-enlivening we focus attention 
upon the vexed question of how to relate the social experience of oppression with the 
uniqueness of individual psychology and history, in a manner which holds the significance of 
both; that is, without blaming the victim, or negating the individual.  The pivotal concept of 
the distortion of personal and psychic boundaries in the lives of persons with impairments is 
thereafter considered in a segment comprised of nine subsections.  The aspects of this key 
issue which are discussed begin with the social forces militating against "real" and authentic 
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relating, with the related implication of disabled persons (in this study) often feeling unseen 
and unknown in relationships (Being real and Being seen).  The nature of some forms of 
(unconsciously motivated) relational response to the disabled figure is then described; these 
include what I term "manic" defensive responses, and the drive toward establishing 
"solutions" to the perceived dilemmas of impairment.  The final three subsections present 
ideas regarding the collusion of disabled persons with relational silencing, the role of manifest 
deprivation in distorting relationships (The reality of limited choices), and the salience of the 
notion of transitional space.  Next, the section entitled The discourse of independence presents 
a critical interrogation of this highly salient notion in the lives of disabled persons, via 
colloquial stereotyped ideas, as well as imperatives operationalised through medical and 
rehabilitative institutions.  The subjective, psychological experience of disablism and 
impairment are foregrounded via the following three topic segments, which are concerned 
with the relinquishing and denial of control, the experience of depression and suicidality, and 
the nature of punitive, internalised imperatives which emanate from lives of continual 
denigration (Control, Depression and suicidality, and Disabled superego).  The final major 
section arising from the interpretation of clinical material provides a critical analysis of the 
fraught notion of loss in the lives of disabled persons.  Traditional medical and psychological 
views of disability apply grief and bereavement concepts to the onset of impairment, in a 
manner which tends to reduce social oppression to a personal, neurotic battle with "losses" in 
bodily functionality.  Against the backdrop of a vigorous critique of this "loss discourse", we 
consider the question of how such stereotyping diminishes social space for the accessing and 
communication of authentic, unique and personal experiences of loss which life in a disablist 
society will so often bring (Acceptance and denial, On being "un-disabled" and Disability, 
entitlement and loss).   
 
The Appendix (Group psychotherapy with severely physically impaired adults:  Aspects of 
process) provides additional enrichment to the reading of clinical material presented in 
Chapter Six, through a close examination of technical issues and relational dynamics within 
the therapeutic setting which arise from the practicalities and evocations of impairment.  The 
segment opens with four sections discussing aspects of the psychotherapeutic work, some of 
which highlight the manner in which severe physical impairment presents challenges to the 
clarity and boundedness of the traditional psychoanalytic frame.  These issues include, firstly, 
the reality of inconsistent attendance due to the ongoing, exhausting nature of life negotiating 
the combination of complex illness and impairment factors, and the unremitting experience of 
exclusion and prejudice.  A second issue pertains to the unavoidable contravention of physical 
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boundaries which attended the clinical process, with a consideration of concomitant 
unconscious meanings.  The role of interpretation in therapeutic work with members of 
oppressed minority groups is then considered; this is a delicate and complex issue, relating to 
the psychoanalytic dilemma of the relevance of "internal" interpretations in the face of real, 
material, external forces of oppression.  The remainder of the appended chapter is devoted to 
five sections concerned with aspects of countertransference gleaned from the clinical record.  
These issues are described with a view to beginning to conceptualise how culturally 
condensed and archaic anxieties surrounding disablement may translate into 
countertransference dynamics in clinical work with disabled individuals.  Key issues here 
include my own experience of a severe performance anxiety (Pressure-anxiety), and tightly 
held political investment in "emancipatory" outcomes (Political investments and therapeutic 
boundaries), as well as the powerful, even irresistable nature of projection and other primitive 
defences in relational spaces surrounding the visibly impaired (Our most damaged selves, and 
the struggle of "not knowing").   
 
The dissertation draws to a close with Chapter Seven, entitled Conclusions.  Here, key themes 
and implications of the study are concisely drawn together, and combined with reflections on 
the rich capacity of the disability phenomenon to contribute to our insights regarding social 
oppression, the silencing of subjectivity, the shortcomings of hegemonic notions of identity, 
and the commonalities of the human condition.  We begin, thus, with a discussion of the 
cultural mystique surrounding the subjective experience of bodily impairment; that is, the 
persistent belief that the nature of the self is somehow written on the body.   
 
Written on the body1 
Across world culture, there exists a long history of attributions for behaviour, indeed, for 
selfhood, to the nature of bodies.  Somatic characteristics are by their nature compelling and 
material, and draw an instinctual attention which may, at least in those crucial first moments 
of contact, circumvent a consideration of more subtle aspects of personhood.  The body 
                                                     
1 After having decided upon this descriptive phrase, I became aware that it is also the title of a novel by 
Jeanette Winterson (1992).  
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mesmerises and captivates us, indelibly marking out to the observer constraints upon what or 
whom the soul it carries may be.   It is the body which provides a material, "corporeal anchor" 
which, to the observer, both reflects and constitutes the psychological realm (Thomson, 1995, 
p. 603).  Perhaps the most pervasively influential bodily signifier is that of skin colour, which 
has in every context come to hold a myriad of personal meanings, typically showing as binary 
oppositions between members of racialised groups.  Frantz Fanon placed fantasies about 
blackness at "the heart of European civilisation" (Frosh, 1989, p. 23; Fanon, 1952).  Further, 
as Morris notes, the notion that physical attributes signal undesirable aspects of the 
psychological self is, to say the least, "a familiar one" to the feminist movement, which has 
sought to locate such assumptions within a critical socio-political context (Morris, 1993a, p. 
86).  Rosemarie Garland Thomson (Thomson, 1995, p. 599) tells of her dismay at a bedtime 
fairytale she is reading to her young daughter, in which the "good" girl's sexual and personal 
worth emanate from "an outer beauty that parallels her inner virtue".  Conversely, the "bad" 
girl's poverty of morals and character is mirrored and confirmed by her indelicate and 
unfeminine features (ibid.).  For the "bad" girl, the fact of being a woman is made more 
condemning by her failure, in her already devalued female state, to redeem herself with 
beauty.  Attractiveness, thus, is firmly linked to virtue (Asch & Fine, 1988, p. 16.2).   
 
In such a world of fervent somatic symbolising, hungry as it is for the ascription of meaning, 
disability must inevitably fill some version of centre stage.  Bodily differences or "defects" 
have commonly drawn the observer into questions regarding whether such discernible flaws 
are analogous to deeper moral or civil shortcomings (Mitchell & Snyder, 1997, p. 13).  In 
Shakespeare's Richard III, there is no question that the protagonist's sinister and "beastly" 
ways are constituted mutually with his bodily deformity.  In fact, he brazenly conspires with 
the audience to the effect that, since he is not worthy of this world's purer pleasures, villainy 
and avarice can be his only ambitions.  In the horrific unfolding of the play, every twist can be 
"traced back to Richard's consciousness of himself as a 'deformed, unfinished' man" (Kriegel, 
1987, p. 31).  Richard is described as having teeth from the moment of his misshapen birth, 
allowing him to "gnaw a crust of bread when only two hours old".  Clearly identifiable here 
are ideas regarding base oral obsession, deprivation and greed, which are located within 
                                                     
2 In a slight divergence from APA (American Psychological Association) referencing format, I choose 
at many points to provide page numbers without the presence of a direct quotation. I believe this to be 
helpful in the context of a review of literature of the size and breadth of the current work. 
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Richard from his very birth.  As such, his evil is not so much a result of his deformity, but 
rather a co-constituent with it of his overall self.   
The emergence of modernity, with its promise of solutions and technologies to master the 
natural world, has brought with it possibilities – which quickly transmutate into moral 
imperatives – to perfect the body.  Bodies successfully made to appear youthful and powerful 
have "increasingly become a sign of social worth", and pivotal to the "notion of the self as a 
project" (Giddens, 1991 cited in Turner, 2001, p. 253).  The fantasy of a body entirely 
amenable to the perfecting, subduing action of technology positions those who fail in this task 
as inferior, negligent or immoral.  Davis (1997b, p. 15) traces the development, through the 
late modern era, of scientific assignation and measurement of the essential bodily identity, 
ranging from scores on intelligence tests to fingerprinting, with all such characteristics 
purportedly expressing one's coded genetic essence.  The marking of bodies with an indelible 
corporeal identity, interspersed with measurements of prowess such as intelligence, causes an 
individual to be laced into an "identical relationship" with his or her body (ibid.); ultimately, 
the body "embodies" the identity.  Consequently, one's resultant identity becomes "as 
indelible as one's place on the normal curve" (Davis, 1997b, p. 15).  Achieving normalcy on 
that same curve – via a body that is "natural and healthy" – thus becomes a prerequisite for "a 
good life", "one worth living" (Michalko, 2002, p. 37).  As we shall see, in the case of persons 
with divergent bodies, the converse attribution of lives that are not worth living is readily to 
be found in modern society.   
 
So prized and praiseworthy are physical characteristics of vitality, health, vigour and energy 
in common-sense accounts that, at first glance, questioning the association of these 
characteristics with virtue may seem incongruous.  Habitually, observations regarding how 
closely a body approximates the fantasy media ideal are accepted as compliments, which 
cleanse and illuminate the body's "inhabitant", not simply the body per se.  We revel in praise 
for our stamina, our ability to work long hours, our resilience and energy.  But hearing a 
discourse wherein health is constructed not as a chance occurrence, but as an admirable 
achievement, from within a disabled body, positions one as not only physically, but 
personally, lacking (Wendell, 1997, p. 269).   
 
In the cases of race and gender mentioned above, critical interrogation of societal forces and 
the action of civil rights campaigns have worked to erode away bodily attributions, as 
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evidence of oppression has grown and overtaken the irresistable urge to ascribe poverty, 
backwardness, immorality or any other form of inadequacy to bodily difference.  Disability, 
though, presents to the observer opportunities for such attribution and symbolisation which 
are that much more legion, more provocative and fantastic, rendering the field of fantasies 
regarding the nature of the disabled self correspondingly florid.  If the shape of the disabled 
body is infinitely diverse, infinitely contorted, so must be the shape of the disabled soul.  
Here, fantasies of potentially limitless bodily (dys)morphology feed, and feed upon, ideas 
regarding the horrific and endlessly diverse states and shapes of the human character.  
Thomson describes, via a consideration of the history of the American freak show, how a 
distorted body may be so saturated with symbolism as to become "pure text"; humanity, then, 
is obliterated by the all-enveloping body (Thomson, 1997b, p. 59).  Such "enfreakment" 
(ibid.) is, of course, at one extreme of a continuum upon which admixtures of body and self 
are able to be heard.  However, what her image demonstrates is the element of a degree of 
squeezing away of the self by bodies that are all-too-readily appropriated as text.  The 
hegemonic status of the body as a textual marker of identity is evident in our universal drive 
to repair, correct and enhance our bodies.  When we improve our bodies, we improve 
ourselves.  Paradoxically, this position both frees and entraps; we are seduced by the 
modernist possibility of change, whilst endorsing a meaning system which affixes our 
selfhood to an ultimately fragile and failing body.  We have the illusion of control, at the cost 
of subjection.   
 
The textual message emblazened on the bodies of disabled persons is, first and foremost, one 
of suffering and abjection.  Disability and suffering, writes Henri-Jacques Stiker, remain, 
throughout history, "inseparable companions" (Stiker, 1999 cited in Michalko, 2002, p. 1).  If 
life and identity are organised within liberal societies around axioms such as free agency, 
mastery, progress and individual will (Thomson, 1997b, p. 47), the image of the disabled 
person flouts and destabilises the very foundations of convention, rendering a radical 
counterpoint to the "good life".  Within popular media in the United States, Hevey asserts that 
the image of the impaired body is the "site and symbol of all alienation ... The contorted body 
is the final process and statement of a painful mind" (Hevey, 1992, p. 73).  The disabled body, 
in such a context, is not only inscribed, but created, with social relations (Thomson, 1997b, p. 
22).  So dominant are cultural associations to bodily frailty and illness, according to Susan 
Sontag, that it is not possible to "take up one's residence in the kingdom of the ill 
unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been landscaped" (Sontag, 1991 cited 
in Barnes and Mercer, 2001, p. 518).   
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Linguistic traces of the association of bodily impairment with suffering and wretchedness 
may be found in a range of popular discourses, such as that regarding what it means to be 
"fortunate".  Allocation of individuals to the categories of "fortunate" and "unfortunate" 
occurs here around a fulcrum of the body.  In the midst of life crises or losses, the mantra that 
one is, in fact, "fortunate" to have "my health', is axiomatic.  Bodily impairment, 
consequently, precludes temporality or change in how one's sense of self is viewed; one 
simply is "an unfortunate", with the unspoken nature of disabled experience occupying the 
pinnacle of a shadowy, yet consensual, hierarchy of suffering.  If the self is written on the 
body, the wretched self is written on the impaired body.   
 
In preparing the way for an extensive consideration of theoretical knowledge regarding the 
social and psychological formations which surround disability, I now turn to a brief sketching 
of the global context of disability development needs.   
 
Disability:  The international development context 
Throughout the world, overwhelming evidence bears witness to the lived oppression which 
disabled people, largely en masse, continue to experience.  Charlton (1998) calls this social 
reality "a human rights tragedy of epic proportions", which embodies "a fundamental critique 
of the existing world system" (Charlton, 1998, p. ix).  Poverty, indignity, exclusion, manifold 
deprivation, and the routine contravention of basic human rights are the cornerstones of the 
social predicaments of the world's disabled population.  Disablist oppression is woven deeply 
into the fabric of societies designed and developed within frames of reference which take no 
account of the needs, experiences and lifestyles of persons with bodily or psychic 
impairments.  As such, it is manifest in visible and invisible, deliberate and inadvertent, active 
and passive aspects of everyday cultural, economic and political life.  Rather than simply the 
work of a bigoted minority, disablism, through the mechanics of ideology, draws all into its 
net, by virtue of the inheritance of societies founded upon deeply embedded, interdependent 
cultural phenomena which provide only for the participation of a proportion of the populace.   
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Developing functional definitions of disability is a notoriously complex task.  Consequently, 
the widely divergent global range of definitions provides statistical prevalence data sets which 
are "inherently problematic" (Coleridge, 1993, p. 104).  It was inevitable that attempts at 
combining this bewildering store of data involved compromise, leading initially to an 
international prevalence estimated at 10% of the world population, which quickly became 
prominent within the discourse of disabled lobby groups worldwide.  The figure, though, has 
been severely criticised as a coarse oversimplification (ibid.).  This one-size-fits-all estimate 
has fostered the assumption that one tenth of any population is disabled; a suggestion "rarely 
borne out in practice" (ibid.), and one brimming with the possibilities of blunders in policy.  
Instead, careful comparison of survey data points to a wide variation in disability prevalence, 
within as well as between countries.  A complex of factors shape disabled populations as 
potentially substantially above or below the oft-quoted 10% mark (Coleridge, 1993, p. 104).  
The World Health Organisation (WHO), which was previously responsible for the 10% 
estimate, now embraces a figure of approximately 4% for developing countries and 7% for 
developed nations (ibid.).  This figure, however, is set to escalate continually for many 
decades to come, as a product of population ageing, deterioration in the natural environment, 
and incidence of social violence (Albrecht & Verbrugge, 2000 cited in Braddock & Parish, 
2001, p. 52).   
 
As noted above – and perhaps contrary to popular intuition – prevalence of reported disability 
in the developed world is considerably higher than that of the developing world, although the 
majority of the world's disabled population reside in developing contexts (Barnes & Mercer, 
2005a, p. 2).  Greater prevalence of disability in wealthier countries is attributed to three 
major causes.  Firstly, in such contexts the far longer life expectancy, and consequently larger 
population of aged persons, provide for higher incidence of age-related impairment.  The 
second causal factor pertains to the typically extensive nature of health and other support 
services in developed states, which produce higher rates of survival of persons with 
congenital as well as adventitious impairments; parallel with this consideration, individuals 
are also more likely to self-identify as disabled if this leads to the procurement of services.  
Lastly, a range of less conspicuous or visible impairments may be grossly under-identified in 
developing contexts.  Conditions such as dyslexia may go unnoticed, or not be considered to 
carry the substantial functional limitation which justifies recording as an impairment (Barnes 
& Mercer, 2005a, p. 2; Coleridge, 1993).  Whilst maintaining the proviso that all 
demographic and prevalence patterns should be approached with a keen sense of caution, it 
appears that an urban bias is often present.  This bias is accounted for by such factors as the 
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greater urban occurrence of road and industrial accidents, the attraction of more sophisticated 
social services, better medical care, a better chance of obtaining sedentary employment, and 
opportunities for begging (Coleridge, 1993, p. 106).  Radically different scenarios are 
typically created by localised incidence of medical conditions, such as river blindness, which 
has a prevalence of 30% in some rural areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (ibid.).   
 
In both wealthy and under-developed nations, however, disabled persons reliably remain 
amongst the poorest of the poor (Barnes, Oliver & Barton, 2002a; Coleridge, 1993; Schriner, 
2001).  Schriner (2001) assures us that it does not "overstate the case" to declare that disabled 
people are "almost universally on the bottom rung of the socio-economic ladder" (Schriner, 
2001, p. 645).  Through the course of the 1990s, international rates of unemployment amongst 
the disabled population changed little, notwithstanding the fact that (disability-related) anti-
discrimination legislation was introduced in several countries during the decade (Oliver, 2001, 
p. 153).  Within even the world's most developed nations, rates of unemployment amongst 
disabled persons are frequently of the order of 80% and beyond, with average personal 
income falling in the lowest decile (Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 53).  Taking the United 
States as an example, by 2002 72% of the disabled population remained out of work, with the 
poverty rate amongst working-age disabled adults topping three times that of their 
nondisabled compatriots (Davis, 2002, p. 148).  One third of all disabled children in the 
United States live in poverty (ibid.).  One might safely assume that the marginal economic 
circumstances of disabled communities in less affluent parts of the globe are, for the most 
part, that much more dire.   
 
Economic disadvantage is often deeply interwoven with the denial of access to resources 
basic to participation in social life.  For example, gaining – or retaining – employment is 
simply impossible for a mobility impaired person in the absence of appropriate, accessible 
transportation.  Mutua (2001, p. 105) relates how, in Kenya, many physically disabled 
individuals survive in a "uniquely paradoxical state of being ... present, yet completely 
invisible", as a result of being entirely excluded from societal participation due to the 
profound isolation engendered by the lack of usable transportation.  The World Health 
Organisation estimated in 2001 that only 1% of disabled persons in the developing world have 
any access whatsoever to rehabilitation or other institutional disability-related services 
(Barnes & Mercer, 2005a, p. 4).  Disabled children, especially girls, are "routinely denied 
formal schooling" in many developing nation contexts (UNESCO, 1995; UN ESCAP, 2003; 
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both cited in Barnes & Mercer, 2005a, p. 7).  Flood (2005, p. 189) estimates that 2% of 
disabled children in the developing world receive a meaningful education 
 
The absence or under-resourced nature of disability-related social services in the developing 
world contrasts dramatically with the far greater financial and human resources which are 
channelled into palliative, preventive and rehabilitative medical services in wealthier 
countries (Barnes & Mercer,  2005, p. 4).  Nevertheless, it should be noted that such services 
are typically rooted within health systems which remain insulated from, and bear little 
influence upon, the broader social exclusions suffered by most disabled persons Hagrass, 
2005, p. 148).  In rich and poor countries alike, disabled citizens face "formidable barriers to 
housing, transportation and freedom of movement, as well as exclusion or segregation in 
education and public accommodations" (Hahn, 2002, p. 165).  In reviewing the development 
of accessible transport services within the European Union, Lawson and Matthews (2005, p. 
80, 84) conclude that, over the last decade, only a degree of progress has been made toward 
full acknowledgment of the problem, with actual reparative interventions described as 
"tentative" and grossly insufficient.  Where attempts at providing key resources such as 
housing, education, transport and public accommodations are made by developed world 
administrations, disabled people have typically been positioned in life-worlds characterised by 
"a more pervasive form of segregation...than the most rigid policies of apartheid enacted by 
racist governments" (Hahn, 1997, p. 174; see also Drake, 2001).   
 
The voracious capital imperatives of an increasingly globalised economy, characterised as it is 
by the deregulating of employment stipulations, international trade, and the global labour 
market, seem destined to further compound the economic exclusions of disabled workers 
heralded by earlier eras of industrialisation (Holden & Beresford, 2002, p. 194, Kelly, 2001).  
Priestley (2005) provides an analysis which poses important questions regarding the complex, 
often conflictual, interchange between European Union disability policy and the particular 
national interests of member states.  The predominance of unfettered market forces has 
historically provided for a strong link between disability and poverty, which, according to 
many disability studies critics, seems set to deepen internationally.  It seems clear that the 
increasingly hegemonic and accelerating market imperatives of a global economy are unlikely 
to position the investigation and dismantling of disabling social and physical structures as any 
sort of pressing priority (Holden & Beresford, 2002, p. 194).   
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The challenge to disability scholars, thus, is to re-orient analyses in a manner which takes 
account of the integrated nature of the global economy, incorporating critique of the influence 
of multi-national corporations and financial institutions (such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank) on forces shaping access to, and management of, labour (Sheldon, 
2005, p. 118).  It is for the fate of developing contexts that the fact of globalised capital 
appears most ominous, yet, a lack of concerted research, as well as poor infrastructure and 
service provision, mean that little systematic knowledge exists regarding the life-situations of 
the majority of developing-world disabled persons (Charlton, 1998, p. 33; Barnes & Mercer, 
2005a).  Against the backdrop of this void of knowledge, myths and stereotypes regarding the 
"backward" or "traditional" treatment of disabled people in poorer countries have flourished.  
One such myth is the notion that people in non-Western countries "hide, abuse, and even kill" 
their disabled family members (Ingstad, 2001, p. 774).  Whilst it is not denied that cases of 
abuse and hate crime exist, it seems that a systematic bias prevails in the manner to which 
such incidents are regarded as broadly representative.  As Ingstad puts it:  "We do not take 
single cases of child abuse to be typical examples of child care in industrialised countries" 
(Ingstad, 2001, p. 775).  Beyond the sheer lack of evidence to support the myth, it also carries 
the dangerous potential to provide an excuse for governments who wish to obscure the reality 
of premature deaths of disabled persons resulting from poverty and a lack of health care 
(ibid.).   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the prevalence of disability in poorer countries is estimated to be 
significantly lower than that of developed nations, by the reckoning of some disability studies 
researchers, as much as one half of all such impairment could be prevented through the 
promulgation of effective policies to fight poverty and malnutrition, and improve sanitation, 
the quality of drinking water, and conditions of labour (Barnes & Mercer, 2005a, p. 4; 
Charlton, 1998).  The banishment of disabled people from the world of work in many poorer 
countries, argue Harber and Davies (1997), is policed by the institutional gatekeeping of 
access to education.  Exclusion from the educational system in early life, which, as noted 
                                                     
3 Although accepted APA (American Psychological Association) referencing format dictates that listed 
references in parenthesis should be alphabetized, at many points I place a single source first in order to 
indicate its significance; thereafter, the remainder of the list is alphabetized. 
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above, is overwhelmingly typical for the disabled children of the "periphery", serves to 
legitimate lifelong inequalities, via attribution of chronically low occupational status to failure 
in prior educational achievement (Harber & Davies, 1997 cited in Barton & Armstrong, 2001, 
p. 693).    
 
Within international policy frameworks, growing interest in disability as an axis of inequality 
began emerging in the 1970s, beginning with the United Nations' Declaration of the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons (1971) and Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons (1975; 
Barnes & Mercer, 2005a, p. 8).  This was followed by the year 1981 being proclaimed the 
International Year of Disabled Persons (IYDP), and the ten year period from 1983 to 1992 the 
Decade for Disabled Persons.  However, the impact of these seemingly radical developments 
was hamstrung by the broad and ongoing hegemony of individualistic medical and 
rehabilitationist understandings of disability (ibid.).  The UN Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (formally adopted in 1993; Barnes 
et al., 2002a, p. 3), whilst carrying no legally enforceable imperative, were proposed in order 
to provide an international benchmarking of standards for disability-related legislation, policy, 
and programme implementation (Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 50).   
 
Meanwhile, the World Health Organisation has attempted to develop a theoretical and 
conceptual framework for research and policy development in disability, initially launched in 
1980 as the International Classification of Impairment, Disability and Handicap (ICIDH), and 
revised in 2000 as the ICIDH-2 (later re-named the International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health, or ICF).  Whilst successive versions of the model 
represented a substantial attempt to move away from a traditional biomedical view of 
disability, the framework nevertheless sustained heavy critique from disability studies 
quarters (Thomas, 2002a, pp. 41-2; Pfeiffer, 2000).  In essence, the WHO's approach has been 
regarded by a substantial quorum of disability scholars as prioritising the prevention of 
impairment, rather than foregrounding contextual issues such as discrimination and 
systematic exclusion (Marks, 1999a, p. 54).  In addition it is argued that the schema carries an 
inherent logic which tends ultimately to ascribe disadvantage to intra-individual, impairment-
based factors (Thomas, 2002a, p. 42; Fougeyrollas & Beauregard, 2001; Lunt & Thornton, 
1994), although this is disputed by some (e.g. Bury, 2000; Shakespeare, 2006).  Pfeiffer 
(2000, p. 1080) goes so far as to brand the ICIDH-2 a "threat to the disability movement 
worldwide", due to its lack of a critical, constructionist approach to such issues as normalcy 
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(ibid.).  In a somewhat more mischievous vein, Miles pokes fun at institutional attempts at 
developing an all-encompassing disability vocabulary, with the view that such "heroic 
linguistic labours" as those undertaken surrounding the ICIDH and ICIDH-2 – in order to 
establish internationally relevant terminology – are inevitably futile (Miles, 2001; see also 
Altman, 2001; Fujiura & Rutkowski-Kmitta, 2001).     
 
One strategy to counter the economic exclusion of disabled persons is that of so-called "anti-
discrimination legislation".  Leading the international trend towards this approach was the 
United States, where the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was promulgated in 1990.  It 
was hoped – believed – that the implementation of this legislation would embody a 
"watershed moment" for global disability rights (Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 50).  As a point 
of departure, this promising new law affirmed that it was socio-political phenomena such as 
discrimination, and the history of segregation and isolation, which engendered the unequal 
positions of disabled persons in modern society, rather than intra-personal factors such as 
impairment (ibid.).  Thus, the Act stipulated that discrimination against disabled individuals 
in the domains of employment, public services, public accommodations and 
telecommunications was recognised as unlawful (ibid.).  This mandated that reasonable 
adjustments to physical environments and practices should be undertaken by employers in 
order to facilitate equitable inclusion of disabled persons.  During the course of the 1990s, 
several other nations quickly followed suit, by adopting similar policy legislation, or 
amending constitutions in order to prohibit disability-based discrimination; these included 
Great Britain, Australia, Germany, Austria, Brazil, South Africa, Malawi, Uganda, and the 
Philippines (ibid., p. 51).  
 
Focusing on the lead taken by the United States, however, the disability movement was to be 
sadly disillusioned by what was to follow.  In what Lennard J. Davis has described as "a 
judicial backlash", well over 90% of cases of discrimination brought by disabled citizens in 
terms of the ADA have been denied relief in US courts (Davis, 2002, p. 148; Colker, 2005).  
Judges in such cases have adopted a narrow and conservative reading of constitutional 
stipulations, in reaching judgments overwhelmingly unfavourable to disabled plaintiffs 
(Hahn, 2001, p. 62).  This unfolding pattern, Hahn argues, is founded upon nondisabled 
lawyers and judges approaching disabled civil rights issues from within a "functional 
limitations" rather than a "minority group" paradigm, and hence abrogating "their historic role 
of defending disadvantaged minorities and seeking to fulfil the promise of equality" (Hahn, 
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2001, p. 62).  Harlan Hahn, along with a substantial proportion of scholars within the 
disability studies discipline, now has ruefully forsaken much of the hope that significant 
progress towards disability equity can be achieved through the splintered – and so far fruitless 
– tactic of litigation (ibid., p.  64).  With Bickenbach and colleagues (Bickenbach, Chatterji, 
Badley & Ustun, 1999, p. 1180), he now concludes that disabled people "cannot expect 
emancipation by appealing to one of the many social institutions that oppress them".    
 
An episode which was to become a watershed moment in the early galvanising of the global 
disability rights movement took shape at a world conference of Rehabilitation International 
(RI) in Winnipeg, Canada, in 1980.  A dispute regarding the full participation of disabled 
people in policy decisions being debated at the conference led to the 250 disabled delegates 
deciding to boycott proceedings (Flood, 2005; Barnes & Mercer, 2005a).  These delegates 
facilitated collaboration between sectors of the disabled population from many countries to 
create a new organisation, Disabled People's International (DPI), composed of and steered by 
disabled persons (Barnes & Mercer, 2005a, p. 8).  The first international congress of DPI was 
held in Singapore in 1981, and incorporated a vehement message to the world that it was 
henceforth unacceptable for discussions to be held regarding the issues of disabled persons 
without their thorough and equitable participation (Flood, 2005, p. 184).  A sober analysis of 
the status of the disabled population across the world reveals, however, that this principle 
remains one which is commonly flouted (Hurst, 2005, p. 77; Hahn, 2002).    
 
In terms of sheer numbers, the disabled community's lobby for the creation of societies which 
are barrier-free, and which outlaw prejudice, is clearly destined to swell considerably over the 
coming decades.  The world's population is ageing, due to shifts in patterns of reproduction, 
and advances in medical technology and access to safer resources which increase longevity.  
A striking incongruity within the construction of disability in contemporary society as "other" 
is the fact of age-related impairment somehow "escaping" the devalued disabled identity.  
According to Pope and Tarlov (1991), the average individual who achieves the age of 75 will 
experience some form of limitation due to impairment for 13 of those years (Pope & Tarlov, 
1991 cited in Marks, 1999a, p. 136).  And yet somehow, it seems, the fact of ageing being our 
universal human fate has led to the cultural fashioning of an artificial gulf between the "real" 
disabled, and the (honorary) "normals" who are merely "old".  The issue of culturally 
condensed meanings buttressing the disabled identity will be examined in more detail later 
(see Culture and prejudice, p.147).  For our present purposes, though, the WHO predicts that 
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by 2020 the planet will house more than 690 million people over the age of 65, in comparison 
with the estimated 380 million of 2002 (Davis, 2002, p. 4).  Of course, this massive inflation 
in the elderly population will radically change epidemiological patterns and health care needs 
(ibid.).  Of key interest is the extent to which the reality of world ageing impacts upon 
governments as well as citizens, in mobilising change toward societies which are more 
accessible to persons with impairments.  The ageing of the planet's population may, if used 
strategically, be instrumental in repositioning disability experience as a universal variable, 
rather than an alienated, binary "other".    
In this opening chapter, I have sought to sketch the centrality of the body in cultural 
ascription, as well as to outline some prominent elements of the development challenges 
which the world faces regarding its disabled population.  We turn in Chapter Two to a 
consideration of ways of thinking about disability, along with the respective consequences 
and implications which each approach ushers in.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
Disability theory I:  The body, ideology and society  
 
For centuries, people with disabilities have been ... isolated, incarcerated, 
observed, written about, operated on, instructed, implanted, regulated, treated, 
institutionalised and controlled to a degree probably unequal to that experienced 
by any other minority group.   
       (Davis, 1997a, p. 1)  
 
Introduction  
The stark reality reflected in the quotation above – of the omnipresent nature of the 
oppression and repression of disabled people – is surprising when juxtaposed with the 
observation that, to much or most of the world's populace, the mere association of the notion 
of disability with oppression would seem surprising, even incongruous.  Whilst we are well 
accustomed to the idea that race – and more latterly gender – are axes of discrimination and 
unjust disadvantage, the association of the words "disabled" and "oppressed" remains, in 
common sense accounts, a yet un-established one (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2006, p. 1).  
Instead, disability remains understood as personal misfortune, with social consequences 
which, while regretted by all, are considered "natural" and largely immutable.  The slippery, 
invisible nature of social oppression based on disablement in contemporary culture is 
highlighted by Olkin (1999).  For the sake of argument, she asks us to call to mind the 
restaurants we have visited which are not accessible to wheelchair users.  Of course, if one 
frequents restaurants, these are plentiful.  We freely patronise these establishments, which bar 
access to mobility impaired people; yet, how would we feel about patronising restaurants 
which did not serve Jewish or black people?  Of course, to most thoughtful people, this would 
feel deeply "unpalatable".  Yet, we inhabit and calmly support the perpetuation of societies 
which are drenched with discrimination, in terms of practices, assumptions, built 
environments, prejudices and innumerable careless, yet unqualified, exclusions.   
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Until relatively recently, the seeming unawareness and muteness within society surrounding 
this reality was largely mirrored within academic discourse.  Indeed, Abberley (1998, p. 80) 
remarks that "the most common response of modern social theory to the disabled person's 
inquiry 'what about me?' is silence" (my emphasis).  We shall, over the course of this chapter, 
meander through many of the important theoretical contributions that have expressly aimed to 
tackle the disability phenomenon, but it should be noted that these accounts exist against a 
backdrop of social disciplines within which disablist oppression has been largely ignored.  For 
example, the feminist movement, whilst formulating an ever more incisive critique of the 
cultural origins of unequal gender relations, has largely failed to relate such critique to the 
predicaments of disabled women (Thomson, 1997b, p. 19; 1997a; McLaughlin, 2003; 
Thomas, 1999a).  This is made that much more remarkable by the fact that, for feminists, it is 
the body which has been regarded as the major arena for political contestation (Wendell, 
1997, p. 260; Meekosha, 1998).  Nondisabled feminist scholars at the epicentre of critical 
theorising have perpetuated a neglect of the oppression of disabled women, constructing them 
as "childlike, helpless and victimised" while symbolically – and at times manifestly – 
ostracising them from feminist ranks, in order to promote "more powerful, competent and 
appealing female icons" (Thomas, 1999a, p. 66).   
 
The explanations we carry for the underprivileged situations of social groups (such as racial 
or ethnic), I suggest, are informative as to our internalised prejudices regarding members of 
those groups.  The lack of critical engagement with the social marginality of disabled persons 
has meant that culturally condensed assumptions regarding the origins of that marginality 
have, like racial stereotypes, largely remained manifest in an invisible hegemony.  In other 
words, our socialised understandings of what disability is and does remain, for the most part, 
uninterrogated, inadvertent, and hence largely invisible.  "Socialisation" here denotes 
meanings and prejudices regarding disabled persons which, in their unquestioned state, 
masquerade quite convincingly as common sense – that is, as essential, self-evident and 
unremarkable truths.  Typically, these common-sense accounts reflect an "individual model", 
which portrays the social marginality of disabled people as "unfortunate", but ideologically 
neutral.   
 
Priestley (1998, p. 75) provides a matrix of ways of thinking about disability which 
incorporates two key dichotomies, viz. individual versus social accounts, and materialist 
versus idealist positions.  Examples of theories of disability (both formal and colloquial) 
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which apply an individual unit of analysis are approaches which are concerned with biological 
and medical aspects, or with identity and the management of social roles at an individual level 
(ibid.).  Individual accounts may be materialist or idealist in their emphasis – in other words, 
prioritising either the physical or psychological concomitants of bodily impairment.  
Examination of more socially oriented models shows analogously that some are preoccupied 
with material and structural aspects of society, while others foreground cultural 
representations of disability (Priestley, 1998, p. 75).  The paradigmatic roots of these 
orientations reflect an enduring debate within sociology, between materialist (often Marxist) 
analyses, emphasising the influence of the economy upon culture, and idealistic standpoints, 
rooted in the work of Max Weber, which argue the converse (ibid., p. 76).  What is 
noteworthy for our purposes is that Priestley's (1998) taxonomy allows, at best, an awkward 
space for accounts of disability which attempt to relate social phenomena with psychological 
aspects.  That is, it seems that analyses which focus on the psychological realm are, in his 
view, necessarily "individualistic".   
 
What the foregoing means is that no theoretical "bridge" has thus far been created which 
attempts to connect ideology – the societal realm of beliefs and practices – with the 
subjectivity of the individual.  Hitherto, accounts of the psychological aspects of disability 
have tended to lack a critical ideological "situatedness".  It is possible, in fact, that Priestley 
and others believe that an account of disability which focuses on individual psychological 
phenomena could not, by its nature, satisfy the requirements necessary for qualification as a 
critical, contextual – and hence politically useful – theory.  The current work calls this 
assumption into question, through aiming to develop bi-directional conceptual links between 
culture and individual subjectivity, via the mechanisms of lifelong socialisation.  Put simply, 
the question posed here pertains to whether it is possible to think about the psychological 
experience of disability, whilst retaining a rigorous analysis of the political context of 
disablist discrimination.  Typically, and as demonstrated by Priestley's taxonomy, these 
strains of theorising have, in the past, tended to be mutually exclusive.   
 
Before beginning to build the parameters of a position which attempts such a synthesis, we 
turn in the following sections to an examination of the two broad and opposing views of what 
disability is about; that is, the so-called "medical" and "social" models of disability.   
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The "medical model" 
The development of modern Western medicine has, over the course of the past one hundred or 
so years, heralded the predomination of a philosophy of health and illness which is centrally 
preoccupied with the "scientific" investigation and treatment of the body. Within this 
dominant biomedical model of health care practice, the prevailing epistemological hierarchy 
dictates that biology is prized above all else as an explanatory paradigm (Feinstein cited in 
Good & Delvecchio-Good, 1980, p. 165; Kleinman, 1987, p. 450).  What this means is that 
the predominant, indeed overwhelming, focus of modern medicine over the course of the last 
century has been the identification and (attempted) "correcting" of structural or functional 
difference or defect within the body.  In the words of critics such as Engel (1977, p. 130), 
though, this orientation "leaves no room within its framework for the social, psychological 
and behavioural dimensions of illness".  A growing current of this form of criticism has 
emerged, notably from writers in the discipline of medical anthropology, who, like Engel, 
view the stance as ideologically problematic and impoverished due to its failure to take 
account of the socio-political environments within which illnesses are experienced (Kleinman, 
1986; 1987: Swartz, 1999).     
 
Within academic writings more specifically concerned with disability, what has come to be 
termed the "medical model of disability" – rooted broadly in biomedicine – has endured a 
barrage of critique for its failure to interrogate the context of societal responses to impaired 
bodies which serve to systematically exclude and disadvantage individuals socially positioned 
as "disabled" (e.g. Abberley, 1996; Barnes, 1990; Barnes & Mercer, 2005b; Barnes, Oliver & 
Barton, 2002a; 2002b; Lunt, 1994; Marks, 1999a; Oliver, 1986; 1990; Thomas, 1999a).  
Whilst these authors would argue that biomedicine at large responds inadequately to the 
unique, socially situated aspects of all illness, it is the disabled population who are placed in 
particularly nebulous predicaments by virtue of its principles.   
 
Disability, as was seen in the previous section, connects bodily difference with pervasive and 
often severe social marginality.  Paul Abberley encapsulates the point elegantly: the so-called 
"medical model", he writes, "functions to link together the experiences of an individual in a 
logic which attributes disadvantage to nature" (Abberley, 1996, p. 62).  In other words, the 
deeply institutionally entrenched prioritisation of "biological realities" within biomedicine 
serve to focus attention on body difference as a mode of attribution for social marginality, 
 27
whilst circumventing a consideration of oppressive socio-political factors.  In this way, the 
social disadvantage experienced by disabled persons becomes viewed, perhaps by a sort of 
default, as the inevitable outcome of intra-individual, impairment related factors (Thomas, 
2002a, p. 40).  A potential consequence is the papering over of the layers of unnecessary and 
systematic disadvantage inflicted upon disabled persons by societies unready and unwilling to 
implement appropriate accommodations.  Of course, it is unsurprising that professionals 
trained in the biological functioning of the body, rather than in social critique, are drawn to 
prioritising somatic factors in making sense of disability.  Medical practitioners tend toward a 
preoccupation with the body, with "dialectically exploring the relationship between symptom 
and somatic disorder" (Good & Delvecchio-Good, 1980, p. 165), rather than with the 
interrogation of societal formations.  Brisenden (1986) comments that, as long as disability 
experience remains examined within institutionally embedded concerns surrounding its 
medical implications, it will tend to remain largely viewed as an issue of physical or 
intellectual dysfunction, with all other aspects receding in salience (Brisenden, 1986 cited in 
Johnson, 1993, p. 620).   
 
Through portraying the (marginal) lives of disabled persons as a function of bodily difference, 
a form of subtle depoliticisation of struggle becomes propagated.  Construing disadvantage as 
the consequence of defective bodies obviates a critique of social institutions and cultural 
formations which underpin the contravention of the citizenship rights of disabled people.  
Instead, deprivation rooted in the maldistribution of resources becomes viewed, even by the 
disadvantaged, as the result of individual deficiency (Abberley, 1987, p. 17; French & Swain, 
2001, p. 736).  Tacitly, and often by omission, the denial of access to full participation by 
disabled persons in the business of cultural production is affirmed and justified, absolving the 
social order from accountability for its careless brutality.  The "damaged" body is excised 
from its context of power relations and capital exchange, thus exculpating the political order 
from responsibility for "social suffering" (Kleinman, Das & Lock, 1997).  Similarly, 
"curative" medical intervention which "problematises" bodies tends to deflect attention away 
from those aspects of societal life which cause illness and impairment, thus precluding the 
indictment of modes of production and exchange which may be harmful or damaging to 
individuals (Abberley, 1987, p. 10; Csordas, 1988, p. 416; Oliver, 1986, p. 16).  Further, 
Marks (1999a) points to what she terms the "curative zeal" of much Western medical practice.  
Here, medicine's bodily preoccupation with "repair" leads to the proliferation of a culture of 
"normalisation", in which the imperative to correct places those with "irredeemable" bodily 
differences in a questionable moral light (Marks, 1999a, p. 75, Hughes, 2002a).  The 
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disciplinary regulation of bodies exercised upon all by modern health care (Foucault, 1976), 
therefore, is brought to bear more acutely in the lives of disabled persons (Marks, 1999a, p. 
75; Brisendon, 1998).   
 
Telling evidence of the moral imperative to "healthy normalcy" is to be found in public health 
campaign messaging, which regularly depicts disabled persons as the negative consequence of 
"unhealthy" actions or lifestyles (Lollar, 2001, p. 754).  Importantly, the clinical encounter 
between health practitioners and disabled patients has historically been one of asymmetric 
relations of power, where the professional voice of medical authority has often been deferred 
to.  French (1994a) characterises this "traditional" encounter as one in which health workers 
have "defined, planned and delivered" health services, while disabled persons remain "passive 
recipients with little if any opportunity to exercise control" (French, 1994a, p. 103).   
 
The attribution of this highly criticised "medicalising" mode of practice to health care 
professionals has, understandably, come to be experienced as a stereotyping affront, which 
tends to paint all health care workers as equally blameworthy.  Clearly, it is reasonable to 
assert that the disabled community has historically had good cause for vigorously 
problematising modern medicine's inattention to factors such as discrimination and systematic 
exclusion in shaping their lives in society.  Yet, this reality has at times led to a destructive, 
simplistic and over-zealous vilification of medical professionals en masse.  The term "medical 
model" seems, logically, to be one intended to apply to "medicine" in its entirety, and for this 
reason it has come to be experienced as a slur (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 18).  Furthermore, since 
the term was coined largely to describe a critique, it is – unsurprisingly – not possible to find 
anyone who chooses publicly to espouse the "medical model" view (ibid.).  Oliver (1996) 
concurs, preferring the broader category of "individual" models of disability, of which 
medicalisation forms one significant element (Oliver, 1996 cited in Priestley, 1998, p. 75).   
 
My own view is that the term is most usefully thought of in the medical encounter as denoting 
a particular clinical stance which, to a greater or lesser extent, may permeate health care 
practice.  Thus, it is not "medicine" per se, but rather a mode of "performing" medicine.  The 
essence of this mode of practice embodies operating within an uninterrogated myriad of signs, 
overt communications and embedded assumptions – an entire "curriculum" of meanings – 
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which surround the idea of bodily impairment as central signifier and causal variable in 
shaping social destiny.  That is, a symbolic and manifest foregrounding of bodily difference 
occurs, typically flanked by meanings such as loss, damage, defectiveness, dependency, and 
the mandatory, moral striving for normalcy – for "cure".  However, the idea of the primacy of 
the body as prescriptor of role and status within society is not exclusively that of health 
professionals.   
 
The assumption that it is bodies that shape the social lives of disabled persons is one typically 
deeply internalised by practitioner and patient alike, by virtue of shared cultural socialisation.  
In this sense, the idea of a "medical model of disability" has relevance as a colloquial, 
common-sense view of what disablement means, in addition to its usage as an idea pertaining 
particularly to medicine.  All who have grown up in a racialised society have inevitably 
internalised differential conditioned responses to individuals of different racial groups, 
depending on the subtle or overt meanings and associations surrounding experiences of racial 
difference – perhaps particularly during the early years of life.  Analogously, what the critique 
of the "medical model" usefully points towards is that store of meanings and attributions 
which we have, similarly, accumulated regarding bodily difference and disability, via cultural 
representations of loss and damage, the internalised meanings of segregation, and the like.  
These assumptions may seem invisible, as they remain well cloaked as "common sense".  Yet, 
honest self-exploration may reveal powerful, culturally condensed assumptions regarding 
what impairment "does"; and why it is that disabled people deserve our empathy for their 
"suffering".  Primarily, this socialised view surrounds the idea that disabled people suffer 
shame, incapacitation, deprivation and helplessness emanating from the fallibility and 
brokenness of the body; not from discrimination, social oppression and systematic exclusion.  
Disabled people, hence, need "cure" – and care – not political representation or social reform 
toward equitable access.  The "problem' of disability is one of damaged bodies, not damaging 
societies.  In this sense, we may broaden the view of the "medical model", to incorporate our 
shared legacy of embedded, inadvertently prejudiced and misleading assumptions about what 
disability means.  The model, in this view, is not "medical" because of its association with 
health care, but rather due to its broad, culturally based "medicalising" logic.  It is this logic 
which one would be most likely to apprehend amongst average citizens on an urban street 
corner – a logic which associates "disability" with medical "problems", to the exception and 
detriment of any consideration of oppressive social "ills".    
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Thus, the picture which emerges is one of a raft of culturally condensed assumptions 
regarding what is definitive within the lives of disabled persons.  Pervasive associations of 
loss, compassion, shame and misfortune ensure that it is intractable "medical" issues which 
remain perceived as central to disabled lives.  Medical practitioners are typically located 
within long-established health care systems and installations which, by their nature and 
design, tend to direct attention toward the biological, and provide minimal or awkward spaces 
for consideration of socio-political aspects of disabled lives.  These issues will be expanded 
upon in a later section (see Medicalisation as a defence, p.107).  We turn, now, to an 
examination of the disability movement's attempt at presenting a viable, emancipatory 
alternative to the medicalising view of disability.   
 
The "social model" 
Proponents of the so-called "social model of disability" emerged in Great Britain during the 
1970s, as disabled persons bearing an overtly adversarial and challenging response to the 
dominance of biomedical accounts of disability.  Their vehemently held, revolutionary 
position was founded upon the conviction that it is the selective inattention of social systems 
to the participation-needs of individuals which is at the root of the marginality and deprivation 
experienced by disabled people (Abberley, 1987; 1996; Barnes, 1990; Oliver, 1986; 1990; 
Swain et al., 1993).  The exclusion of disabled persons from full participation in all aspects of 
social life, according to this radical position, is an entirely avoidable artifact of oppressive 
ideology, rather than part of the inevitable "sequelae" of bodily difference or dysfunction (as 
held by the traditional medical view).   
 
In embarking upon a searing critique of prevailing modes of thinking about disability, which 
directed attention instead toward a critical interrogation of society, these authors began by 
drawing a key conceptual distinction between the notions of "disability" and "impairment".  
Within the new schema, "impairment" was defined as a narrow, medical account of difference 
or dysfunction of the body or its systems.  Separating off this "diagnostic", somatic layer 
paved the way for a new, inherently subversive account of what composes disability, which 
was designed to bring the ideological mediation of disabled lives firmly into relief.  Whilst 
social model definitions of the "narrow" and theoretically specific concept of disability have 
varied, this variation has been slight, and merely the result of ideas and wording being fine-
tuned over time.  This example of such a definition is typical, and instructive:  
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Disability:  The loss or limitation of opportunities that prevents people who have 
impairments from taking part in the normal life of the community on an equal 
level with others due to physical and social barriers.      
  
     (Finkelstein & French, 1993, p. 27) 
 
In separating out these concepts, the architects of the social model inverted the prevailing 
logic on disability.  Instead of the bodies of disabled persons being placed under the 
microscope, the new subject of interrogation became society itself – the complex, layered 
world of "barriers", be they cultural, physical, legal, institutional, or whatever, which obstruct 
impaired individuals from full and equitable participation.  So, in the minds of the social 
modelists, would begin a long and intricate process of unpacking society's multifarious, 
distorted, and disadvantageous responses to persons with impairments.  From the 
stubbornness of prejudiced myths, to the sweeping narrative of socially engineered 
segregation; from rehabilitation, normalisation and control, to the demeaning exploitation of 
the freak show; from educational and occupational exclusion, to the alienation engendered by 
a physical environment racked with unnecessary barriers; such aspects as these are the subject 
matter of the model's cross-examination.  The social model, in contrast to the scientific 
"crispness" of medical attributions for the marginality of disabled persons, directs complex, 
testing questions at the social order, seeking out multifaceted and layered answers embedded 
within the very fabric of society's organisation.  A notion of disability with the concept of 
social oppression at its epicentre had begun to move into view (Abberley, 1987, p. 5).  To "be 
disabled", within this theoretical position, was to be identified as subject to a "complex 
system of social restrictions" inflicted upon persons with impairments by "a highly 
discriminatory society" (Abberley, 1996, p. 61).   
 
Advocates of the new social approach vociferously demanded that attention be drawn toward 
how so-called "normal" human modes of living are structured and constrained by an 
inherently discriminatory societal context; one which is designed and constructed with 
exclusive consideration of the needs of non-impaired persons (Abberley, 1996, p. 61).  
Correspondingly, the ostracisation and systematic deprivations experienced by disabled 
persons within contemporary society remain justified and entrenched by medically and 
culturally sanctioned – yet illusory – notions of normalcy and aberrance (Braddock & Parish, 
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2001, p. 13).  In launching a fierce attack on the role of biomedicine in the perpetuation of 
"individualising" accounts of disability, social model theorists branded the medical approach 
a "personal tragedy theory" (Oliver, 1986, p. 16).  What was meant here was that modern 
medicine's somatic preoccupation created a meaning system surrounding disability which 
reduced what were, in fact, complex and atrocious societal ills, to chance personal 
experiences of misfortune.  Furthermore, medicine's subtly depoliticising sleight of hand 
created the illusion of immutability around disability struggle, in a manner which obviated 
societal accountability for human rights violations which were – in the social model schema – 
entirely avoidable (Barnes et al., 2002a, p. 5).  Oliver (1986, p. 16) locates this "personal 
tragedy theory" of disability as one "victim-blaming" model amongst many others, all serving 
the purpose of obscuring the political and economic structures which underpin social 
oppression.  Examples of such "deceptive" accounts of social phenomena include the use of 
deficit theory to explain poor scholastic  performance, character weakness as a cause for 
poverty, or sickness as an explanation for criminal behaviour – in each case, individuals are 
condemned as deficient, to the detriment of social critique (Ryan, 1971 cited in Oliver, 1986, 
p. 16).  The onus for dealing with "deficit" is, via such understandings, placed on the 
individual.  Thus it is that, notwithstanding what Imrie (1998, p. 129) describes as the "design 
apartheid" of Western cities, mobility impaired persons are required to "confront" and "deal 
with" built environments riddled with impossible obstructions (Imrie, 1996).   
 
As will be explored later, the social model was not without its conceptual shortcomings.  
Nevertheless, its radical re-focusing of attention upon modes of exclusion served, and 
continues to serve, an extremely valuable purpose in facilitating personal recognition amongst 
disabled people of the everyday contravention of citizenship rights (Thomas, 1999a, p. 26). It 
is the hegemonic nature of such aspects of one's life-world that may cause even quite palpably 
oppressive contradictions to remain, until consciously questioned, cloaked in a disguise of 
familiarity.  The social model provided a device capable of transforming a domesticating and 
unjust self-blame into rightful outrage at one's unnecessary exclusion; the social model 
message was a clarion call to political action.   
 
The advent of the social model repositioned disability as a temporally and contextually 
specific phenomenon; not a "natural" or "essential" aspect of being (Marks, 1999a, p. 76).  
Thus ran the logic: if disability is a social accomplishment – an artifact of the arbitrary neglect 
of the needs of impaired persons – then an optimally accessible society is feasible, within 
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which impairment may be present without disability.  It is at this theoretical juncture that the 
original, roundly materialist version of the social model approach – described by Priestley 
(1998, p. 80) as a "social creationist" view – begins to intersect with a more social 
constructionist interpretation of the model.  Within the social constructionist philosophical 
position (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1985), reality is viewed as intersubjectively 
socially constructed (Lunt & Thornton, 1994, p. 226), situating "disability" as an illusory 
cultural artifact.  The distinction between these deeply interwoven orientations is one of 
emphasis, with the Marxian historical materialist genealogy of the original social model 
position being primarily concerned with economic relations of production and exchange, 
rather than cultural representations.    
 
A more constructionist orientation may, inter alia, focus on the buttressing of social identity 
via processes of "othering", which compose identity as pairs of binary oppositions, offering 
the opportunity for the affirming of one's favourable status in opposition to a denigrated 
"other" (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  Oliver (1990) notes that "there can be no such thing as 
madness without the idea of 'unmadness'", or "reason without unreason" – it is in the moment 
of positioning oneself as the favourable, unblemished "opposite" that pathology and deviance 
become exclusively located within a devalued "other" (Oliver, 1990, p. 47; Foucault, 1995).   
Thus it is, continues Oliver (1990), that the notion of disability as an individual pathology 
only becomes feasible upon formulation – and reification – of an idea of "individual able-
bodiedness" (Oliver, 1990, p. 47).  Here we find that, despite the staunchly materialist 
leanings of the early social model theorists, the psychological realm must begin to be brought 
into view, as we consider individual, psychic needs for the disavowal of unwanted or feared 
aspects of the self.  Cixous and Clement (1975; 1986) regard the need for the reaffirmation of 
one's positive identity distinctiveness via the denigration of its (constructed) social 
counterpoint as so intrinsic to psychic functioning that "if there were no other, one would 
invent it" (Cixous & Clement, 1975; 1986 cited in Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996, p. 8 – my 
emphasis).  It is a central aim of the current investigation to begin the work of creating a 
synthesis between social and intra-psychic levels of analysis of the disability phenomenon.  
The lack of conceptual space for an integration of psychological aspects within the social 
model approach has, in my view, foreshortened the model's relevance and impact, through 
affording only a partial capacity for the reflection, and hence validation, of disabled life.    
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Finkelstein (1980) argues that the bureaucratic delineation of citizens into the binary 
categories of disabled and nondisabled, with profound consequences for participation in all 
aspects of social life, was catalysed by the labour demands of early industrialisation in 
Europe.  New and ever more highly differentiated patterns of division of labour arising during 
the industrial revolution led to imperatives to measure, categorise and separate out those with 
different or compromised capacities to participate in production.  Over time, these roots of 
division solidified into increasingly structural segregation, the rise of institutionalisation, and 
the entrenchment of a myriad of constitutional elements which situated disablement as an axis 
of discrimination (Barnes, 1990, p. 10; Finkelstein, 1980).  The nature of the social 
predicaments of disabled persons during mediaeval, pre-industrial times is an issue of some 
dispute.  Historiographical accounts of the premodern disabled world range from an idealised 
view of an integrated, diverse society, uncontaminated by the distortions of capitalist markets 
and production (e.g. Finkelstein, 1980), to reconstructions which portray disabled lives as 
characterised by unmitigated hardship, ostracisation, deprivation, and death (Winzer, 1997; 
see also Borsay, 2002).   
 
Henri-Jacques Stiker (1982), within the Foucaultian discourse analytic tradition, adds a 
further contextualising layer by associating the horrors of "the war to end all wars" with the 
rise of modern biomedical rehabilitation, and the drive to "normalise" disabled bodies (White, 
1995, p. 267; Stiker, 1982).  The catastrophic devastation during World War I of the material 
and cultural stuff of which society was composed was mirrored, macabrely, by the multitudes 
of distorted and damaged bodies to be re-incorporated into an ailing social world.  A fervent 
need, in Stiker's terms, for belief in quasi-magical repair found form in prostheses, and 
quickly generalised to a dominant notion of people – and society at large – as "machines" 
amenable to reconstruction and restitution (ibid.).  Such projects of reconstruction, however, 
inevitably became directed toward an illusory, idealised fantasy of what came before the 
apocalypse – a perfect, harmonious society, populated by pristinely shaped and functional 
bodies.  Biomedical normalisation, and the submission of the "docile body" (Foucault, 1979) 
to the "rehabilitating" gaze of medicine, was born.  Stiker carefully distinguishes between the 
notion of "cure", which he defines narrowly in relation to health, and the profoundly 
ideological actions of normalisation and re-integration, which exert forces of uniformity and 
control at the social level (Stiker, 1982, p. 141).  Correspondingly, proponents of the social 
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l model, whilst virulently critical of medicine's "normalising" imperatives, reiterate that their 
view does not preclude the appropriate implementation of health care interventions where 
needed (Oliver, 2004 cited in Momin, 2005, p. 65).  On the contrary, states Oliver and others, 
the denial of such services should be viewed as a contravention of citizenship rights (ibid.).   
 
Varying historical factors within the United States of America and the United Kingdom led, 
during the course of the second half of the twentieth century, to contrasting disability rights 
movements.  In the USA, the diversity of the population, and the rise of the civil rights 
movement during the 1960s, contributed to a disability lobby whose strategic emphasis lay in 
litigation, and the promise of anti-discrimination legislation (Hahn, 2001, p. 59).  The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was the culmination – albeit a deeply disappointing 
one to most – of this approach.  Many view this tactical manoeuvre, known as the "minority 
model" view (Hahn, 2001, p. 62; Olkin, 1999), as one which fragmented the disability issue 
into the legal ramifications of the cases of individual litigants, diffusing the potential impact 
of a mass challenge to the status quo.  Conversely, the roots of the British movement, based as 
these are within a tradition of Marxian class politics, fostered a brand of disability struggle 
which foregrounded the economic hardships of disabled persons, in a manner which situated 
such struggle within differential access to the means of production (Hahn, 2001, p. 59).  The 
original social model aimed, thus, to forge an attack on social disadvantage based in group 
solidarity, and a rigorous – at times orthodox – adherence to theoretical "policies" on the 
"real" nature and origins of disability.  Both viewpoints, though, have faced massive obstacles 
to liberation and progress (Hahn, 2001, p. 59).  Not least of the social forces retarding the 
propagation of a fresh, emancipatory view, is the fact of disability in the developed world as a 
multi-billion dollar industry, incorporating an elaborate web of professional, organisational 
and cultural concerns (Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 586).   
 
One strand of the orthodoxy attributed to social model theorists pertains to the (at times) 
acrimonious controversies concerning terminology.  One significant quarrel amongst many 
others is that between advocates of so-called "people first" language (preferred within the US 
"minority model" tradition), and UK-based social model theorists who volubly denounce this 
usage (Albrecht, Seelman & Bury, 2001, p. 3; Stone, 1999).  "People first" language is of the 
form of "persons with disabilities" rather than "disabled people"; it is intended to recreate the 
idea of disability as one human characteristic amongst others, not something inherent and all-
encompassing.  In addition, the usage interfaces with an American capitalist emphasis on the 
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importance of the individual within society, and concurrently with the US disability 
movement's opting for a litigation-based counter-oppression strategy (ibid.).  Social model 
authors favour the term "disabled people", here connoting the anti-medicalising idea of 
"people who have been disabled by society".  These writers testily assert that "people first" 
language naively accommodates the prevailing cultural impression of disability as a defective 
aspect of the individual, rather than an exogenous social force.   
 
The project of re-authoring the disability concept as a shared, group-based characteristic of 
oppression, in opposition to the splintering, diversifying medical view, involved the adoption 
of a certain "strategic essentialism" (Thomson, 1997a, p. 283); the (initially) self-conscious 
illusion of homogeneity amongst members of the disability movement.  Hence, the need to 
underscore a common predicament led to the papering over of a mosaic of diverse experience, 
of both societal and bodily origin.  The reluctance of social model adherents to engage with 
the confounding multiplicity of impairment within their ranks was later to form the thrust of a 
key critique of their standpoint.  Interestingly, this criticism of social modelist zeal – of which 
there will be more detailed discussion later – brings the wisdom of an early disability studies 
pioneer, Irving Zola, into clearer relief.  Zola, ever cautious regarding the distorting influence 
of political expediency, proposed a model of disability as a continuum, rather than a 
categorical absolute (Altman, 2001, p. 100; Williams, 1998; 2001; Zola, 1988).   
 
Within all social movements bent on uncovering and delineating suffering, as well as 
directing accountability at those elements within society held to be responsible for such 
troubles, disputes over "politically correct" terminology seem ever-present.  Sinason (1992) 
argues that the constant flux and change in what nomenclature is "permissible" relates to the 
intolerable nature of those unconscious evocations (within the observer) with which such 
provocative ideas as disability are associated (Sinason, 1992, p. 42).  For her, the clamour of 
shifting positions regarding the acceptability of terms for sexual orientation, mental illness, 
race, disability, and the like, reflects an obsessive, insatiable hunger for euphemisms able to 
momentarily thwart the reality of human difference (ibid.).  The wish to deny such difference, 
always only temporarily gratified, recreates the need for new ideals, and new villains – the 
world of learning disability (or, mental handicap / intellectual impairment / mental 
retardation) is an instructive case in point.  The lack of flexibility and nuance which 
characterises the social model will, along with a range of related criticisms, be considered in 
the following three sections.   
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Criticising the social model 
It was perhaps inevitable that the social model's historical materialist philosophical 
foundations would, in the effort to galvanise political action, fall short in the task of 
accurately mirroring a complete portrait of the experience of disabled personhood.  The 
motivation behind the social model was, first and foremost, one of catalysing resistance and 
revolution; clearly an approach which does not lend itself to nuanced, finely toned 
representations of social reality.  It is, of course, in the nature of revolutionary movements 
that the outrage of oppressed peoples be harnessed via the over-simplified – even crude – 
drawing of binary distinctions between villains and victims, in a manner which tends to reify 
and homogenise both groups.  At a psychic level, the defensive distortions of "splitting" (in 
the Kleinian object relations tradition of psychoanalysis), seem elemental here, drawing all, to 
a greater or lesser extent, into the reverberating snares of simplified divisions between self 
and other (Klein, 1946).   
 
Critics of the early social model pointed to a host of questionable assumptions made by its 
authors.  In order to argue for a consistent, oppressed predicament afflicting all disabled 
persons, it was essential that the rubric "disabled people" be defined in such a manner as to 
foreground commonality – a commonality rooted in the shared experience of oppression 
(Oliver, 1990).  However, this forced alignment of experience was to evoke a steady stream of 
objection, notably from feminist disability scholars (e.g. Morris, 1989; Thomas, 1999a; 
Wendell, 1996).  At issue was the differential (though inconsistent) impact of a range of 
superimposed social identities upon the nature and degree of marginalisation experienced by 
disabled people (Marks, 1999a, p. 87).   
 
In a manner analogous to the narrowly white, middle class and Western assumptions which 
(problematically) shaped early feminism, social model theorists were accused of reducing the 
experiences of a richly diverse disabled population to the common denominators of their own 
lives; that is, the experience of middle class, male, white, Western wheelchair users (ibid.).  A 
model of disablist oppression forged exclusively within this sub-community, would not be 
well placed to illuminate the struggles of disabled members of ethnic or sexual minorities 
(Begum, Hill & Stevens, 1994; Shakespeare, Gillespie-Sells & Davies, 1996), or, indeed, of 
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disabled persons with vastly different impairments (notably of a sensory, psychiatric or 
intellectual nature; Crow, 1992; French, 1993a; Morris, 1991).  Instead of some amalgam of 
oppression and impairment, the social model's exclusive focus was vigorously directed at 
material "barriers" to inclusion, and, at that, the "barriers" experienced by a specific subset of 
impaired persons.  The need for an adversarial counterpoint to medicine's individualising 
account of disability had wrought a theoretical picture with a limited ability to tolerate the 
uniqueness of individual experience.  Such evidence of diversity would come to be regarded 
as a contaminant to the forceful purity, the clarity, of a credible and unified movement.  
Exploring the unique aspects of disabled experience might, in the minds of the social 
modelists, leave the movement vulnerable to a regressive confirmation of the "individual" 
nature – and origins – of the marginality of disabled persons.  If entertained, such depictions 
of disability would quickly be misappropriated in buttressing precisely those medicalising 
views which the social model aimed to dismantle.  As we shall explore, the "personal" was to 
be prohibited.   
 
Recognition of the partial, strategic image of disability which the social model prism allows, 
has led some authors to allege (or concede) that the model should never have been regarded as 
a "theory" in the first place, but more as a political device.  Carol Thomas (1999a) considers 
the model an essential conceptual point of departure, but one which "poses rather than 
answers important theoretical questions about disability" (Thomas, 1999a, p. 26).  At the very 
heart of the social model is the "disability" versus "impairment" binary – relying upon the 
proposition that culture has no corporeal substrate, and that a pristine, presocial body exists 
before and beyond social construction.  It must be reiterated at this point that, notwithstanding 
its imprecision, this schema has contributed immensely to the liberation of minds, through its 
interrogation and exposing of disadvantage.   The social model defied the hegemony of 
acquired wisdom, and ripped into a store of suffering and atrocity which was hitherto directed 
at the self, or branded as deviance.  Without the model, this sea change would not have 
occurred.  Now, though, it seems that the resultant psychosocial debris which has been 
exposed is too complex, too tangled between society and soma, to be adequately dealt with in 
rude dichotomies.  Shakespeare (2006), in a blistering assault on the British social model 
"establishment", describes the model's key insight as "important and unarguable", but latterly 
having evolved into a rigidly held, ossified, and crudely misleading ideological orthodoxy 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 01).  The essence of this "dogma" lies in the declaration that disability 
is "everything to do with social barriers, and nothing to do with individual impairment" (ibid. 
– my emphasis).  In contrast, however, a number of disabled authors relate how unclear the 
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origins of their struggle appear – decidedly not entirely impairment-based, but also not 
entirely socially produced (e.g. French, 1993a).  Despite this, it must be recognised that many 
of these writers would profess that their personal journey toward an understanding of 
disability as an axis of oppression has been – transformatively – driven by the social model.   
 
Sally French, a partially sighted woman, describes vividly how her life has been shaped by 
discrimination and unnecessary exclusion based upon her impairment; yet she also points out 
how a layer of her life's difficulties lies "in between" her body and society.  This layer of 
experienced struggle is not reducible to her impairment, but is also not amenable to social 
intervention.  For example, her inability to recognise people, though spoken of assertively in 
relationships, nevertheless constructs dynamics of misunderstanding or misattunement which 
disrupt or confuse easy relating (French, 1993a, p. 17).  She points to the danger of a rigidly 
held assumption that, if disability is reducible to social barriers, scrupulous removal of those 
barriers will render a Utopian society of complete equity and equality.  One arena in which 
this dangerous illusion may arise is that of assistive technology.  French (1993a) relates how, 
as a student, she required assistance in identifying and finding literature from librarians at her 
university, as library data-bases and cataloguing systems were inaccessible to sight impaired 
persons.  Later, and, it seems, with not a little fanfare, the university installed a computer 
data-base system within the library which incorporated voice synthesis technology, for use by 
visually impaired students or staff members such as herself.   Enthusiastically, though tacitly, 
endorsing the social model "fantasy" of disability being an entirely eradicable social artifact, 
university authorities proclaimed that "henceforth" visually impaired students had full and 
equal access to the means of performing library research.  This was, in the experience of 
French and others, quite untrue.   
 
In what is by now a familiar paradox, the installation of assistive technology never fully fills 
the diverse and complex needs of a highly varied impaired population; but what does occur is 
that the entitlement of such individuals to personal assistance is abruptly diminished (ibid.).  
Of course, none of the foregoing is intended, in any way, to question the need and imperative 
for the provision of all forms of assistive technology which promote equitable access; indeed, 
the neglect of implementation of such universal access embodies a contravention of human 
rights.  And yet, the argument that provision of a "barrier-free" social environment will 
provide fully for the needs of an infinitely diverse impaired population, is a dangerous myth.  
It is the modus operandi of the social model strategy to foist every fragment of struggle 
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experienced by disabled persons onto societal neglect and exclusion.  And, of course, the 
pervasiveness and extent of the atrocious, dehumanising circumstances under which a vast 
population of disabled people live worldwide, lend a good deal of sense and credence to this 
approach.  This drive toward a dogged resolution that all disadvantage is due to social barriers 
is an irate reaction to a world where the prevailing logic is unable – or unwilling – to resist 
gravitating toward the "failings" of the body.  Routinely, the assertion that inherent lack will 
always prevent "complete" overcoming of inequity becomes an underhanded, convenient 
justification for the everyday atrocity of avoidable societal barriers remaining unaddressed.  
The logic here is one which says that "we can't change society to suit everybody ... 
everybody's needs are just too different", or "it will cost too much".  The fact, thus, that a 
residual layer of "impairment effects" (Thomas, 1999a) will always remain, is thus used as a 
rationalisation for doing nothing at all.   
 
In sum, Shakespeare (2006, p. 5) argues that, since the disability-impairment distinction is at 
the root of the social model, and its logic is unsustainable, for him the model should be 
abandoned.  The "ivory tower" created by British social model authors has, he believes, led to 
the impoverishment of disability studies as a discipline, as such writers have been very 
reluctant to recognise or integrate disability research from other parts of the world, due to its 
not subscribing to a "rigorous" social model philosophy.  Important and potentially useful 
work has, on the basis of "politically incorrect" terminology such as the "people first" 
principle, or adherence to the maligned ICIDH2 (Bury, 2000), been rejected or demeaned.  
Researchers who have suffered the ire of the staunch British social model school – in this case 
in the person of Colin Barnes – include figures as important as the American theorists Harlan 
Hahn, Susan Wendell and Lennard Davis; they, too, have found themselves relegated to the 
research junk-heap labelled "medical model" (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 24).  The labour politics 
roots of the British social model movement, for Shakespeare (2006, p. 13), show up in the 
"hard, combative and ideological" methods which its champions employ.  The resolute belief 
at work here is that "progressive approaches are impossible in the absence of the social 
model", and that only individuals who overtly endorse the social model are capable of 
"respecting [the] rights and individuality", and "promoting inclusion" of disabled persons 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 27).  In its orthodoxy, the social model is "alone amongst political 
movements", in allowing no revision or acceptance of critique; instead, it remains "like a 
fundamentalist religion" (ibid., p. 34).  Lee (2002) notes how the often simplistic applications 
of the social model promote an "underdeveloped" politics which "inhibits the development of 
realistic strategies" (Lee, 2002, p. 148).  The model's disdain for all things personal precludes 
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what Lee (2002) terms "a politics of individual actions and interventions" (ibid.), which does 
not simply tolerate medical or rehabilitative involvement, but makes nuanced theoretical 
provision for it, in interaction with conceptual spaces that allow for the unique and individual 
layers of disability.  Clearly, Shakespeare (2006) is correct in identifying the social model's 
founding principles as "unarguable"; yet it does not always follow that these are always useful 
(see Dewsbury, Clarke, Randall, Rouncefield & Sommerville, 2004).  Lee (2002) draws an 
analogy with leftist intellectual accounts of poverty; here it is, of course, true to ascribe this 
social ill to systemic, rather than individual, failings.  However, whilst accepting that poverty 
is structurally generated by capitalist society, the "logical" response to this – that we eradicate 
poverty (only) through a wholesale conquering of capitalism – represents a "phenomenally 
simplistic politics" (Lee, 2002, p. 149-150; see also Borsay, 2002, p. 105).  The construct of 
oppression represented within this view of society is one of a unidirectional force, exercised 
upon faceless individuals wholly subjectified by crushing ideological machinery; a system of 
villains, victims, and malevolent forces to be overthrown.  Lee (2002) is quite correct in 
asserting that it would be "naive" to assume that individual behaviour in no way contributes to 
the compounding of poverty.  This recognition, as we see it mirrored within the disability 
arena, finds us on the threshold of what is, to the social modellists, the unspeakable terrain of 
complicity.  It is precisely this juncture, this beckoning conceptual space, which has led to the 
spurning, by social model writers, of virtually all things psychological.  And, as we shall see 
through our examination of prior psychological accounts of disability rooted within the 
medicalising view, their misgivings regarding how a "psychological" approach to disablement 
may collude with the most dehumanising, obliterating ideological forces, have not historically 
been at all unfounded.     
 
A critical consequence of political movements choosing to rely on the sustaining of simple 
binaries for their cause is that the identities concerned become increasingly reified.  In this 
case we consider a situation in which progressive, critical thinkers, notably operating from a 
social constructionist viewpoint, would seek to undermine disablist oppression via the 
disruption and debunking of the category of "disabled person" itself.  However, the political 
course embarked upon by the "narrow" social model movement relies on quite the opposite; 
that is, on an endorsement of the disabled-nondisabled binary, through strategies such as the 
development of "positive" disability identity (e.g. Swain & French, 2000).  Shakespeare 
(2006, p. 80) argues that such separatism is not a necessary ingredient for a progressive 
politics of disability; a strongly contextual position may also incorporate space for theoretical 
nuance and individual variation.  Paterson and Hughes (1999, p. 600) comment that radical 
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politics concerned with a variety of social issues has, over recent times, arrived at something 
of a watershed; a position rendering "turmoil and reorientation".  In their influential words:  
"The Marxist certainties of the past have given way to post-Marxism and post-modernity, to a 
context in which politics spills into culture, if not amorphousness... " (Paterson & Hughes, 
1999, p. 600). 
    
The tendency for the separatism we see, incorporating the inevitable splits and 
oversimplifications of political rhetoric, is, I argue, fuelled by disability's exceptional capacity 
for the evocation of experiences and fantasies of psychic trauma.  The construct of disability 
is so imbued with evocative cultural meanings, notably surrounding damage, as to position 
disabled people and "disability issues" within a realm of thought profoundly channelized by 
the psychic need for management of anxiety-provoking, often unconscious parts of self (e.g. 
Bion, 1970) – typically via crude defences such as splitting.  This observation in no way 
detracts from the reality of suffering experienced by disabled persons worldwide at the hands 
of a brutally negligent, or frankly malevolent, society.  However, it is essential in the case of 
the disability phenomenon that space be made for a mutually constitutive interaction of both 
of these powerful sets of variables – the social and the psychic.  The current work aims to 
highlight, and attempts to begin to address, the social model's shortcomings with regard to the 
latter.  The social model movement, not unlike many political formations aiming to mobilise 
some sort of revolution, requires, but simultaneously cannot tolerate, the personal – that is, the 
psychological.   
 
Prohibiting the personal 
Our anger is not about having a chip on the shoulder, our grief is not a failure to 
come to terms with our disability.  Our dissatisfaction with our lives is not a 
personality defect but a sane response to the oppression which we experience.   
      (Morris, 1992, p. 163) 
 
Jenny Morris (1992) reflects upon the crucial moment in the development of feminist 
discourse, in which the subjective experience of women – of struggle, rage, grief and 
confusion – ceased to be viewed as an endogenous artefact of biology.  This watershed 
moment began opening the way for an investigation of women's experience as a 
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phenomenology of gender domination, rather than an individual outpouring of temperament 
or personality.  The "moment" in the unfolding of the disability movement which was ushered 
in by an awareness of the conceptual lacunae of the social model – pertaining to the personal 
and the psychological – seems precisely analogous.  Disabled people had begun to recognise, 
as early feminists did, that their experience was worthy of contemplation; that the roots and 
consequences of oppression were to be found in the inner, as well as the social, world 
(Thomas, 2001, p. 49; Hughes, 2002a).  Within this new, emancipatory frame, experiences of 
emotional turmoil came to be seen not as evidence of madness, but as sanity (Griffin, 1982 
cited in Morris, 1992, p. 163).  In a form mirroring that of the psycho-political predicament of 
subordinated women, the lives of disabled persons are (I argue) littered with cultural 
mechanisms which serve to facilitate the turning inward of anger or distress, in a manner 
which (to some extent) reduces social oppression to personal shortcoming.  The backdrop of 
profound material deprivation and exclusion, in domains such as education and employment 
amongst a myriad of others, provides for a virtually limitless supply of subject matter for self-
pathologisation.  Further, the continued subscription to a modernist Cartesian separation of 
body from society (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 597) restricts personal experiences – such as 
those of impairment – to a shadowy inner world, where the layered residues of oppressive 
socialisation are left to re-inflict their denigrations unhindered.   
 
The "domesticating" influence of a binary split between the public and private worlds allows, 
within the gender realm, for the pernicious assertion that such issues as women's familial 
roles, sexual relationships and domestic violence are not, in fact, "political" concerns 
(Thomas, 1999a, p. 74).  The social model's material and "public" focus, arguably allows for 
corresponding distortions – what Soder terms "contextual essentialism" (Soder cited in 
Shakespeare, 2006, p. 56).  It would be unfair and incorrect to assert that proponents of the 
social model approach take no account at all of the psychological experience of impaired 
persons occupying disablist society, yet it is incontrovertible that the model itself allows only 
for the most awkward and narrow of spaces for the exploration of this layer of disabled life.  
Faced with the critique of Morris and others, "strong" social model authors have responded by 
arguing that disabled persons' experience of emotional struggle should, in fact, be regarded as 
a most direct and painful manifestation of oppression (e.g. Finkelstein & French, 1993, p. 31).  
Given this, though, writers at the centre of the social model movement have thereafter been at 
pains to discourage the active exploration of the emotional level of disabled experience (e.g. 
Finkelstein, 1996), holding firm to the position that "exclusion from the world of work is the  
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most important factor in what happens to disabled people" (Oliver, 2001, p. 149; 1990).  In 
averring the shift to a more embodied and psychological construct of social personhood, 
social modelists position their framework as awkwardly out of step with contemporary social 
theory.   
 
Frosh (1991) frames the scene by noting how "something unexpected" has taken place across 
social science disciplines, where the political has truly become personal – in fact, "some 
might say it has become so personal as to no longer be political" (Frosh, 1991, p. 1 – my 
emphasis).  The inquisitive gaze of these disciplines has, thus, become increasingly concerned 
with the intrapsychic coalescing of ideology; with subjectivity as a product – and agent – of 
social power.  Hoggett (1992) reflects candidly on the trajectory of his own political 
development, seeing in retrospect the poverty of social paradigms which unabashedly ignored 
the individual:  he comments:  "The mysteries of life and death, of feeling and passion, of 
dreaming and imagination, of love and terror – it was as if these things didn't exist" (Hoggett, 
1992, p. 3).  Within this socialist milieu, one could only succeed in being recognised as 
"politically committed" if one pledged allegiance to an ("incontrovertibly") "shallow view of 
life" (ibid.).  For him, the contradiction inherent in a framework which claims a materialist 
orientation, yet refuses to acknowledge the materiality (the flux, the advance and decay), of 
the body, had come into a relief too stark to overlook (ibid., p. 6).  Further, theoretical 
provision for a psyche which has "its own laws of structuration and process" (ibid.; see 
Pinker, 2003) was set to confound the Marxist view of humans as "some kind of putty on 
which social forces work" (Hoggett, 1992, p. 6).  Axel Honneth (1995) delivers a harsh 
critique of frameworks of social theory which exhibit a "fixation on the dimension of interest" 
(Honneth, 1995, p. 166).  In his view, such exclusively materialist readings of society embody 
an active obscuring of the crucial – the quintessentially human – significance of moral 
feelings on the shaping of the social order.  In light of this circumstance, he calls upon 
theoreticians to execute a "correction", which offsets the centrality of material interest as a 
mediator of social processes.  Crucially, Honneth asserts that the fact that a collective interest 
corresponds with a certain social conflict, does not mean that the social conflict is reducible to 
that collective interest.  Rather than being something "ultimate or original", the collective 
interest associated with a conflict may, instead, "have been constituted within a horizon of 
moral experience that admits of normative claims to recognition and respect" (Honneth, 1995, 
p. 166).  Thus, besides the question of material interest, the theorising of social conflict must 
make provision for, in Honneth's terms, "the moral grammar of social struggles" (ibid.).  With 
particular reference to disability, the implication here is that the social status (the esteem, the 
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identity) embodied by disabled persons must be thoroughly considered as part of a mutually 
constitutive dialectic, which, along with material concerns, shapes and justifies the social 
destiny of disabled persons.  Borsay (2002) further destabilises the social model 
understanding of the origins of the marginal position of disabled persons, through calling its 
account of the economic history of Western disability into question.  The social modelist 
view, seemingly, seeks to reduce the development of power relations within Western society 
to the rise of industrialisation, which centralised economic and political power around 
mechanised manufacture and professionalised states (Borsay, 2002, p. 103; Barnes, 1990).  
For Borsay, this account is not only historically flawed, but also conceptually inadequate, 
since no provision is made for a cultural dimension (ibid.).  A credible and thorough historical 
picture, instead, must succeed in holding "materialism and culturalism – or structure and 
agency – in tension" (ibid., p. 104).    
 
Whilst Frosh (1991) and others appear to revel in the "re-psychologisation" of the social 
subject, "strong" social model theorists fall squarely into his category of those who fear that 
politics will so collapse into the personal as to no longer be political at all.  The "disdain and 
suspicion" with which these authors view the exploration of personal aspects of disabled life 
is based upon the assertion that such research is "diversionary", and highly likely to be 
misappropriated in the bolstering of pathologising and individualising accounts of disability 
(Thomas, 2001, p. 49).  What Finkelstein, Oliver, Barnes and others appear to be saying is 
that disabled persons cannot afford to make their internal struggles known, as social prejudice 
dictates that attribution for this misery will automatically be made to an inherent wretchedness 
that accompanies impairment, powerfully offsetting the political drive for recognition of 
systematic exclusion and deprivation inflicted upon disabled persons.  Stereotypes which 
associate disability with vulnerability, dependency and damage stand to be confirmed by 
accounts of struggle, in a manner which perpetuates the exculpation of a cruel social order.  
Finkelstein (1996, p. 34) describes a concern with personal experience as a "discredited and 
sterile approach to understanding and changing the world", stating that the disability 
movement has been (partially) hijacked by academics bent on replacing the active vision of 
resistance with "passive theoretical abstractions" (cited in Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 600).  
There is little question that the argument made for the "dangers" of personal experience 
research are well founded.  However, the social modelist claim – perhaps inadvertent – that it 
is feasible to theorise social disability without provision for the intra-psychic, seems at best 
impoverishing; at worst, dangerous.   
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The antagonism felt by social model theorists towards phenomenological research in 
disability finds very clear expression in the fractious relationship between disability studies 
and the discipline of medical sociology (Williams, 2001, p. 124).  Medical sociology or, "the 
sociology of health and illness" is a discipline which explores the experience of chronic 
illness and disability, often within a framework of symbolic illness meanings, and the 
personal construction of narrative (ibid.).  These "frosty" relations are based on the assertion, 
by social model theorists, that medical sociology typically epitomises oppressive and 
individualising disability research, by failing to interrogate contextual factors, and hence 
buttressing disabled stereotypes (Thomas, 1999a, p. 151).  The theoretical perspectives often 
used in such investigation combine symbolic interactionism (in the tradition of Erving 
Goffman – e.g. Goffman, 1963), and phenomenology (pioneered by Maurice Merleau-Ponty – 
e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  Critics of this research tradition describe how a searching 
curiosity regarding the subjective aspects of disability experience renders an ever-deepening, 
solipsistic, and even quasi-religious account, which increasingly "loses sight altogether of the 
structures which make the experience take the shape it does" (Thomas, 1999a, p. 151).  For 
Vic Finkelstein, such work captures the loathsome essence of what he terms "inside-out" 
research (Finkelstein, 1996) – which begins with the individual, and becomes so entangled 
within the interstices of the internal world, that the social is never reached.  These narratives 
often deal with how sufferers "cope" with chronic illness or disablement, incorporating 
"damage" to identities and the re-configuration of self-worth; the social origins of these 
subjective states are typically not explored (Thomas, 2002a, p. 44).    
 
Barnes responds to the entire "personal versus political" dispute by pointing out that the social 
model itself grew out of experiential accounts of disablist discrimination (Barnes, 1998, p. 
77); a store of early research which has been "overlooked".  This, however, does not seem to 
soften his assailing of disability researchers who seek to integrate the experience of 
impairment, fatigue, pain and depression into the social model view (ibid.).  This, he believes, 
besides being inherently unhelpful, also embodies an inane replication of the existing, 
massive and ever-expanding medical sociological literature concerned with these very 
matters.  The key criticism he levels at such work is that it "effectively blurs the crucial 
distinction between the experience of impairment and the experience of disability" (ibid.), 
instead foregrounding a tone of "sentimental autobiography".  This position, clearly, assumes 
that, somewhere within the tangle of biology, socialisation, perception and subjectivity, a 
"clear" distinction between these "entities" serenely awaits our discovery.  Interestingly, 
Barnes (1998) then goes on to inform his reader that the experience of depression, fatigue or 
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pain is "not unique" to disabled persons; and, conversely, that "large numbers" of disabled 
persons will never encounter these experiences (ibid.).  Of course, what Barnes suggests is 
unquestionably true; what is of interest, I believe, is his need to reiterate it in the manner in 
which he does.  Understandably, Barnes (1998) seeks to debunk – to sever – the cultural 
connection between bodily impairment and emotional anguish; yet, in doing so, he risks 
dissociating the lives of disabled persons from emotional struggle, shearing off psychology 
and subjectivity with one, expedient, Cartesian stroke.  One may readily acknowledge the fact 
that medical sociological research, due to its paradigmatic emphasis, portrays disability in a 
partial, problematic manner which invites misappropriation.  But to respond to this difficulty, 
simply, with an adversarial and equally partial account, seems intellectually irresponsible, if 
not petulant.  Thomas (2002a, p. 43; 1999a) valiantly aims to resolve the impasse by 
suggesting that the social model does not ”deny" the potential of impairment to impose 
restrictions on activity, but that such limitations do not constitute disability.  Instead, she 
coins the term "impairment effects" to signify restrictions on activity, thus "rehabilitating" the 
beleaguered disability-impairment distinction.  Whilst the ideological motivation for this 
conceptual hopscotch is very clear – even admirable – it may be that a fundamental, and 
insurmountable, fault-line within the social model paradigm is coming, inexorably, into light.   
 
Where we find ourselves, then, in our quest to fashion a conceptual framework which allows 
for a multi-layered construct of disability, is somewhere between the scylla and charybdis.  
That is, lost in ever-deepening existential solipsism, or condemned to an arid and 
dehumanising materialism.  Some authors argue that it is possible to remain politically 
vigorous in conjunction with exploring the "darker phenomenological waters" of individual 
narrative (Williams, 2001, p. 144; Turner, 2001).  The difficulties with this, though, should 
not be underestimated.  These personal accounts of disabled experience emanate from 
subjectivities which, themselves, have taken shape within a historically specific cultural soup 
of disability meanings, resonances and evocations; is it possible to study subjectivity alone, in 
order, thereby, to understand and critique the origins of subjectivity?  Celebrated and 
scholarly auto-ethnographic authors within the medical sociology tradition, notwithstanding 
their highly compelling and enriching accounts, demonstrate – I believe – the profound lack 
of theoretical strands with which to connect internal turmoil, bodily difference, and the 
mechanisms of ideology (e.g. Frank, 1995; 1998; Murphy, 1987; Toombs, 1994).  The social 
and political contexts within which these narratives are situated tend, within the reader, to 
become overshadowed by feelings of sympathy or pity (Mitchell & Snyder, 1997, p. 11), 
arising from the profound capacity of disability to provoke conscious and unconscious 
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processes of identification.  The emotional hyper-arousal which accompanies culturally 
condensed meanings of disability, as we shall see, is an essential factor in the obscuring of the 
material realities of deprivation suffered by disabled persons.  It is "personal tragedy" – not 
"discrimination" – that evokes instantaneous identification, with its heady paradoxes of 
enmeshed sentimentality and violent othering.  But to evict the personal – the "tragic" – is 
simultaneously to (at least partially) eclipse the experience of disability, and hence to bury 
those aspects of disablism which manifest in this realm (Thomas, 2001, p. 55).  According to 
Thomas (1999a, p. 74), this route embodies a denial of the social origins of forms of 
oppression operating in the personal domain – these include self-identity, interpersonal 
relations, sexuality and family.  The materialist elision of these aspects of disabled life, she 
continues, renders critical disability theory vulnerable to "psychologists and others", who 
would "not hesitate" to apply an individualising model in filling these theoretical breaches.  
Whilst her point is well made, the depiction here of "psychologists" serves to demonstrate the 
prevailing difficulty with "imagining" a critical, ideologically situated psychology of 
disability.   
 
In addressing the question of racism, Frosh (1989) leaves his reader in no doubt whatsoever 
that this scourge is present, and perpetuated, not only at the level of social organisation and 
collective interest, but also within the recesses of the individual psyche (Frosh, 1989, p. 229).  
Development of a psychological model of racism is not intended as a substitute for a socio-
political analysis, but is an essential, complementary element of any thorough explication of 
how racism is maintained (ibid.).  Individual psyches forged within a system of ideological 
meanings and competing social interests imbibe societal significations which become 
inextricably tangled with subjective life, conflating and hybridising agency with ideology, 
volition with power.  This psychic precipitate of social processes, of course, situates all 
players within its meaning system, shaping the unconscious lives of oppressor and oppressed 
alike as proponents of values regarding self and other.  Similarly, Frantz Fanon (1952, p. 29) 
came to view the workings of racism as "a story that takes place in darkness" – an internal 
darkness – thus requiring that "the sun that is carried within me must shine into the smallest 
crannies" (ibid.; Davids, 1996, p. 215).  In other words, in order to understand – to overcome 
– oppression, it is essential that all actors within the social system powerfully look inward.   
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Returning to disability, Clegg (2006, p. 128) reports findings emanating from an exploration 
of the psychically embedded meanings which learning disabled persons attach to "rational" 
social service policies.  These are policies which, as per their social model origins, are 
concerned only with environments and behaviour, to the exclusion of personal experience.  
Here, introspection reveals a rich store of deeply personal meanings attached to material 
conditions.  For example, it was found that learning disabled boys using respite care often 
imagine that they have done something wrong, as their siblings are not required to stay away 
from home.  Similarly, persons who have undergone physical restraint often saw this as an 
arbitrary decision, presumably with implications for the subjective safety – and experience of 
being valued or wanted – prevailing within the residential setting in question (ibid.).  As we 
shall see, Valerie Sinason's pioneering work in the area of the social suffering of learning 
disabled persons (Sinason, 1992), movingly and profoundly demonstrates the import of such 
subjective meanings.  Sinason (1992) underscored the immense impact of trauma – the trauma 
of not being wanted, and of (consciously or unconsciously) recognising one's social role as an 
exile – upon the psychological and cognitive functioning of her learning disabled subjects.  
Meanwhile, a study by Morris (1989) further confounded social modelist predictions 
regarding the core concerns of disabled persons.   In her interviews with women with spinal 
cord injury, Morris (1989, p. 24) found that their most common difficulty with health care 
professionals was a lack of recognition or consideration of emotional aspects of disability.  
The tendency of the social model approach to "lose" the "phenomena" of human subjectivity – 
the "real world, real life experiences of disabled people as they go about their everyday lives" 
– has led Dewsbury et al (2004) to derisively ask whether, in fact, it should be termed the 
anti-social model" (Dewsbury et al., 2004, p. 153 – my emphasis).   
 
Coleridge (1993, p. 38), from a development studies viewpoint, strongly rejects the 
increasingly global view that "human nature" – in respect, particularly, to the treatment of 
disabled persons – can be changed and shaped through legislation.  He refers, of course, to 
legal mechanisms such as the USA's Anti-Discrimination Act (ADA), Great Britain's 
Disability Discrimination Act (DDA), and many others.  To assert that such a materialist view 
is correct, Coleridge contends, is to yield to the idea that the enterprises of development and 
education are, in fact, redundant (ibid.).  The veiled accusation levelled at the social model 
here is not inconsiderable; viz. the suggestion that a strongly materialist view actually 
militates against the appropriate prioritisation of resources which foster the development of  
 50
human capital.  Whilst the basic needs of life – food, shelter, health care – must clearly be 
provided for, for Coleridge there is a fundamental problem with viewing "development" as 
primarily a process of fulfilling this function (Coleridge, 1993, p. 213).  He writes:   
 
The problem lies in the fact that such needs are passive:  if these needs are met, 
so this approach asserts, then 'development' has happened.  But there are other 
needs which are just as basic:  the need to be creative, to make choices, to 
exercise judgment, to love others, to have friendships, to contribute something of 
oneself to the world, to have social function and purpose.  These are active 
needs; if they are not met, the result is the impoverishment of the human spirit, 
because without them life itself has no meaning.   
      (Coleridge, 1993, p. 213) 
Disabled lives, Coleridge urges us to acknowledge, carry every aspect and nuance of human 
complexity; of relationship, self-regard, loss and hope.  A theoretical model which purports to 
reflect and validate disabled lives must offer conceptual spaces which provide for all such 
aspects of experience; all aspects of human experience.  One layer of disabled life which has 
often been de-legitimated through the collusion of the social model with Cartesian dualism, is 
the experience of the body – that is, inter alia, the experience of impairment (Crow, 1992).  As 
the figure of the materialist subject will not tolerate the psychological, so, too, is the 
embodiment of the self anathema.   
 
The vanishing – and reappearing – body 
Proponents of the social model, intent upon foregrounding oppression as the defining (indeed, 
exclusive) feature of disability, unwittingly were directing their movement towards a "somatic 
impasse".  Although the social model had been conceived in diametric opposition to the 
"traditional" medical model, the disability-impairment binary at its centre – and so dear and 
elementary to its authors – inadvertently buttressed the exclusive mandate of medicine to 
"management" of impairment.  By asserting – impetuously, to some – that "disability" is 
purely social, the social model's logic relinquished "impairment" to the realm of the purely 
biological (Hughes, 2002a, p. 67; Thomas, 1999a; 2002b).  In so doing, the social model 
aligned itself with Cartesian medicine's view of the body as "a domain of corporeality 
untouched by culture" (Hughes, 2002a, p. 67).  Impairment, therefore, was to become viewed 
within this philosophical position as a "reality" which has an existence independent of the 
cultural milieu in which it arises (Marks, 1999a, p. 17), recapitulating biomedicine's model of 
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the body as (nothing but) a "faulty machine" (Hughes & Paterson, 1997, p. 329).  The irony 
evident in the profound convergence of the social model with a biomedical view of 
corporeality, in reproducing the problem of mind-body dualism, is, indeed, remarkable.  The 
model tacitly concurs with traditional medicine, in constructing the body as a "pre-social, 
inert, physical object, as discrete, palpable and separate from the self ..."  (Hughes & Paterson, 
1997, p. 329).  The construct, the conceptual space, of disability offered by the social model, 
thus was – and is – a disembodied one.   
 
A further irony surrounds the extent to which the sociology of disability – in the form of the 
social model – has, over recent decades, been elaborating itself in an epistemological direction 
which markedly opposes the broader currents of sociological theory (Hughes, 2002a, p. 59).  
During an era in which paradigms such as post-structuralism and phenomenology have sought 
to assail traditional enlightenment dualisms, the social model has instead propounded a 
framework of irreducible polarities – the body and society, medicine and politics, therapy and 
emancipation, pain and oppression, and, of course, impairment and disability (Hughes & 
Paterson, 1997, p. 330).  The need for such "clean" conceptual splits emanated from the social 
modelists' drive to stridently dissociate their orientation from the "murky" and "disablist" 
vagueries of medical sociology.  But in doing so, these writers created a seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle to their own potential development of any sort of sociology of 
impairment (Hughes, 2002a, p. 59).  A most dramatic contrast to this conception is provided 
by Susan Bordo (1993); for her, the body is everything but a stable or acultural constant.  
Instead, culture is always, a priori, inscribed upon and penetrated through the "living" of our 
bodies; there is no "natural" body – instead, "natural" is "the script of culture writ large on the 
body" (Bordo, 1993 cited in Michalko, 2002, p. 58).  Far from the abandonment of the 
corporeal evidenced by the vanguard of disability studies, in other arenas of social and 
political conflict and turmoil, the body has become ever more the site of engagement (Hughes 
& Paterson, 1997, p. 327).  Hancock et al (2000) paint the scene thus:  
Meanwhile the body was making itself ever-present in social and political life, 
be it in the shape of a battered woman, a terminated foetus, a victim of torture or 
televised war, a proud celebration of womanhood, disability, colour or 
homosexuality, an organ in transit for transplantation, a human-machine stepping 
on the moon, a sample of DNA under the microscope, a man who was a woman 
or vice versa, a body transformed by diet, exercise or the surgeon’s knife, a 
homeless person camped on the streets of the world’s richest nation, a mass 
grave, another world record smashed.   
   (Hancock et al., 2000 cited in Hughes, 2002a, p. 66) 
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But astonishingly, for disabled persons within the ambit of the social model's analysis, the 
living, breathing body had vanished; in its place, a "timeless, ontological foundation" (Hughes 
& Paterson, 1997, p. 327).  The impaired body, notwithstanding its purported immersion in 
forces of oppression, remained itself a "dysfunctional, anatomical, corporeal mass obdurate in 
its resistance to signification and phenomenologically dead, without intentionality or agency" 
(ibid.).  As Hughes (2002a, p. 66) timeously comments, the preoccupations of disability 
studies were with the "realities" of furthering the cause of disabled people via political means, 
rather than with the intricate conceptual trifles of aligning body, mind and society in some 
form of satisfactory theoretical synergy.  However, the implications of these priorities have 
left the lived experience of impairment adrift in an isolating limbo, between the control and 
invalidation of biologism, and the unwelcoming disdain of repressive populism.   
 
Social model thinkers may defend their orientation by pointing to the fact that certain 
ideological analyses of impairment have, in fact, been developed within their framework.  
Here, primarily within the work of Paul Abberley (1987; 1996) and Mike Oliver (1996), the 
social origins of impairment are interrogated.  Abberley (1996, p. 63) argues – quite correctly 
– that impairment of various forms always occurs within a certain historical and political 
context, which may contribute to its emergence, its exacerbation, or its amelioration.  Thus, 
unsafe working conditions, the efficiency of health systems, access to appropriate vaccination, 
levels of public safety – these and a host of other contextual factors shape the incidence and 
consequences of impairment (Abberley, 1987; 1996).  Whilst the context of factors implicated 
in bodily impairment is highly salient and deserving of critique, this analysis, however, falls 
massively short of creating a platform for the examination of impairment as a complex, 
embodied process comprising both societal and personal aspects.  Instead, Abberley (1987) 
introduces the issue of the social underpinnings of impairment via a structuralist analysis, but 
then abruptly sets aside the resultant phenomenon of impairment as a reified, unproblematic 
and consensual "reality" (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 599).  The theoretical gateway to an 
exploration of the social and psychological nature and constitution of impairment experience, 
thus, remains firmly closed.  Loyal to the social modelist penchant for separation, no 
possibility is proffered here for exploring disability and impairment as interpenetrating, 
mutually incorporated experiences (ibid., p. 598).  For Paterson and Hughes (1999, p. 598), 
the "Cartesianised" subject fashioned by the social model's binaries eliminates the possibility 
of disabled people building an "emancipatory politics of identity" – one born of and based 
upon the delineation and mutual validation of the interwoven threads of cultural and corporeal 
existence.   
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One strategic exit route from the conceptual confusion of circumscribing what – and where – 
disability is, is provided by post-structuralist and social constructionist approaches, following 
the writings of Michel Foucault, and the traditions of postmodernism and epistemological 
relativism (Turner, 2001, p. 255).  Within the post-structuralist universe, no direct perception 
of a unified "reality" of any sort is provided for; all that is available to our grasp are 
"versions" of our world (Marks, 1999a, p. 18).  Consequently, this view holds that it is not 
just the slippery notion of disability, but also impairment, which is entirely an artifact of 
social construction (ibid.).  The secure, stable ground of essential characteristics and intrinsic 
identities is left far behind, in favour of a subject composed of fluid, shifting and continually 
negotiated repertoires.  From a social constructionist standpoint, the concepts and categories 
with which the world is delineated and dissected are viewed as entirely culturally and 
historically specific, arbitrary, and containing no inherent or transcendant robustness (e.g. 
Gergen, 1985).  Disability researchers operating within this paradigm would seek to wrest 
control of "disability meanings" from positivist accounts, which incorporate a  "western 
conception of objective, individualistic, ahistoric knowledge" (Gergen, 1985, p. 272).  Such a 
re-alignment, which repositions disability as a social accomplishment rather than an inherent 
characteristic, embodies a valuable counterpoint to biological essentialism.  Yet, within the 
critical constructionist view, it must be noted that all such accounts are equally illusory.   
 
Whilst the view of disability as a product of society's organisation is shared by social 
constructionist approaches and the social model, the units of societal analysis prioritised by 
these orientations differ.  The social model, identified by Priestley (1998, p. 80) as a social 
creationist position, focuses primary concern on the structural "realities" of society's disabling 
barriers.  By contrast, a social constructionist agenda foregrounds the cultural representations 
of disability which predominate within a society, holding that it is the production and 
perpetuation of these meanings which provides the repertoire, the subject matter, for 
oppressed disability experience (ibid., p. 81).  Of course, the principles of these and other 
approaches are not entirely mutually exclusive, but for the purposes of explication, it is 
helpful to contrast the essential leanings of each.  Within a rigorously constructionist account 
of disability, the body is momentarily "rehabilitated" as a salient frame of discursive struggle 
– along with endless others – but then immediately engulfed by the imperatives of 
deconstruction, which evacuate it of any shred of non-contingent meaning (Turner, 2001, p. 
254; Price & Shildrick, 1998; Thomas, 2002a).  As noted earlier, a form of biological 
essentialism is, by default, acceded to via the social model's abstention with regard to the 
body.  This essentialism, true to its positivist character, allows no scope for the unique 
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"living" of the disabled body.  But the social constructionist perspective fails to balance the 
equation, instead replacing an arid biological essentialism with an equally depersonalising 
"discursive essentialism" (Hughes & Paterson, 1997, p. 333; see also Hacking, 1999).  Instead 
of breathing life into the body, deconstruction dissolves the body into nothing more than the 
constituent cultural signifiers that imbue it (transitorily) with meaning (ibid.).  Rosemarie 
Garland Thomson (1997a) takes a pragmatic, strategic view, which seeks to make the most of 
the interrogative and emancipatory potentials of both orientations.  First, she argues, it is 
imperative to employ a "strategic constructionist" argument in order to launch a 
"denaturalising" assault on reductionist accounts which portray disability as bodily incapacity, 
substituting this with a critical and contextualised analysis of disability as the product of an 
interaction of bodily difference with a misattuned cultural environment (ibid., p. 282-3).  
Here, group delineation of the identity of "disabled" is unclear; an illusory product of 
ascribed, rather than inherent, identity characteristics.  Second, Thomson advocates that this 
constructionist view be amalgamated with a "strategic essentialism", in order to affirm, to 
preserve, the historical reality of the disabled body.  Embodied differences, such as the use of 
a wheelchair or living without sight, may thus be claimed and elaborated – both personally 
and collectively – by those who live them, rather than be left to the denigrations of a 
prejudiced society (ibid.).  She explains the compromise: 
 
Thus, a strategic constructionism destigmatises the disabled body, locates 
difference relationally, denaturalises normalcy, and challenges appearance 
hierarchies.  A strategic essentialism, by contrast, validates experience 
andconsciousness, imagines community, authorises history, and facilitates self 
naming.   
      (Thomson, 1997a, p. 283) 
 
Seminal work concerning the human experience of disease and disability within the social 
constructionist paradigm is that of the Foucaultian discourse analytic tradition (Foucault, 
1976; 1995; Stiker, 1982).  As alluded to above, notwithstanding the piercing social critique 
embodied in these investigations – notably surrounding the notion of normalisation – the 
discourse analytic view allows little conceptual space for exploring the nature of subjectivity, 
or providing for the possibility of individual agency (Whyte, 1995 cited in Turner, 2001, p. 
255).  In fact, on the nature of the everyday lived experience of the subjective world, 
discourse analysis is altogether silent – ruling out, in the words of Shakespeare and Watson 
(1995), the development of an "ethnography of physicality" (cited in Turner, 2001, p. 257).  
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In addition, whilst the "strategic essentialism" recommended by Thomson above does admit 
the body as palpable, the positivist biomedical realm which is its natural home is not well 
suited to an elaboration of the intricate threads of subjective embodiment.  Thomson (1997a, 
p. 282) develops her position by positing a "universalising disability discourse", which, 
drawing on the feminist altercation with gender hegemony, asserts the body as a "cultural text 
which is interpreted, inscribed with meaning, [and] indeed, made within social relations of 
power" (my emphasis).  The critique wrought by this assertion is crucial in the 
destigmatisation of "damaged" social identities, but it also tends toward obscuring the "real" 
material (lived) effects of those differences, simultaneously destabilising the very social 
identity categories with which we render oppressed experience collectively meaningful 
(ibid.).  We are oppressed by the ascriptions of these categories (gender, race, disability), yet 
require their reificatory effects for the legitimation of our – otherwise groundless – 
experience, not to mention for the purposes of critical social analysis.  In Thomson's (1997a, 
p. 282) words, "the post-structuralist logic that destabilises identity potentially frees 
marginalised people from the narrative of essential inadequacy, but at the same time it risks 
denying the particularity of their embodied experience".  The complex implications of this 
predicament for the development of a cohesive disability movement – one able to attract clear 
identification from its constituency – will be considered in some detail later (see Identity 
politics and the movement, p.191)  
 
The (presumed) nature of "different" bodies is, doubtless, at the heart of the medicalising 
domestication of disabled persons; yet, the specific character of this embodiment seems an 
essential – an elemental – aspect of the lived reality of oppression, and, perhaps 
consequentially, of identity (Turner, 2001, p. 254).  Deconstructing contested social 
categories will, to some extent, neutralise or obscure the political aspects of the material 
differences which they signify (Thomson, 1997a, p. 282).  In reducing the body to a 
"phantasm" of collected representations, much of the self, the subjective life, of disabled 
individuals risks similar corrosive deconstruction.  At the current point in history, the 
disability movement at large simply cannot afford to discard the category of disability as per 
the post-structuralist critique of identity (ibid.).  Interestingly, a sector of the global deaf 
community has adopted this tactic, choosing, via the principles of deconstruction, to promote 
the community as a cultural and linguistic minority, whilst stridently disidentifying with the 
disability movement (e.g. Corker, 1994).  From this standpoint, it is not only "disability" 
which is attacked as an arbitrary socio-linguistic product, but "impairment" as well.  In sum, 
though, the scepticism expressed by a range of authors regarding the ultimately self-defeating 
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relativism, and lack of explanatory capacity, of a radically constructionist approach seems 
well founded (Thomas, 1999a, p. 117; 2002).  Perhaps more significant, however, is the 
groundswell of (predominantly) feminist-oriented writings within disability studies which call 
for a simple, visceral – common-sense – return to the lived reality of bodies.  As reflected 
upon in the previous section, "impairment", for these writers, is an essential aspect of disabled 
life, and must, therefore, be conceptually provided for. 
 
Crow (1996) is vociferous in her critique of how the social model has marginalised the 
experience of impairment in her own life.  She writes that the disability movement, under the 
auspices of the social model approach, has sought to portray impairment as "irrelevant, 
neutral, and, sometimes positive, but never, ever as the quandary it really is" (Crow, 1996, p. 
208).  For Crow (1996), this "glossing over" of that layer of subjective life which concerns 
impairment disguises the contradictions and complexity, the confusion and ambivalence, 
which are inevitably incorporated within the physicality of social life in an impaired body 
(ibid.).  If pain, for example, is subjectively meaningful – and in psychological terms this 
seems incontrovertible – it must, therefore, also be culturally meaningful (Paterson & Hughes, 
1999, p. 602).  Within this socially mediated view of pain, its experience is not viewed as 
"physical sensation with additions of meaning, but as permeated with meaning, permeated 
with culture" (Jackson, 1994 cited in Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 602 – my emphasis).  
Hughes and Paterson (1997, p. 333) point to the sinister implications of social modelist 
"dumming down" of the lived nature of impairment, correctly observing that the bodies and 
impairments concerned are generated within a biomedical frame, hence offering "sovereign" 
control of the nature of impaired life to medical authority.  Michalko (2002, p. 56) concurs, 
arguing that the social model's "naturalisation" of impairment embodies an impediment to the 
political conscientisation of disabled people.  The social model, thus, offers no harbour to 
Crow's (1996) experience of "quandary"; instead, she finds her experience negated, and 
herself subjectively marooned.  But Hughes and Paterson's (1997) alarms run still deeper; 
surely, in their analysis, a biomedical discourse which has had "free reign" over the realm of 
impairment would render bodies, and to some extent, subjective states, continuous with its 
categories – that is, "a particular genus of body with its appropriate signs, symptoms, 
behaviour and normative expectations" (ibid., p. 333).  The challenge, then, for disabled 
persons such as Crow, is not simply to express her experience of impairment, but, first and 
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 foremost, to find that experience amongst the control and debris of a socialisation steeped in a 
medicalising, depersonalising silence.  Turner (1994) seems to hold hope for this endeavour, 
remarking that, in the postmodern era, the body is singular in its capacity to defy regulation – 
an arena in which desire will always, in some form, survive the subordinating onslaught of 
reason (Turner, 1994 cited in Hughes & Paterson, 1997, p. 327).   
 
Thomas (1999a, p. 38) grounds the discussion by simply asserting that a layer of the 
everyday, palpable realities of impairment must remain irreducible to both medical and 
deconstructionist abstractions.  "Surely", she writes, "it is obvious that some restrictions of 
activity are caused by limited physical, sensory or intellectual functioning?" (ibid.).  This 
observation does not necessitate a corresponding value judgment placed upon the richness or 
worth of impaired life; instead, the path is opened to exploration of the multiplicity of ways in 
which life, with its ubiquitous hopes and dreads, may be lived and imagined (Wasserman, 
2001, p. 222).  Wendell (1997), with a candour disarming to constructionists and materialists 
alike, asserts that many, and perhaps most, forms of impairment draw upon the energy and 
stamina of the impaired individual, in a manner which may have a limiting effect beyond the 
confines of restriction in a particular (impairment-salient) area of activity (Wendell, 1997, p. 
271).  In a similar, if somewhat more conservative vein, French (1993a) has noted how parts 
of the lived implications of her sight impairment, whilst clearly having a social aspect, are not 
amenable to environmental modification – instead, these facets of impaired life occupy a 
"middle ground" between the social and the somatic (French, 1993a, p. 17).  Shakespeare 
(2006, p. 56), in further elaborating his orientation as social model dissident, states, simply, 
that "people are disabled by society and by their bodies" – and, that it is "inescapable that 
some forms of impairments are more limiting than others".  Arrival at such a seemingly self-
evident conclusion might, to the less careful observer, belie the very real and complex 
political concerns which have caused the path thence to have meandered so.  The location 
reached via this bewildering journey – a place where impairment may be re-admitted – is 
altogether different from the biomedical view which begins, and remains, within the 
reactionary territory in which physicality informs social status (Hughes & Paterson, 1997, p. 
326).  The social model, thus, is required to engage in a critique of its own philosophical – 
that is, dualistic – foundations, in order to provide for the now evident necessity of a body 
which is "part of the domain of history, culture and meaning" (Hughes & Paterson, 1997; 
326).  Whether the model is sufficiently robust to survive this interrogation remains a 
question upon which opinion is divided.   
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Thomas (1999a; 2002a) presents her own solution to the crisis by circumscribing the bounds 
of a "materialist ontology of impairment and impairment effects" – an ontology which is 
"neither biologically reductionist nor culturally determinist" (Thomas, 1999a, p. 125).  She 
believes it to be feasible that these constructs be applied alongside the retained essence of the 
social model, within an "extended" social-relational approach.  As noted earlier, her concept 
of "impairment effects" is defined as "restrictions of activity which are associated with being 
impaired but which are not disabilities in the social relational sense" (Thomas, 1999a, p. 43).  
These "effects" are "profoundly bio-social, that is, shaped by the interaction of biological and 
social factors", and "are bound up with processes of socio-cultural naming" (ibid.).  
Impairment, thus, becomes re-located at the juncture where biology and culture meet (Hughes 
& Paterson, 1997, p. 329).  Disability and impairment, here, are not experienced as discrete 
entities, in "separate Cartesian compartments", but as part of "a complex interpenetration of 
oppression and affliction" (Hughes & Paterson, 1997, pp. 335-5).  This view of the body as 
the very "stuff of human affliction and affectivity" as well as the subject and object of 
oppression, point us towards the value of a phenomenological sociology of the body (ibid.).  
Here, the living and lived body incorporates selfhood which is no longer extrinsic to its 
functioning, but embodied within its viscera, its sensation.  Rather than the body being an 
object for the subjective view of the self, the lived body incarnates the individual's point of 
view on the world (Toombs, 1994, p. 338).  The body, in short, is not possessed, but lived.  
The contribution of a phenomenological sociology of the body to the conceiving of a 
sociology of impairment lies in its capacity to bring "sentience and sensibility" to the notions 
of disablist oppression and exclusion (Hughes & Paterson, 1997, p. 334).   
 
The current of theoretical development, thus, is toward a dialectical approach to the body, 
which is able to contain a symbiosis lived between the somatic and the social (Lupton, 1995 
cited in Marks, 1999a, p. 93).  In this new world the body re-appears, "filling up" the metallic 
spaces of positivism with desire, sensation, flux and caprice.  Shakespeare (2006, p. 54), 
seeking conceptual apparatus with which to accommodate this body, recommends to us the 
model of critical realism – this view attends to the realness of bodies; "bodies which 
sometimes hurt, regardless of what we may think or say about [them]".  Williams (1999, p. 
798) concurs, noting how the critical realist view, whilst able to allow the biological body 
back in, does so "without stripping agency of agency or structure of structure".   
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This re-embodiment of the disabled subject is directly analogous to developments within 
feminism, where the prior, politically expedient sex-gender split reflects the social model's 
dualist strategy.  Within this conceptual frame, sex was viewed as the pre-social substrate 
"upon" which gender became inscribed via the workings of ideology.  Latterly, influential 
feminist authors (e.g. Butler, 1993), have discarded this binary, ushering in an era in which 
"the materiality of the [female] body will not be thinkable apart from the materialisation of 
that regulatory norm" (Butler, 1993, p. 2; Williams, 1999).  Put another way, the experiences 
of feminine and impaired embodiment are both profoundly cultural ones.  Williams (1999, p. 
798) refers to the centrality, within the critical realist model, of provision for "mind-
independent generative mechanisms", where the body and (cultural) experience of the body 
are indissoluble.  With reference to an earlier section, the body is not "written upon", but 
rather, simply, "written"; the body has an ontological depth which is untouched by 
constructionist epistemological claims (Williams, 1999, p. 806).  As such, and in stark 
opposition to the materialist appeal, "humanity ... is never a gift from society" (Archer, 1995 
cited in Williams, 1999, p. 806).  An extremely important aspect of the critical realist 
perspective, for our purposes, is the proposition that layers of experience, of embodied 
selfhood, lie beyond the reaches of consciousness.  This proposition, uncomfortable though it 
doubtless is to both materialists and post-structuralists, provides for the "critical" and 
"emancipatory" potential of the model (Williams, 1999, p. 810) – for the possibility of the 
"discovery" of oppressive, internalised layers of embodiment.  For Williams (1999, p. 810), 
the potential for "emancipation" here is a promise of something "far more concrete and 
tangible than the shift to alternative discursive registers".  Rather, the development of a 
conscious awareness of structural internalisations is provided for, in a manner which beckons 
the subject to an emancipatory interrogation of self.   
 
The critical realist approach, in addition, combines synergistically with the theory of 
phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), which provides a conceptual frame for the 
exploration of the lived nature of the body, and thus, of impairment.  To Merleau-Ponty 
(1962), the body is "like a work of art", because, in each case, it is impossible – in fact, 
meaningless – to attempt to distinguish the expression from what is expressed (Langer, 1989, 
p. 53).  Like proponents of a critical realist view, Merleau-Ponty eschews fantasies such as the 
"purely bodily" or "purely psychic", replacing these with the notion of an integrated, 
simultaneous subjectivity, in which all levels of experience "interfuse" (ibid.).  There remains, 
by consequence, a constant dialectical tension between "having" and "being" a body (Lyon & 
Barbalet, 1994 cited in Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 601).  The body, within Merleau-Ponty's 
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(1962) vision, is the primary and fundamental route through which humans gain access to 
experiences of the world; it is the body which holds the phenomenology of perception (Lyon 
& Barbalet, 1994 cited in Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 601; Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  Whilst 
the "phenomenological body" is clearly a social product, this process of making, becoming 
and being a body incorporates the project of making, and living, a self (Turner, 2001, p. 260).  
At this juncture, again, there appears a particular salience to the theorising of social disability 
– embodiment and enselfment are construed as entirely interwoven and interdependent 
projects (ibid.).  Disability, then, is neither the exclusive outcome of oppressive societies or 
impaired bodies, but an emergent property, which flows from the interplay of structural 
constraints, physiology, and cultural elaboration – a "materialist phenomenology" of 
disability.  Williams (1999) summarises his view of disability through this new, combined 
conceptual lens:  "A dynamic, dialectically unfolding process between body and society, 
located within a temporal frame of reference (both historical and biographical)" (Williams, 
1999, p. 813).   
 
Where we find ourselves, then, is within a new conceptual landscape, in which we allow the 
body to live, but remain wary and critical regarding the encroachment of the dehumanising 
effects of biologism.  Simultaneously, a phenomenological approach shows up the continuous 
life of bodily perception, set against the (critical) "reality" of bodily difference and societal 
structures; here, the impaired body is a lived cultural phenomenon, rather than an ahistoric 
biological fact.  Disability studies, with the aid of these new instruments, is afforded the 
opportunity to elaborate theories of the culturally situated nature of disabled selfhood, "with 
the body at the centre of its analysis" (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 601).  Within this domain, 
a space for development of the socially situated and embodied nature of the psychological 
experience of disability is created; this space beckons us to psychoanalysis.     
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CHAPTER THREE  
Disability theory II:  Psychoanalysis, social construction and the 
contextual phenomenology of disability  
Preamble 
To some, the psychoanalytic model may appear as an unlikely lens through which to 
interrogate the disability experience.  Our common-sense associations with the idea of 
psychoanalysis render images of a small, plush room in an urban, western setting, with an 
analyst's couch, and professional and patient engaging in a lengthy and very expensive 
process of individual psychotherapy – a far cry from the often stark development needs of the 
world's disabled people. We tend, to our detriment, to be less aware of the remarkable critical 
power of the psychoanalytic model to make sense of behaviour at the broadest social level, as 
well as at the level of the individual. What the model provides us with is a means to begin to 
interrogate the phenomena of the intra-psychic world, toward developing an understanding of 
how these processes in turn profoundly influence and shape collective action within society.  
In the case of disability, psychoanalysis directs our attention at the unconscious meanings 
with which bodily difference is imbued, and beyond, toward an analysis of how universal 
anxieties regarding these evocations manifest in oppressive social formations (Marks, 1999a; 
Watermeyer, 2006).  As alluded to, the "identity" of psychoanalysis as a critical, even 
emancipatory theoretical frame is, to say the least, controversial.  To some – not least, those 
of a materialist orientation aligned to the social model – psychoanalysis may be anathema; a 
symbol of class separation, and the solipsistic indulgences of the bourgeois.  Before 
examining its specific application within the disability arena, therefore, we turn first to a 
consideration of psychoanalysis' "credentials" as a frame for interrogating oppression.  In 
order to do this, we shall assess a range of opposing opinions regarding the model's utility – or 
otherwise – in the field of social critique.   
 
Psychoanalysis and social critique:  Depoliticisation or subversion?  
As noted above, the idea of psychoanalysis calls to mind images of the couch and consulting 
room, typically involving the rarefied exploration of internal, individual concerns.  Partly 
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because of the immense expense attached to this enterprise, which renders it available only to 
a tiny, moneyed fraction of Western society, the commonly held view of psychoanalysis is 
one far removed from ideas of social critique, let alone political subversion.  Instead, the work 
of psychoanalysis is viewed as of only solipsistic relevance, seeking, as it does, to explore, 
describe and "integrate" the complex, layered intricacies of the internal psychological world.  
As we begin to consider this discipline, and its potential relevance for our purposes, it is 
important to establish that the concerns and foci of psychoanalytic discourse extend well 
beyond the realm of clinical therapeutic work.  It is clinical material that offers a route to 
unconscious processes – the key unit of analysis of the discipline – yet, the implications of 
psychoanalytic knowledge, as we shall find, are argued to extend way beyond the individual, 
to the shaping and dynamic interchange of group processes, and the broad nature of the social 
order.  Further, the psychoanalytic frame has been applied directly to societal phenomena, in a 
manner which seeks to interrogate the unconscious underpinnings of everyday social life, as 
these are shaped via ongoing dialectical interchange between intra-individual and social 
psychological processes.  The efficacy of the psychoanalytic model for social critique, is, 
however, one perennially contested between its earnest proponents, and equally earnest 
critics.  The latter often hail from a materialist tradition – recalling the social model of 
disability – within which individual characteristics such as emotional functioning are regarded 
as epiphenomenal, and a tiresome distraction from the "real" material issues of socio-political 
life (Figlio & Richards, 2002, p. 183).  By contrast, authors working within the 
psychoanalytic tradition have, over recent decades, displayed burgeoning interest in the links 
between intra-psychic and social processes (Hinshelwood & Chiesa, 2002a, p. 1).  As we 
begin to ponder over this complex relationship, Temperley (1984, p. 25) presents us with a 
key distinction in approaches to its theorising.  First, a "Utopian" view, which attributes the 
countless ills of society to the nature of the social order itself, hence reasoning that, if social 
structures were rectified, a naturally benign human nature would freely express itself in 
beautific harmony.  The second, darker view of the human condition, holds that the human 
psyche is constitutionally imbued with not only kindly, but also hostile forces, which are 
reflected and enacted within social evils. Here, the injunction to each individual, if society is 
to be improved, involves taking cognisance of, and responsibility for, one's own direct and 
inadvertent role in creating and perpetuating social troubles (ibid.).  The battle between forces 
which allay, and those which perpetuate, the suffering and brutality which afflicts society, is 
regarded within this perspective as a reflection of the insoluble, intrinsic conflict elemental to 
human psychological functioning.  Upon both earthly and psychic terrains, writes Samuels 
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 (1993), there is a "fight between consciousness, liberation and alterity on the one hand, and 
suppression, repression and omnipotent beliefs in final truths on the other" (Samuels, 1993, p. 
4).  With this brief orientation, let us consider, first, key criticisms of the psychoanalytic 
model, particularly with reference to its application to social process.   
The interplay between societal and intra-psychic levels of functioning has, according to some 
critics, led psychoanalysis into a form of "psychic reductionism", in which social actions, 
such as political radicalism, become interpreted" as nothing more than the manifestation of 
individual needs to manage internal existential conflicts (Figlio & Richards, 2002, p. 194).  
The "repressive" implication of such a state of affairs lies in the tacit location of struggle 
within the internal, in a manner which tends to obviate an interrogation of social structures 
which may be implicated in human suffering; here, psychoanalysis risks "dumming down" 
social suffering, in a manner which erodes the subjective legitimacy of political resistance.  
The psychic wounds arising from social oppression, thus, may be read as the sequelae of 
personal neurotic fallibility.  However, the fact that political commitment may not be 
reducible to intra-psychic phenomena, does not mean that an analysis of the internal needs 
which this fulfils is not necessary or fruitful (ibid., p. 196).  The difficulty, perhaps, lies in the 
compelling nature of psychological attributions, which turn accountability inward in a manner 
seductive to the human predisposition for self-blame.  Such analyses – in a manner analogous 
to the biomedical view of disability – begin with, and consequently become cemented within, 
the individual.  Grossberg (1998, p. 65) laments how the field of cultural studies has become 
thus ensnared, leading to a retreat from the world of substantive social policy, to an impotent 
and circular reflection on the components of social texts.  Similarly, Gordon (1995, p. 277) 
paints a dim picture of the psychoanalytic academy, as a "rather self-referential" group, 
communicating in a remote and rarefied language starkly dissonant with the engaged 
discourse of viable political praxis.  In my view, a theory of intra-psychic functioning which 
does not interface clearly with history and economics – with the substantive , collective 
realities of human life – will ultimately flounder in its quest for relevance.  Such a model 
presents society as an individual psyche writ large, with no provision for the dynamic 
generative capacity of psychological exchange (Hinshelwood & Chiesa, 2002a; 5).    
 
A further, formidable critique of the psychoanalytic tradition pertains to the role of its 
institutions in, perhaps unwittingly, perpetuating a raft of bourgeois liberal socio-political 
conventions.  The fact that the psychological "discoveries" of psychoanalysis are embedded 
within a particular historical and cultural matrix, confirms its normalising role, as a discipline 
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which is not only descriptive, but also inevitably – helplessly – prescriptive (Samuals, 1993, 
p. 275).  Exploration and delineation of, for example, how psychological development may 
take place, quickly becomes indistinguishable from models of how development should take 
place, notwithstanding the unavoidable slants implied by the cultural embeddedness of all 
such investigations.  Further, the influential object relations model within psychoanalysis 
overwhelmingly favours intra-psychic and interpersonal explanations for personality 
development – including dysfunction – and remains, in this regard, almost exclusively 
preoccupied with the very early years of life (Samuels, 1993, p. 275).  This emphasis on the 
inner familial "sanctum" as definitively influential in shaping the self tends, by its nature, to 
disregard other, more collective aspects of psychological experience (ibid.).  The normalising 
imperatives of this discourse are, unfortunately, set against the backdrop of a psychoanalytic 
"establishment" which is, for ostensibly theoretical reasons, unyieldingly hierarchical (Frosh, 
2006, p. 275).  This fact, one imagines, may only compound the ready, omnipotent fantasy of 
ultimate and "sacred" knowledge engendered by rites of occupational closure.   
 
An aspect of the "authoritarian" training and admission culture of psychoanalytic institutions 
(Frosh, 2006, p. 275) which Samuels (1993) finds especially regrettable is the split between 
the "public, apolitical, hyper-clinical face of the profession", and the private personhood of 
clinicians well aware of their political context and history (Samuels, 1993, p. 265).  The 
image created by Samuels (1993) is one of a disingenuous professional persona, which is 
tireless in its search for intra-psychic attributions for the subjective struggle of its patients, 
whilst, in fact, battling to find personal balance between attendance to the internal and 
external exigencies of "real life".  It should be noted, though, that in his international survey 
study, it was British psychoanalysts who most thoroughly fulfilled the depoliticising stance 
which this scenario implies.  The professional reticence of psychoanalytic thinkers is 
identified by Gordon (1995, p. 277), who remarks that while he is able to name a "horde" of 
psychoanalysts expert in a range of chosen fields, none of these could be described as "a 
public intellectual" – that is, a thinker writing in socially relevant areas in a manner which is 
broadly accessible.  The oft quoted reason for this reticence is the nature of psychoanalytic 
clinical work, within which public visibility presents potential contamination of the 
transference relationship with psychotherapy patients.  Gordon (1995, p. 287) summarily 
dismisses this explanation as "precious", and "an excuse for doing nothing".  Exclusive 
"devotion" to the therapeutic endeavour, to Gordon (1995, p. 285) represents offering a 
palliative – a "band-aid" – to society, in lieu of substantive advocacy or activism towards 
materially transforming societal structures.  Instead of societal transformation, individual 
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change is facilitated, such that the ideological machinery which shapes human subjectivity 
may continue undisrupted.  It should be noted, though, that within depth oriented 
psychotherapy it is extremely difficult to maintain a focus on the "primary task" of the work – 
rigorous self-examination – whilst simultaneously offering recognition of the "reality" of, for 
example, an oppressive relationship. "Understanding" of such relationships is often simply too 
imbued with a recognition of the patient's own complicity for this to be feasible – the "crisp 
realities" of political action lie far from this complex, nuanced terrain.   
 
Upon the momentum of developments within feminism during the 1970s and 1980s, a turn 
within the social sciences toward psychoanalysis came into view, born of the beckoning 
possibility of closing the conceptual gap between our understandings of emotional states and 
socio-political processes (Figlio & Richards, 2002, p. 187).  What was hoped for by this 
cohort of thinkers was the elaboration of a "politics of everyday life" (ibid.), in which the 
dynamic interplay of factors such as social coercion, psychic agency, socialisation and 
identity may be woven together, fashioning a model of politically situated, yet psychological, 
personhood.  Regrettably, the fruits of psychoanalysis' role in this venture have been scant; "at 
best banal, and at worst deeply normative and conformist" (Gordon, 1995, p. 279).  
Psychoanalysis, it seems, has been retarded in its development of a "political" psychology 
through its exclusionary, dogged attachment to theoretical tenets which, notwithstanding their 
defensibility, remain un-tethered to socio-political phenomena.  For example, limiting one's 
analysis of the requirements for the "flowering" of the developing infant to concepts such as 
"good enough" mothering in the early years, and aspects of the normative matrix of the 
nuclear family, whilst providing for important layers of influence upon personality, arguably 
restricts the reach of explanation to a largely pre-political domain.   
 
Such limited conceptual frameworks, to Samuels (1993, p. 271) are "hopelessly passive in the 
face of problematic social and political structures".  Of course, it is not my intention to imply 
that concepts such as those describing early attachment and the milieu of infancy are not 
crucially important – I believe them to be so.  But where psychoanalysis has failed in its 
attempt to forge a politically situated theory of mind is in the connecting of conceptual 
threads, which bind and expand the familial model of personality development outward into 
the world of group political struggle.  Some influential developmentalists have attempted to 
create just such a concentric conceptual system (e.g. Bronfenbrenner, 1977), but this initiative 
has generally not been followed by theorists operating within the psychoanalytic frame (for an 
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exception, see Kraemer & Roberts, 1996a).  A situated psychoanalytic theory must locate the 
developmental exigencies of, for example, maternal containment and early experience, within 
psyches which negotiate lifelong social struggles in a profoundly unequal, discriminatory, 
often brutal and generally atomised social world.  But, crucially, this must be achieved 
without reducing social suffering to internal, individual frailty; instead, formulating models 
which make provision for organismic, interactive psycho-social outcomes.  Models which 
focus almost exclusively on the material, or the intra-psychic, are equally subject to a 
"defensive" denial of the reality and import of – respectively – psychological and political 
factors.  The splitting inherent in such accounts, furthermore, is all too readily utilised and 
reflected in similarly defensive understandings of the underpinnings of subjective experience 
within the individual – in other words, the idea that "it's all about my own weakness", or, "it's 
all about oppression".  These positions, in turn, may represent a psychic struggle with – again 
respectively – acknowledging the horrific realities of social oppression, or the dark truth of 
psychological conflict.  Of profound relevance to the concerns of this work, is the simple fact 
that the experience of oppression, of discrimination and prejudice at the hands of a cruel 
society, causes psychological damage to its target population.  The risks, thus, regarding the 
previous two sections' debate surrounding the "personal" aspects of disability experience, are 
heightened by the recognition that, if we examine the psychological functioning of disabled 
persons who have suffered lives of exclusion, trauma and denigration, we are very likely to 
find damage.  "Diagnosis" of this damage may then, all-too-easily, foreclose our analysis of 
its social origins in a manner which – true to the pitfalls of psychoanalysis – locates social 
suffering in personal shortcomings.   
 
Psychoanalysis' focus on the development of concepts to describe the ephemeral world of the 
internal has, further, shaped a research tradition severely lacking in scientific rigour (Frosh, 
2006, p. 275).  The model may, to sober, scientific thinkers, appear more as a religious 
framework than an empirical enterprise, showing a lack of capacity for systematic evidence-
gathering (ibid.), and – within opposing camps – the acceptance of conceptual knowledge on 
subjective, "doctrinal" grounds more than rational ones.  Generally, the discipline has failed in 
the quest to persuade thinkers outside of the "school" of the model's (I believe) incisive 
interrogative power.  Sadly, the discipline's repeated "retreat from collective engagement" 
since the social science turn to psychoanalysis some decades ago, has created a culture of  
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commentary, rather than direct, creative social initiative, thus missing the opportunity for a 
valuable debunking of the intra-psychic politics of everyday social life (Gordon, 1995, p. 
277).  What, then, does psychoanalysis have to offer us in the realm of a social psychological 
critique? 
 
To begin with, what psychoanalysis brings to the interrogation of society is a fruitful, 
provocative suspiciousness regarding the multi-determined nature of social actions.  In the 
words of Paul Hoggett (1992), the objective of psychoanalysis is to assist us in attempting to 
"lie to ourselves a little less than we do" (Hoggett, 1992, p. 3).  Human motivations are 
reliably complex and layered, imbued with latent valencies not reducible to an equation 
measuring the number of removes from the means of production.  Psychoanalysis introduces 
the ambivalence inherent in a kaleidoscope of human subjectivity, opening the door to the 
irrational, and upsetting the hoped-for predictability and stability of a unidimensional material 
world.  Despite the dreary reports on psychoanalysis' more recent attempts at developing a 
politically engaged agenda (e.g. Gordon, 1995; Frosh, 2006), a radical political strand in 
analytic theorising has a long history, beginning with Freud's Civilisation and its Discontents 
(Freud, 1930), through the work of the Frankfurt school, and the contributions of several 
influential feminist writers (Marks, 1999a, p. 5).  During the first half of the last century, it 
was Wilhelm Reich (Reich, 1945; 1946) who most actively advanced the possibilities of 
psychoanalysis as a revolutionary catalyst, constructing a synthesis of Marxist and 
psychodynamic ideas in an attempt to explain "irrational" social phenomena – not least, the 
rise to power of fascism (Hinshelwood & Chiesa, 2002a, p. 10).  For Reich (1946), the role of 
psychoanalysis in politics was clear:  
 
...the area in historical materialism where psychoanalysis has to fulfil a scientific 
function, which social economy is not in a position to accomplish:  the 
comprehension of the structure and dynamics of ideology, not of its historical 
basis.   
       (Reich, 1946, p. 28) 
 
What Reich's (1946) words point to is a theory of ideology as it works "in the head" of its 
interpellated subjects; that is, how the "facts" of political economy interact in a mutually 
constitutive dynamic with the nature of subjectivity.  The "emotional truth" which lies – or 
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"writhes" – in this psychological realm, it must be said, is a profoundly shifting and unstable 
one – the task of conceptualisation is hard.  Yet this fact does not in any way reduce the 
necessity, the imperative, to explore these complexities; indeed, what psychoanalysis can 
bring, to the exclusion of positivist frameworks, is a ready capacity to acknowledge "limits, 
gaps, vulnerability, and a lack of knowledge" in its analysis (Cooper & Treacher, 1995, p. 3).  
Within a historical materialist analysis of society, the identity of the villains – the enemy – is 
generally all too clear, in a manner which circumvents the "painful" reality that social 
relations are dynamic and collusory; that victims and perpetrators alike shape the ongoing 
social tangle which is oppression.  The role of unconscious forces in mediating such 
relationships is, thus, very substantial; dissonance is managed, in order that life may continue.  
While psychoanalysis may not offer directives regarding the "solutions" to these problems, 
the uncovering of the myriad of social "inadvertencies" engendered by unconscious motives 
nevertheless illuminates our understanding of where societal power lies (Gould, 1991, p. 37).  
Political and social structures are mirrored – and lived – in unconscious phantasy; it is 
essential that any thorough analysis of societal power relations is able to describe the battle 
lines of the internal, as well as the material, drama of engagement (Frosh, 2006, p. 174).   
 
In the findings of his international empirical survey of psychoanalytic practitioners in many 
countries, Samuels (1993) was to encounter many surprises.  Chief amongst these was the 
dramatic contradiction of his assumption that only a small minority of psychoanalysts would 
"confess" to having openly discussed political issues with their patients.  Samuels (1993) 
expected a picture to emerge of "a massive denial of the 'reality' of socio-political thematic 
material" brought into the clinical setting, with practitioners tending to "interpret away" such 
contextual factors as political instability or oppression (Samuels, 1993, p. 216).  This would 
have been unsurprising, considering the psychoanalytic proclivity for viewing such material 
as symbolic commentary on the transference relationship, or other aspects of intra-psychic 
conflict.  With the notable exception of the United Kingdom, his expectations were strongly 
disproved.  Samuels (1993, p. 235) experienced these findings as "truly amazing", and 
comments that this evidence calls into question the well-established view that psychoanalytic 
practitioners "pay no attention to political realities".  Samuels (1993, p. 51) elaborates upon 
his new-found optimism by arguing that, again contrary to expectations, psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy often does not dissipate individual rage at the horrors of social injustice, but 
rather focuses generalized feeling in a way which facilitates a directing of accountability at 
the social milieu.  In other words, intra-psychic exploration may be subversive in its 
undermining of defences of self-blame, via the interrogation of internalised authoritarian 
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figures.  Frosh (2006, p. 168) is noticeably decisive in declaring that prejudice and 
discrimination, be it on the basis of colour, gender, sexual orientation, disability or whatever, 
are never satisfactorily accounted for by explanatory models located solely in the social 
sphere.  These social ills, besides being played out on the terrain of manifest politics, are also 
deeply embedded in the internal realities of individual psychology, rendering, in the words of 
Michael Rustin, the "tenacity" of a phenomenon such as racism (Frosh, 2006, p. 168; Rustin, 
1991).  Surely, no theory of social life could aspire to completeness without engaging with 
subjectivity, emotion, and the non-linear nature of individual agency (Frosh, 2006, p. 275).  
What excites about psychoanalysis, if critically, courageously, and hence subversively, 
applied, is its potential to unlock in buried seams of consciousness realities which overturn 
stereotype and confound simplistic, reified views of the division of social power.  Unlike 
materialist accounts, psychoanalysis carries the capacity to interrogate, and hence to free from 
within.   
 
A key and ongoing debate surrounding the application of psychoanalysis to the socio-political 
realm can be traced back to the mid-twentieth century altercation between the so-called 
"Frankfurt school" (notably the theorists Marcuse and Adorno), and the "Revisionist 
psychoanalysts" (in particular, Fromm, Horney and Sullivan - Frosh, 2006, p. 174).  The crux 
of this debate centres on the "Revisionist" view that it is possible to separate out human 
"needs" from the nature of the prevailing social order, and the "critical" psychoanalysts of the 
Frankfurt school's rejection of this proposition (Frosh, 2006, p. 174).  In the minds of the 
Revisionists, the idea that "human psychological needs" are readily identifiable, and largely 
universal, created the potential for the forging of a psychoanalytically informed humanism, 
which would be in a position to prescribe which societal conditions are favourable, or 
harmful, to human psychological development (ibid.).  Within this view, optimal social 
circumstances may be created for human life, in which the full potentials of each individual 
may be reached.  Whilst these proposals for a mode of socially engaged psychoanalytic 
theorising seem sensible – and temptingly beneficial – at first glance, it is essential to be 
cognisant of the attendant ideological implications.  Within this position, if psychoanalysis is 
to be engaged with social change, it must endorse the existence of a "non-social subject"; in 
other words, a pre-social human self which, although developing within the social world, is 
not fundamentally conceived by it (ibid.).  Psychoanalysis may then issue "directives" on 
what this inherent "self" needs in order to flower.  There are at least two potentially pernicious 
ideological consequences of this state of affairs.  First, a pristine "self" is constructed as the 
only "real", and hence, "healthy" self – the sort of self that will respond positively to optimal 
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treatment.  Secondly, this posits a human psychic structure which is positioned as unassailable 
to the enquiries of deconstruction; that is, any interrogation of the role of ideological forces in 
the shaping of this "primary" psychological substrate is obviated (ibid., p.  175).  Wolfenstein 
(1990, p. 150), along with Marcuse and the balance of the Frankfurt school, regard the 
existence of such a self as dangerous fantasy.  If psychoanalysis is given authority to define 
the parameters of this "essential" self, the discipline locates itself consequently as the 
gatekeeper of normalcy; as an authority on what people "need", based upon a fixed, ahistoric 
notion of what people "are".   
 
For the Frankfurt school, every layer of psychic structure that we encounter in analytic work 
is always, already, a profoundly social phenomenon.  Failing to recognise this reality would 
lead to development of a "situation specific" psychoanalytic humanism, which would 
inevitably privilege psychological functioning which fulfils its normative expectations.  In my 
view, this theoretical direction embodies a calamitous missing of the essence of what 
psychoanalysis offers, which is a framework for interrogation which, in its ideal form, brings 
no normative expectations, and privileges no sacred cows.  Within the disability world, a 
"humanistic psychoanalysis" would, I believe, tend toward what might be termed a 
"rehabilitationist psychology", which identifies, a priori, whom the disabled subject "is", and 
consequently what she needs in order to "function" or "integrate" adequately within the 
prevailing, culturally specific, social order.  This route would, I fear, not only obstruct enquiry 
into the nature and ideological roots of disabled subjectivity, but consequently would miss the 
opportunity which this store of oppressed human struggle has for contributing to the broader 
understanding of socialisation, social life and the human condition.  The history of 
psychological theorising about disabled persons, based upon the assumption of inherent 
difference (see Psychoanalysis and disability: A brief history, p.73), creates a sinister 
backdrop to this view, foregrounding the all-too-familiar social propensity for the prescriptive 
control of disabled lives.  Any remotely universalising theory of the pre-social disabled 
psyche will tend to obstruct one's view of the highly complex, intricate and already carefully 
ideologically obscured roots of disablist culture, and hence socialisation.  In the disability 
phenomenon, we are confronted by prejudices which have exceptionally deep psychic roots, 
manifesting in social practices which, notwithstanding their brutality, remain bathed in 
normalcy, and hence invisible.  Penetrating the obscure frontiers of these unconscious cultural 
meanings will require dogged critique of the most rigorous and determined nature.  The 
question of where, theoretically, to place the experience of the ("critical realist") body within 
this framework, remains an awkward one; it involves holding the incisive instruments of 
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constructionism, whilst affirming the embodied nature of manifest impairment.  To 
Wolfenstein (1990, p. 150), the positing of the social as "objective" in opposition to a 
"subjective" individual embodies an illusory split, highlighting the awkwardness of 
psychoanalysis' encounter with Marxism.  He relates how Freud (1921), predicating the 
Revisionist position, missed the opportunity to create a truly social psychoanalysis by 
inserting a universalising structure – the notion of the primal horde – into his framework "in 
the place where human history should be" (ibid.).  In so doing, Freud, for the time being, 
confounded any possibility of theoretically integrating political reality into his psychology.  
Without this "mystification of history", arising out of Freud's "psychological individualism", 
the recognition might have emerged far earlier that psychoanalysis is "eo ipso, a social 
psychology" (Wolfenstein, 1990, p. 178).  The post-Freudian work of Klein and Bion present 
a more dialectical picture of personality development, which would seem to allow more for 
the interrogation of socialisation; this will be explored with particular reference to disability in 
later sections.  
 
The advent of Kleinian object relations theory (Klein, 1946; 1948; 1952; 1957) incorporated 
the conceptualisation of a new range of primitive mental functions with which to relate the 
intra-psychic with the socio-political realms (Hinshelwood & Chiesa, 2002a, p. 7).  Prior to 
these developments, the Freudian picture of political commitment relied largely on the notion 
of identification; this was the "glue" that connected the intra-psychic with social action.  
However, Kleinian concepts such as projection, introjection and projective identification for 
the first time provided for a bi-directional relationship with an external, and then internalised, 
object (ibid., p. 7).  The importance of these concepts to the business of understanding social 
action was, for Klein, a relatively insignificant issue, since she herself showed no interest in 
using analytic principles to unpack social process (ibid.).  It is Kleinian concepts which now 
largely embody the lingua franca of psychoanalytic critiques of society (Richards, 1989, p. 3), 
utilising a model in which the social group becomes viewed as a collectivity comprising, in 
fantasy, parts of the personalities of individuals (Hinshelwood & Chiesa, 2002a, p. 6).  Intra- 
and inter-group dynamics may then be understood as, at least in part, enactments of the 
internal dramas of ongoing object relations (ibid.).   
 
Within psychoanalytic theorising on social process utilising Kleinian concepts, it is the nature 
of defences erected against the intrusion of infantile, psychotic anxieties which most 
decisively shape social actions (Young, 1994, p. 74).  The psychic need to maintain 
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equilibrium in the face of threat, however, routinely perverts and distorts cognitions of social 
reality (Bion, 1961; 1967; 1970), in a manner which may obscure political contradictions, 
whilst rigidifying adherence to the status quo.  In other words, we may, for intra-psychic 
reasons, "need" to continue to construe social processes in a particular manner (Young, 1994, 
p. 74).  The actions of such defences (including splitting, projection and projective 
identification) constrict mental space, tending to reduce the world to a system of polarities, in 
which free, nuanced and creative apprehensions are banished from view.  Put simply, it is 
hard, when such defences are evoked, to think; to make a clear-minded, un-invested and 
equitable assessment of the manifest (ibid.).  It is within this reactionary psychic environment 
that primitive psychological processes facilitate the unconscious scapegoating of social 
minorities, such as disabled persons, for unconscious psychic ends.  To Young (1994, p. 82), 
these anxieties are a ubiquitous, inevitable aspect of psychological functioning, with the 
attendant defences therefore profoundly shaping culture and the nature of social institutions.  
Social change, consequently, is likely to require "analysis of the common anxieties and 
unconscious collusions underlying the social defences determining phantasy social 
relationships" (Jaques, 1955 cited in Young, 1994, p. 88).   
 
The psychotic defences which shape social institutions are, within Klein's model of psychic 
functioning, associated with the paranoid-schizoid position (Klein, 1946).  For Klein, the 
manifestation of psychotic forms of thought was not remote, not qualitatively removed from 
"everyday life".  Rather, her position makes provision for a "psychotic layer" within all – 
healthy and afflicted – minds, such that experiences which resonate with unconscious 
anxieties regularly raise, in all of us, psychotic modes of seeing the world.  Within the 
paranoid-schizoid position, which such psychically provocative experiences may re-evoke in 
us, parts of the ego become split off, and are experienced instead as aspects of the external 
world (as in projection and projective identification, to be examined later).  Here, an imminent 
threat to psychic equilibrium has provoked a drastic, contorted re-configuration of psychic 
elements, in a bid to evacuate unmanageable feelings such as shame or hostility (Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983, p. 130).  The world of fantasy conjured by this mobilisation of defences is 
populated with idealised good objects, set up in opposition to persecuting malevolent ones; a 
simple, denuded world of good and evil (Young, 1994, p. 78).  The prominent presence of 
paranoia – arising from the projection of malevolent aspects of the ego – make for a vicious, 
concrete, and desperately self-seeking mode of functioning; that is, one hostile in paranoid 
anticipation of violent, excoriating attack from the wicked forces which lurk at the edges of 
consciousness.  It is dark fears such as these which effectively hold the social order to ransom, 
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precluding change via the need to maintain the psychic splits so characteristic of intergroup 
behaviour.  Entry into a particular social group may involve entering into the key splits and 
projective identifications with which the group achieves (positive) differentiation from other 
groups (Young, 1994, p. 136).  A "complex and subtle interaction", continues Young, is 
woven between intra-psychic defences of the individual, and those of the social institution 
(Young, 1994, p. 136-7).  The defence system of the individual is repeatedly projected into 
the institutional defence system, while the social institution's defensive constructions are 
repeatedly introjected into the intra-psychic realm (ibid., p. 137).  Thus do group allegiances 
and individual strategies for the maintaining of psychic security become interwoven, mutually 
constitutive, and symbiotically self-perpetuating, rendering a groupwise profile of splitting, 
scapegoating and stereotyping which simultaneously fills unique, individual defensive needs 
(ibid.).   
 
As this chapter continues, the utility of these and other psychoanalytic concepts to the project 
of accounting for the ostracisation, denigration and cruelty perpetrated against disabled 
persons around the world, will be considered.  In opening this discussion, we turn now to a 
review of the history of psychoanalytic theorising on the issue of disability.   
 
Psychoanalysis and disability:  A brief history 
In documenting an unusual occurrence in the world of professional psychoanalysis – a 
psychoanalytic conference segment concerned with treating disabled patients – De La Torre 
(2002, p. 675) describes the issue of disability as "a topic that has been largely foreign to 
psychoanalysis".  Indeed, with regard to theorising on disability and psychic functioning, the 
silence from psychoanalytic quarters has, for much of the last century, been deafening 
(Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1981, p. 145).  This fact is bewildering; surely, one imagines, the 
experience of bodily impairment, with its concomitants of culturally embedded denigration 
and discrimination, should be of interest to a discipline concerned with mapping the depth and 
diversity of human subjectivity.  In reading this silence, one may consider a number of 
possible explanations: first, that psychoanalytic writers felt that there was no reason to believe 
that disability is associated with mental health concerns which necessitate its being afforded 
"special attention" within psychological theory.  The second, more ominous possibility is that 
psychoanalysis – perhaps inadvertently – constructs disabled persons as "too damaged" to 
benefit from the work of analytic psychotherapy.  Or, is there something about the mystique, 
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the evocativeness of impairment, which has rendered a subtle avoidance of the exploration of 
disabled subjectivity? On a more material level, it may be that the typically disadvantaged 
socio-economic position of disabled persons has placed their lives beyond the ken of the 
bourgeois world of couch and consulting room.  Evidence from the limited literature seems to 
indicate that psychoanalytic accounts, like the majority of psychological theorising on 
disability, assume that the onset of bodily difference necessarily brings with it pathological 
psychic reverberations (Lenny, 1993, p. 233; Asch & Rousso, 1985; Gill, 2001).  The 
stridently negative, at times damning, prognostications associated with these assessments lend 
credence to the idea of psychoanalysis' neglect of disability relating to an amalgam of anxious 
avoidance and therapeutic pessimism.  The key issue which forms the backdrop to these 
reflections pertains to the origins of the psychological difficulties experienced by disabled 
persons.  Of course, not all disabled persons encounter psychological problems, but, as in any 
population, a proportion will.  Writing from a social model perspective, Oliver (1993a, p. 61) 
argues that nondisabled mental health professionals have, largely, viewed such difficulties as 
emanating from the functional limitations which arise from impairment.  The disability 
movement, conversely, has averred that it is not bodily difference, but the failure of social and 
physical environments to provide equitably for the needs of the impaired that is at the root of 
the emotional distress evidenced by some of their number (Oliver, 1993a, p. 61).  An 
influential piece of "rehabilitationist" research which is held in infamy by disability studies is 
that of Miller and Gwynne (1972), who portrayed the disabled persons in the institutional 
settings which they studied as having psychological difficulties which were an inevitable 
outpouring of their physical "limitations" (Miller & Gwynne, 1972; Morris, 1993a, p. 86).  
This penchant for forging causal links between the nature of bodies and the health of psychic 
functioning is echoed through most psychoanalytic contributions on the subject of disability.   
 
Adrienne Asch and Harilyn Rousso (1985), in their cutting critique of psychoanalytic 
theorising on disability, describe how, in general, this work has done much to compound and 
reinforce prejudicial stereotypes regarding the emotional functioning and potential for 
productivity and intimacy of disabled persons (Asch & Rousso, 1985, p. 1).  Much 
psychoanalytic literature, tacitly or overtly, constructs disabled persons as (relatively) 
unanalysable, due to the (believed) ubiquitous presence in this population of poor levels of 
ego integration, compounded by primitive psychic defence structures (ibid., p. 4).  The logic 
of these investigations is one which seeks a direct impact of bodily impairment upon 
personality development; that is, purporting to "read" what of the self is "written" on the 
body.  Having predicated their work upon this assumption, the attention of such investigations 
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then moves to questions regarding the extent to which the "psychological effects of 
impairment" are "inevitable, preventable or modifiable" (ibid.).  By way of example, Thomas 
and Siller (1999) recount that typical reactions to disability include "depression, withdrawal, 
shame, overcompensation and denial", as well as "considerable sensitivity about the 
disability" and "feelings of inferiority" which are managed via a "generalised hostility"  
(Thomas & Siller, 1999, p. 182; Siller, 1963; see also Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1981, p. 145).  
Whilst each of these "sequelae" are not discounted, and are quite plausible, the key issue at 
hand is that little or no mention is made in this body of research of the potential pathogenic or 
harmful effects of the exclusion, prejudice, discrimination and denigration which are the 
hallmarks of disabled life in most societies.  In a retrospective review of analytic work in the 
area, Castelnuovo-Tedesco (1981) identifies the overwhelming focus on bodily factors within 
this literature, but in no way problematises this.  With a similar disregard for ideological 
concerns, a range of authors echo Thomas and Siller (1999) in identifying unmastered 
aggression as a common emotional consequence of bodily defect, with severe maladaptive 
implications emanating from a lack of ego maturity (Bornstein, 1977; Burlingham, 1961; 
Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1981; Niederland, 1965; Ogden, 1974).      
 
Perhaps the psychological effect of impairment most reliably suggested by this legacy of 
psychoanalytic theorising is that of narcissistic pathology (Harris & Wideman, 1988, p. 117; 
Davis, 2002).  Although, as we shall see, Freud's utterances on the issue of disability are 
somewhat ambiguous, Niederland (1965, p. 518) buttresses his own position by pointing to 
the fact that the father of psychoanalysis viewed work with patients with "organic disease" as 
a key route to understanding narcissism (Freud, 1914, p. 550-51).  Note, at this point, that for 
the purposes of explication of my key difficulties with this early legacy of psychoanalytic 
theorising on disability, Niederland's (1965) work will be examined in some detail; with some 
minor variation in positions taken by this clutch of writers, my primary objection to their 
position is brought clearly to light in his writings.  For Niederland (1965, p. 518), bodily 
"defects" may function as "nodal psychological factor[s]" in the "genesis and perseverance" of 
narcissistic disturbance".  This purported disturbance relates to the assumption that a 
"damaged" body (from infancy or childhood) will necessarily lead to distortions of the body 
ego, which, via projection, will render a distorted picture of the world (ibid.; Castelnuovo-
Tedesco, 1981).  The potential import of this cause-effect assertion for the manner in which 
subjective distress experienced by disabled persons is interpreted, borders on the horrific; the 
"damage" which manifests in such distress is forcibly "pushed" into the body, cementing the 
locus of lack, of defect, of failure, within the individual as an inevitable consequence of a 
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"spoiled" body.  Further, this assertion constructs disabled people as carrying an inherent 
psychological "difference" which – unavoidably – emanates from within, as a result of 
"organic factors".  Perception of self and other and reality testing, evolving against the 
backdrop of an "essentially bodily self-image and cathexus" based on an "oral-tactile" early 
concept of body, are viewed as doomed to severe distortion (Hoffer, 1950 cited in Niederland, 
1965, p. 527).  The "damage" which inheres in body and body ego, in turn, is responded to 
within this portrayal by a range of desperate, narcissistic defensive distortions, such as 
aggrandisement, magical thinking, secretiveness, aggression, and a florid fantasy life, replete 
with such themes as revenge, immortality, and birth-rebirth (Niederland, 1965, p. 521; 
Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1981, p. 146).  Niederland (1965) restricts his analysis to subjects who 
have had bodily impairments since birth or early childhood, thus arguing that basic body ego 
development has been distorted, via the "oral-tactile" apprehension of the "bodily self".  
However, the onset of impairment in later life has, elsewhere within the psychoanalytic 
literature, analogously been viewed as a potent assault on the ego (Lenny, 1993, p. 236; 
Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1981, p. 146).  Again, an asocial, cause-effect relationship between 
body and body ego is tacitly postulated, fulfilling cultural scripts of disablement as "personal 
tragedy", rather than social injustice.   
 
A central question for our consideration is whether it is reasonable to argue that the pre-social 
experience of an impaired body may, or will, lead to body ego distortion and concomitant 
narcissistic injury.  Freud (1923, p. 636) wrote that the ego is "first and foremost a bodily 
ego"; the ego is "a projection" of the surface of the body.  This would seem to suggest that the 
nature of bodies directly informs the nature of the body ego, hence carrying formative 
influence over the ego.  Of interest, though, is the question of whether culturally condensed 
assessments of value pertaining to the normalcy of bodies mediate this "reflection" of the 
body as it is precipitated into a body ego.  Writers such as Niederland (1965) view the 
imprinting  of narcissistic injury upon the ego arising from "basic physical experiences" as 
unproblematic (Niederland, 1965, p. 522 – my emphasis).  But elsewhere, Freud (1914, p. 
561) seems to intimate a far more "ideologically situated" view of bodily difference or 
disease.  He writes:   
In the aetiology of neuroses organic inferiority and imperfect development play 
an insignificant part.  Neuroses make use of such inferiorities as a pretext, just as 
they do of every other suitable factor.  
      (Freud, 1914, p. 561) 
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 Here, Freud (1914) locates bodily difference clearly as secondary to psychic functioning – 
that is, suggesting that somatic "defects" may be utilised as a rationalising "kernel of truth" 
which allows material sense to be made of what are, in fact, purely psychic, neurotic 
phenomena.  Winnicott (1965) places strong emphasis on the physicality of bodily experience 
in shaping what he terms "the imaginative self" (Winnicott, 1965, p. 244).  Dwelling within, 
and exploring the "inside" and "outside" of the "live body" provides the subject matter, the 
shape and sensation, of the coalescing self (ibid.; Erskine & Judd, 1994).  But crucially, this 
does not mean that without the distorted socialisation which is so often the corollary of bodily 
difference, that the impaired body would nevertheless come to be experienced, in a primary 
way, as damaged.  The body which the congenitally impaired infant possesses is the only 
body which he or she has ever experienced; its boundaries and shape, its motility and 
sensation – these are not aspects set against pre-existing ideals, but primary apprehensions of 
a unitary self.  It is difficult to see how evaluative judgments, impacting upon the incremental 
solidifying of self, can take form without the mediation, the mirroring influence, of the social 
world.   
 
Asch and Rousso's (1985) core criticism of the legacy of "traditional" psychoanalytic research 
on disability is expressed by the authors as follows:  "Our major criticism ... is that by asking 
what impact a physical disability has on adult psychopathology, many authors overlook the 
impact of parental, familial and societal treatment on the psychological development of their 
disabled patients" (Asch & Rousso, 1985, p. 6).  This keen observation is at once compelling 
and disturbing.  What it might suggest is that the gripping evocations associated with 
disability have led psychoanalytic thinkers to temporarily abandon or disregard basic 
theoretical tenets of their orientation.  To explain:  it seems reasonable to assume that 
researchers operating within most psychoanalytic frameworks would place the influence of 
the family at centre stage in shaping the development of individual psychic functioning, be it 
of an adaptive or pathological sort.  Yet, astonishingly, this principle seems to have been 
discarded here.  Perhaps the hegemony of individualising modes of attribution pertaining to 
disability has permeated the views of these authors to the extent that, inter alia, the role of the 
responses of primary attachment figures in shaping the experiences of self and other of their 
impaired offspring is hardly considered (e.g. see Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1981).  One of 
Niederland's (1965, p. 521) research subjects, a woman with a paralysed arm, is portrayed in 
his analysis as manifesting strong signs of grandiosity which are attributable to her 
impairment.  After recounting this interpretation, he then informs his reader of how she was 
kept in traction – flat on her back, and presumably in hospital – for most of her first year of 
 78
life.  Niederland makes no significant mention of the potentially definitive aetiological import 
of this experience, instead moving quickly to a consideration of her "revenge fantasies", 
involving bodily dismemberment, mutilation, and the like.  Again, there is no reason to 
question or doubt the presence of, say, revenge fantasies within this woman; the key question 
is, revenge upon whom, and for what?  There is an inherent – even glaring – contradiction 
within a logic which attributes such phenomena as fantasies of revenge or grandeur to asocial 
origins.  Surely, our investigation should be directed toward the culturally condensed 
meanings of lived bodies, rather than the material, banal "presumed" body.  Psychoanalytic 
research which inadvertently performs the sleight of hand of conflating primary, "natural" 
bodily experience with cultural, evaluative bodily experience fail to heed the words of Susan 
Bordo cited earlier.  These authors set up "impaired" bodily experience, even in infancy, 
against the myth of a "natural" body – a body which does not exist; instead, "natural" is "the 
script of culture writ large on the body" (Bordo, 1993 cited in Michalko, 2002, p. 58).  This 
comment is not intended to diminish or question the embodied reality of impairment; rather, 
what must be emphasised is the social nature of meanings and significations attached to that 
impairment.  Put simply, Niederland, Bornstein, Burllingham and others fail to investigate 
how their impaired patients have been responded to throughout their developmental years, by 
– in all probability – a fretful and frightened social world, deeply unready to engage with the 
shameful evocations and ambiguity of disablement.  Later in the same paper, Niederland 
(1965, p. 529) does add a few caviats to the rather bald statements recounted above.  He 
writes:  
 
While noting these relations between disturbed ego development and early 
physical defectiveness, I wish to emphasise that I do not regard the latter as the 
sole pathogenic influence in their clinical picture.  I believe, rather, that the 
defect, in addition to its significance as a concretising and organising experience 
of pathogenic import from early childhood, adds a 'kernel of truth' quality and 
multidimensional aspects to the pathological fantasies which are likely to arise 
during the developmental phases.   
      (Niederland, 1965, p. 529) 
  
What the author seems to suggest here is that, to some extent, the impairment becomes – in 
Freud's (1914) words – a "pretext" into which more basic and universal relational conflicts are 
projected.  Notwithstanding this helpful "afterthought", the overwhelming emphasis, and 
interpretive logic, of Niederland's account reflects a profound circumvention of social factors 
in mediating development.  Relational considerations are named here in the abstract, but no 
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space or real endeavour is devoted to imagining the contours of such dynamics.  The 
compelling nature of the damaged body, instead, entrenches itself into a virtual monopoly of 
attributive meaning.    
 
If bodily impairment is so evocative, so compelling, to psychoanalysts as to bias attribution 
so, surely its "counter-transferential" effect upon parents of "defective" neonates will – 
especially during the crucial early years of life – be equally or more significant.  The effect of 
systemic anxieties surrounding sight impaired infants and children, often manifesting in 
bizarre, even perverse distortions in socialisation and education, has been movingly, and at 
times disturbingly, documented (e.g. Chapman, 1978; French, 1993b; see also Scott, 1969; 
Armstrong, 2005).  In the psychoanalytic study of congenitally blind children, attempts have 
typically been made to conceptualise the impact of the "naked" absence of sight upon 
developing object relations (Blank, 1957; Bornstein, 1977; Burlingham, 1961; Nagera & 
Colonna, 1965; Omwake & Solnit, 1961; Wright, 1991).  These accounts proffer quite 
unilaterally pessimistic prognoses for what they view as the personality "sequelae" of 
development without vision.  For example, Burlingham (1961, p. 131) argues that blind 
children are restricted in adaptively managing aggression, through the lack of apprehension of 
the consequences of their actions via the visual modality.  Assumptions, thus, were often 
made by the children she studied that their actions brought about catastrophic effects, tending 
to lead to a constriction and anxiety surrounding agency.  With a similar tone, Bornstein 
(1977) observes that blind children are "reduced to helplessness and panic" upon repeatedly 
failing to verify their mother's existence, through the unsatisfactory, cumulatory modality of 
audition (Bornstein, 1977, p. 25; Wright, 1991).  The blind children studied by Bornstein 
(1977) showed very poor object constancy at 3 years, as against the typical achievement of 
this milestone at about 1 year by control children.  Correspondingly, Nagera and Colonna 
(1965, p. 271) reported how, in contrast to sighted children, blind children remained largely 
rooted in pre-phallic phases of drive development.  In making sense of this they argue that 
blindness interferes so profoundly with identifying environmental means of gratification that 
such means, when "captured", tend to lead to a fixated preoccupation which prevents their 
being abandoned, and consequently constrains development.  Lastly, Omwake and Solnit 
(1961) describe a therapeutic intervention with a blind girl: while directing attention to the 
traumatic experiences of her first three years of life as influential in her (disturbed) 
development, these authors then frame her impairment as causal in her psychopathology, 
arguing that her "consequent" under-stimulation rendered it impossible for her to develop 
psychic imagery necessary for the solidifying of the structural foundations of repression.  
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Kenneth Wright's (1991) influential contribution to this area has been critiqued in some depth 
elsewhere (Watermeyer, 2002).  What all of these contributions share is a fascination with the 
"dark world" of blindness, which stunts and distorts the potentially incisive power of an object 
relations analysis of the dynamic effects of blindness in infancy.  The conceptualisations 
offered by these authors, quite simply, are lacking in a rigorous interrogation of the relational 
implications of impairment; that is, the multifarious, largely unconscious, impact of infantile 
blindness upon the delicate development of the early dyadic relationship, as this sets a tone 
for later, systemic constructions of self and other.  As shall be argued in the following section, 
the extraordinary capacity of disability to evoke primitive anxieties in the other, may 
profoundly disrupt the early developmental milieu, rendering potentially calamitous 
distortions in key areas such as containment and mirroring.  Reference within the work cited 
above to, for example, inadequate stimulation, is typically made with no attention whatsoever 
to issues such as parents' struggle in developing a healthy sense of secure belief in their 
capacity to contain and manage this unexpected, perhaps "tragic" arrival – a blind infant.  
Again, one would imagine that these issues, viz. the nature and management of parental 
fantasies and fears surrounding the capacity to parent, to imagine and hold the fantasised 
internal world of their child – would be of primary, definitive concern to psychoanalytic 
researchers.  Instead – and familiarly – the emphasis of all these analyses begins with, and 
remains entranced with, the somatic.  Where attention should be carefully directed to issues 
such as the attuned responsivity of an anxious, ambivalent, and probably un-informed world, 
Bornstein (1977) instead remains preoccupied with "infantile masturbatory conflicts".  The 
realness of such conflicts, as noted earlier, is not in doubt; but it is the tacit or overt 
attributions made regarding the origins of these that are of paramount importance.  Surely, it 
is incontrovertible that "symptoms" such as difficulties with channelling aggression, anxiety 
at not "finding" a parent and consequent poor object constancy, and a lack of appropriate 
gratification due to paucity of stimulation, are all situations with, at the least, a substantial 
relational dimension.  It is only when one begins by peering in the direction of relational 
factors that the profound, formative influence of such dynamics begins to crystallize.  
Dangerously, these dynamics may produce effects which masquerade all-too-readily as the 
sequelae of impairment; at least in the, at times, extravagant imaginations of minds captured 
by bodily "defect.  By way of one further example, Berger (1967), although developing ideas 
on chronic illness rather than disability, emphasises the experience of feeling "unknowable" 
as a virtually ever-present feature of the subjective nature of this personal situation.  Again, 
this layer of experience is attributed, in a largely pre-social manner, to somatic factors 
(Berger, 1967 cited in Erskine, 1994, p. 49).  Now, if, as we are beginning to see, the 
experience of disability or illness is likely to often be marked with ongoing misattunements 
and "empathic failures" rendered by a world which is anxious, reluctant, or even manifesting 
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of a hostility borne of threat, then feeling "unknown", and hence probably "unknowable" is a 
more than likely consequence.  Yet here, we fall readily into the presumption that it is not an 
experience of feeling unknowable – a relational artifact – which is at work; rather, it is the 
"modernist" reality of being unknowable.  Whilst these positions reflect variations in 
emphasis, rather than a categorical contrast, it is my position that a rigorous focus on the 
relational is typically required in order to overcome our deeply socialised, stereotyping 
attributions which "favour" the body.  To some extent, Freud's most significant contribution 
to theorising on disability, entitled The Exceptions (Freud, 1916), falls into similar snares.  It 
is of sufficient interest to deserve special attention, and will thus be considered in some detail 
in a later section (see Disability and the distortion of personal and psychic boundaries: 
Introduction, p.260)  
 
The characteristic flaws of emphasis described above may, in psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
with disabled persons, render oppressive and biasing attributions which may serve to cement, 
rather than subvert, internalised, individualising defences of self-denigration (Lenny. 1993, p. 
236).  The flawed logic of such attributions is contradicted by a host of research findings cited 
by Olkin (1999), which demonstrate that the degree of severity of impairment is not correlated 
with assessments of psychological adjustment (Olkin, 1999, p. 67).  In other words, the 
mediating influence of relational factors is underscored by the finding that "greater" severity 
of impairment does not imply more substantial psychological morbidity.  A further, ominous 
fragment of evidence directing attention towards the relationships which surround 
impairment, rather than some fantasy of its solipsistic course, is the finding that impairment 
within the child has predictive value in the precipitation of violent child abuse (Milowe & 
Lourie, 1964 cited in Friedrich & Boriskin, 1976).  At particular risk were children whose 
impairment required some special provision in interaction (such as sight or hearing 
impairment), with a child's perceived unresponsiveness triggering violent assault by a parent 
(ibid.).   
 
In closing this brief critique, we come full circle, returning to De La Torre's (2002) account of 
three presentations on therapeutic work with disabled patients delivered at a psychoanalytic 
conference in the United Kingdom. Like much of the work cited above, there is no sign in this 
account of an awareness of disability as an axis of oppression, or as an identity phenomenon 
likely to profoundly shape socialisation.  The impairments of patients in the three 
contributions are described, but the culture of constructions, of responses, to these 
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impairments is not touched upon; the word discrimination does not appear.  What these 
authors combine in tracing, is the invisible outline of an illusory construct of the "disabled 
personality"; the "issues" of impaired persons, which require therapeutic attention in order 
that these may be "overcome".  The complex, layered, and – I believe – definitive influence of 
social factors in giving meaning, life and valency to the impaired bodies of these patients 
remain uninterrogated, and in all probability take up a reconstructed, malignant residence as 
subjective "flaws", rather than aspects of oppression.  An alternative, critical psychoanalytic 
view of disability, which aims expressly to cross-examine cultural factors in shaping its 
situated, lived reality, has been pioneered in the work of Deborah Marks (Marks, 1999a).  We 
consider, and expand upon, her approach during the course of the following section.    
 
A critical psychoanalytic view of disability 
In embarking upon an interrogation of social responses to disability, Marks (2002a, p. 2) 
locates unconscious processes as pivotal.  With Obholzer and Roberts (1994), she asserts that 
both conscious and unconscious processes are "inextricably intertwined" with the shaping and 
flux of social structures (Marks, 2002a, p. 2).  What this means is that the contoured 
landscape of the social order is constituted and reconstituted mutually, in ongoing 
reverberation, with its intra-psychic reflection.  Social structures, thus, exist for "over-
determined" reasons, serving both manifest and logical, as well as latent and irrational – that 
is, personal – purposes.  Psychoanalysis, consequently, must take up a privileged position in 
our work, due to its unique capacity to conceptualise the fantasy structures which resonate 
with, and shape, political forces (Frosh, 2006, p. 174).  The predominantly individual focus of 
traditional psychoanalysis, besides presenting the risk of ideologically sterile analyses, can be 
thought of as a strength here, through its spacious ability to shape its description around the 
myriad of unique, individual aspects of subjective life.  The challenge, as noted by a range of 
authors, is to weave such intra-psychic and personal aspects of functioning into a socio-
historical and group-based analysis, which does not reduce social processes to individual 
neurotic foibles (Gordon, 1995, p. 279).  If one accepts the inter-penetration of social and 
psychic – in particular, the deep, intricate configurations of investments in social outcomes 
with which the mind is woven together – then one must simultaneously acknowledge that 
progressive moral changes in society will involve painful psychic struggle (Cooper & 
Treacher, 1995, p. 7).  In other words, such change will require that the deep, unconscious 
significations which contributed to the perpetuation of certain social ways of being must be 
abandoned, rendering disequilibrium which will require new strategies for functional psychic 
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compromise.  Defensive profiles, in short, will have to be re-configured.  Figlio and Richards 
(2002, p. 197) neatly capture this point, describing how, if one is to make sense of the impulse 
towards "civil defence", it is essential that one understands the strategy whereby this becomes 
the "vehicle" for "psychic defence".  Of particular interest to our discussion of contested 
political models of disability oppression, however, is their further comment that such 
interpretation of the unconscious underpinnings of social conflict tends to muddy the 
"automatic rightness" of struggle politics (ibid.).  As splits are interrogated and complex 
ambivalences revealed, crude vilifications are rendered less credible, and less sustainable.  It 
is this "new and important embodied and psychological dimension" which psychoanalysis 
brings to the critical study of disability (Marks, 1999a, p. 2), which dismays the certainties of 
depersonalised materialist accounts.   
 
Evidence for the unconscious rootedness of the social order is to be found in the reality that 
such social ills as racism and disability-based discrimination are not ameliorated by simple 
educational interventions (Marks, 1999a, p. 13: Zizek, 1990).  It is not merely a "lack of 
awareness" which maintains these evils, but something far more tenacious and obstinate; to 
some extent, these phenomena embody a ransom for psychic stability in the lives of those 
who have unwittingly appropriated, and been appropriated by, their societal concomitants.  In 
the arena of racial struggle, it was all too clear to Fanon (1952, p. 224) that equality could not 
be won by simply compiling a case structured within the logic and rationality of conscious 
discourse (Davids, 1996, p. 214).  Instead, the ascribed, unconscious meanings of skin colour 
were to be interrogated.  Within this set of presumptions, a socially constructed identity 
formation such as "disabled", comes to be formed, reified and internalised in a manner which 
shapes and entrenches identity-meanings and relations of both disabled and nondisabled 
persons.  In a sense, all come to inadvertently "rely" on the continued existence of these 
"socio-psychic instruments".  Observable "disability phenomena", such as special schools, 
rehabilitation units, residential care facilities and so forth, thus can begin to be "interpreted" 
as outpourings of systems of defence surrounding the particular store of unconscious material 
which is evoked by, or related to, the idea of disablement.  The highly irrational, brutal, 
perverse and contradictory treatment of disabled persons in all societies surely must point to a 
relatively centralised, and profoundly influential store of unconscious investment within the 
general population.  The critical question which arises, thus, pertains to what this store of 
unconscious meanings surrounding disability is composed of.   
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Although not explicitly working within a psychoanalytic framework, Thomson (1997b, p. 43) 
provides an eloquent description of the symbolic burden carried by disabled persons in her 
society:  
 
The disabled body stands for the self gone out of control, individualism run 
rampant: it mocks the notion of the body as compliant instrument of the limitless 
will and appears in the cultural imagination as ungovernable, recalcitrant, 
flaunting its difference as if to refute the fantasy of sameness implicit in the 
notion of equality.  Even more troubling, disability suggests that the cultural 
other lies dormant within the cultural self, threatening abrupt or gradual 
transformations from 'man' to 'invalid'.   
      (Thomson, 1997b, p. 43)  
 
Disabled persons, for Thomson (1997b), have come to be socially – psychically – positioned 
as the symbolic custodians of damage, brokenness, frailty and defect.  Disabled lives, 
consequently, are reliably constructed within western society as dysfunctional and spoiled 
(Marks, 1999a, p. 12).  Similarly, Shakespeare (1994) sees disabled people as symbolically 
appropriated by society as “ciphers” (or “dustbins”) for those “feelings, processes or 
characteristics” with which nondisabled persons cannot deal, rendering the “cementing” of 
these negatively valued aspects to the disabled community (Shakespeare, 1994, p. 287).  A 
psychoanalytic – in particular, object relations – view of human development posits that 
emotional "holding" is by its very nature always imperfect (Winnicott, 1947).  The young 
infant, consequently, is subject to progressive "disillusionment" as she or he grows in 
becoming accustomed to an increasingly separate existence in a subjectively threatening 
world.  Experiences of the terror of abandonment, thus, are universal, and vary only in 
intensity with the complex interlacing of infantile temperament and parental goodness-of-fit.  
Later development will, amongst much else, bring further imperatives to separate, the 
competitiveness of school, anxieties regarding intellectual and sexual adequacy, concerns 
about acceptability and the capacity to be loved, and fears of dependency in an often cruelly 
autonomous world.  The psychic conflict inherent within the psychodynamic model of mind 
allows for the selective repression – the splitting off – of memories and attendant emotions 
which surround the long and inevitably bumpy road of maturation.  Survival dictates that the 
conscious acknowledgement and "working through" of this store of trauma be selective, 
limited and functional, such that psychic stability is maintained, and the ongoing tasks of life 
can continue to be negotiated.  All, thus, carry unconscious seams of suffering, described by 
Marks (1999a, p. 176) as "universal existential anxieties".  Notions and images of disability 
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may provide convenient, tangible and sanctioned objects for their elicitation and "vicarious" 
management.  Further, the lack of realistic and even-handed representations of the experience 
of disability, working in concert with the utilisation of "the Disabled" as containers for 
unconscious conflicts, ensures that the perceived "emotional experience" of disability remains 
regarded as not only different to the normative struggles of human life, but as inconceivable 
and alien to the subjectivity of nondisabled normalcy (Wendell, 1996, p. 43).  This, therefore, 
further entrenches the illusion of sanctity offered by strategies of disavowal such as projection 
and projective identification.  Correspondingly, though, a consideration of psychoanalytic 
accounts of unconscious fears, feelings and struggles surrounding normality and acceptability 
reveals that "those [perceived] aspects of disability which generate most anxiety are precisely 
those areas of human experience which many people struggle with" (Marks, 1999a, p. 170).  
The disability arena, with its volatile combination of identification, stereotyped 
sentimentalism, ostracisation and "invalidity", and romanticised redemption, offers a semantic 
landscape brimming with fantasy potential.  This mesmerising, magnetic valency is pictured 
by Marks (1999a, p. 11) as it plays itself out in a common street interaction involving a 
visibly disabled person.  She writes:  
 
As in a child told not to stare, the desire to look, combined with a fear of 
something dangerous and unthinkable, yet intriguing, create a heady mix of 
prurience, insecurity and avoidance of the subject. 
      (Marks, 1999a, p. 11) 
 
In this vignette, the onlooker is captivated, yet appalled; she desires unconsciously to 
apprehend a fragment of herself in the other, yet is simultaneously repelled by the impetus of 
a fracturing split which severs subjective commonality.  In the disabled life before her, she 
sees tragedy, sinister darkness, loss, the unknown; every aspect an affront to her hopes and 
aspirations (Hunt, 1998, p. 16).  In the face of such unstable, catalytic evidence of the 
dreaded, a moment allows little choice other than deflection and dislocation; the alternative is 
to acknowledge that of which disability is a harbinger – "that life is tragic and we shall all 
soon be dead" (ibid.).  The repeated, mostly unquestioned attaching of representations of 
disability to these sinister, shadowy aspects of the human condition, ensures that unconscious 
emotional transactions involving the positioning of disabled persons as tragic and wretched 
victims of nature continues unabated, and probably largely unnoticed by all concerned.  To 
question or deny this "natural order" would be to cast into doubt the crucial illusion of 
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essential difference which is at the heart of othering; it would be to re-position disabled 
persons as human subjects who suffer oppression, as I might, and suffer the frailty of the 
body, as I will.  This readmission of disabled persons into the human empathic fold would 
carry with it the imperative to acknowledge that society is "shot through with inequity", to 
which all are vulnerable; in this sense disabled persons "represent a fearsome possibility" 
(Murphy, 1987, p. 117).   
 
All relating, throughout life, is deeply shaped by aspects of emotional transference (Klein, 
1952, p. 201).  Yet, against this backdrop, the presence of disability within the predominant 
Western cultural milieu provokes the incidence of heightened, channelized and focal 
evocations which situate disabled persons as the personifications of the disavowed self of the 
modern subject.  Bion (1957) constitutes human subjectivity as necessarily composed of a 
flux of psychotic and non-psychotic elements, shifting with alterations in the salience of 
disturbed psychic elements.  Here, attacks upon subjectivity from internal objects may be 
stimulated by symbolic resonances apprehended in the external world, harnessing primitive 
defences which distort reality for the preservation of psychic integrity (Bion, 1957; Hoggett, 
1992).  It is the specific distortions characteristic of the psychotic defences – to be examined 
in the following section – which are of particular relevance as we interrogate prevalent 
stereotypes regarding disabled persons.  It is my contention that the primitive conflicts which 
are the ready evocations triggered by disability, in turn lead to social responses to disabled 
persons which are marked by a regression into concrete, paranoid and elementary modes of 
cognitive functioning – within Klein's (1947) schema, the hallmarks of the paranoid-schizoid 
position.  As described earlier, this mode of being provides no room for a reflective, 
interpreting subject; instead, both inner and outer worlds are reacted to via immediate, 
unmediated and paranoid psychic acts of accusation and self-protection.  I will attempt to 
demonstrate that engaging with the fantasies which cluster around disability within most 
cultures, renders the squeezing away of the thought-space required to soften and re-align 
cognition in a manner which de-polarises stereotyped splits – in Ogden's (1986) words, the 
space "in between" self and experience (Ogden, 1986 cited in Hoggett, 1992, p. 83).  This, 
crucially, allows for the availability to consciousness of more than one standpoint vis-a-vis a 
particular stimulus (ibid.).   
 
Richards (1986, p. 106) explains how social injustices, as well as interventions aimed at 
managing these, are often especially magnetic to the projection of various personal conflicts 
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and experiences of psychic fragmentation.  This may render the consequence that socio-
political actions which purport to resolve contradictions within society may, at an 
unconscious level, attract very personal hopes for healing or relief (ibid.).  As, I believe, in the 
fraught case of the charity discourse which dominates cultural constructions of disability, 
these personal investments in the "recognition" of struggle or loss may, in fact, cement 
demeaning representations, thus confounding social change.  We need, perhaps, to identify 
with the struggle and loss, but we also need the struggle to continue, in order that a chronic 
desire for discharge may be provided for.  Social institutions, thus, whilst aiming to transform 
the status quo, will often become entangled in complex and paradoxical investments from 
within and without, rendering a sabotage of precisely the changes which were initially desired 
(Fenichel, 1946 cited in Menzies-Lyth, 1988, p. 284; Bion, 1962a; Foster, 2001).  Within the 
society's vision of disability – a turgid and shifting world richly laden in subjective poignancy 
– the definitive effects of constant waves of projection and introjection can hardly be 
overestimated (Klein, 1959, p. 250).  Judgment, consequently, remains unstable.   
 
Gordon (1995, p. 280) questions the extent to which the facilitating of insight into the intra-
psychic "functioning" of social processes will reap benefits in terms of substantive social 
change.  To exemplify, Gordon (1995) declares that it was no help whatsoever, during the 
course of the first Gulf war, to be informed that the global political landscape at that time was 
dominated by hails of projection.  Whilst this instance may be true, in the case of disability, I 
disagree with the principle.  Unlike intercontinental warfare, disablism occurs in some of its 
most profound forms within relationships of intimate proximity; between professionals and 
patients, parents and children, "carers" and "cared for".  Of course, in the Gulf war case 
mentioned above, the issue of anti-Islamic prejudice – with or without military activity – is 
central.  Yet, I contend that disablist prejudices lie that much more deeply, interdependently 
embedded within dominant cultural formations – invisibly hegemonic within cultural 
groupings, beginning with the family.  Within this tightly bound meaning-system, perpetually 
rich with unquestioned projective and introjective activity, insight which facilitates the 
recognition and (partial) integration of split off aspects of personality "lived" through 
disability narrative, can hardly be over-valued.  To begin with, in the lives of persons who 
have grown up with congenital impairments, the degree of insight into these processes 
amongst parents must be recognised as crucial.  Considering the intricate interweaving of 
"common sense" culture with disablist prejudice, it may be that, in the disability arena more 
than others, personal insight proves an indispensable asset in shifting stubborn relational 
dynamics.   
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Zizek (1990) attempts to further "solidify" the conceptualisation of group allegiance by 
adding his notion of "enjoyment" to the pattern of symbolic identification described above.  
This "enjoyment" is described as being "beyond the pleasure principle", situated as an internal 
seat of deeply culturally embedded narcissistic affirmation of the sanctity and unique worth of 
the group (Zizek, 1990, p. 51; Frosh, 2006).  It is from here that vigorous energy repeatedly 
seeks to demonstrate the "reality" of certain group attributes.  This "enjoyment" is what is 
held as tying group members together, within an illusory, but ostensibly universally evident 
and "real" bond of commonality; further, it typically structures relations toward external 
forces.  It is the relationship towards a group's fantasied "enjoyment" which is put at 
subjective risk by "hazards" to group identity such as assimilation or overwhelming 
emigration (Zizek, 1990, p. 52; Frosh, 2006).  Here, it is the illusion of a consensual material 
"way of life" which comes under threat from the corrosive forces of out-group culture.  The 
nebulous, wishful nature of the "way of life" which is at stake in Slavoj Zizek's model is 
highly reminiscent of the group fantasy of "nondisabled culture".  Within this formation, an 
imaginary boundary is prepared, which separates the "ways of normalcy" from the 
contaminating impingement of perceived difference.  The illusory semantic boundary quickly 
becomes realised in the materiality of social policies and installations, facilitating and 
legitimating the steady hum of projections which traverse its span.  Whilst the nondisabled 
"way of life" is consciously maintained as inaccessible – indeed, unliveable – to disabled 
persons, it is "nonetheless constantly menaced by 'them'" (Zizek, 1990, p. 52).  This 
irreducible, intricately fabricated "way of life" forms the cement which stabilises internal 
narcissistic scaffolding, persuading its adherents of the "vivacity and plenitude" which is, by 
its virtue, theirs alone (ibid.).  In this way fantasy marshals very real group political power, 
where subjective consolation is contingent upon the activity of maintaining separation.  In 
terms of fantasies of the "disabled threat", the historical prominence of demonological beliefs 
regarding the aetiology of impairment provides clues toward an understanding of the 
unconscious resonance of this form of otherness (Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 20).   
 
The threat to nondisabled "enjoyment" may be apprehended in a number of aspects of social 
life; consider, for example, sexuality.  Sinason (1992) describes the darkly portentous, 
visceral threat imputed to sexual activity amongst learning disabled persons.  The "threat" 
here to the "enjoyment" of nondisabled "majority" culture lies in the catastrophic fantasy that 
the perceived wretchedness and shame of learning disabled lives will, in some monstrous, 
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exponential wave, reproduce itself, its swarming numbers overwhelming "civilised" 
existence.  The very long history of deeply oppressive, forceful constraints upon the sexual 
relating of learning disabled persons is testament to the incipient power of the fantasy.  White 
(2003, p. 136) provides an equally startling, corresponding analysis of the history of "sex 
education" for blind persons, finding that such "education" would more accurately be 
described as the fervent, anxious and often dehumanising enforcement of an especially rigid 
species of heteronormativity.  Disability, with its unnerving diversity, and propensity to act as 
a lightning rod for projections, carries an immense capacity for the destabilisation of much 
cherished (and needed) "norms" of "legitimate being".  It is at times when this "legitimate 
being" is under threat – by, say, the integration of learning disabled children into early 
learning centres – that a need to "enumerate disconnected fragments" of "nondisabled culture" 
may emerge, as nauseous fears of "mixing" bubble to the surface, and social and psychic 
ranks begin to narrow (Zizek, 1990, p. 52).  The "national" (or "nationalist") "enjoyment" of 
which Zizek (1990) writes is, of course, far more evident (even in its illusory nature) than the 
invisibly transparent, hegemonic "nondisabled culture".  Yet, I believe the concept may throw 
light on the far more multifarious phenomenon of resistance to social change regarding 
disability, as well as the complexity – and perhaps futility – of attempts at forging a "disabled 
identity" (see Identity politics and the movement, p.191).    
 
Marks (1999a, p. 22) orients her investigation into unconscious processes implicated in 
disablist oppression by posing a number of key questions to her reader; questions, she 
believes, that can only be satisfactorily addressed by a psychoanalytic approach.  She asks:  
• What is the origin of the excessive emotional energy (be it sadistic, fearful or 
kind) evoked by images of disability? 
• How do we account for patronising, hostile, or avoidant responses of nondisabled 
people?  
• What “emotional payoff” is achieved by nondisabled persons’ involvement in 
“altruistic” disability-related work? 
• What typically unacknowledged existential anxieties has disability come to 
symbolise? 
• Why are persons with disabilities repeatedly represented in popular media as 
dangerous, helpless, disordered or infantile? 
       (Marks, 1999a, p. 22 [paraphrased]) 
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Marks (1999a) clearly concurs with Rose (1996) as he affirms that fantasy is far from the 
inconsequential, ephemeral and irrelevant entity which it is held to be by prominent leftist 
political rhetoric (Rose, 1996 cited in Frosh, 2006, p. 173); by contrast, its influence, and 
hence its interrogation, must remain central.  In Frosh's (2006, p. 173) words, "It is the fantasy 
that fuelled the politics, as well as the other way around; indeed, it may be that it is the former 
even more than the latter".  Surely, if an analysis is to carry influence which brings some 
promise of social change – that is, behavioural change – it is elemental that one begins by 
penetrating, and thence operating within, prevalent systems of social signification; viz. the 
world of fantasy.  Thus it is that Murphy (1995, p. 140) rejects unidimensional analyses of 
both a somatic and historical materialist nature, in asserting that "stigmatisation is less a by-
product of disability than its substance" (my emphasis).  He continues:   
 
The greatest impediment to a person's taking full part in his society is not his 
[sic.] physical flaws, but rather the tissue of myths, fears and misunderstandings 
that society attaches to them.   
      (Murphy, 1995, p. 140) 
 
Within normative resistance to the socio-psychic impingement of disability difference, there 
is nothing less at stake than the modernist project itself; in particular, what Zygmund Bauman 
(1994) terms "deconstructing mortality" (Bauman, 1994 cited in Frank, 1995, p. 83).  
Modernism, earnest and desperate, aims to exorcise the fear of human frailty, vividly 
embodied in the disabled figure, through control, separation, or eradication (Hughes, 2002b, 
p. 573).  It is in this way that not only visible bodily "damage", but, more importantly, the 
internal "damage" which this symbolises, may, in a magical wish fulfilment, be excised from 
existence.  The post-structuralist axiom that difference will always tend to organise itself into 
hierarchy is, due to the evocativeness of the "fractured body", powerfully played out here 
(Thomson, 1995, p. 600).  The psychic threat of disability is not novel or foreign; rather, it is 
of the nature of what Freud (1919) termed "the uncanny" – that which arouses "dread and 
creeping horror" (Davis, 1997c, p. 68), precisely because of its perverse intimacy with the 
familiar.  To Davis (1997c, p. 62), the feelings of disgust and revulsion evoked by "the 
uncanny" – das Unheimlich – bear marked resemblance to the feelings associated with the 
visualising of the disabled body by "normals".  Freud (1919) himself, makes explicit reference 
in elaborating the flavour of "the uncanny", to bodily mutilations – "dismembered limbs, a 
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severed head, a hand cut off at the wrist" (Freud, 1919, p. 49).  Sinason (1992, p. 42) observes 
how it is around particularly evocative markers of difference – race, sexuality, mental illness, 
disability – that politically correct "euphemisms" tend to cluster, demonstrating the obsessive, 
splitting nature of attempts at managing the anxious – and probably hostile – fantasies which 
these evoke.  But it is disability which seems to cut the deepest.  Davis (2002, p. 3) draws 
attention to a patently correct, yet shocking reality: it is familiar to see white people 
embracing the civil rights cause of blacks; likewise, many straight people have taken up the 
cause of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people.  Yet, it is a small and highly 
exceptional minority of nondisabled persons who have managed to clearly identify disability 
as a social oppression issue, and participated within the disability movement's political agenda 
(Davis, 2002, pp. 3-4).  For him, the reasons for this are "telling".  As we jointly observe 
social divisions and inequalities, we are aware that no white persons are at risk of becoming 
black, and few straight people will during the life course alter their sexual or gendered 
orientation.  Yet every "normal" individual can, and most will, become disabled during the 
life course (ibid.).  The disability phenomenon, thus, possesses most intrinsically Freud's 
(1919) character of das Unheimlich.   
 
The theoretical orientation which I aim to develop is one which combines an object relations-
based, critical psychoanalytic position, with the vigour of cultural investigation afforded by 
social constructionist critique.  The pre-Kleinian, more strongly drive-oriented psychoanalytic 
view is, I believe, one which provides insufficient scope for the interrogation of social 
representations of the body as these impact, inter alia, upon the unconscious and conscious 
elements of (especially) early socialisation.  In critically reviewing Fanon's work, Davids 
(1996, p. 223) correctly identifies his model of racialised socialisation as one which locates 
personality and society within a dialectical, mutually influential relationship.  Meaning 
attributions of, say, skin colour, carry a strong element of social construction, which interacts 
dynamically with intra-psychic factors in the genesis of racism.  However, Fanon positions 
this model awkwardly within a drive-based metapsychology, drawing on the work of Jung 
and Adler.  To Davids (1996, p. 223), Fanon's project – as ours – would be far better 
accommodated within a shifting, dialectical, and "partially" constructionist, object relations 
view.  In the current work such an orientation would pose questions regarding the 
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 unconscious, yet culturally influenced meanings of disablement, and how the defensive 
management of these evocations impacts upon interpersonal dynamics of relevance to the 
coalescing of selfhood.  I turn, in the following sections, to a consideration of specific modes 
of psychic defence relevant to the evocations of disability, examining in each case the 
possible oppressive effects of the varying forms of cognitive distortion which these create.     
 
Defence mechanisms implicated in disablist oppression 
A psychoanalytic interrogation of social responses to disability is centrally concerned with 
exploring the nature and effects of defence mechanisms, which are utilised in response to the 
unconscious conflicts often evoked by ideas and images of disability.  The need, within the 
observer, to manage unconscious parts of self which are enlivened by exposure to disability 
may render distortions in social responses to disabled persons, as external "interventions" are 
applied in the stilling of internal struggles.  In this way, every aspect of the world of societal 
responses to disabled persons – from legislative frameworks to linguistic conventions, service 
installations to religious rituals, health care protocols to educational policies – may be 
understood as, to some extent, a manifest expression of profiles of psychic defence.  In this 
manner, the nature of a community's relating to its disabled population may be understood (or 
interpreted) as a reflection of intra-psychic modes of managing the unconscious, anxiety-
ridden subjective "meanings" which disability carries. A range of psychic defence 
mechanisms – to be examined below – act to maintain psychological and material "distance" 
between disabled and nondisabled persons, such that the former remain available as projective 
containers for the unwanted, disavowed parts of self of those members of society self-
identifying as "normals" (Marks, 1999a, p. 22).   
 
Within the Kleinian view of early development, intense vulnerability and a chronic sense of 
threat are key aspects of the infant's world, with severe states of anxiety driving the ego to 
configure forms of psychic defence in order to find equilibrium (Klein, 1946, p. 292).  These 
experiences of a quite undiluted, psychotic anxiety, and the (typically primitive) defences 
which coalesce for their management, form an unconscious psychic template which remains 
the mode of functioning harnessed during periods when anxiety-provoking stimuli cause 
regression to rudimentary mental states.  The nature and reactivity of this psychotic layer of 
personality is, to a large extent, dependent upon the degree to which the extreme vulnerability 
and fear characteristic of the predicament of infancy was tolerated and responded to in an 
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attuned manner by care-givers.  Of course, no parenting is perfectly attuned, and experiences 
of misattunement are essential if separation is to proceed.  But it is the extent, the flavour and 
intensity, of experiences of infantile abandonment – of unmet primitive dependency needs – 
which will inform the rigidity of defences employed, and the permeability of psychic splits.  
Michael Rustin (1991, p. 62) writes how racial prejudices are often suffused with emotion, 
such that the meanings construed regarding social reality are profoundly mediated by the 
psychotic defences attendant upon the base conflicts surrounding self and other which race 
reflects.  For Rustin (1991), the simplicities of thoughts wrought within psychotic states of 
mind fit all too well with the stark "truths" of racial bigotry, thus rendering psychic discharge 
at the cost of the dehumanisation of others.  The intense affect often associated with racial 
prejudice, of course, has its source elsewhere; a place which could only be revealed to 
consciousness at the cost of overwhelmingly intense feelings such as shame and terror.  Our 
task, likewise, is to trace the unconscious roots of, in the words of Marks (1999a, p. 22), the 
excessive levels of kindly, fearful or sadistic emotional energy evoked by disability.   
 
Splitting  
This is a primitive defence mechanism whereby an individual avoids the anxiety-provoking 
ambiguity of a complex world by, instead, endowing individuals or things with "all good" or 
"all bad", unidimensional qualities (Marks, 1999a, p. 22).  This need to divide the world into 
binary dualities reflects the infant's inability to tolerate his or her aggressive instincts, which 
must thus be projected into the world – the mother.  What is rendered is a maternal figure that 
is split into good and evil; an idealised "good breast", and a denigrated, hateful "bad breast" 
(Klein, 1946, p. 293; 1960; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).   The escape from the fearful, 
creeping contamination of dangerously ambivalent feelings via the strategy of splitting carries 
a particular salience for disability.  Disablement, by its nature, is evocative of fantasies of 
inability, brokenness, dependency and loss of control; importantly, the degree of these 
fantasied states tends to remain uncertain and ambiguous to the observer.  For example, when 
meeting a sight impaired individual, the observer's incipient fantasies regarding life without 
the environmental command afforded by sight, tend to be exacerbated by an inherent 
ambiguity regarding the "extent" of impairment.  In the face of welling anxieties evoked by 
our imagining of a life without sight, there emerges a fraught need to gain some form of 
control via a sense of "knowing" the extent – the "reality" – of the danger.  This situation is 
very closely analogous to that of the anxious infant, who consequently resolves her chaotic 
world into black and white.  For disabled persons, this situation renders the familiar, split 
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stereotypes of the "useless invalid", and the "superhuman" disabled person, who, in the 
observer's desperate fantasy, can do "anything".  In being forced, through the observer's 
regression to the use of psychotic defences, into this binary, disabled persons may remain 
unseen as complex, nuanced individuals, instead carrying wholesale idealisation or 
denigration.  At the edges of consciousness, anxieties evoked by contact with disability may 
take the form of threatening echoes of dependency, in combination with the fear of becoming 
impaired, and guilt over experiencing oneself as "able-bodied" (Murphy, 1995, p. 143).  Of 
course, part of the splitting process is that between observer and observed, between 
nondisabled and disabled, serving to reconstruct an illusory and essentialist notion of 
disability as a bounded and qualitative characteristic.   
 
Idealisation, as one consequence of splitting, is rendered as a defence against persecutory 
anxiety, which is based upon unmanageable guilt regarding feelings of hostility (Klein, 1960, 
p. 274).  The picture of the idealised disabled person is a culturally familiar one, typically 
involving, for example, "heart-warming" accounts of plucky and steadfast resilience in the 
face of adversity, as well as the attribution of a range of other excessive, unreal, and overly 
positive characteristics.  What this often reflects is an inability within the observer to make 
mental space available for considering the experience of the individual before him or her, due 
to the constricting, disquieting threat of imminent, infantile and subjectively malevolent 
fantasies regarding the intolerable nature of perceived struggle.  Klein's (1960, p. 274) 
reference to echoes of guilt over hostile feelings also seems salient here, framing idealisation 
of the disabled person as a defensive response to repressed sadism directed at the shameful, 
disavowed dependency which he or she carries.  The history of brutal oppression, forced 
sterilisation and eugenic extermination suffered by disabled persons provides disturbing 
evidence of the voracity of this idea.  Disabled persons falling on the other side of the split 
may function as projective containers for a broken, inert and unwanted aspect of the self; 
helpless and inadequate, and deserving of abandonment.  Needless to say, where such a 
rudimentary, defended repertoire for perceiving disabled persons obtains, empathically 
accurate relating, and its corollary, an experience of being seen and known, is rendered all but 
impossible.  Foster (2001, p. 81) describes how work with populations perceived as 
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vulnerable repeatedly draws social service workers back into a mode of relating characterised 
by splitting, where typically guilt- and hostility-ridden conflicts constrict mental space, and 
disallow authentic communication.  The interesting point here pertains to the truism that it is 
not the nature of feelings which distorts or corrupts relationships, but rather the extent to 
which feelings are tolerable to consciousness; this principle is central to many of the 
propositions of the current work.   
 
To give life to the notion of the idealised disabled person, I have elsewhere employed the 
following example (see Watermeyer, 2006, p. 37-8):  In the film Scent of a Woman (Universal 
Studios, 1992), Al Pacino plays an embittered and isolated blind man, who, despite his 
"limitations", undertakes a range of breathtaking feats, which include dancing a dramatic 
tango after simply enquiring about the dimensions of the dance floor, and driving a sports car 
at breakneck speed under the instructions of a terrified and unwilling navigator.  Here, the 
blind person is represented at both extremes of a split concept of what disablement implies.  
The first of these positions portrays Pacino's character as the stereotype of an emotionally 
damaged and isolated disabled person, whose impairment has stunted and distorted his social 
self.  This image, arguably, embodies a reflection of fantasies – held by the screenplay writer, 
and echoed by societal stereotypes – of "how I would feel if I did not have sight".  These 
fantasies are then employed as the basis for a unidimensional, broken character.  The "coping" 
afforded here by the splitting defence refers to the observer who, in the face of threatening 
fears about what a blind person's life may (in fantasy) be like, achieves some sense of mastery 
and control by "deciding" that the blind person's life is, in fact, the way it is fearfully 
imagined to be.   
 
Conversely though, Al Pacino's ability to perform the antics that he does in Scent of a Woman 
may reflect a need within the observer to overcome the fear that, due to his blindness, he is in 
fact utterly restricted, desolate, and capable of nothing. Thus, what we see may be a response 
to a more basic attribution, where the observer has originally disowned and given over 
feelings of deep inadequacy and incapability evoked in response to the idea of living with 
blindness, and thereafter has managed these feelings by a form of reversal, which presents the 
need to portray the blind person as heroic and unusually (implausibly) capable. In some sense, 
therefore, Pacino's character has been shaped in a manner which allows the observer to feel 
reassured that his life is not the unmitigated tragedy which we fear, and know, it to be.  
Distorted constructions such as the foregoing may preclude the perceiving of disabled lives as 
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carrying the characteristic complexity of "normality"; including strengths and vulnerabilities, 
hopes and losses, competence and inadequacy.  The marked inability of Hollywood to present 
disabled film characters as normatively complex individuals, muddling through life's 
challenges with success and failure, hope and disappointment, has been well documented (e.g. 
Norden, 1994).   
 
Projection 
This defence forms perhaps the primary explanation of how unwanted feelings and parts of 
self may come to be attributed to external objects.  For Marks (1999a, p. 23), the concept 
embodies a "key tool for understanding the psychic mechanisms of prejudice against disabled 
people".  Klein (1960, p. 273) explains how the child feels him or herself to "be bad", and 
thereafter escapes from the ensuing guilt by coming to regard the "badness" as being a 
characteristic of others.  This, of course, tends to reinforce persecutory anxieties (ibid.), as the 
boundaries of the psyche rigidify in order to "hold out" the increasing, threatening weight of 
disavowed psychic matter.  Haunting guilt also plays about the psychic shadows, arising from 
hostile feelings directed at the denigrated other, as well, perhaps, as an awareness of the 
inauthentic, victimising sleight of hand of the psychic transaction.  A scenario called to mind 
by these thoughts is that of a family system which includes a disabled sibling.  Relational 
dynamics often emerge within such families which serve to reify and concretise splits 
between the "neediness" or "vulnerability" of the disabled child, and the converse 
"independence" and "strength" of her nondisabled fellows.  Parental anxiety regarding the 
ability to cope of the disabled child, impacting as it often does upon appropriate separation, 
may introduce dynamics of splitting which are internalised by each child, rendering the 
projection of neediness, incapability and emotional frailty into the disabled child, with other 
siblings inadvertently coming to be seen as comparatively infallible.  Guilt, relating to feeling 
like an undeserving "survivor", may compound such splitting and projection.  Within broader 
society, however, group-based projection, via the mechanisms of insistent mass media 
representations of disabled persons as broken, damaged unfortunates, continue to reinforce the 
position of disabled persons as "dustbins for disavowal" (Shakespeare, 1994, p. 287).  In this 
manner, citizens are afforded the opportunity to reaffirm membership of the "normal" class, 
whilst simultaneously deflecting the internal encroachment of the death instinct (Klein, 1946, 
p. 298).   
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Within feminist and post-colonial discourse, the deconstructionist project of investigating 
how group-identity splits are created and perpetuated, has often embraced a psychoanalytic 
(in particular, Lacanian) view of the construction of subjectivity (Burman, 1996, p. 138).  
Within this view, the sentient self coalesces via processes of differentiation from social 
"others" (ibid.), whose negative characterisation reaffirms the ostensible positive 
distinctiveness of the subject.  As in the case of disabled persons, it is that "Other" who is 
consequently forced to "carry the burden of difference, the excess, the surplus that will not fit" 
(ibid.).  The model of identity being propounded here is a determinedly post-structuralist one, 
which leaves no room whatsoever for the "realness" of (projected) aspects of self; indeed, 
Burman (1996, p. 138) expressly refers to the "fantasy" of a prior time of "unity and 
completeness", which, in fact, never existed.  Whilst not endorsing the notion of an era of 
psychic or social unity, my position is one which does allow for a residue of materiality 
within the crossfire of identity fragments.  That is, the "reality" – and, the universality – of 
split off, shame- and anxiety-ridden aspects of self, ever-present by virtue of the drama of 
infancy.  There is, in short, reality to that layer of our shared human condition which we 
struggle to acknowledge.  Frosh's (2006, p. 261) model of the psychic nature of racism fits 
well with this schema; he writes:   
 
The process of racist ideation is therefore one in which unwanted or feared 
aspects of the self are experienced as having the power to disturb the personality 
in so damaging a way that they have to be repudiated and evacuated or projected 
into the racialised other, chosen for this purpose both because of pre-existing 
social prejudices and because, as a fantasy category, racial 'otherness' can be 
employed to mean virtually anything.  
       (Frosh, 2006, p. 261-2) 
 
Similarly, disabled people in modern society embody a docile and largely voiceless minority, 
featuring bodily "damage" all too readily utilisable in the business of "rationally" affirming 
the voracity of ascribed brokenness and inadequacy.  The hegemonic value system which 
constructs health and vigour as moral virtues, further cements the position of disabled persons 
as deserved exiles of mainstream social life (Wendell, 1997, p. 269).   
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In a prior section, we saw how the earlier legacy of psychoanalytic theorising on disability 
was fiercely criticised, primarily for its failure to recognise the significance of social factors in 
mediating the psychological impact of impairment.  However, I believe that the wholesale 
scuppering of this body of work, as would be advocated by social model writers and others, 
might embody a grave case of the baby being disposed of with the bathwater.  To 
demonstrate, amongst many authors vilified within disability studies (e.g. Lenny, 1993; 
Goodley & Lawthom, 2006b) were Thomas & Siller (1999), whose work may here be called 
upon in support of a critical, socially situated and emancipatory psychoanalytic view.  Siller 
(1970) found that fear of rejection amongst nondisabled persons functioned as a meaningful 
predictor of unwillingness to associate with disabled persons (Siller, 1970 cited in Thomas & 
Siller, 1999, p. 183).  In other words, what was demonstrated is that the ostracisation of 
disabled persons bears direct correlation to anxieties regarding acceptability within members 
of the broader populace.  Other researchers cited by Thomas and Siller (Siller et al., 1967; 
1995), found that the expectations which nondisabled subjects carried regarding impaired 
people's emotional response to their disablement, corresponded closely with the profile of 
internal psychological struggles which each subject manifested.  The idea that disablement 
would, for example, lead to depression or anger, thus embodied a "direct projection of one's 
own unconscious fears" (ibid., p. 185).  Furthermore, these expectations could be related to 
fears regarding specific forms of impairment.  They write: 
For example, a woman with intense communication problems expressed greatest 
fear, if disabled, of being deaf.  Paralysis was a particular issue with those 
showing dependency fears.  Cerebral palsy posed a great threat to those for 
whom control is critical, with physical uncontrol objectifying emotional 
uncontrol.   
   (Siller et al., 1967 cited in Thomas & Siller, 1999, p. 185) 
 
Thus it is that the system of meanings within which disability is culturally perceived is 
directly related to defensive needs for projection held by the community at large.  Examples 
of such projections were also identified by Emry and Wiseman (1987); these workers found 
that disabled persons were "expected" to be socially introverted, psychologically unstable, 
depressed, hypersensitive, and easily offended (Emry & Wiseman, 1987 cited in Fox & Giles, 
1996, p. 266).  The essence of the predicament of disabled persons is that which besets all 
members of oppressed minorities – to have one's abilities, one's character, and oneself, 
defined from without.  Kriegel (1987), in critically analysing representations of "the cripple" 
in English literature, concludes that, while others cry "I am what I am", disabled people are 
coerced to submit to the cries of others, saying, instead, "I am what you tell me I am" 
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(Kriegel, 1987, p. 33 – my emphasis).  Only by such submission, according to Kriegel, may 
disabled people secure a deeply conditional place within the society of "normals" (Kriegel, 
1987, p. 33; Barnes & Mercer, 2001, p. 518).  Although working from a non-psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, Hunt (1998, p. 9) describes, in essence, how the nondisabled majority seems 
invested in maintaining disabled persons as ready, fitting receptacles for projection.  He notes 
how the observer betrays a subtle need for disabled people to show evidence of suffering, in 
order that the privilege and standing he or she is afforded by nondisabled status be reaffirmed 
as worthy and valuable (ibid.).  If the low-status individual – in this case, a disabled person – 
shows no sign of misery with his lowliness, this may present an awkward challenge to 
narcissistic assurances which turn upon a fulcrum of positively distinctive identity.  In this 
manner, all may unconsciously carry a "personal investment" in the convincing perpetuation 
of the "disability imago".   
 
Taking this analysis one step further: Frosh (1989, p. 237) argues that in the case of racism – 
like disability – unwanted aspects of the self are projected outward, to then be attacked by the 
selves that would disavow them.  But in association with this projection, the denigrated group 
is also stereotyped in fantasy as possessing idealised features or privileges.  The rejected 
group is loathed for these "special" qualities, which the "oppressor", with eviscerating scorn, 
attempts to pulverize (ibid.).  What seems closely mirrored here in the disability arena is the 
familiar, often hateful stereotyping of disabled people as "freeloaders", who have "special 
privileges" and live lives of passive, gluttonous dependency on the balance of society.  
Intermingled with these more manifest envies, may be subtle echoes of resentment at the 
disabled individual's perceived licentious permission for dependency; simultaneously 
despised, and unconsciously desired.  Disabled people, in this "receptive dependent space", 
may in fantasy be viewed as occupying a mythic, warm and idealised, nurturant and perfectly 
attuned, intimate environment; the perfect, wished-for maternal dyad.  These suggested 
psychic underpinnings may form an important psychological context for, inter alia, the 
various forms of abuse and hate crime perpetrated upon the disabled population – aggressive 
acts which, by their nature, will serve only to enliven and escalate the paranoid ideation which 
propels them (Zizek, 1994, p. 78).  The entire system of images and projections, further, is 
consistently re-invigorated and confirmed by the demeaning, sympathy-inducing imagery of 
the disability charity industry (Hevey, 1992, p. 140).  Since we are, by definition, disquieted  
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by the projections – our own – which we apprehend in these images, our ongoing alienation 
from the subjects we observe is assured.  Our incapacity to "see" the complex, nuanced reality 
of human life in disabled persons is proportional to an inability to consciously experience our 
own dysphoric selves; others, within this schema, are perpetually reduced to monochrome 
reflections of a fragmented, dingy inner world (Frosh, 1991, p. 76).   
 
Projective identification  
Projective identification is a defensive manoeuvre closely related to projection, in the sense of 
the attributing of psychic material to others.  Yet, the two concepts differ – perhaps along a 
continuum – in that the (largely consensual) definition of projective identification makes 
specific provision for the recipient of projections being emotionally affected by the process 
(Young, 1994, p. 124).  Thus, as against "pure" projection, which constitutes nothing but 
unconscious fantasy in the mind of the "projector", projective identification involves the 
recipient being unconsciously "drawn in", to a collusory enactment of the attributions made to 
him or her.  In addition, projective identification may serve not only the purpose of evacuating 
the psyche of noxious contents, but also aim to control the other, to find refuge for a 
threatened positive part of self, or to secure a non-separate psychic connection (Spilius, 1988 
cited in Young, 1994, p. 124).  Each of these functions carries the quality of a "psychic 
appropriation" of the object of projection, incorporating an invasion and exploitation of 
psychic space.  Within the study of racism, the use of projective identification for the 
realisation of a psychically needed, social "other", has been described as "the internal 
equivalent of colonial occupation" (Davids, 1996, p. 216).  In the last section, reference was 
made to dynamics of projection involving disabled persons, in which those undertaking the 
projection evidenced a need for the disabled "other" to visibly fulfill or manifest the personal 
or psychic characteristics attributed to him or her.  Here, the unconscious fantasy of a 
denigrated "other" moves beyond the psychic, into a relational space, where the "other" comes 
to be strategically "created" in a manner which reaffirms, solidifies and perpetuates the 
subjective credibility of the projection.  If we examine the myriad of repressive, demeaning 
material and psychic aspects of the social situatedness of disabled persons, we are led to 
questions regarding the unconscious utility of these scenarios, in terms of the facilitation of 
projective identification.  Do we in modern society, for example, politically "create" disabled 
persons who are marginal, ostracised, dependent, uneducated, and emotionally damaged, in 
order to maintain a material "other" who may "live" these split off parts of ourselves on our 
behalf?  Within institutional settings such as higher education and training, or the world of 
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work, to name but two, the picture of disabled persons who are "set up to fail" is a familiar 
one; here, the intrinsic inadequacy which is "written on the body" is repeatedly enacted, as 
disabled persons are sabotaged by systematic exclusion and disadvantage.  Theoretical 
contributions to the understanding of the unconscious life of organisations may be of great 
benefit here, in casting light on such destructive dynamics (e.g. Obholzer & Roberts, 1994).   
 
In her definition of projective identification, Segal (1973, p. 124) notes how the projective 
recipient becomes "possessed by, controlled and identified with the projected parts" (see also 
Ogden, 1979).  Of relevance to our discussion is the fact that, if projective materials are to 
find a "home" in the other, it is essential that these feelings be experienced as fitting, as 
familiar, by their recipient.  In other words, the recipient must come to experience the feelings 
as his or her own; originating from within, and fitting with self and circumstance.  Now, a key 
message implicit in dominant cultural beliefs regarding disability is that which is at the centre 
of colloquial representations of the "medical model"; that is, that disability is a phenomenon 
of individual defects and shortcomings, which, by their damage, unavoidably preclude 
disabled persons from participating in, and fruitfully contributing to, social life.  
Consequently, what we apprehend is a picture in which disabled people suffer chronic and 
needless deprivation and exclusion at the hands of an oppressive society, yet are "willed" into 
the adoption of aspects of self which locate the origins of this disadvantage within intrinsic, 
"natural" factors.  It is via this covert colonisation of the self that ideology is lived, as it 
interpellates all into unconscious collusion.   
 
In psychoanalytic psychotherapy work, a key marker of the presence of projective 
identification is an uncertainty, within the therapist, of "what is, and is not, mine".  What may 
have occurred here is that emotional materials have been projected into the analyst, but within 
an unconscious strategy which directs these contents to psychic locations which "fit" with 
their nature, such that one's own feelings and memories quickly dissolve into 
indistinguishable continuity with intrusions from elsewhere.  Indeed, it is in the very nature of 
"successful" projective identifications that the recipient remains unaware that projection has 
occurred, at least until consciously teasing out the tangled strands of what is, typically, a 
sensitive and charged personal issue.  Instead, he or she "holds" the displaced parts of self as 
his or her "own".  In the oppressed and marginal predicaments of many disabled persons in 
modern society, questions of "responsibility" for struggle are often elemental.  In other words, 
as one battles, against enormous material and cultural odds, to succeed in education, 
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employment, or the social world, the question of whether "I am to blame", or "society is to 
blame", is a perennial one.  The split over-simplification of this dilemma, I believe, only 
underscores the anxiety-ridden, concrete and limited thought-environment which a culture of 
crude projection surrounding disability makes available to all concerned.  In the lives of many 
disabled persons faced with insurmountable obstacles to fulfillment, nagging internal mantras 
which direct accountability at a self which "didn't try hard enough", or "wasn't organised 
enough", or was "too needy", or "too difficult", are manifestations of the cultural re-instilling 
of a self-blame which destabilises identity and entitlement.  All, of course, carry the capacity 
for self-doubt and self-blame, yet it may be that these universal emotional aspects are 
systematically, continually re-enlivened in the lives of disabled persons, as material and  
 
psychic factors operate in concert to prepare this group as "intrinsically damaged" projective 
containers.  The question of "where" the lack, the defect, the insufficiency, originates and lies, 
in this most devalued of social identities, is one which goes directly to the heart of the 
problem of the origins of human subjectivity.   
 
Young (1994, p. 140) emphasises what he describes as the "primitiveness", and the "adhesive, 
binding power" of projective identifications, which cause these connections, when 
established, to be very stubborn and resilient.  The upshot of this is that projective 
identification serves as a "profoundly conservative" device, involving constructions of the 
other – prejudices – which are immensely difficult to dislodge (ibid.).  Part of the obdurate 
nature of attitudes towards disabled persons, as mobilised via projective identification, relates 
to the "adhesive" connection wrought by unconscious investments in the "living" of suffering 
and struggle.  We are compelled, even obsessed, by lives which offer discharge to our own 
unvoiced psychic fragments, and dogged in our clinging to the opportunity to fulfill 
controlling roles in such relationships.  In their meditative study of philosophical aspects of 
"helping" work, Ram Dass and Paul Gorman (1985, p. 55) describe the "pull" of such 
relationships as follows:  
 
It's as if our vicarious involvement with the trials and tribulations of others 
engages us in the life process in a way that we seem to need, but also want to be 
able to control.  We want to watch it, but be able to turn it off at will.   
      (Dass & Gorman, 1985, p. 55) 
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The issue of control is central, as the need within the observer to impose control upon his or 
her internal world manifests in the material, "worldly" control of those appropriated as ciphers 
for intolerable parts of self.  Hinshelwood (1987, p. 51) uses his concept of "dramatisation" to 
connect the influence of formative developmental relationships to dynamic, repetitious 
enactments within the community.  "Dramatisation" refers to the playing out of unconscious 
scripts – the psychic sequelae of imperfect "holding" – in current relationships.  The 
unconscious penchant for repetition leads to the "recruitment" of participants as players in the 
re-composition of an earlier drama.  This, in Hinshelwood's (1987, p. 51) words, is a 
phenomenon which, in the community setting, corresponds precisely to the notion of 
transference as it manifests within the therapeutic dyad.  Transference, involving, as it does, 
processes of projection and projective identification which serve to "coax" and invite the 
analyst into colluding with the archaic dynamics being replicated, demands the "working 
through" of unconscious material by all concerned, if destructive repetitions are to be 
overcome (Ogden, 1979, p. 365; Bion, 1967).  If we bring these concepts to the political 
configurations prevalent around disability in societies such as ours, we see, I believe, that the 
disability phenomenon embodies an immense propensity for the creation of interwoven, 
chronic repetitions unconsciously sustained by nondisabled and disabled participants alike.  
Disabled persons, as we shall explore later, are arguably subject to systematic distortions in 
socialisation; involving, inter alia, the denial of separation by intrusive "caring", control and 
coercion ("benevolent" as much as malicious), expulsion from the mutuality of a common, 
human legitimacy of subjectivity, and the like.  These formative "object experiences", 
themselves shaped by the unconscious evocations which hover about the disabled imago, may 
leave disabled persons vulnerable to projective repetitions which position the other as 
authoritarian, superior, avoidant, vulnerable, or whatever the case may be.  Conversely, and as 
already outlined, nondisabled persons may bring to the intersubjective field the common 
multitude of split off fragments of loss, vulnerability, dependency and shame; all too readily 
"given over" in projective identification to disabled figures.   
 
Whilst this initial dynamic model is necessarily a crude and oversimplified one, it begins to 
show us the (perilously) rich potential within relationships steeped in the emotive 
provocativeness of the disability phenomenon, for deeply rooted and ongoing enactments.  
These, surely, have precisely that "profoundly conservative" quality of which Robert Young 
(1994) writes.  If such "damaged" identities are to be re-shaped, this will require an 
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extraordinary level of honest, cooperative self-examination, since the relational schemas 
involved are so deeply imbued with shared, differential archaic meanings.  In the everyday 
world of families, residential care institutions, special schools, places of work, and a host of 
further environments in which the disability imago makes its presence felt, "dramatisations" 
involving object relations constantly piqued by disability continue unabated.  We must, of 
course, beware of the danger of pathologising disabled persons as "carriers" of chronically 
disturbed relating, as this view may easily be misappropriated in buttressing individualising 
disability models.  But it is a more grave error, I believe, to fail to acknowledge the very real, 
and damaging, impact of the lifelong distortions in relating which may often surround persons 
with impairments.  Projective identification, within this realm, is a concept with enormous 
explanatory potential in charting the crystallization of disablist ideology into disabled – and 
nondisabled – subjectivity.    
 
Reaction formation  
This is a defence mechanism which protects the ego from intolerable feelings by manifesting 
their opposite extremes in consciousness (Marks, 1999a, p. 23).  Images of disability, 
provocative as they are, may evoke in us unconscious responses which feel morally heinous, 
leading to the need for a compensatory, conscious "reparation" or "undoing".  Marks (1999a, 
p. 22) asks that we carefully investigate the "emotional payoff" which some individuals glean 
from involvement in "altruistic" disability-related work.  What she is pointing to, is the idea 
that a portion of the subjective "satisfaction" felt in such work may relate to the reassuring 
disavowal of unconscious feelings and impulses towards disabled persons which are of a 
diametrically opposite nature.  If disability does, indeed, mirror to us shameful or intolerable 
parts of self, it is likely that our instinctive response to disabled persons would be one of 
wanting to obliterate or conceal such reminders (Watermeyer, 2006, p. 38).  The ubiquitous 
presence of an often irrational pity surrounding disabled persons, when viewed in this light, 
suggests more hostile, even sadistic, unconscious ruminations.  Freud (1933, p. 253) explicitly 
associates altruism with disavowed sadism, implying that the culturally condensed guilt 
surrounding a death wish towards, for example, disabled persons, renders intolerable guilt 
which is managed through "good works".  If we are correct in asserting that the atmosphere 
surrounding disability tends to be thick with conflictual unconscious material, then it is self-
evident that individual motivations to undertake caring professions within this field are 
probably highly complex and worthy of our attention.  To begin, it is likely that such 
individuals are drawn to these professions by motivations which harbour a significant 
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unconscious component.  The ideological influence of such relationships – in residential and 
nursing care, a range of medical professions, state social service institutions, community 
rehabilitation organisations, charity and religious groups, and a host of others – can hardly be 
overestimated.  Within such relations, typically between disabled "clients" and nondisabled 
professionals, such issues as the negotiation of "needs" may be profoundly coloured by 
unconscious investments in control, or other gratifying discharges, which subdue looming 
unconscious fears.  The vast tract of critique levelled at health care, rehabilitation and other 
social services by the disability movement, bears testament to the often perverse distortions 
manifest in these arenas by the deeply personal, often uninterrogated motives of practitioners.  
The long and ongoing struggle waged by disabled people for the right to a decisive voice in 
the design of such services is a demonstration of needs within the professional community to 
retain primary influence on how disability is "managed" (Watermeyer, 2006, p. 39).   
 
In the manner sketched above, it is possible to interpret a "latent" motivation underpinning a 
vast array of societal responses to disability.  Control, institutionalisation, adult re-
socialisation (Scott, 1969), segregation, enforced rehabilitation, zealous attempts at medical 
"normalisation" – these and many other responses to the spectre of disability may be 
interpreted as reactions not only to disabled people, but as specific modes of managing the 
internal evocations which exposure to disability stimulates.  Workers in disability-related 
social services may be blamelessly oblivious to the residue of unconscious aggression which 
plays about the seeming "kindliness" of their work.  The deep, personal investments in 
particular, self-soothing types of "disability policy" within service organisations is readily 
evident in the charged, even vicious controversies surrounding the "right" way things ought to 
be done, or the question of what disabled people "really" want or need.  At the unconscious 
level, it may be that the drive toward eugenic extermination and smothering, infantilising 
institutional "care" occupy, in fantasy, not unrelated psychic spaces.  It is not in any way my 
intention to bluntly or obliquely vilify social service workers; quite the contrary.  My point, 
though, pertains to the very specific need for reflexivity, and adequate occupational 
containment (via such resources as psychological supervision), in order to disrupt the very 
real danger of malignant unconscious impingements upon disability-related work.   
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Rationalisation  
In the case of rationalisation, guilt-evoking impulses of unconscious origin are managed 
through the construction of conscious and coherent justifications for the actions they inform 
(Marks, 1999a, p. 24).  With reference to disability, I illustrate with the following 
(Watermeyer, 2000):  
 
Some 100 kilometres outside my home city is a small town which has, over the past several 
decades, developed into a centre for disability social services.  These include residential 
special schools for visually and hearing impaired children and residential sheltered 
employment facilities for sensorily, physically and multiply impaired adults.  Now, the 
conscious explanation for the location of these services, and hence their consumers, in a small 
rural town, surrounds issues of safety – for example, persons with sensory impairments are 
regarded as far safer in an environment not characterised by the busy streets and heavy, fast-
moving traffic of the city.  However, a critical psychoanalytic interpretation of the policy may 
render an alternative explanation – that is, that at an unconscious level policy-makers were 
drawn to service development initiatives which made provision for the location of disabled 
people out of sight, out of the everyday social world.  Perhaps such an evacuation of persons 
with disabilities from the ken of the broader community served to facilitate the fulfilment of 
an unconscious wish that “damaged” people, and, more importantly, the emotional “damage” 
which they embody, do not, in reality, exist.  It is, in my experience, a familiar scenario that 
the manifest, overtly described objectives of disability-related social services fall easily and 
unproblematically on the uncritical ear, within the context of a tacit culturally entrenched 
belief environment which, broadly, affirms “helping” and “support” as necessarily and self-
evidently good and admirable.  Put another way, we tend to feel uncomfortable, even 
outraged, at the questioning of the motives of individuals and organisations which purport to 
expend time and effort in “helping” those “less fortunate than us”, in a manner sometimes 
traceable to strands of religious doctrine.  This culture of “helping”, which tends to be 
regarded at baseline as unproblematically praiseworthy, renders a situation in which the 
possible, and pervasive, latent and unconsciously motivated mediating factors impinging on 
the implementation of disability social services remain obscured.  
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In the foregoing illustration, the social service organisations concerned, steeped as they are in 
self-conscious religious-altruistic orthodoxy, tend to be experienced by the observer as 
unassailable to critique, since their motives are reconstructed as overwhelmingly above 
reproach.  On the level of consciousness this may well be the case, but, as I have attempted to 
demonstrate, the potentially widespread influence of the powerful unconscious responses 
evoked in individuals by the disability phenomenon requires careful, candid and critical 
reflection.  It is clear to me that the nature of institutional and cultural responses to disability, 
if left uninterrogated, will tend toward ever more not being shaped by the nature of the needs 
and predicaments of those whose lives are at the centre of the struggles at hand, but by the 
projected intra-psychic defensive profile of a community unready to reflect on its unvoiced 
pain.   
 
Medicalisation as a defence 
This, of course, is not a "defence mechanism" which one would find in any psychoanalytic 
text.  I create it here with reference to particular repressive strategies which make use of 
medical discourse in silencing or constricting the voice (in fantasy or reality) of disabled 
experience.  Technically, the defensive manoeuvres which will be described below may be 
understood within descriptions of a range of "formal" ego defences; those described above, 
and others.  Yet, I regard it as helpful to gather these in terms of a rubric which highlights the 
role of medical ideology, as appropriated in professional as well as colloquial terms 
throughout modern society.  To begin with, it is in the nature of a health care establishment 
founded upon Cartesian dualist principles that, in the very act of engagement with medicine – 
in diagnosis – the social experience of disablement is sheared away.  In the place of an 
analysis of oppression, personal tragedy theory locates disadvantage as a morally neutral, 
individual misfortune.  Virtually everything about biomedical installations and practice 
deflects, or "looks past", the cruel inequality of disablist exclusion.  Gill (2001, p. 365) argues 
that the predicament of disabled persons is one more critical than that of racial minorities or 
women, as the disabled body carries "real' human difference, which can more successfully 
(though prejudicially) be linked to negative ascriptions.  The fact that impairment-based 
difficulties – such as pain, fatigue or functional limitations – are experienced by many 
disabled persons, and are not reducible to political factors, allows for such experiences to be 
easily misused as blanket foundations for devaluing attitudes (ibid.).  Typically, such aspects 
of disabled life are overgeneralised, or cited in isolation from other tracts of individual 
experience, in a manner which evokes a "distorted wholesale disparagement of the disability 
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experience" (ibid.).  The collective identifying of the "medical" as the pivotal locus of 
causality in shaping the trajectory of disabled lives could be described as a shared introjective 
identification (Hinshelwood, 1987, p. 71).  What has occurred here is that members of the 
community have, via the facility of an external, supporting "object" – medical discourse – 
accrued a defensive benefit which allows for the rational deflecting of a fearsome reality – 
brutal social injustice.  The isolation, deprivation, denigration, shunning and wholesale 
dehumanising of disabled persons prevalent everywhere may, accordingly, be disposed of as 
the regrettable, inevitable consequences of nature.   
 
At the opposite end of the scale, Menzies (1960) notes how certain introjective identifications 
are "forced into" recipients despite their will, buttressing demeaning identity ascriptions, 
rather than providing respite from psychic dissonance (Menzies, 1960 cited in Hinshelwood, 
1987, p. 71).  The psychic, cultural coercion of disabled persons into the submissive assuming 
of the role of personifications of a marginal, devalued stereotype seems to fit this description.  
Meaning-spaces are created by the interweaving of discursive mechanisms with the 
requirements of psychic expediency, such that it becomes extremely difficult to "imagine" a 
society in which disabled persons are whole, legitimate and "fully human" social actors.  In 
his ground-breaking monograph of rehabilitation organisations for sight impaired persons in 
the United States, the shrewd and perceptive social anthropologist Robert Scott (1969) 
demonstrated vividly how the so-called "rehabilitation" of blind persons was more accurately 
conceptualised as a process of "adult socialisation"; that is, an exercise in "training" the newly 
impaired in the business of "being" the society's disabled minority (Scott, 1969).  With 
disturbing clarity, Scott (1969) showed up how "clients" of rehabilitation service 
organisations were rewarded, or negatively sanctioned, for behaviour and modes of "being 
disabled" which did, or did not, fit with official protocols.  What disabled persons' 
predicaments involve, and hence what disabled people "need", was unequivocally articulated 
by "professional", nondisabled agents.  For Stiker (1982), the emergence of rehabilitation as 
an institutional response to impairment heralded the dominance of a culture of 
"identification"; that is, a drive to making humans identical.  This obliteration of alterity will, 
in fantasy at least, dissolve from society "all that is lacking", creating the idealised illusion of 
a homogenous social whole (Stiker, 1982, pp. 128, 131-2; McRuer, 2006).   
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Where the social sequelae of disability are found, an ever-present corollary to these is guilt.  
This may be within the disabled individual, or others, and conscious or unconscious; but as 
disability reliably implies inequality and deprivation, it predictably also brings guilt.  
Wherever the glaring contradictions of differential provision of essential resources to 
ostensibly "equal" citizens is to be found, it seems incontrovertible that relationships will be 
distorted by guilt, amongst other conflicted feelings.  What the biomedical view of disability 
offers is the opportunity for the provided-for observer to substitute "disability guilt" with the 
(often) far milder discomfort of "impairment guilt".  "Disability guilt", I suggest, involves a 
level of real culpability to the observer, in terms of being implicated, by virtue of passive 
collusion, in the atrocities perpetrated by an unjust society upon some of its citizens.  By 
contrast, "impairment guilt" reframes the issue as one in the hands of destiny, nature or God, 
hence absolving the society, and the individual, of accountability or blame.  The extremely 
dominant discourses of pity and charity fit very snugly into this defence, as they compose the 
human objects of "impairment guilt" – the hapless tragics, the chance unfortunates – leaving 
the onlooker with nothing but the welcome opportunity to be altruistic, powerful and generous 
in relation to that which earlier brought fault and shame.  These concepts are not intended as 
crisp, neatly distinguishable orientations, but rather as extremes of a continuum, upon which 
shifting positions are negotiated, as proximity to the awful reality of disability oppression 
varies in everyday social life.  When evidence of this suffering looms, citizens are hence 
afforded the opportunity to appear – to be – the bringers of succour, rather than the causes of 
affliction.   
 
Fantasies about the lived experience of disability and, in particular, the psychic management 
thereof, are central originators of a host of oppressive relational dynamics which surround 
disabled persons.  One mode of defending against the looming, projected abjection of 
"disabled life" is by constructing the body as something which can, by virtue of care and 
science, be controlled.  In particular, it is the chance, indiscriminate incidence of bodily frailty 
which must be denied; for this purpose, medical discourse is of supreme utility.  The 
propositions of this rationalising logic are twofold:  first, that those who suffer the frailty of 
the body do so through their own negligence, and second, that those who subject themselves 
properly to medical authority can be restored to wholeness.  Susan Wendell (1997, p. 269) 
tells of her personal experience, after falling severely ill, of friends candidly questioning her 
regarding what she believed she might have done "wrong" in order to bring the illness upon 
herself.  She writes:  "... our cultural insistence on controlling the body blames the victims of 
disability for failing and burdens them with self-doubt and self-blame" (ibid.).  Marks (1999a, 
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p. 75) identifies a "moral zeal" with which health care is pursued, undoing any possibility of 
illness or disablement becoming "integrated within conceptions of community and humanity".  
Obsessive nutritional fads, exercise regimes, rigidly advocated esoteric practices, and a host 
of further lifestyle imperatives prepare the way for the illusion of somatic and spiritual 
control.  Attachment to this illusion manifests in the moral judgment, and administering of a 
just damning to illness, of those who have the audacity or carelessness to flout clear directives 
of what is "right".  Sinason (1992, p. 149) comments that, without fail, blame enters the arena 
of disease "with a vengeance".  Fear of illness, of disability, of madness – all evoke the 
irresistable instinct to blame the victim (ibid.).   Susan Sontag (1997, p. 233) delineates the 
defensive ascriptions made to persons living with HIV and AIDS, who are viewed as guilty of 
indulgence or delinquency, and as addicted to chemical substances or deviant sexual excesses.  
In an interesting and provocative passage, Tom Main (1989, p. 205) positions medicine and 
war in parallel, as arenas both satiated with "issues of life and death, crippledom (sic.) and 
loss, sadnesses and terrors about external dangers", as well as, from inner sources, 
unconscious fantasies of "primitive sadism" and "punishment".  All this, of course, is the 
destabilising stuff of primitive defences and consequently shifting realities.   
 
Through what Marks (1999a) and others term "epistemic invalidation", the voice of medical 
authority ignores, minimises, or denies outright those aspects of bodily experience which it 
cannot "subdue" through explanation (Marks, 1999a, p. 54; Kraemer, 1994; Wendell, 1996; 
1997).  Interlaced with the "psychic expediency" of the denial of experiences of uncontrol, 
exists a certain "professional expediency" (Barnes, 1990, p. 6), whereby the authenticity of 
medicine's explanatory powers remains undisrupted by wayward experiential data.  Medicine, 
in this guise of empirical gatekeeper, allows overtly for the disregarding of "the excess, the 
surplus that will not fit" (Burman, 1996, p. 138).  Whether this "excess" be traumatic social or 
psychological aspects of disability, or rehabilitative outcomes which do not "fit" with 
professional goals, it is the disabled individual's perceived failings which settle as explanatory 
ascriptions.  By contrast, in Barnes' (1990, p. 6) words, "the 'expert' is exonerated from 
responsibility, professional integrity remains intact, traditional wisdom and values are not 
questioned, and the existent social order goes unchallenged".  Health care technology is often, 
within the dominant discursive frame which Arthur Frank (2006, p. 70) terms "neoliberal 
medicine", regarded as something we "do things with", rather than an act in itself (Edwards, 
2006, p. 55).  Medicine's masquerading as a "value neutral" enterprise (Marks, 1999a, p. 51) 
allows for the defensive, introjective appropriation of its pronouncements by individuals who, 
thus, may also mindlessly assume moral neutrality.   
 111
 
In giving life to his conception of how the reparative drive of medical discourse reframes, and 
hence elides, aspects of social experience, Frank (1995) describes how the medical gaze 
performs an illusory transformation of "mystery" into "puzzle".  The curative zeal of medicine 
cannot allow suffering; this is a "mystery", which can only be faced up to, or tolerated.  
Within the gaze, note, to be different is, by definition, to suffer.  By contrast, a "puzzle" 
admits solution; thus are disabled lives turned into "puzzles" or "challenges", experiences into 
problems with "solutions", and identities into blemishes which imply imperatives for repair.  
Experience and identity can only be valued as "mysteries", which, unlike "puzzles", cannot be 
"got right" because "there is no 'right' way to get it" (Frank, 1995, p. 81).  It is precisely the 
absence of solutions which make mysteries "a scandal to modernity" (ibid.).   
 
In closing this section, I note that Gliedman and Roth (1980, p. 239) are blunt in their 
assertions regarding the split-off, discarded and often denigrated position of the psychological 
in health care.  Psychological expertise, they observe, is typically obtained by medical 
practitioners exclusively via the decades-long process of trial and error experience with live, 
often troubled patients.  Advocates of a narrow social model view of disability should, I 
believe, take careful cognisance of their complicity in maintaining and justifying this 
splintering of experience and personhood.  It is the "heroic", physiological, curative, 
depersonalised nature of biomedicine which impoverishes the philosophy of medical ethics to 
an exclusive consideration of issues of "life and death"; perpetuating the unfortunate myth 
that the primary purpose of medicine is to control the unruly body (Wendell, 1997, p. 270).  A 
more inclusive, flexible and humanistic view would admit a host of further concerns central to 
the social living of bodily difference; notably, how medical discourse and society at large 
"understand, mediate, assist with and integrate experiences of illness, injury and disability" 
(ibid.).  This defended "oversight" means that knowledge regarding how to live in current 
society with illness or disability, how to uncover and communicate one's experience, and how 
to sustain life in the face of uncertainty, pain, or functional limitation remains marginal, as 
unsystematised and largely disregarded irrelevance (ibid.).   
 
Over the course of the balance of this theoretical synthesis, I will consider a range of concepts 
and topics relevant to the development of a politically situated psychology of disablement.  
Whilst these areas of concern vary in theoretical proximity to the psychoanalytic model, I 
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make use of the analytic lens as a common interrogative thread which, I trust, will illuminate 
and situate the potential contribution of each.  I begin with a brief examination of the utility to 
our discussion of the medical sociological notion of stigma. 
 
Stigma 
Erving Goffman's (1963) notion of "stigma", though highly controversial, is an ever-present, 
provocative element in most reviews of disability social science.  In Stigma: Notes on the 
management of spoiled identity (1963), Goffman painted a stark, at times disturbing picture of 
distortions in social relating which surround "stigmatised" identities, such as disablement.  
Within his view, developed via monograph data, a major aspect of life as a disabled person 
involves the imperative to deflect, to ward off, social devaluation provoked by one's damaged 
identity (Gill, 2001, p. 355).  Amongst much else, Goffman (1963) focused attention on the 
strategic means whereby persons marked by signifiers of damage attempted to minimise or 
disguise evidence of the unwanted identity, in order to avoid or delay the triggering of 
denigrating responses from others.  A range of strategies such as the use of humour, the 
proving of competence, or the hiding of evidence of difference were identified, which may 
temporarily allow the stigmatised to "pass" as normals (Gill, 2001, p. 355).  Failure to 
sufficiently mitigate the current of denigration drawn toward one's "broken" body, leads to a 
more or less inevitable cementing of one's consignment to the social margins; a destiny 
which, it is subtly suggested, seems predictable to all.  As a complex of aspects of relating, 
stigma embodies a property of the individual, a process between participants, a form of social 
categorization, and an accompanying affective set (Coleman, 1997, p. 216).  As such, it is a 
difficult concept to categorize as especially "psychological" or "cultural".   
 
Earlier, we considered at some length the traditionally oppositional stance of disability studies 
towards the discipline of medical sociology; Goffman's work was amongst that most heavily 
criticised by writers such as Finkelstein and Oliver (e.g. Finkelstein, 1980; Oliver, 1990; both 
cited in Thomas, 1999a, p. 146).  The critical view propounded by these and other social 
model authors is, in the first place, the familiar – and pertinent – one relating to Goffman's 
(1963) neglect of a concerted investigation of the broader socio-political context of systemic 
disadvantage under which disabled persons suffer (Thomas, 1997, p. 146).  Beyond this, 
though, Goffman's work was regarded as representing disabled persons as passive "victims" 
of prejudicial treatment, living with the "unfortunate but inevitable social consequences of 
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being impaired" (ibid.).  Unsurprisingly, materialist analyses found nothing of value in a study 
which focused on cultural, relational and symbolic aspects of disability.  Within the 
materialist universe, oppression does not dwell primarily in these phenomena, but in relations 
of production; Goffman's concepts were consequently regarded as, at best, diversionary.   
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However, taking a renewed view of his work, from a perspective which foregrounds the 
micro-mechanics of intra-psychic and interpersonal aspects of discrimination, renders a 
valuable and insightful contribution to understanding the relational and emotional stressors to 
which disabled persons are subject.   
 
The social modelist critique of Goffman (1963) seems typical of an overly hasty, even 
scornful, materialist rejection of "personal epiphenomena".  His description of strategies 
aimed at countering the devaluing gaze of the social world, in the view of Finkelstein and 
Oliver, serve only to confirm and reproduce stereotypes of disabled persons as helpless 
individuals relentlessly subject to victimisation.  The repressive danger of such a view lies in 
the following:  there exists a very real risk of a desire to propound "positive" images of 
resourceful and resilient disabled persons disallowing a rigorous and candid representation of 
the very real, often abject, suffering endured by persons whose identities are, for much of the 
balance of the social world, a source of disgust.   Finkelstein and others seem to regard an 
examination of stigmatisation as an incidence of generalised slander, rather than an attempt to 
circumscribe what are, in fact, most painful, even dehumanising, elements of social 
oppression.  In an ironic twist, materialist authors seem to miss the point that the "stereotypes" 
propounded by Goffman exist as very real sources of shame and suffering in the lives of 
marginal persons.  This, of course, in no way justifies such imagery; on the contrary, within 
the process of description is an implicit intent of problematisation.  Surely, it is the silencing, 
not the investigation, of denigrating modes of treatment which demeans.  It is fair to say that 
Goffman's (1963) account is vastly inadequate in socio-political critique, but no more 
unsatisfactory than a correspondingly bald materialist view.  Goffman (1963) is clear that 
stigma is a phenomenon of social relationships, not physical or psychological attributes; the 
meaning attributions of identity signifiers vary with history and culture (Coleman, 1997, p. 
217).  Consequently, he is describing "what is", rather than "what is inevitable".  A more 
reasonable criticism of Goffman (1963) is the argument that he underestimates the agency and 
resourcefulness of individuals negotiating their stigmatisation, tending to describe desperate 
attempts at survival, rather than calculated coping (Frank, 1988, p. 96).  My own view is that 
the key issue under investigation is the ongoing exigencies of distorted relating directed at 
persons with impairments, which continue to emanate from modern culture despite the degree 
to which these may be successfully "managed" by their target population.  What Goffman  
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(1963) illuminates are the processes of projection and projective identification, under the 
guise of an alternative conceptual framework.  Whether, and to what extent, these imputations 
may be deflected by individuals, the predicament of lives lived in the face of relentless 
othering must remain a fundamental focus of our exploration of oppression.   
 
Perhaps the most objectionable of Goffman's (1963) utterances to his materialist critics are his 
intimations regarding how stigmatised persons, perhaps only momentarily, may be drawn into 
endorsing denigratory views of self (Frank, 1988, p. 96; Watson, 1998, p. 147).  What 
Goffman is referring to is some formulation of internalised oppression, which is anathema to 
social model materialists.  Even the idea that "for a moment" an individual suffering relentless 
stigmatisation may weaken or waver in her internal resistance to identity assault is viewed as 
an unacceptable, unthinkable libel.  The indispensable contribution of the psychodynamic 
model of mind finds clear expression here, providing for the human ambivalence which is so 
patently absent in materialist discourse.  This concrete response to the demeaning, projected 
imputations of a prejudiced social world is a retaliatory and wholesale re-projection of the 
whisperings of damage.  As such, it bluntly elides any consideration of how cultural assailants 
may have taken up residence within.  The absurd myth implicit here is that internal 
conceptions of self are unambiguous, and that feelings of, for example, self-loathing, do not 
exist as long as we manage to direct our thoughts elsewhere.  Far from "dooming" members 
of devalued groups to "eternal stigmatisation in their own eyes as well as those of society" 
(Ablon, 1981 cited in Frank, 1988, p. 96), Goffman (1963) was forging the beginnings of a 
model of oppression which incorporated the relational, and hence, the psychological.  Gill 
(2001, p. 356) takes issue with the fact that Goffman (1963) gives little attention to the case of 
"deviants" who decide deliberately to forego the struggle for acceptance by "normal" society.  
She too, I believe, fails to recognise that the hail of projections, the constant hum of 
denigrating fantasies and representations, is sustained equally by individuals who may choose 
to negotiate their lives – their selves – in highly contrasting ways.  If Goffman (1963) 
evidences – as I believe he does – a subtle pessimism regarding the prospects for a "solidarity 
of deviants" based on the affirmation of marginal identities, it is only mildly facetious to 
argue that this renders his position more clearly resonant with latter critiques of identity 
politics.  Gill (2001, p. 356) also points out how Goffman argued that "deviant" individuals 
who choose to reject "mainstream" culture in favour of forming alliances with other similarly 
stigmatised individuals, risk calling attention to their difference, in a manner which reinforces 
marginality.  Whilst such an observation may not expediently serve the purposes of disability 
politics, what Goffman has attempted to do is thoroughly describe the quandary, the double-
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bind, that is stigma; that, often, is disability.  Lastly, his caviat that such attempts at an 
"affirmation model" (Swain & French, 2000) of marginal identity politics will inevitably 
become snarled in the very acts of categorisation and closure which they seek to defeat, was 
some way ahead of its time.    
 
Liminality 
The anthropologist Victor Turner (1969) coined this term to describe the position of members 
of society who have no clear status, typically because a prior position, standing, or identity 
has been expunged, and re-allocation has not yet taken place (Turner, 1969 cited in Murphy, 
Scheer, Murphy & Mack, 1988, p. 237).  Famously, Turner described such persons as 
"betwixt and between", occupying a state of suspended animation outside of the taxonomies 
and protocols which govern social life (ibid.), often during the course of rites of passage.  
Robert Murphy (Murphy, 1987, 1995; Murphy et al., 1988), in his auto-ethnographic 
disability monograph The body silent, identified the concept as peculiarly apt to the social 
predicaments of disabled persons.  He writes:   
 
The long-term physically impaired are neither sick nor well, neither dead nor 
fully alive, neither out of society nor wholly in it.  They are human beings but 
their bodies are warped or malfunctioning, leaving their full humanity in doubt.  
They are not ill, for illness is transitional to either death or recovery.  ... They are 
neither fish nor fowl; they exist in partial isolation from society as undefined, 
ambiguous people.    
       (Murphy, 1987, p. 131) 
 
The liminal state, in Turner's cross-cultural research, is likened to a range of ambiguous states 
of existence, including death, being in the womb, being invisible, and bisexuality (Murphy, 
1987, p. 135).  Liminality is often associated with processes of transition, which are 
incomplete, and thus embody an ambivalent social status (Marks, 1999a, p. 127).  The 
concept, though, is imbued not only with ambiguity regarding social standing, but expresses a 
deeper instability concerning one's fundamental nature, one's humanness (Golden & Scheer, 
1995, p. 1445).  Murphy et al (1988, p. 238) argue that much disability rehabilitation strongly 
mirrors ritualised processes of transition used to mark passage from one identity to another in 
so-called traditional societies.  Newly disabled individuals are withdrawn from mainstream 
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culture in order to undergo training in the modes of living which fit their new social status.  
Scott's (1969) critique of rehabilitation as a process of "adult socialisation" – noted earlier – 
provides a strong demonstration of this position.  Note the implication, in both cases, that 
rehabilitation functions not only as a palliative medical intervention, but perhaps more 
importantly as a mode of restoring the taxonomic clarity of the social order.  For Murphy, 
though, the "transition" of disabled persons is typically perpetual; rather than exiting the 
liminal state as legitimate citizens, these individuals often remain trapped between liminal 
isolation and an unfeasible social emergence, not "counting" as legitimate citizens (Gill, 2001, 
p. 358).  Such individuals are considered "sociologically dead", and thus present a chronic 
threat to the legitimacy and coherence of the social order (ibid.).  The society, consequently, 
"manages" such individuals by a form of sequestering, allowing only for the participation of 
disabled persons in social process within the bounds of narrow, ritualised realms – that is, the 
"disabled role".  This, in Murphy's words, is relegation to "the twilight zones of social 
indefinition" (Murphy et al., 1988, p. 237).   
 
Murphy conceptualises disabled persons as anomalous, as "out of place", and a threat to the 
social order.  As a theoretical parallel, Mary Douglas (1966) developed an anthropological 
model of the societal management of "contaminants", of anomalous presences which disrupt 
the cultural categories imbuing social life with meaning.  In Purity and danger (1966), 
Douglas elaborated the symbolic, cultural construct of "dirt", broadly defined as discordant 
elements which defy society's dominant schema of control and predictability (Thomson, 1995, 
p. 605).  For Douglas (1966, p. 35), "dirt" cannot exist in an isolated, acultural space; rather, 
its menace always implies the presence of a specific, stipulated set of ordered relations.  The 
"threat" of disability, thus, must direct us toward investigation of the specific modes of being 
– the invisible hallmarks of normalcy – that are menaced by the disability phenomenon.  After 
Honneth (1995), thus, we must turn our attention to the "moral grammar" of modes of 
exclusion, rooted in cultural mores which, though invisible, carry the mythic essences of our 
beloved "enjoyment" (Zizek, 1990).  The awkward, specific and complex "needs" of disabled 
persons within societies designed to interface with "normal" bodies, present the essence of 
disquieting anomaly; that which is ill-fitting, unworkable, and haunted with a shadowy, 
anxious threat of "systemic failure".  The failure of "the system", though, is at the heart of 
Douglas' (1966) terrain of unthinkable knowledge, which harnesses restorative ritual and 
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 categorical judgment in squeezing the locus of disjuncture, of unfeasibility, "back" into the 
individual.  The legitimacy of the system, thus, is contingent upon the chronic liminality of 
the individual, the "misfit".  Allowing him or her into full, integrated social personhood would 
translate not into the presence of neutral difference, but an encroachment of pollution, taboo 
and contagion (Thomson. 1997b, p. 34).   
 
Douglas (1966) outlined five strategies via which societies "deal" with polluting anomaly, 
which have ready resonance with social responses to disability.  First amongst these is the 
assigning of ambiguous phenomena to a single absolute category, typically within systems of 
binary opposition (Thomson, 1997b, p. 34).  The disabled-nondisabled binary, along with 
characteristic anxieties pertaining to the uncertain "degree" of impairment, exemplify here.  
The second strategy is one of simple elimination of the delinquent social ingredient, calling to 
mind the eugenic extermination and abortion of disabled bodies.  Third, practices which allow 
for avoidance of the anomaly are created, such as the sweeping ideology of segregation and 
institutionalisation that is the global history of disabled persons.  The fourth stratagem 
involves the distancing and (psychic) control of problem elements through labelling these as 
dangerous intrusions, with such assignations carrying some form of institutional ratification.  
Lastly, ambiguous elements may be managed through their incorporation into ritual, in order 
"to enrich meaning or to call attention to other levels of existence" (Douglas, 1966, p. 40; 
Thomson, 1997b, p. 34-7).  This last possibility is regarded as the only potentially positive or 
socially transformative strategy in Douglas' (1966) taxonomy.  It may – optimistically – imply 
attempts at a valuing recognition of the contribution of disabled subjectivity to an 
understanding of the human condition.  But perhaps more likely is the appropriation of a 
constructed version of disabled experience in literature or art, which exploits disability as a 
metaphor, with, in fact, conservative implications (see Artistic and literary representations, 
p.151).  To Douglas' (1966) theory of the management of social anomaly, Murphy (1987, p. 
132) adds Claude Levi-Strauss' assertion that the most fundamental of binary distinctions in 
the human world is that between nature and culture.  Within this "grand dualism", impairment 
of the body presents as an intrusion of nature, which "undercuts one's status as a bearer of 
culture" (ibid.).  In combining Goffman (1963) and Douglas (1966), one may suggest that 
human stigmata present in the modern world as "social dirt" (Thomson, 1997b, p. 33); the 
investigation of the lived experience of inhabiting this social space via the approaches of 
existential phenomenology holds much promise (Kasnitz & Shuttleworth, 2001, p. 30).   
 
 119
To close this section, the constructed, cultural nature of the "dirt" of disability is demonstrated 
by the clear inconsistency in stigmatisation applied to aged persons with impairments 
(Priestley, 2006, p. 86).  Whilst impairment in child – or adulthood is constructed squarely as 
aberrance, in old age it is viewed as simply a "generational norm" (ibid.).  This cultural 
"space" for functional limitation in old age rescues this type of impairment from invidiousness 
and anomaly, "rehabilitating" the elderly as "not disabled", just "old".     
 
Monstrosity 
The Latin word monstra, from which the English "monster" is derived, means "sign", and also 
forms the root of the verb "demonstrate" – that is, to show (Thomson, 1997b, p. 56).  The 
etymology of the word shows plainly how bodily difference, in particular, birth 
malformations, have been regarded as omens or portents – typically boding ill – throughout 
antiquity.  Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the phenomenon of the 
"freak show" enjoyed its heyday, providing, as we shall see, a platform for the cultural and 
psychic othering afforded to "normal" society by the spectacle of extravagant bodily 
difference (Bogdan, 1988).  Within the spine-chilling thrills of P.T. Barnum's travelling 
shows, citizens of the early United States were offered the opportunity to grapple with 
dilemmas of classification, with which the skills of constructing self and devaluing 
"otherness" – the skills of "nation building" – could be honed (Thomson, 1997b, p. 58).  To 
Thomson, such shows provided to the rank and file population what science offered to the 
educated classes – "an opportunity to formulate the self in terms of what it is not" (ibid. – my 
emphasis).   
 
Fiedler (1978) provides a rich and insightful history of the cultural phenomenon of human 
"freaks", with a view to investigating the role of stark difference in the coalescing of personal 
and social identities.  He traces how, through the medium of religious doctrine, malformed 
bodies came to carry the projected weight of divine wrath poured out upon a wickedly errant 
humanity.  Indeed, as in the case of the monster of Ravenna (b. 1512), individual aspects of 
the malformation were interpreted as specific messages from God, designating the evils 
committed by wayward humanity (ibid., p. 25).  Traces of this "divine" logic in the, at times, 
desperate straits of coming to terms with the birth of an infant with congenital malformations 
are, yet, all but uncommon.  In Fiedler's (1978, p. 24) view, the psychic need for images of 
"monstrous" bodily difference is such that, were we not to have access to such, we would 
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create them for ourselves in narratives and pictures.  The "prototype" of the human monster, 
he argues, is not to be found in embryology or teratology, but in the depths of a human psyche 
constitutionally troubled with its own physicality  (ibid.).  Here, basic human conflicts to do 
with the limits and structuration of bodies are to be found, common to all due to the universal 
ego perturbations engendered by physical development.  As we grow, from infancy through 
childhood, the development of secondary sexual characteristics, and adult maturity, a constant 
stream of changes besets our physical sense of self, with the final destinations of these 
processes always unknown.  Primitive and conflicted fantasies regarding bodies and selves 
litter this developmental path, confronting us with fears about our size, the boundaries and 
shapes of our bodies, the adequacy of our maleness or femaleness, the animality of our 
physiques, and much else.  In negotiating this shifting, primal terrain, we need markers with 
which to position ourselves within a host of dualities, viz.:  "[between] male and female, 
sexed and sexless, animal and human, large and small, self and other, and consequently 
between reality and illusion, experience and fantasy, fact and myth" (Fiedler, 1978, p. 24).  
Fascination with freakery is elemental to childhood fantasy, arguably because children "need" 
the extremes of the freakish body in order to reposition the changing self as possessing not 
"too much" or "too little" of a given characteristic (ibid., p. 27).  Observing the hermaphrodite 
stills anxieties about gender ambivalence, the "bearded lady" normalises the emergence of 
bodily hair, conjoined twins provide an arena for confronting conflicts regarding merger and 
separation, giants and dwarfs offset fears of excessive or stunted size; the list continues 
(Marks, 1999a, p. 170).  In each case, the extremes of the monstrous "other" realign self-
assessments as clearly normative, as whole, as right.  Fiedler (1978, p. 31) captures the point 
thus:  " 'We are the freaks', the human oddities are supposed to reassure us, from their lofty 
perches.  'Not you.  Not you!' ".   
 
The juxtaposition of a range of bodily deformations with the imago of "the monster" tells of 
the primitive significations of bodily impairment, as markers of the dark, disavowed 
counterpoint to the phrenetic, earnest development of a viable ego.  In Mary Douglas' (1966, 
p. 39) terms, the birth of a child with a congenital malformation may evoke the discordant 
character of "matter out of place", transforming an infant with neutral bodily differences into 
a peculiarity, a sign; in some sense, an object.  She recounts how, in Nuer society, 
"monstrous" births are construed as baby hippopotamuses, "accidentally" born to human  
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mothers; disposal of such infants, thus, becomes culturally possible, and the social order is 
restored (ibid.).  In a not dissimilar fashion, the freak show provided a choreographed frame 
for the reifying of racial, ethnic and disability difference into cultural, even existential 
otherness, paving the way for the plethora of inequalities to come (Thomson, 1997b, p. 60).   
 
Robert Bogdan (1988, p. 7) criticises Fiedler's (1978) interpretation of the construct of the 
"freak" as an inevitable consequence of universal existential anxieties.  In Bogdan's (1988) 
view, Fiedler (1978) reifies "the freak" in a manner which condemns persons with unusual 
bodies to filling the role of custodians of the projected "monstrosity" of others, thus obviating 
an interrogation of the multifarious influence of culture.  The question which this encounter 
gives rise to is indeed an interesting and weighty one: to what extent may visceral responses 
to otherness be ascribed to inevitable, constitutional aspects of the human condition?  Hoggett 
(1992, p. 5) is provocative in his confounding of materialist reductionism; he declares that, if 
political and social thought is to come fully to grips with the contribution of psychoanalysis, it 
is not sufficient to affirm that "the personal is political".  He writes:   
 
It needs to understand that the human being is not an infinitely malleable 
material but, conversely, that as corporeal beings we have a nature which is not 
only irreducible to social circumstance but itself is a nature capable of 
determination.  The personal is, to some extent, political; but the political is also, 
to some extent, personal. 
      (Hoggett, 1992, p. 5) 
 
In the area of evolutionary neuroscience, with particular reference to gender, a view which 
positions the political as, to some extent, a complex of both cultural and neurodevelopmental 
factors, is increasingly incontrovertible (Pinker, 2003).  In the absence of such research which 
may shed light on the constitutional bases of disability-othering, let us consider what 
psychoanalytic theorising may suggest.   
 
Within the psychoanalytic framework of Jacques Lacan (Lacan, 1977a; 1977b), the process of 
the formation of a "whole", "coherent" identity is, essentially, one of self delusion.  The 
intrinsic nature of human existential experience is, in his view, a fragmented and chaotic one, 
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pieced together only via the cultural concoction of a brittle, illusory mask of wholeness.  The 
most basic experience of the body is of a fragmented body, (corps morcele), experienced by 
the infant as chaotic turbulence, as un-integrated parts; an assemblage of limbs and surfaces 
(Davis, 1997c, p. 60).  This flailing, violent disorder of tissues and impulses is shepherded 
into an unreal unity during what Lacan, 1977b, p. 4) terms "the mirror phase" of development, 
where the child first dons the unified self-identity which she apprehends in her reflected 
image (Davis, 1997c, p. 60).  The seductive boundedness and coherence of the unitary, 
mirrored figure provides a relief to the child from the anxious chaos of fragmented impulses, 
casting the splinters of affect and intention in the gloss of a new unity (Frosh, 2006, p. 184).  
The perceived integrity of the ego is, in fact, a social construct appropriated for the purposes 
of psychic equilibrium, rooted in ideology which stresses autonomy and the sanctity of the 
unitary, independent self (ibid.).  Lacan (1977b) points to the creeping knowledge within each 
of us that we are not whole, not ordered and unified; not the harmonious beings of the 
modernist dream (Frosh, 2006, p. 184).  It is at the level of the infantile, fragmented self that 
"the real" is to be found; or, rather, to be elided.  It is here, perhaps, where constitutional 
aspects of the human psyche dwell which carry investments relating to the malformed body.  
Zizek (1991) frames "the real" as that which plays about the edge of the mirror, constantly 
threatening the placid illusions of cultural life with the contorted core of self (Zizek, 1991 
cited in Frosh, 2006, p. 186).  Disability, surely, must fill this description as the shadowy 
harbinger of "a return"; it is disability, to the exception of other identity markers, which lies 
dormant and ready in the bodies of all.  In this sense, it is a "sign" par excellence, delicately 
holding both the threat of disintegration, and the lure of enlivenment.  In his description of the 
"imagos of the fragmented body", Lacan (1977c, p. 11) makes specific reference to aggressive 
impulses toward bodily mutilations, including castration, dismemberment, dislocation, and 
evisceration – unconscious contents seemingly set to resonate readily with images of 
disability.  The complex evocations of disability, including guilt, hostility, and obsessive-
compulsive phenomena, also seem to fit well with this imagery.  The disabled body, perhaps, 
is a resonant, animate version of the repressed, infantile fragmented body (Davis, 1997c, p. 
60).   
  
If disability does, indeed, operate as a "messenger" from "the real", which consequently has 
the potential to imbue life with meaning and energy, one means of framing this role is via the 
idea of "the carnivalesque" nature of the different (the "grotesque") body (Bakhtin, 1981).  To 
Bakhtin (1981), the carnivalesque figure represents the right, the means, to transgress social 
norms and categories, showing up the illusory nature of these in a wry or clownish manner 
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(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 159).  Social hierarchies are inverted and the political status quo is 
disrupted, as the "disorderly body" teasingly goads all towards recognition of "the real" 
(Thomson, 1997b, p. 37).  The profound potential of the disability phenomenon to critique 
and disrupt dominant tenets of identity politics has already been alluded to, and will be 
considered in more depth later.  But here, we find an example of Douglas' (1966) lone 
"optimistic" incidence of the cultural management of anomaly; that is, the action of "matter 
out of place" in mobilising a critical reconstitution of cultural discourse (Thomson, 1997b, p. 
37).  Disabled persons, in this view, may fulfil the role of entitled bearers of valuable and 
novel perspectives on human existence, in a manner which has the potential to erode and 
reconfigure political barriers.   
 
In the following three sections, I turn now to a consideration of current debates within the 
discipline of applied bioethics, which have specific relevance to disability.  As before, my 
intention here is to apply the psychoanalytic lens, in attempting to bring the influence of 
emotional – and unconscious – factors upon these dilemmas into relief.   
 
Disability and bioethics 
Lives not worth living 
The uniting concerns of the philosophical discipline of bioethics surround fundamental 
dilemmas of health and illness, life and death; in particular, the relationship of medicine to 
nature (Asch, 2001, p. 298).  Here, the advent of curative and palliative medicine has given 
rise to existential questions regarding the quality, the fulfilment, which lives must carry in 
order to be "worth living" – in order to be preferable to not being alive (ibid.).  As such, the 
discipline carries specific – to some, sinister – relevance to the disabled population 
worldwide, as it is routinely disabled lives which come under the scrutiny of ethicists in the 
context of a range of medico-legal scenarios.  Adrienne Asch (2001, p. 299) characterises the 
role of bioethics as one which substitutes the medical question of "can this life be saved?" 
with a philosophical question:  "should this life be saved?"  The essence of the dilemmas 
underlying the medico-legal presentations at issue may be expressed as: 1) what are the 
conditions under which it becomes morally permissible to kill, or to let die, a disabled person?  
and 2) how potentially impaired must a foetus be in order to justify the prevention of its birth? 
(Wendell, 1989 cited in Asch, 2001, p. 297).  Bioethics has, as a discipline, taken a position 
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which advocates that assessments of the quality of life after treatment should be a factor in 
medical decisions, including those regarding the allocation of resources; at times, ethicists 
have argued against the use of technology and medical acumen in the sustaining of lives of 
individuals who will carry impairments (ibid., p. 299). Unsurprisingly, the at times livid 
criticism of disability studies scholars has directed attention to the "medicalising" logic 
implicit in such assessments, which tends to view quality of life as an acultural function of the 
integrity of the body.  At a deeper conceptual level, the arguments of bioethics must rest on 
the assumption of some consensus regarding the definitions of the medical terms being 
employed; the definition of "health" is an excellent case in point.  Kelman (1975) regards the 
definition of this familiar notion as "the most perplexing and ambiguous" issue in the study of 
medical social services (Kelman, 1975 cited in Altman, 2001, p. 100), thus setting the tone for 
the slippery and subjective nature of much of the philosophical debate confronting us in this 
area.   
 
Over the course of this brief critical discussion, we shall consider 3 situations arising from the 
encounter of bioethics and disability studies, viz.:  1) the withholding of treatment to impaired 
children or adults; 2) the prenatal testing of foetuses for the presence of congenital disorders, 
with a view to abortion; and 3) the question of assisted suicide, or "the right to die", for 
disabled persons.  The related issue of the forced sterilisation of persons with heritable 
impairments will be considered later, in the section entitled Eugenics.   
 
Withholding treatment from children and adults  
A common scenario in neonatal and paediatric medicine is that in which parents are charged 
with deciding whether or not their infant or minor child should undergo treatment, when the 
child will be disabled after the intervention, but may die without it (Asch, 2001, p. 302).  For 
example, a neonate with Down syndrome may also have heart disease, or an intestinal 
blockage – some clinicians may counsel parents to let the infant die, rather than treating the 
illness, and allowing the child to live with Down syndrome (ibid., p. 303).  The situation is 
complicated further when the appropriate treatment is especially invasive, and has a poor 
chance of success.  During the course of the 1990s, many writers in bioethics have defended 
the position that it is acceptable, if not morally desirable, for doctors to end the lives of babies 
that would be permanently disabled after acute treatment, citing the suffering inherent in 
many interventions, as well as the nature of the impairment (ibid.).  One painful outcome is 
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that of the ill child who suffers a brief and miserable life of fruitless medical interventions, 
compounding and extending the anguish of parents.   
 
In opposition to these assertions, the disability studies critique here centres on the social 
construction of congenital conditions such as Down syndrome, spina bifida, and cerebral 
palsy.  The argument of these writers holds that decisions regarding the possibility for 
"quality of life" of children with such conditions represent cultural judgments, merely 
masquerading as medical realities.  The lack of positive, even-handed cultural representations 
of the life-narratives of, for example, persons with Down syndrome, is implicated in the 
generally negative and stereotyped view of such lives, manifesting in medical 
"condemnations".  Basnett (2001) provides a telling example of this contradiction, relating the 
story of a friend – like him, a wheelchair user – who was admitted to hospital with a "minor" 
chest infection.  A junior doctor in attendance wrote in her case notes that, if required, she 
should not be resuscitated, due to "poor quality of life" (Basnett, 2001, p. 455).  In such 
situations it is, of course, nothing but stereotype which informs potentially lethal decisions.  
By way of a further example, in a paper attempting to describe the psychological effects of the 
birth of a congenitally impaired child on parents, MacKeith (1973) comments: "I do not hold 
the view that it is always the doctor's duty to do everything that he [sic.] can to save life; death 
is sometimes a blessing" (MacKeith, 1973, p. 136).  In the lives of acute paediatric 
practitioners, where death and tragedy are commonplace, it seems fair to recognise the 
legitimacy and positive intent of the sentiment being expressed here.  Yet, what this example 
foregrounds is the ambiguous, personal layer of variables at play in decisions often perceived 
as "scientific" or "objective".  The history of cultural imagery of disability, and the ideology 
of segregation, surely must have relevance in mediating assessments of a "worthwhile" life.  
Princeton philosophy chair Peter Singer has drawn a particularly fierce battering from the 
ranks of disability studies, due to his outspoken views on the value – or lack thereof – of life 
with a range of physical, sensory and cognitive impairments (Asch, 2001, p. 305).  To Singer 
(1993, p. 184), "the killing of a defective infant is not morally equivalent to the killing of a 
person; very often it is not morally wrong at all".  While conceding that individuals may 
maintain meaningful lives with these impairments, he insists that such lives will necessarily 
be less satisfying than the lives of persons without impairments (Asch, 2001, p. 305).  What 
we seem to be apprehending here, is the logic of subjectivity "written on the body"; and "writ 
large", at that.  Singer (1993) evenly asserts that it is possible to make absolute and infallible 
statements regarding the comparative nature of unseen individuals, simply on the basis of 
physical or cognitive characteristics.  Consequently, he argues that it is acceptable that parents 
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kill newborns with such conditions, in order that the "defective" child be replaced by a 
"healthy" one, who will necessarily enjoy life, and bring more joy, than the unknown 
impaired child ever could (Asch, 2001, p. 305).  With such dramatically divergent positions at 
play, and with the incontrovertible and chance influence of the cultural exposure of 
practitioners, the overt and tacit meanings of impairment presented to parents – typically in 
crisis – are multifarious and potentially definitive.  The "medical encounter", thus, is not an 
engagement with "value neutral" medical science (Marks, 1999a, p. 51), but, at least partially, 
with some chance fragment of a kaleidoscope of cultural meanings surrounding disablement, 
of discursive as well as intra-psychic, unconscious origin.     
 
Prenatal testing and abortion 
The fast growing international availability of prenatal testing to detect the presence of a range 
of congenital disorders presents many prospective parents with the dilemma of whether to 
bear children who will live with impairments (Asch, 2001, p. 305).  Asch (2001) writes:    
 
...the vast majority of [bioethics] theorists and health professionals...argue that 
prenatal testing, followed by pregnancy termination if an impairment is detected, 
promotes family well-being and the public health.   
      (Asch, 2001, p. 305) 
 
Against the backdrop of the predominance of a pro-choice philosophy on abortion, one view 
is simply to locate the impairment question as one amongst many others confronting adults 
considering the feasibility of parenthood.  However, Sinason (2002, p. 38) points to 
systematic variations.  In the United Kingdom, for example, "ordinary" pregnancy has an 
upper limit for termination of 24 weeks; for foetuses carrying a strong possibility of a range of 
congenital conditions, this restriction is waived, and no precise limit is provided (see also 
Shakespeare, 2006, p. 94-95).   In an international survey of geneticists, Wertz (1995, p. 
1654) found that 54% endorsed so-called "eugenic" goals; that is, the reduction in the number 
of carriers of genetic disorders in the general population.  This position was justified in terms 
of the unchanging nature of negative social attitudes towards impaired persons, and the 
conviction that the birth of an impaired child is typically destructive to healthy family 
functioning (ibid.).  Again, the retort of disability studies critics pertains to the socially 
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constructed, stereotyped idea that a disabled child necessarily cannot provide the fulfilment 
parents seek in child-rearing (Asch, 2001, p. 305).  These critics do not oppose abortion per 
se, but question the cultural underpinnings of decisions to abort particular foetuses on the 
basis of physical features (ibid., p. 307).  The implication of writers from within the disability 
movement is that the desire to terminate pregnancies involving impaired foetuses embodies an 
expression of broader cultural antipathy toward persons with those impairments, not just 
unborn, but living.  This, in some quarters, has been termed "the expressivist critique". 
 
In her psychoanalytic work in the area of learning disability, Valerie Sinason (1992; 2002) has 
found deep evidence of the psychological impact, amongst learning disabled patients, of the 
knowledge that only a lack of technology allowed for their birth.  That is, persons with a 
range of congenital impairments live with the knowledge that, had parents or medical 
professionals known of their "nature" before birth, they would likely not have been born.  
Sinason writes:   
 
The deepest and most painful psychoanalytic theme that comes from long-term 
work is that learning disabled people can experience extreme annihilatory fear 
because it is hard (or impossible) to separate out the idea of amniocentesis or 
abortion of unborn learning disabled foetuses from a death wish towards learning 
disabled children and adults.   
       (Sinason, 2002, p. 39) 
 
The essence of the "expressivist critique" lies in the assertion that legal or medical 
interventions which preclude the birth of persons with certain impairments "express" the, 
perhaps unconscious, desire of the broader population that living persons with such conditions 
did not exist.  Learning disabled persons, in particular, are argued to carry the most wretched 
of projected aspects of the human condition; the lack of an intact intellect has widely 
relegated such persons across world culture to a status below that of full humanness 
(Parmenter, 2001, p. 290).  But across a broad range of heritable impairments, disabled 
persons routinely have the experience of "genetic counselling" aimed explicitly at preventing 
the addition of other such impaired persons to the populace.  Rod Michalko (2002, p. 45) tells  
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of his being haunted in young life by the knowledge that "my type of person" – that is, a blind 
person – "was not welcome in my homeland".  After much agonizing over why this was the 
case, he was brought to a recognition of the imputations culturally at play surrounding the 
perceived nature of his life.  He writes:   
 
What was it about me and my life that recommended not reproducing it?  Why 
should I be prevented from happening again?  The answer is simple:  blindness is 
a condition that deprives people of most, and sometimes all, of their eyesight 
and, in turn, eliminates most, and sometimes all, of their ability and even 
pleasure.   
       (Michalko, 2002, p. 50)   
 
Saxton (1998) regards the disability basis for prenatal testing as "the greatest insult", 
affirming that "some of us are 'too flawed' in our very DNA to exist" (Saxton, 1998 cited in 
Asch, 2001, p. 308).  A key question for our purposes pertains to what the effects upon 
psychological functioning and identity are of the knowledge that "there are people who go to 
great lengths to avoid the birth of someone like you" (Glover, 2006, p. 5).  Assuming a 
typically provocative position, Shakespeare (2006, p. 87), stridently diminishes the import of 
such "cultural messaging".   
 
To Shakespeare (2006, p. 87), the "expressivist critique" embodies an excessive, even 
histrionic, "plot discourse", which ascribes a systematic, sinister intentionality to reproductive 
health policy which is mistaken and misplaced.  Shakespeare's position is a hyper-rational 
one, emphasising, in response to the critique of prenatal testing, that "there is no government 
plan to eliminate disabled people" (ibid.).  He responds, thus, to the issue as an illusory 
"eugenic threat", rather than a lived form of social denigration with potentially measurable 
effects upon the disabled community.  In downplaying the disability movement's concerns, he 
points to the fact that it is often parents themselves who are active agents in the choice to 
terminate (ibid.).  Whilst this is undoubtedly true, the observation elides a critical recognition 
of the symbiotic relationship of medicine and culture, as well as fudging any interrogation of 
the origins of such parents' instinctive views on what disabled life may be like.  The glaring 
lack of exposure of most members of modern society to naturally nuanced, normative, 
functional  disabled lives ensures that assessments of disabled life rely primarily upon 
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(typically aversive) fantasy, rather than first-hand experience.  Further, the fact that 
reproductive health policy contains no deliberate conspiracy does not change the deep 
(potential) meaning of manifest events in the lives of disabled persons who, as anyone might  
be, are harmed and penetrated by the knowledge that they are an accident, unwanted, and of 
inferior value.  A critique of social policy which focuses on intentions, rather than effects, will 
surely not render a full, rigorous picture of its lived implications.  Undoubtedly, a host of 
dreadful health care policies have seen implementation under the best possible intentions, but 
with a lack of understanding of the meanings these will bring to individual lives.  
 
Shakespeare (2006, p. 89-90) continues his clinically rational argument by pointing out the 
contradiction which inheres in the assumption that, if amniocentesis had been available, "I 
would not have been born".  There would, he writes, be no "I" to be born, as the "I" concerned 
would not exist.  To him, a "more rational" view is one which states that "this technology 
might prevent future people like myself from being born" (ibid, p. 89 – my emphasis).  This, 
whilst still potentially distressing, has less "personal resonance" than the idea of one's non-
existence (ibid.).  My own view is that the key aspects of this issue cannot be considered 
adequately in "rational" terms, as they pertain most meaningfully to the deeper, often 
unconscious, and irrational layers of human experience.  Shakespeare (2006) seems unable to 
allocate thought-space to the reality of a persistent tissue of denigrations surrounding 
disability which prevail in society more generally, to potentially be crystallized in issues such 
as reproductive health policy.  The bioethics debate, in this schema, is not "the problem", but 
simply a terrain of engagement surrounding an issue of far broader, deeper import; the 
complex, cultural territory of identity, trauma and selfhood.  In placing prenatal testing 
amongst a range of innocuous reasons why one might not have been born – if one's parents 
had not met, if they had used contraception, and so forth – Shakespeare (2006, p. 90) 
mistakenly equates free-floating aspects of human life experience with those which are 
applied with specific identity-meanings.  In my view, this statement is tantamount to asserting 
that the experience of "being poor" is identical whether or not one inhabits a racist state in 
which one's poverty is a function of demeaning, racialised economic exclusion.  In the South 
African apartheid state, the abject poverty and other social deprivations suffered by black 
persons were inflicted within an explicit logic which connected one's "undeserving" status to 
one's colour, one's identity.  Similarly, the potentially toxic thrust of the knowledge that 
efforts are afoot to prevent the existence of others "like me", must to some extent imbue "my 
way of being" with a demeaning evaluative assessment; "the reason why the world is 
attempting to prevent more people like me, is because of the way that I am".  Thus, poverty, 
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within the apartheid ideology, tracks back to undeserving, and undeserving tracks back to 
blackness; the struggle, the affliction, is ultimately within.  Here, as in the lives of disabled 
persons, the experience of deprivation and marginality are tied to identity, to the nature, the 
essence, of one's being.  The reason for poverty coincides with the reason for amniocentesis; 
and it is in the internal realm that the dark ramifications of these social realities are seeded, 
and grow.    
 
The above discussion does not imply that it is wrong to aim to prevent impairment, but simply 
directs attention at the need to explore the human meanings which attend such activities.  If 
taken to absurd – though "logical" – lengths, the expressivist critique may be used as an 
objection to such self-evidently humanitarian initiatives as polio vaccination, or the clearing 
of landmines, as these activities may be viewed as devaluing of impaired life (Shakespeare, 
2006, p. 90).  But the absurdity of these propositions should not deflect attention from the 
voracity of cultural and personal meanings attached to prenatal impairment prevention.   
 
Assuming an historical and ideological perspective, a central question is whether termination 
of, for example, a Down syndrome pregnancy embodies a legitimation – an acceptance, a 
validation – of the discriminatory ideals of people in the broader population, from whom the 
parents concerned typically wish to protect their unborn child.  The termination reduces the 
extent to which these ideals will be challenged, or will come into clear relief; the persons who 
propound these ideals will not be forced to confront the logical implications of their actions.  
Instead, we acquiesce to this threat, in a manner which leaves the social order undisturbed, 
and deprives culture of the means to overcome the web of implications which are lived as part 
of invisible disablist ideology.  The result is that some impaired individuals live with constant 
messaging regarding the consensual view that their lives are "not worth living"; messages 
which would appeal to the more fragmented, more malignant, parts of any human psyche.  
Disablism, thus, manifestly and materially impacts upon the lives of impaired persons in 
traumatic ways, via multiple exclusions and deprivations; whilst simultaneously reproducing 
messages which affirm the futility and meaninglessness of lives.  This schema presents very 
real questions regarding the locus of human experience; of "the real".  Occupying a world in 
which one's existence is overwhelmingly socially constructed as wretched, may create 
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 existence thus.  Access to only a limited repertoire of the possible natures of experience – one 
centring on the abject – surely must create massive obstacles to the development of an 
experience of being which flouts these expectations; it would require that one found oneself 
somewhere other than in the mirrors of the social world.    
 
Assisted suicide and the right to die 
An important initial distinction to draw in this highly emotive area is that between supporting 
assisted suicide in the final stages of terminal illness, and the voluntary euthanasia of persons 
who are not terminally ill, but have impairments.  The crux of this contrast is between the 
enabling of dying persons to die, and the legal, cultural encouraging of disabled persons to 
end their lives (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 131).  In the second case, the often overwhelming 
predominance of desolate cultural assessments of the nature of life with, say, quadriplegia, 
underpins the gathering of discursive forces which recommend the termination of such lives.   
A number of landmark legal judgments in the United States have dealt with requests for 
assisted suicide made by persons with severe physical impairments, thus creating a platform 
for the exploration of social constructs of such lives, expressed via the authority of courts of 
justice.  The question posed to these courts, in essence, regards whether these lives are, in 
fact, "worth living".   
 
In the now famous case of Elizabeth Bouvia, a young woman suffering from severe cerebral 
palsy and arthritis, such a request to be assisted in suicide was made in 1983 (Asch, 2001, p. 
311).  She asked the court to grant permission for hospital staff to keep her sedated, and 
withdraw tube feeding in order that she would starve to death (ibid.).  Bouvia approached the 
American Civil Liberties Union for support in her endeavour, leading to this organisation 
representing her case.  The ACLU centred their argument squarely on her experience of 
impairment – that is, on her "intolerable affliction", which caused her to endure a "pitiful 
existence" involving the "indignity and humiliation" of personal assistance with bodily 
functions (ibid.).  In 1986 the California Supreme Court ruled to uphold this account, stating 
that "she herself is imprisoned, and must lie physically helpless, subject to the ignominy, 
embarrassment, humiliation and dehumanising aspects created by her helplessness" (ibid.).  It  
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is important to note that Bouvia's was not a case of imminent terminal illness; it is possible 
that she may have lived for many years with the correct assistive technology.  What was 
glaringly missing from the assessment of Bouvia's condition and request, was a social and 
psychiatric evaluation of her life circumstances and mental state.   
 
A non-impaired Elizabeth Bouvia, had she checked into a hospital and refused feeding would 
doubtless have been diagnosed with suicidality emanating from psychiatric disorder, probably 
understood as rooted in social stressors.  Yet, three psychiatrists regarded Bouvia's decision as 
reasonable, and not associated with any degree of impairment resulting from psychological 
morbidity (Herr & Phil, 1992, p. 5).  Because of her impairment, Bouvia's suicidality was not 
regarded as contingent upon her mental state, and, consequently, the ethical imperative to 
provide appropriate treatment for suicidal mood disturbance was circumvented.  More 
disturbing, though, is an assessment of the life stressors endured by Bouvia in the few years 
prior to her request for assisted suicide.  Bouvia, during this period, experienced marriage and 
divorce, the miscarriage of a wanted pregnancy, her mother's illness, the death of her brother, 
many forced moves due to familial problems, chronically inadequate personal assistance, and 
a withdrawal from university study after being informed by her dean that her disability would 
preclude her from succeeding in postgraduate social work training (Asch, 2001, p. 311).  
What these aspects of Bouvia's case call to attention are the multifarious, and often 
excruciating, social factors which dominate the lives of many impaired persons within a 
discriminating and grossly unequal society.  This is the terrain of disability; wholly ignored 
by civil society and the judiciary in the assessment of Bouvia's case.  Faced with this 
onslaught of psychosocial stressors, let alone the more disability-specific ramifications of 
inhabiting a discriminatory and inaccessible society experienced by someone in Bouvia's 
position, most humans may contemplate the escape which suicide offers (Herr & Phil, 1992, 
p. 4).  But the beguiling nature of her impairment led mental health professionals and judicial 
authorities alike to "forget" that, for an extended period of her adult life, Bouvia had engaged 
in the lifestyle practices commonly considered "meaningful" in the modern western world – 
she had lived independently, completed her college education and begun a masters degree, 
married, had a sex life with her husband which resulted in pregnancy, and planned her 
motherhood.  What confronts us, thus, is the sleight of hand of a medicalising logic which 
ascribes – at least substantially – psychosocial ills to the immutable, lived nature of 
impairment.   
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In the case of Kenneth Bergstedt, the US courts displayed a similar "impairment bias".  Here, 
authorities constructed a factitious argument purporting to differentiate between physically 
impaired persons and suicidal nondisabled persons, on the grounds that the latter "enjoyed the 
prospect of mental rehabilitation that might restore the will to live", and faced "potentially 
reversible pessimism" regarding their quality of life (Herr & Phil, 1992, p. 6).  The cultural 
view of the inevitably wretched nature of impaired life is reflected here, positioning the lives 
of persons living with such impairments as, by the nature of their very bodily essence, futile 
and meaningless.  The final example of the case of Larry McAfee is particularly instructive in 
demonstrating the neglect of any consideration of societal exclusion and oppression in the 
shaping of impaired experience (Herr & Phil, 1992, p. 8).  McAfee was granted his request of 
assisted suicide by court authorities, who, in their judgment, made no mention whatsoever of 
the remarkable and appalling details of his final place of residence.  As a severely physically 
impaired man, McAfee was turned away from all residential care facilities in his county, and 
consequently forced to take up residence in an intensive care unit for the final eight months of 
his life, although he was not ill or unstable.  Now, a condition known as "ICU psychosis" has 
been identified, involving severe emotional disturbance which results from the "timeless" 
intensive care environment; there is no privacy, no darkness, intermittent crisis, and constant 
noise and activity (ibid.).  Astonishingly, the Georgia Superior Court agreed that McAfee's 
ventilator should be shut off with no mention at all of these recent life circumstances (ibid.).  
In the words of Herr and Phil (1992, p. 8), "the state that had denied McAfee the right to live 
a meaningful, independent life did not contest his fight to die".  The question of respect for 
the autonomy of disabled persons – as all citizens – in making life and death choices is, of 
course, one which deserves very real recognition.  But when an individual chooses death as 
the "only escape" from what are entirely remediable, appalling social circumstances, it is 
"perverse and unfair" to construe such actions as a healthy and appropriate expression of self-
determination (Bickenbach, 1998, p. 128).  Conwell and Caine (1991), in a study of the 
medical records of persons who have committed suicide, found that between 90% and 100% 
of such individuals end their lives during the course of "a diagnosable psychiatric illness" 
(Conwell & Caine, 1991 cited in Herr & Phil, 1992, p. 10).  There is no reason why this 
principle should not be viewed as applying to the disabled population.  Suicidal depression is 
a life threatening, but largely treatable condition, and consequently presents an ethical 
imperative to health care services to provide appropriate pharmaceutical and psychological 
intervention.  The prejudiced "common-sense" of the attribution of emotional distress to the 
perceived immutable concomitants of impairment must, in light of the foregoing, result in 
substantial under-diagnosis of mood and other disorders amongst impaired persons.  Our 
attention is irresistably drawn to fantasies about the dreadful lived nature of impairment, 
rather than the materiality of resources such as housing, assistive care, appropriate medical 
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services, and personal emotional support (ibid., p. 11).  In closing this debate, let us consider 
the black and sardonic words of Bickenbach (1998), as he satirises the contradictions brought 
to light by cultural assessments of the "liveable" life:   
 
It is telling that...there is never any suggestion that the right to physician assisted 
suicide should extend to people who do not have a severe disability.  Implicit in 
the judgments themselves...is precisely the prevailing prejudicial social attitude 
that having a disability is a sensible reason for committing suicide.  Perhaps 
proponents of physician-assisted suicide would be steadfast in their view even if 
it meant that qualified doctors could patrol school grounds waiting for 
despondent but mentally competent seventeen-year-olds who, having failed 
geography or being unable to find a date for the prom, might want to use their 
assisted-suicide services.   
      (Bickenbach, 1998, p. 130)   
 
Eugenics 
In composing a picture of the psychic undercurrents which give life to modernity, Frosh 
(1989, p. 233) writes of a "balance" between the age's "two faces".  At one side of this tension 
we find "multiplicity, contradiction, flow", and the "celebration of heterogeneity".  The 
flipside of these intents, perhaps enlivened by the more primitive of psychic impulses, reflects 
"rigidity, domination" and "totalitarianism", manifesting in the overt, evaluative divisions of 
fascism, and the global scourge of racism (ibid.).  Disability has not been exempt from the 
destructive excesses of the latter.  Davis (2002, p. 157) exhorts us to "never forget" that it was 
the physically impaired and the "feeble-minded" who were the first to be despatched to the 
death camps by the Nazis.  It was only after the murder of between 200 000 and 300 000 
impaired persons that the attention of the vanguards of the "final solution" moved onto 
dealing with "racial undesirables" (Ravaud & Stiker, 2001, p. 502).  Of concern to this 
discussion, as we ponder upon the possible cultural pervasiveness of the purportedly "dark 
intentions" of modern bioethics, is whether a "fascist undercurrent" may be detected in 
modern society more broadly, which carries echoes of a totalitarian drive toward the 
obliteration of difference.    
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The term eugenics first appeared in the work of Francis Galton in 1883, spawning a 
movement whose principle goal was the translation of scientific research regarding heredity 
into social policy which would prevent the production of "degenerate" human stock (Trent, 
1994, p. 136).  Of interest, when one considers the colloquial view of the eugenics movement 
today, is the fact that, during the first decades of the twentieth century, its proponents 
reflected a broad cross-section – including progressive liberals – of the scientific community.  
It was, though, the movement's linkages with reactionary ideology which, even to the present, 
assured its longevity (ibid.).  Advocates of policies of racial "purification" propounded the 
view that, through the progressive elimination of inferior human stock, such social problems 
as poverty, crime, unwanted children, insanity and mental retardation could be extinguished 
(ibid.).  In terms of the social circumstances of disabled persons, this burgeoning movement 
coincided with the twentieth century's ever-growing medicalisation of disability (Hughes, 
2002a, p. 61).  The unruly disabled body, like the "distorted" bodies of "non-European" racial 
minorities, carried all too clearly the somatic markings of its corruption, rendering it a 
palpable target for what Foucault (1979, p. 54) termed "the racisms of the state".  The 
onslaught upon disabled persons, when not in the more base forms of genocide or forced 
sterilisation, was to take the form of a concerted ideology of measurement, seeking to locate 
all in relation to statistical expressions of normalcy (Fujiura & Rutkowski-Kmitta, 2001, p. 
70).  It was Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection which provided the backdrop for a 
construing of disabled persons as "evolutionary defectives", to be purged through the just and 
necessary balances of nature (Davis, 1997b, p. 14).   
 
As we trace the trajectory of the increasingly scientific (or scientistic) measurement and 
categorisation of humanity through the twentieth century, what seems to emerge is the steady 
crystallizing of a corresponding, but hegemonic and invisible, "nondisabled" identity.  In 
guiding our consideration of this matter, McRuer (2006, p. 1) describes – analogously – the 
coalescing of the heterosexual norm during the course of the last century.  He writes:   
 
...it was the 'homosexual menace' that was specified and embodied; the 
subsequent policing and containment of that menace allowed the new 
heterosexual normalcy to remain unspecified and disembodied. 
       (McRuer, 2006, p. 1)   
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Like heteronormativity, the nondisabled figure came to "masquerade as a non-identity, as the 
natural order of things" (McRuer, 2003, p. 79).  Slowly, it seems, the forces of totalitarian 
sameness were silently engulfing "disability difference", as any and all deviations became 
shown up as errors of nature, as "glitches", rather than expressions of "natural" diversity.   
 
Pernick (1997, p. 90) regards reflection on the history of the eugenic movement as essential, 
in illuminating the cultural value judgments that reframe bodily difference as disease or 
disability.  The hideous "pinnacle" of murderous intent toward disabled persons – the 
extermination of around a quarter of a million impaired persons in Germany between 1939 
and 1945 – was reflective of eugenic ideals which were by no means unique to the Third 
Reich.  Not only was German racial purification founded upon the self-same British and 
American eugenic arguments cited above, but even at the height of the extermination in 1941, 
prominent British biologist Julian Huxley was publicly bemoaning the lack of decisive 
application of eugenic policies in Great Britain (Hubbard, 1997, p. 189; Davis, 1997b).  More 
remarkable is the historical fact that, unlike the mass murder of Jewish people, no 
prosecutions were ever initiated against those responsible for the extermination of disabled 
persons in Germany (Gallager, 1990 cited in Marks, 1999b, p. 616).  In 1933, Germany had 
instituted a programme of forced sterilisation of primarily intellectually impaired persons, 
which resulted in as many as 400 000 sterilisations; the policy was modelled on that already 
in place in California (Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 40).   
 
Between 1907 and 1949, more than 47 000 forced sterilisations of intellectually impaired 
persons were recorded in the United States (Woodside, 1950 cited in Braddock & Parish, 
2001, p. 40).  As in the case of the Nazi extermination of disabled persons, it was medical 
practitioners who performed these procedures, in the USA as well as several other western 
countries, upon persons presumably not fulfilling the modern capitalist ideals of autonomy 
and rationality (Glover, 1977 cited in Marks, 1999b: 616).  Post World War II, and far more 
recent accounts of legalised and illegal enforced sterilisations, have emerged in countries 
including Spain (Bosch, 1998), Japan (Asch, 2001), Australia (Cordner & Ettershank, 1997), 
Denmark (Braddock & Parish, 2001), and Sweden (Hughes, 2002a).  In these states, the view 
that "disability represents a contaminant within and a threat to the physical and moral integrity 
of the population" remained promulgated in the legislative denying of the right of 
reproduction (Hughes, 2002a, p. 61).   
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Bringing the account up to the present day, it is argued by some disability studies critics that 
the modern availability of "genetic counselling" embodies a sanitised, but nevertheless 
antagonistic, version of the eugenics movement's attack upon the disabled population.  
Hubbard (1997, p. 196) describes how modern "scientists", simply carrying a new species of 
the same malevolent motives as their openly fascist predecessors, leave the task of "decisions" 
regarding the prospective lives of unborn children to pregnant women.  Within a "liberal" 
rights discourse, the illusion of "free choice", in fact, places women in an impossible double-
bind in cases of the prenatal diagnosis of an impaired foetus.  Typically, in such cases, there is 
limited means for assessing the severity of the impairment (ibid.).  If the prospective mother 
chooses to not take prenatal tests, or not to terminate her pregnancy in the face of a positive 
result, Hubbard (1997, p. 196) argues that she tacitly receives responsibility for whatever the 
disability may mean to the unborn child, as well as to herself and her family.  She has, in the 
convenient, euphemistic distortions of the dream of autonomy, "chosen" this child, this life.  
Therefore, she is vulnerable, nay liable, to the reproaches of family, society, and the child him 
or herself, for the pain that may ensue (ibid.).  The responsibility she carries, it must be noted, 
is not simply for physical pain, but also for the anguish engendered by society's shunning of 
her child; in practice, the logic places this account before her, rather than interrogating and 
problematising the disablist social order (ibid.).  In this muted, "rights-based" form, the logic 
of the selection and extermination of lives nevertheless pertains, in the form of pressures upon 
women to "elect" to terminate troubled pregnancies (ibid., p. 199).  Of course, many women 
want to implement such terminations, but, for Hubbard (1997, p. 199), one reason why this is 
so, is that "society promises much grief to parents of children it deems unfit to inhabit the 
world".   
 
Shakespeare (2006, p. 86), in characteristically challenging style, frankly rejects arguments 
such as that recounted above, viewing the equation of genetic research with eugenics as 
irrational and excessive.  Whilst in material terms the death camps of Germany are light years 
from the cool, sterile rationality of a genetic counsellor's consultation room, a question 
remains regarding whether it is possible to trace the faint outlines of related intra-psychic 
phenomena underpinning each.  Assessment of the credibility of this idea must also be made 
in a manner well cognisant of the familiar excesses of wholesale, stereotyping vilification of 
the medical establishment emanating from some quarters of the disability studies academy.  
There is little reason to doubt that, whilst eugenic ideas assumed peculiarly heinous, florid 
and terrible expression in Nazi Germany, the essential motives – and unconscious 
concomitants – of the drive to disallow difference are common across nations and time-
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frames.  That is, the essence of the human "nature" for destructive and sadistic impulses 
towards the custodians of projected damage, obtains across a range of its expressions.  On 
making an assessment of the burgeoning body of disability studies research, it is soon 
demonstrated clearly that the addition of psychological and psychoanalytic constructs to the 
critical analysis of such questions is much needed, and distinctly overdue.  For example, the 
lack of a psychological conceptual frame of reference, in my view, prevents Shakespeare 
(2006) from reaching the root of disability studies' furious critique of modern genetics.  He is 
unable to see, to conceptualize, a deep wound telling of the unremitting experience of being 
construed as intrinsically damaged.  Instead, the debate rages about theory and history, rather 
than about the manner in which the arena of bioethics provides focal issues for the expression 
of a host of more manifest, yet less material, cultural denigrations, which continue unabated in 
the fabric of social life.   
 
Disability and the medical encounter 
A discourse analytic view of  the social construction of disability (e.g. Stiker, 1982; Foucault, 
1976), based upon interrogation of the ways in which the body is culturally produced and 
regulated, treats medical interventions such as the rehabilitation process, as normalization 
(Turner, 2001, p. 253).  The primary purpose of disability rehabilitation, in this view, is the 
restoration of the social order via the subduing of difference; that is, the imposition of 
mechanisms of social control upon politico-cultural dissidents.  Within a Foucaultian 
discourse analysis tradition, Stiker (1982) traces the development of what may be described as 
a medicalistic rehabilitative fervency back to the First World War.  He argues that the vast 
numbers of impaired persons produced by the conflict laid the foundation for an acute 
paradigm shift in western societies' responses to impairment, establishing notions of 
"replacement, substitution and compensation" as the benchmarks of medical rehabilitation.  
He writes:   
 
As the catastrophe of war required reconstruction, so damaged people were to be 
rehabilitated, returned to a real or postulated pre-existing norm or reference, and 
reassimilated in society.  The process was not one of curing:  ‘Curing is an 
expulsion and concerns health, re-integration is situated on the social level and 
replaces a deficit.  
      (Stiker, 1982, p. 141) 
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Stiker (1982) implies that the bodily, and hence social, "ideal" striven for in the normalisation 
process is, in fact, an illusory construct – an idealised retrospective fantasy of functionality 
and uniformity which, in reality, did not exist.  The imperative to "re-realise" this ideal state 
fosters a culture of health care practice which is centrally preoccupied with repair, with cure, 
and consequently ill-equipped to engage with the disability reality of chronic difference.  
Instead, rehabilitation's key concern, within this reading, is the reduction of any deviation 
from the norm, incorporating actions upon the individual which seek to "efface any 
difference" (Ravaud & Stiker, 2001, p. 507).  The object, thus, of the devices, prostheses and 
technologies of rehabilitation is not to assist in the shaping of subjectively functional and 
fulfilling – but unique – ways of being, but in causing the individual to act "like others" 
(ibid.).  The corrective force of such services is brought to bear upon bodies that wantonly 
defy the cherished "normate" ideals of self-contained autonomy; in diametric opposition, the 
disabled body represents –   
...the incomplete, unbounded, compromised and subjected body, susceptible to 
external forces:  property badly managed, a fortress inadequately defended, a self 
helplessly violated.  
      (Thomson, 1997b, p. 45) 
 
In more specific and applied terms, Rioux (1994, p. 4) observes that success in the design and 
delivery of rehabilitative services is typically measured in terms of how closely persons using 
such services approximate the "normal".  Evaluative studies tend to be functionalist in nature, 
and assume congruence between the ideals of providers and users, thus eliding opposing 
interests or approaches (ibid.).  The question of the definition of "needs" is, of course, a 
fraught one (Fraser, 1989, p. 161; Finkelstein, 1998; Handley, 2000).  Theorists writing in 
defence of particular social service models may point to the real issue of members of the 
disabled community demanding assistance in becoming "as normal as possible".  A difficult 
balance is required here, between respect for the sanctity of individual choice, and the 
opposing reality of a broad social environment in which all, impaired and non-impaired alike, 
are steeped in an ideological denigration of difference.  Finkelstein (1993, p. 13) asks that we 
situate the declared "needs" of disabled persons within the disability-related belief systems of 
such individuals.  Understanding one's suffering as a simple consequence of impairment, he 
points out, would tend to inform a subjective "need" for normalisation.  Conversely, if 
discrimination is seen as the central difficulty, support aimed at the securing of equal 
opportunities may be requested (ibid.).  The role of professional medical authority in the 
propounding of certain discourses of needs is significant, in light of the ongoing involvement 
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of practitioners in the lives of many members of the disabled community (French & Swain, 
2001, p. 734).  Traditionally, "needs" and corresponding social services have been outlined, 
designed and delivered by health professionals, positioning disabled persons as passive 
recipients with minimal opportunities to enforce control upon these processes (ibid.).  Rink 
and Calkins (1996) found that disabled persons in their study tended to acquiesce to 
professional decisions, at times fearing the loss of privileges or care in institutional settings 
(Rink & Calkins, 1996 cited in Asch, 2001, p. 310).   
 
Returning to the work of Robert Scott (1969) affords an eloquent description of how 
rehabilitation dictates the "correct" ways in which disability is to be lived.  The trappings and 
deportment of "the blind man", to Scott (1969, p. 14), such as the guide dog, the white cane, 
and a docile and melancholic demeanour, represent facets of a narrow and clearly 
circumscribed script of culturally sanctioned methods of living which "package" the 
individual in a guise palatable to broader society.  In his analysis, a key indicator of 
rehabilitative success for social service workers was "the degree to which the client has come 
to understand himself and his problems from the worker's perspective".  From a 
psychoanalytic vantage point, there is potential for the interrogation of such preferred modes 
of disabled life as phenomena shaped by the nature of defences which, in turn, are erected in 
response to anxious fantasies which a particular form of impairment evokes.  The guide dog, 
for example, certainly assists functionally in the mobility of a mass of blind persons 
worldwide, but, as certainly, functions as a reassuring container of projected "blindness 
fantasies" carried by scores of anxious observers.  This is attested to by Scott's work, via the 
familiar image of ardent, even angry protestations levelled at disabled persons choosing not to 
make use of such means.  The management of fearful unconscious evocations by the 
application of manifest social control seems elemental in the psychological understanding of a 
host of forms of "disability normalisation".  What results is that identities are contested, often 
through nondisabled professionals advocating what is "appropriate and normal" behaviour in 
the lives of disabled "clients" (French, 1999, p. 21).   
 
As alluded to earlier, health practitioners may have an extended, even lifelong authoritative 
presence in the lives of disabled persons.  Consequently, these professionals carry particular 
responsibility regarding the modelling of attitudes to do with the possibilities and constraints 
of life with a certain impairment (Hordon, 1994, p. 203).  A number of disability studies 
authors make the important point that health professionals may retain negative, stereotyped 
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attitudes due to predominant exposure to disabled persons requiring help and treatment, rather 
than healthy individuals leading independent lives within the community (e.g. Gerhart et al., 
1991 cited in Asch, 2001, p. 301; Hordon, 1994, p. 203).  Health workers such as those 
staffing casualty wards and disability rehabilitation centres, close as they are to incidents of 
trauma, tend to "dramatically underestimate" the life satisfaction of disabled people; in 
addition, this finding holds regardless of the amount of experience of professionals in such 
settings (Bach & Tilton, 1994 cited in Asch, 2001, p. 301).  Asch (1998) presents the point 
bluntly:  doctors and bioethicists influentially shape disability-related decisions made by 
patients and families, but cannot provide genuinely informed information about managing life 
with an impairment if they themselves remain disbelieving or sceptical that impaired persons 
may lead fulfilling and satisfying lives (Asch, 1998 cited in Miller, 2006, p. 220).  Perhaps 
disturbingly, evidence to hand suggests that attitudes of health professionals towards disabled 
persons roughly reflect those of the broader population; that is, predominantly negative and 
stereotyping (French, 1994b, p. 687; Johnson, 1993; Scullion, 1999; Biley, 1994; James & 
Thomas, 1996).  Some studies point to the significance of the nature of contact between 
professionals and disabled persons, with equal-status, "non-therapeutic" relating garnering the 
most positive attitudinal results (Basnett, 2001, p. 452; Eberhardt & Mayberry, 1995; French, 
1994b).  Basnett (2001) argues that the attitudes of health professionals not only accentuate 
the individualistic accounts prevalent amongst the general public, but also actively promote a 
medicalising paradigm that buttresses the legitimacy of their own role, and confounds the 
emergence of critical consciousness in health care settings (Basnett, 2001, p. 452).   
 
One particularly harrowing form of "medical socialisation" recounted by the disabled 
community is the phenomenon of so-called "public stripping", involving the demeaning, at 
times naked use of disabled persons as objects for medical tuition.  This appalling treatment is 
now recognised as institutional abuse, with the emergence of first person accounts indicating 
its disturbingly widespread occurrence (French & Swain, 2001, p. 738).  In a study by 
Lonsdale (1981), one female respondent gave the following account:   
 
My memory is basically of a whole series of experiences of being very coldly 
and formally mauled around.  It's very alienating.  It's as if you're a medical 
specimen...I was never told that I was nice to look at or nice to touch, there was 
never any feeling of being nice, just of being odd, peculiar.  It's horrible.  It's 
taken me years and years to get over it. 
    (Lonsdale, 1981 in French, 1994a, p. 103)   
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To Coleridge (1993) it is a common and serious oversight that we underestimate the potential 
impact of health-related socialisation upon the self-image of the disabled community.  Some 
such individuals endured more or less constant involvement with health practitioners 
throughout childhood, when "play, enjoyment, and discovery were replaced by stress, medical 
examinations and developmental programs (Coleridge, 1993 cited in French & Swain, 2001, 
p. 738).  The repressive constraining of healthy psycho-sexual development is a common 
systemic side-effect of familial-medical preoccupations with childhood impairment, often 
serving to developmentally stunt normative sexual maturing (McRuer & Wilkerson, 2003, p. 
9).  Boazman (1999) describes the experience of being composed as a set of medical failings 
thus:   
 
Their [health professionals] responses towards me varied greatly, some showed 
great compassion, while others showed complete indifference.  I had no way of 
communicating the fact that I was a bright, intelligent, whole human being.  That 
is what hurt the most.   
      (Boazman, 1999, p. 18-9) 
 
The advent of internet-based virtual chat and support groups amongst disabled persons has, 
over the course of recent times, created an environment for the sharing of experiences and 
lifestyle choices free from the medical gaze, or any institutional affiliation (Gold, 2001, p. 44; 
Blasiotti, Westbrook & Kobayashi, 2001).  Such engagements may provide a thought-space 
which is more geared toward the sharing of knowledge regarding societal life with 
impairment-difference, rather than an emphasis upon "medical conditions" and questions 
surrounding "cure".   
 
As has been noted, a pervasive critique of biomedicine's responses to disability surrounds a 
primary focus on prevention and cure, which sidelines the development of "emancipatory" 
knowledge regarding impaired life in a disablist society (Rioux, 1994, p. 3).  The "curative 
zeal" of biomedicine (Marks, 1999a, p. 75) directs health care resources at research and 
intervention strategies which carry promise of a realisation of "repair", in a manner which 
positions the permanently impaired as chronic defectives, whilst remediable social 
deprivations persist.  Sinason (1992) identifies how the imperatives placed upon health 
professionals – to restore the body to functional and aesthetic wholeness – locate the 
"defective" body as an intolerable insult, a failure, an insoluble blight.  The nature of the intra-
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psychic defensive correlates of Cartesian biomedicine, I suggest, is one which reflects the 
binary splits of that philosophical position; where disability is an intolerable absence of cure, 
and little thought-space is readily available for a consideration of novel, modified "neo-
normal" human life.  To Sinason (1992, p. 36), health practitioners may, in an unconscious 
defensive manoeuvre, "go stupid" at evidence of the "incurable", "not just because it is 
painful, but because it is unbearable to see damage and not be able to repair it".  In a similar 
vein, Main (1989, p. 206) focuses attention on modes of clinical practice which may appear as 
"hallowed" medical techniques or philosophical positions, but in fact are inadvertently 
devised as defensive manoeuvres which lessen anxiety within medical professionals.  For 
Tom Main (1989, p. 207-8), the experience – and management – of "helplessness" within 
doctors embodies a primary theoretical concern in the analytic study of health and illness, 
expressed in ways as diverse as "laughter, forgetfulness, aloofness, scotomata, denial", and 
much else.  A combination of the primitive evocations characteristic of the disabled imago, 
and the ongoing exposure of health practitioners to intractable damage and trauma, may 
constrict the "thought space" available for engagement with the awkward reality of difference 
(Marks, 1999a, p. 46; Bion, 1967).  Considering the widespread influence of the health care 
establishment over disabled lives, it is not difficult to see how the potential growth of an 
articulate disabled voice, moving from individualising self-pathologisation toward a 
politically conversant expression of valued difference, may be derailed by the hegemony of 
"cure".   
 
Asch and Fine (1997, p. 251) describe how practitioner "needs" surrounding a normalising 
ideal may lead to disabled patients' assuming of inauthentic, placating roles.  Michelle, a 17 
year old respondent in their study, told her interviewer that she wore her prosthetic arms only 
on visits to her doctor's surgery, as they were clumsy, and more a hindrance than a useful 
addition.  She was "perfectly comfortable" with others seeing her short and "deformed" arms, 
but could not share this with her doctor (ibid.).  To further abstract this theme, modern 
western culture, drenched as it is in the ideals and dictates of "somatic success", prizes and 
affirms what Frank (1995, p. 78) terms the "restitution narrative".  The narrative is to be found 
in a vast range of cultural contexts – from television advertisements for cold remedies to 
moralising parables regarding the "consequences" of an unhealthy lifestyle; in each case, the 
story reflects how things "get better" when one follows stipulated social protocols, and "tells" 
one's illness in a socially appropriate, "cure-striving" manner.  Social or occupational default, 
in the schema, is the unacceptable outcome of a body poorly managed.  In this fantasy world, 
all is curable, or at least avoidable; it is human dereliction alone which manifests the 
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emergence of Mary Douglas' (1966) "matter out of place".  The need for the shoring up of 
shared defences against the looming threat of the "cultural heresy" of intractable loss or 
brokenness, may cause practitioners to deflect or otherwise silence subjective accounts which 
flout its prerequisites.  Hinshelwood (1987, p. 58), writing on the residential care of learning 
disabled persons, sketches a relational scenario of such avoidance, which is instructive (I 
believe) in a range of impairment-related contexts.  He points out how, in clinical encounters 
with learning disabled persons, despair is often not clearly recognised or addressed, whilst 
anger is over-emphasised (ibid.).  What may have occurred here is that the patient has 
attempted to communicate an experience of despondency, which appears pre-consciously to 
the clinician as the unruly and untenable spectre of intractable loss, perhaps flanked by echoes 
of guilt and dysphoria over the social and power inequalities at play.  This aversive 
unconscious response may be experienced by the clinician as coming from the client, who is 
consequently viewed as actively wishing to cause hurt.  The incipient guilt of the clinician 
seems central here, in informing his or her experience of "blameless persecution".  What was 
initially a communication of despair, thus, comes to be viewed as hostility, and this cognition 
tends to evoke a counter-aggressive response, perhaps of extreme and disciplinary proportions 
(ibid.).  The client, hence, is left with an enactment of the all-too-familiar experience that 
"others cannot withstand my despair", leading to such emotional experience being driven 
underground.  The stereotype of the "troublesome", "ungrateful", "uncooperative" or 
"manipulative" disabled client or resident, is not hard to discern here, reaffirmed in the 
repetition of such dynamics.  
 
Investigations of the nature and influence of medical training upon disability prejudice have 
led to some alarming findings.  Evidence suggests that professional training tends to increase 
the prevalence of negative attitudes, and decrease levels of empathy (Brilhart et al., 1990; 
Diseker & Michielutte, 1981; Rezler, 1974; all cited in French, 1994b, p. 689).  Training in a 
critical, empowerment model of disability, it seems, is at best patchy across tuition programs 
in a range of medical disciplines (e.g. Biley, 1994, p. 786).  Before and beyond the influence 
of training, though, is the question of the personality profile which is attracted to the 
(predominantly) "reparative" disciplines of modern medicine.  In describing individuals 
drawn to surgery as a profession, Marsh (2006, p. 121) characterises this cohort as "the 
fixers"; "interventionists" who "need to be the active agents in resolution of situations to 
obtain personal satisfaction".  The awkward, ambiguous and intractable nature of permanent 
impairment would, one imagines, impart a dysphoric incongruity, a troublesome lack of fit, to 
the functioning of minds fulfilling this description.  Interacting with this pre-existing 
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personality profile, are the extraordinary, even brutal, demands of training regimens, 
involving exhausting working hours spent dealing, sometimes relentlessly, with trauma, pain 
and death.  Very little, if any, psychological resources or training is typically provided to 
assist health professionals in dealing with this onslaught.  On the contrary, at times a more 
authoritarian, rigid and judgmental chain of command may pertain, borne of the split off and 
denied vicarious trauma of those who have gone before.  These practitioners are, in my view, 
victims of history and institutional circumstance who deserve our empathy, and are typically 
doing the very best they can in organisational settings acutely disregarding of the 
psychological needs and struggles associated with medical practice.  The highly regrettable, 
wholesale vilification of health professionals voiced by some quarters of the disability 
movement deserves to be recognised as the stereotyping which it is (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 
80). 
 
A final issue for our consideration in this section is that of the political significance of 
adequate representation of the disabled community in the ranks of the various health 
disciplines (Lawthom & Goodley, 2006).   To begin, a range of authors have provided 
evidence of staunch institutional resistance to the admission of disabled persons to training in 
mental health professions, such as clinical psychology (Asch & Rousso, 1985; Bliss, 1994; 
French, 1988; James & Thomas, 1996; Stannett, 2006).  The legacy of psychoanalytic 
literature which suggests the inevitable presence of undesirable psychological traits in 
impaired persons – already considered – seems to imply a corresponding scepticism regarding 
the suitability of disabled persons for psychoanalytic psychotherapy training (Asch & Rousso, 
1985, p. 4; Bliss, 1994).  A view which characterises disabled persons as, inter alia, 
borderline, narcissistic, paranoid, grandiose, impulsive, controlling, dogmatic, lacking in 
insight, prone to denial, detached, isolated, and withdrawn, as the traditional psychoanalytic 
view does, is clearly going to inform extreme circumspection in the consideration of disabled 
candidates (Asch & Rousso, 1985, p. 4).  A further concern cited is the potential disruption of 
the therapeutic dyad emerging from the effects of visible impairments upon the patient (Bliss, 
1994, p. 117).  In response to this concern, Bliss (1994) points out that it is only disabled 
clinicians such as herself who are in a position to be fully aware of the therapeutic 
implications of this scenario.  Other accounts find that visible impairment may be an asset in 
therapeutic work, serving as evocative "grist for the mill" which, if managed thoughtfully, 
may contribute to the analytic process (French, 1988, p. 170; Asch & Rousso, 1985; Levinson 
& Parritt, 2006).  The defining concern of this matter, though, rests in two related points.  
Firstly, it is incontrovertible that disabled persons are best placed to achieve accurate, 
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empathic understanding of the predicaments of others with bodily differences; note, though, 
this is not at all to imply that disabled persons are "by their nature" capable of such empathy.  
Simply wearing the ascription of a social category (race, gender, disablement) does not equate 
with conscious, layered understanding of the complex, often paradoxical nature of the 
oppressions experienced by the group.  Rather, it is personal insight which, in interaction with 
socio-political experience, renders the unearthing of an emancipatory capacity for empathy.  
The second issue flows from this; that is, the broader ideological need for development of a 
shared narrative of group consciousness, which emanates from the interrogation of personal 
experience.  The importance of carefully sifting through, critically examining, and 
documenting existential data surrounding the lived nature of impairment within disablist 
society, can hardly be overestimated.  This is the business of finding a voice which transcends 
internalised silences, opening the way for identification, and the growth of conscientisation.  
It is, in regard to identity categories such as race, a self-evident imperative that professions 
such as those concerned with mental health – that is, concerned with the endeavours of 
"finding voice" – should reflect appropriate proportional representation in their demographic 
make-up.  It is difficult to see how the same principle should not apply in the case of 
disability, in mental health disciplines as well as all others concerned with the "needs" and 
"care" of disabled persons.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Disability theory III:  Impairment, culture and identity  
 
Introduction 
Over the course of this chapter we will explore a range of aspects of the cultural substrate 
within which representations of disability take shape, impacting upon disablist social 
formations, as well as the socialisation of disabled persons.  The intersection of denigrating 
projections regarding the disabled "other" with the dominant ideals of modernity, and the 
narcissistic drives of the capital market, will be considered, in an attempt to understand the 
extraordinary resilience of disablist prejudices. In bringing these manifest political formations 
"inward" to the psychic terrain of the individual, we then turn to a consideration of issues of 
identity formation within the disabled population, beginning with the complex difficulties of 
entrenching a positive "disabled political identity".  Reflection on the roots of ambivalence 
regarding this identity brings us to early development and the family, as we examine concepts 
such as internalised oppression, and the often distorted nature of social mirroring experienced 
by disabled persons.  Finally, the implications of all of these issues direct us toward the 
question of what "disability development" must involve, if the disabled community is to 
emerge from social as well as internal marginality.    
 
Culture and prejudice 
Narcissism, normalcy, modernity, and the market 
 
If such a thing as a psycho-analysis of today's prototypical culture were 
possible...such an investigation would needs show the sickness proper to the time 
to consist precisely in normality. 
    (Adorno, 1951 cited in Davis, 1997b, p. 9) 
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The predominating, materialist orthodoxy of the disability studies academy would, no doubt, 
baulk at Theodore Adorno's call for a "psychoanalysis of culture", in elucidating mechanisms 
of prejudice and oppression.  A deterministic (or "determined") Marxian account of the 
disability phenomenon sees no purpose in searching through cultural artefacts for evidence of 
the roots of oppression, as these are located exclusively in relations of production (Thomas, 
2002a, p. 49).  Latterly however, a growing number of authors have vigorously problematised 
this downplaying of the role of culture and discourse in the generation of disability and 
disablism (e.g. Corker & French, 1999; Shakespeare, 2006).  Although such voices in no way 
intend to argue that access to the world of work is not a cornerstone of disablist oppression – 
on the contrary – the view from more postmodernist and social constructionist quarters is that 
cultural processes must be thoroughly interrogated, in assessing the role these play in the 
reproduction of meanings, practices and discourses which justify and maintain inequality 
(Thomas, 1999a, p. 138).  If we assume that the self is, at least to a partial degree, a 
"precipitate" of cultural meanings, mediated through language, it is essential that we attend to 
symbolic significations which emerge in social relating (Stockall, 2001, p. 121).  It follows, 
from the postmodern critique of the strong materialist view of disability, that communities are 
no less significant sites for the negotiation of power than are institutions (Borsay, 2002, p. 
105).  Frantz Fanon's model of the propagation of racism (Fanon, 1952) manages, 
significantly, to demonstrate how social practices find translation into "ideological givens", 
which, in turn, reproduce psychological phenomena such as feelings and complexes at an 
individual level (Frosh, 1989, p. 240).  It is these functional threads, linking ideology, cultural 
practices and subjectivity, which must assume centre stage in our investigation of disablist 
oppression.   
 
As alluded to earlier, both the cultural and psychic phenomena of disablism remain, at 
present, virtually invisible to most, woven deeply into the groundwork of everyday practices 
and assumptions.  In the words of Lennard J. Davis, "while we may acknowledge we are 
racist, we barely know we are ableist" (Davis, 2002, p. 148 – my emphasis).  Similarly, 
Coleridge (1993, p. 21) describes a journey of discovery into his own prejudices; he remarks:  
"Even someone starting out with full sympathy and the intent to champion the cause of 
disability finds himself falling into the very trap that created the problem in the first place".  
The argument that culture has little or no defining influence upon the marginality of disabled 
persons, would correspond logically with the proposition that disability is universally 
associated with oppression across temporal and geographical locations.  In contrast, 
archaeological and historiographical evidence seems to suggest that disablist oppression is 
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more situation-specific, and hence presumably (at least in part) the product of local cultural 
mechanisms (Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 21; Scheer & Groce, 1988, p. 26).  In considering 
the positions of disabled persons in historical and prehistorical realms, it is important to 
recognise, as first principle, that in such times physical and cognitive difference was the rule 
rather than the exception (Mitchell & Snyder, 2001, p. 205; Stiker, 1982).  As shall be 
demonstrated later, the extraordinary levels of control and "sterility" embodied in modern, 
resolutely autonomous life serve to heighten and reify the illusion of essential difference 
between the "whole" and the "broken".  For example, during and after periods when Europe 
was tormented by plagues (e.g. the Black Death, 1347-1351), Stiker (1997) argues that the 
massively widespread nature of disease actually de-emphasised impairment-difference more 
than in any other epoch (Stiker, 1997 cited in Braddock & Parish, 2001, p. 21).  Evidence 
such as this lends credence to the view that no universal definition or interpretation of 
disability pertains across contexts (ibid.).   
 
In what is to follow, I outline and synthesise theoretical contributions to an understanding of 
western, late capitalist modernity, with particular emphasis on the fundamental role of 
narcissistic intra-psychic formations in this identity milieu.  To begin, I suggest that the 
central, indispensable nature of narcissistic meaning-making within market economies locates 
individuals within differential identity hierarchies, relating to variations in material access to 
the means of successful narcissistic self-construction.  In other words, the convincing 
maintenance of capitalist ideals of autonomy, mastery and status – all likely ingredients in 
narcissistic self-representations – are, to some degree, dependent on access to the 
commodities, the trappings, of modern, materialistic life.  In short, we require access to the 
material means to adequately bolster our self-identities toward the narcissistic cultural ideal; 
the luxury cars, sophisticated lifestyles, and perfect bodies of the idealised phantasm of the 
modern age.  The import of this state of affairs for disabled persons is, I believe, twofold.  
First, recognition of the manifold material deprivations of disabled persons in most societies – 
of essential services, employment opportunities promising the accumulation of wealth, and 
broad cultural participation, amongst much else – means taking cognisance of the reality of 
this population's systematic alienation from the cultural means of approximating the 
narcissistic ideal.  Capital accumulation and, in particular, successful "autonomous" life are 
deeply interwoven with the narcissistic ideal, and as deeply (materially, unnecessarily) alien 
to the marginal, compoundly impoverished lives of most disabled persons.  The second 
important implication of what has been termed "the culture of narcissism" (Lasch, 1978; 
1984), pertains to the penchant for out-group prejudice, and the denigration of difference, 
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which is so inherent to the identity-reifications of the narcissistic self.  Visibly disabled 
persons, to be sure, fall squarely into that category of troublesome outliers, of shameful 
misfits, who are the bane – as well as the needed "other" – of the aggrandising self.  The just 
and appropriate upholding of the human rights of disabled persons, it seems, may exist in an 
impossible tension with the predominance of narcissistic culture.  Bauman (1997) paints a 
picture of modernity which has "a dream of purity", "a vision of order", and "a world clean 
and hygienic" at its epicentre (Bauman, 1997 cited in Hughes, 2002, p. 573).  The imperative 
to endlessly "purify" existence with ever-new and superior "beginnings" (ibid.) is clear and 
unrelenting, positioning disabled persons as a rude and unyielding disfigurement upon the 
age's noble intents.  But at a more intrinsic level, the very act of "making order" is 
indistinguishable from the "announcement" of ever-new abnormalities, which "draw new 
lines" and identify and set apart "ever new strangers" (ibid.). The crisp lines and categorical 
differences of modernism act to quell the impinging, chaotic voice of disability; perhaps, of 
humanity.  The ghettos, institutions, retirement homes and terminal care wards of modern 
societies, write Dass and Gorman (1985, p. 57), are the product of a culture which pays to 
keep suffering away.  But while the modern subject may feel "safe from the troubles of the 
world", we also, over time, begin to feel "dry, empty and alone in our insulated havens" 
(ibid.).   
 
Christopher Lasch's (1978; 1984) provocative characterisation of the modern epoch as 
predicated upon the narcissistic personality, and narcissistic ways of being, presents an image 
of atomised, self-adoring humans unwilling and unable to give to, or receive from, one 
another (Treacher, 1989, p. 143; Lasch, 1978; 1984).  Lasch (1984) asserts that the self-
absorption, rampant individualism and materialism of contemporary consumer culture points 
to a deep seated existential void, an emptiness, at the heart of modern life, and the individuals 
who lead it (Frosh, 1991, p. 64).  In this existential world, the visual reality of surfaces is 
central; reality exists in the evidence of apparent states and commodities, as paranoia shapes 
the customs of conspicuous consumption (Frosh, 1991, p. 65).  But this superficial world 
fosters alienation, as it disallows or neglects experiences of the recognition of self or other 
(ibid. 65-6).  All that is "real" to the "modern man" is the world of objects; or, more 
accurately, the world of projected aspects of self existing in fantasy as objects – a single plane 
upon which everything exists "only to gratify or thwart his desires" (Lasch, 1984, p. 30).  It is 
the immediate procurement of gratification that is striven for, the "momentary illusion, of 
personal well-being, health and psychic security" (Lasch, 1978, p. 7; Treacher, 1989).  The 
sculpted perfecting and adorning of the body – it, too, an object of fantasy – give an 
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obsequious materiality to the silent self.  Murphy (1987, p. 113) refers to this aspect of the 
narcissistic treadmill as "part of the immortality project of a secularized middle class that no 
longer believes in redemption of the soul, and has turned instead to redemption of the body".  
There is no time, no inclination in this abrupt world toward admitting the painful effects of 
authentic relating, although it is upon these that "the development and sustenance of selfhood 
depends" (Richards, 1989 cited in Frosh, 1991, p. 66).  In a world of arid impermanences, the 
fleeting, illusory self must be constantly re-conjured, re-created through the denigration of the 
unsettling "other", into whom all shame and despair are projected.  The subversive import of 
difference is reformulated as the "damage" of the other, in a manner which shores up, 
although only temporarily, the illusion of value and power.    
 
It is instructive to recall, at this point, that narcissism and narcissistic culture – as, arguably, 
all culture – is shaped by what has been lost.  The narcissistic manoeuvres with which we 
"create ourselves", with which we augment and adorn the facades overlaying the silence of 
eschewed deprivations, are composed as modes of managing what we could not have, or 
cannot be.  In Freud's (1923, p. 638) words, "the character of the ego is a precipitate of 
abandoned object cathexes", and the ego thus "contains the history of those object choices".  
This assertion, in itself, embodies a stark and sobering corrective to the rampant narcissism of 
the modern West.  The ego, in its self-aggrandising attempt at assuming the desired features 
of the lost object, is forcing itself upon the id as a substitute, to dampen and avert the raw 
discharge of frustrated desires (ibid., p. 639).  The glossy, "sophisticated" excesses of 
consumer culture are, thus, inherently testament to the shame-ridden, dingy experiences of 
human abjection which they so vehemently seek to renounce.  It is disappointed object-libido 
that finds new life as narcissistic libido.  But let us consider more specifically the relationship 
between, at the individual intra-psychic level, the symbolic meanings of disability, and the 
broad incidence of social prejudice based in narcissistic culture.  With regard to disability 
prejudice, an individual, chronological view of psychological development would pose 
questions regarding the nature of infantile experiences of attunement and distress, which may 
later form the substance of narcissistic disability-projections relating to dependency, shame, 
rejection, or whatever.  At the cultural level, ongoing processes of projection, projective 
identification and introjection may then serve to reify and solidify these fantasied meanings, 
in a manner which facilitates the embedding of shared institutional and societal defences.  The 
phenomenon of disability segregation is a key marker here, forming, as it does, a dynamic, 
affirming enactment of the "othering" so fundamental to successful projection.   
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It is interesting that the legacy of impairment-centred psychoanalytic writing on disability 
makes repeated reference to the purported incidence of narcissistic psychopathology amongst 
disabled persons.  To the extent to which such assessments are (or were) accurate, we know 
that it is the authoritarian, denying and misattuned treatment of the world which fosters such 
defences – not amongst this group alone, but within all populations.  Further, if our 
hypothesised links between narcissism, disability-projections and prejudice are reliable, it is 
likely that incidence of visible impairment within an infant or child will tend to evoke the 
rigidifying, splitting influence of narcissistic structures, heightening the risk of the re-
infliction of the very deprivations which are at the core of all narcissistic formations.  The 
idea that "narcissism begets narcissism" is a maxim that would come as no surprise to those 
endorsing a psychoanalytic perspective, but perhaps, in the case of disability, this unfortunate 
principle may have a particular, amplified relevance.  The depressed, self-absorbed or 
punitive authoritarian parent is vulnerable to the primitive, unconscious provocations afforded 
by images of disability, rendering impaired infants and children vulnerable to permissive or 
punitive relational distortions, which threaten the likelihood of the attuned mirroring which is 
so fundamental to integrated selfhood.  The gravity of these circumstances will be examined 
in more detail later (Attachment and infancy, p. 162).   
 
Bollas (1987) traces the outline of a personality structure forged within, and synergising with, 
the certainties and repressions of the modern age.  In the "normotic" personality, we find a 
particularly ardent need for the defining of clear boundaries between normality and 
abnormality (Marks, 1999a, p. 170).  Such individuals are described by Bollas (1987, p. 136) 
as "abnormally normal"; as complacently preoccupied only with the "thingness" of objects, 
and "fundamentally disinterested in subjective life".  This individual occupies a stable, secure 
and comfortable world of precise mastery, in which it is only the material constituents of life 
which have substance, and require "dealing with".  Here, rationality is the key to freedom, 
whilst empathy, imagination and emotionality are steered well clear of (ibid.).  The normotic 
state is reached through the entrenchment of narcissistically oriented defences such as 
rationalisation, intellectualisation and sublimation, ridding the self of the subversive threats of 
subjective emotional life.  It is socialisation within a materialistic culture, emphasising 
resources and wealth as the route to personal power and mastery, which fosters the normotic 
state.  Correspondingly, these emphases encompass a failure of key attachment figures in 
accurately mirroring and validating a child's inner, emotional reality (Marks, 1999a, p. 171).  
Instead of acknowledgment and emotional authenticity, it is rationality, accumulation and 
power which are the means of gaining refuge from a shadowy awareness of the shame, 
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vulnerability and abjection which inhere in the human condition.  Like Lasch's (1978; 1984) 
illusory self, the self of Bollas' (1987, p. 135) normotic individual is "conceived as a material 
object among other man-made products in the object world".  The dangers of emotional chaos 
have, within this self, led to the "annihilation" of creativity, and with it the possibility of 
intersubjective symbolisation, communication, and compassion (Bollas, 1987, p. 136).  
Emotionality within the self, like disability within the community, is "matter out of place", 
which must be reformed, neutralised, and assimilated.  It is the world of objects, not least of 
the commodities of the "culture of narcissism", which allow for the defensive de-
symbolisation of subjective states of mind, through their transfer onto material things.  Surely 
it is the mastery, the aggrandisement, of sophisticated material commodities which offer this 
opportunity par excellence, evacuating dysphoria and re-populating the self with new, 
gleaming "objects".  As described above, it may be that it is the unconscious, deliberate denial 
of access to these "defensive resources" which position disabled persons as the designated 
custodians of human imponderables.  In worlds of sedentary isolation, ostracisation, the 
denial of access to education or other means of personal emancipation, and so forth, disabled 
persons may be chronically "exposed" to what, in broad human existential terms, lies 
"beyond" the veil of avid material distractions.   
 
The oppression and marginalisation of disabled people, it seems, is so intrinsically woven into 
modernist cultural mores such as autonomy, the "free" market, and the narcissistic gaze, that it 
is – disquietingly – difficult to see how liberation is possible without fundamental social 
change.  The fragmented and disappointing progress offered by "rights" approaches such as 
that applied in the USA, has led some authors to conclude that oppression will continue until 
and unless the "very basis of the rules of the market" are questioned (Russell & Malhotra, 
2002 cited in Sheldon, 2005, p. 124).  Shakespeare and Watson (2001, p. 560) concur, adding 
that the already splintered and impotent influence offered by "mainstream" concepts such as 
democracy and citizenship, is further undercut by the growth of the global market, which 
limits the likelihood of national-level investment in egalitarian reform.  The perverse and 
distorted nature of the "free market" in employment is demonstrated by evidence such as that 
provided by McDonough (1997), who found that "there are weak correlations between 
individual physical or mental attributes and work disability at the empirical level" 
(McDonough, 1997 cited in Schriner, 2001, p. 643).  In other words, there is little doubt that 
prejudice intervenes in excluding disabled persons from a range of feasible occupations 
(Abberley, 2002).  But if we move beyond this point, we find recognition that some 
impairments will necessarily reduce output in various occupations, notwithstanding the fact 
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that the disabled individuals concerned may work as hard or harder than their colleagues.  
French (1993a, p. 20) provides the example of sight impairment, which, despite access to 
assistive technology and a facilitative environment, and the familiar risk of over-work 
bordering upon self-harm, will in many cases unavoidably reduce speed of productivity.  
Within the context of modernity's idealisation of the market, she soberly locates this impasse 
as follows:  
 
Other more profound societal changes, for example paying disabled employees 
the same amount as able-bodied employees for less work if their working speeds 
are slow, would more successfully reduce disability, but enormous attitudinal 
changes within society, and within disabled people themselves, would need to 
take place before this could be put into practice without causing even worse 
problems in terms of resentment, guilt and lowering of self-esteem.   
      (French, 1993a, p. 20)  
 
It is the individual who is coerced into "fitting" the ideology of capital economics; never the 
converse.  Frank (2006, p. 74) brings this truism to life in a manner bordering on the macabre, 
in describing what he terms "technoluxe" medicine.  An example of this phenomenon is the 
exclusive podiatrists of New York, who perform cosmetic surgery on women's feet in order to 
make them "look good" in designer shoes; the foot, literally, is transformed to fit the shoe, not 
the other way around.  In this "market" it is those who possess the most resources to channel 
into their bodies who can produce bodies which accrue the most capital (ibid., p. 76).  The 
discourse surrounding such "boutique" medicine is described by Frank (2006, p. 74) as a 
"Prozac-like language of transformation and life-change", which calls forth the body as 
evermore an object, a commodity, an analogue, which masquerades as a self.   
 
The hegemony of the contemporary western notion of the individual, as an autonomous, self-
contained sphere of thought and will, is sufficient as to render it invisible as the culturally 
specific ideological artifact that it is (Rose, 1989 cited in Hughes, 2001, p. 27).  This 
"autonomous" creature is constructed as the exclusive architect of its acts, and solely 
responsible for its unfolding biography (ibid.).  Culpability for social or economic failure, 
within this schema, defaults to the individual, with discourses of the measurement and 
hierarchisation of human qualities re-rendering socio-political inequalities as "just desserts".  
The crux of success in the "autonomous" world, is control, which is exercised via successful 
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implementation of the conventions of the capital-interest enterprise (Fine & Asch, 1988, p. 
15).  Independence and self-seeking competitive ability are what secures "just" success, and 
situates the "undeserving" as, equally "justly", marginal.  Imputed morals transform into the 
constant self-surveillance of the panopticon, as the oracle of the market waits to pronounce on 
one's progress, and hence one's destiny (Bartky, 1990, p. 64).  The imago of disability as a 
"loss of control", as an eviscerating attack on agency, positions impairment and impaired 
persons symbolically as a dreaded counterpoint to the moral imperatives of survival in the 
market.  In a study by Albrecht and Bury (2001), an American college student with a spinal 
injury characterised the neoliberal milieu as follows:   
 
We've been there before but didn't get anywhere.  The real problem is not with 
me nor with curb cuts, elevators and accessible bathrooms nor even with the 
medical establishment.  The real problems are with managed care, access to 
education and jobs, raw capitalism in the workplace, emphasis on rugged 
individualism, social values favouring 'good looking', young, productive, high-
energy nondisabled persons and a bunch of politicians who want things to 
continue just as they are. 
     (Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 585)  
 
The framework of social liberalism buttresses the legitimacy of the market by downplaying 
the reality of human difference, instead touting the illusion of a "level playing field" 
(Shakespeare & Watson, 2001, p. 558).  But even in that elusive Utopia of "equal 
opportunity", differing ability will persist.  The "universal, abstract, disembodied individual" 
of this ideal world of work is, according to Lister (1997), in actuality one who is "male, white, 
heterosexual and nondisabled" (Lister, 1997 cited in Shakespeare & Watson, 2001, p. 558).  If 
oppressed groups challenge the glaring contradiction, their views are seen as "the rantings of 
biased, partial and selfish special interest groups that wish to seek favour for their own 
particular grouping at the expense of the mainstream" (Young, 1990 cited in Shakespeare & 
Watson, 2001, p. 558).  The recognition of equality within democratic revolutions moves, all 
too quickly, to a desire for, a belief in, sameness (Ravaud & Stiker, 2001, p. 495).   
 
Thomson (1997b, p. 8) conceptualises the invisible counterpoint to disability "difference" as 
the "normate" – this is the veiled figure whose outline can only be discerned by identification 
of the bodily "deviants" who flank, and hence constitute, it on every side (see also Swain & 
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Cameron, 1999).  Through societal structures which implement a host of technologies 
whereby bodies are measured, classified and regulated, the "normate" forms the centrepiece 
for Foucault's "principle[s] of coercion" (Foucault, 1979, p. 184; Thomson, 1997b).  The 
normate self, to Thomson (1997b, p. 41), is informed by four interlocking ideological 
principles:  self-government, self-determination, autonomy, and progress.  The modernist 
dream is entrusted to this noble, illusory agent, dismissing misfits and eccentrics as 
troublesome non-contributors to the human project.  Davis (1995) launches a ferocious attack 
on the broad notion of normalcy, which arose with the development of modern statistics, and 
the advent of the bell curve.  Before the nineteenth century emergence of "the normal", no 
such concept was evident in western culture; indeed, the English word appeared only as late 
as 1840 (Davis, 2002, p. 105).  Prior to this conceptual shift, the dominant schema of human 
value centred on the idea of "the ideal"; an unattainable, divine quality and prowess, before 
which one was gladly humbled.  All, consequently, were positioned along a continuum of 
shared imperfection, without the clear delineations of deviance afforded by the normal curve.  
Later, the homogenisation of bodies coincided with the rise of nationalism, the standardisation 
of languages, and the emergence of "national types" (Davis, 2002, pp. 105-6; 1995).  The 
epoch of the unitary identity, the narcissism of commodification, and the modernist 
veneration of progress had begun.  Against this backdrop, the bias towards the nondisabled 
figure presents not as a habit of certain prejudiced persons, but as part of far-ranging changes 
in European, and thence global, culture and ideology; it is part of the very fabric of 
Enlightenment (Davis, 2002, p. 106).   
 
Rod Michalko (2002, p. 89) points out the odd arbitrariness of cultural meanings of human 
variation.  Some differences are happily subsumed "within" the normal, such as height or eye 
colour, whilst others situate their bearer as a somatic pariah (ibid.).  Diseases or mutations, 
correspondingly, are constructed as phenomena with identifiable "causes", such as genetic 
defects or bacteria.  But peculiarly, "non-impaired" biology simply happens "naturally"; or – 
better – supernaturally.  Modern science, he remarks, cannot meaningfully attribute cause to 
either natural or supernatural forces, since such causes would themselves need to be caused, 
leading to an unfathomable sense of infinite regress (ibid.).  "Normal human biology", 
"normal human variation", as well as "nature" itself, are all interpretive, highly abstract and 
metaphoric entities, sculpted into credible, categorical descriptors by assignations of 
pathology.  Thus, the "difference" that disability makes is not one of varying subjective 
apprehension of the world, but instead resolves into the "wrongness" of disabled experience, 
and the "rightness" of the "normal" (ibid.).  This positioning of disabled persons resonates 
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clearly with Simone de Beauvoir's feminist critique, where, in an ostensibly symmetrical 
brace of sexes, the burden of difference, of negativity, is carried entirely by the female 
(Morris, 1992, p. 158).  The political position assumed by some quarters of the US Deaf 
community brings this implicit denigration into sharp focus.  Thoryk, Robers and Battistone 
(2001, p. 191) explain the objection of this quorum to being described as "hearing impaired", 
rather than the preferred "deaf", exclaiming that "we do not label a black person 'white 
impaired', and we would not call a man a 'female impaired' person".  The interaction of value-
laden judgments of disability with those of gender may position disabled women at one 
further remove from the "normate", although impairment has been shown to threaten 
culturally sanctioned performative aspects of gender in both sexes (Asch & Fine, 1997, p. 
242; Sandahl, 2003).  Modern social life, it seems, is formulated around difference, and a 
difference which is inseparable from value.   
 
Artistic and literary representations 
Turning briefly to the aesthetic world, literary and cinematic representations of disability tend 
to reflect and replicate the hegemony of the "normate", in a manner which distances and 
objectifies disabled characters from the audience (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 164).  Typically, it is 
the character's impairment which is his or her central feature, forming the symbolic fulcrum 
of a moral fable or tale of redemption.  The disabled figure is, in short, a "means to an end" 
(ibid.); a mechanism whereby writer or film-maker may evoke identification and the 
discharge of emotion, drawing the audience into a narrative which appropriates impairment as 
an existential signifier (Thomson, 1997b).  Cinema stereotypes such as the "noble warrior", 
the "charity cripple", the "curio", the "freak" and the "Pollyanna" abound, whilst the 
appearance of a disabled person whose impairment is not symbolically relevant to the plot, is 
highly infrequent (Darke, 1998, p. 181; Shakespeare, 1999).  Movie scenes in which disabled 
persons are seen as extras or background characters, far from depictions of "normal life", are 
"intended to heighten an atmosphere of exoticism, perversion, evil or fantasy" (Shakespeare, 
1999, p. 164).  With wonderful aptness, this "over-signification" of the disabled figure has 
been termed "narrative prosthesis" by Mitchell and Snyder (Davidson, 2003, p. 58; Mitchell 
& Snyder, 1997; 2001).  Continuing the metaphor, the disabled body "serves as a crutch upon 
which literary narratives lean for their representational power, disruptive potentiality, and 
analytical insight" (Mitchell & Snyder, 2000 cited in Davidson, 2001, p. 58).  More 
conspicuous still, is the fact that the overwhelming majority of disabled film characters are 
performed by nondisabled actors and actresses (Marks, 1999a, p. 128).  Marks muses that this 
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may be so in order that, whilst the "disability drama" offers a passing catharsis to the viewer, 
it is reassuring for him or her to know that "it's only pretend" (ibid.).  Disabled characters, 
thus, are appropriated as receptacles for projections of the psychic conflicts of viewers, who 
are maintained at one further remove from their own "realities" by the fact that Al Pacino is 
"not really blind" and Daniel Day Lewis is "not really paralysed" (ibid.).  For Marks (1999a, 
p. 160), if the actor or actress "remained" disabled after the performance, his or her 
"continued" existence would cause discomfort, as evidence would remain of the fear states 
originally evoked by the impairment.  This ambivalence, arguably, mirrors the positioning of 
disabled people across society; spurned, yet needed – the objects of both aversion and 
prurience.  In The cinema of isolation, Martin Norden (1994) identifies various cinematic 
disability stereotypes, and traces their prevalence to historical eras in a manner which 
demonstrates links between political realities and forms of prejudice (Darke, 1998, p. 182).  A 
comparison, for example, of post World War II and Cold War era images of disability is 
illuminating.  The earlier representations show a "rehabilitative" and "normalising" view, 
relating to the high number of impaired veterans returning home – with actual screen writers 
and directors forming part of their number.  Decades later, the legacy of McCarthyism and 
fears of the Soviet threat recreated disability in cinema as a "freakish", dangerous symbol, a 
contaminating threat to cherished social norms (Darke, 1998, p. 182; Norden, 1994).  Davis 
(1997c, p. 66) observes how, more often than not, a disabled character will be "cured" by the 
end of the drama.  What is brought to light by this is the perennial, resonant salience of the 
tension between the "erotic, complete body" and the "uncanny, incomplete body", rendering 
the need to re-evoke, and repeatedly resolve, its associated conflicts (ibid.).   
 
Perhaps most troubling is the fact of a more or less constant stream of television programmes 
and films which carry the most blatant, egregious stereotyping of disabled people, but raise no 
audible objection from society at large (Davis, 2002, p. 150).  The common-sense belief, 
according to Davis (2002, p. 139), is that there is little or nothing to be learnt about disability 
which an "ordinary", "sensitive" person would not simply intuit.  The notions of "oppression", 
"politics" or "systematic disadvantage", within colloquial representations, bear no relation to 
what disability "is".  Disability has yet to be established within the broad social consciousness 
as an issue which requires interrogation, and, most especially, self-reflection.  Within 
photographic genres or criticism, disabled persons are, quite simply, virtually absent (Hevey, 
1997, p. 332).  Hevey (1997) interprets this absence as based upon a reading of disabled 
persons as "socially dead", and "not having a role to play" which merits their documenting in 
visual representations of society.  When they do appear, disabled persons are almost 
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exclusively present as symbols of otherness (Davis, 1997c, p. 63).  One particularly haunting 
resonance observed by Hevey (1992) is that between medical photographs of disabled persons 
and colonial, racialised images.  In both, the "patients" and the "blacks" stand frozen and 
passive, awaiting an experience of being "done to", whilst doctors and "whites" fill 
authoritative, self-satisfied and coolly confident attitudes (Hevey, 1992, p. 53).  The striking 
absence, across all media, is that of the disabled person presented as a nuanced, normatively 
complex individual, simply living life and negotiating human struggles; a person with hopes 
and disappointments, fears and strengths, who falls in and out of love, finds and loses faith, 
and so forth.  In short, the disabled figure in literature, film or the other visual arts is 
appropriated as a symbolic commodity, as a portent which gives fleeting and safely vicarious 
life to the unthinkable, before being reassigned to invisibility.  Avery (1999) summarises: 
 
...our novels and films, religion, art and myths are replete with images of the 
tortured body, the body distorted by pain, the Picassoesque figure that cries out 
in anguish and terror.  But less often explored is the psychic pain caused by the 
disability experience, the effects of the social construction of stigma that situate 
the anomalous body as subaltern. 
       (Avery, 1999, p. 116) 
 
Charity discourse 
Across most nations, a tradition of charitable "support" of disabled persons, at times informed 
by religious doctrine, is an ever-present contributor to cultural ascriptions about disability.  
Organisations and institutions have undertaken attempts at providing for disabled persons 
excluded from much of social and economic life, and abandoned by the state.  But – it is 
argued – in the process of "providing", the discourse of charity has increasingly entrenched 
the oppressed position of disabled persons, via their reconstruction as passive objects of 
benevolence, rather than legitimate, entitled citizens.  Pity and kindness, thus, become the 
unstable grounds upon which disabled persons' "rights" are provided for, with the concomitant 
implication of lives falling evermore under the control of "expert", "professional" – and 
"philanthropic" – decision-making (Rioux, 2002, p. 214).  Whilst potentially providing 
appropriately for some basic needs – inappropriately for others – charity typically does little 
to alter the status quo regarding the ideological positioning of disabled persons; it may, in 
fact, perpetuate such distortions (Coleridge, 1993, p. 3; see also Jack, 1995).  If development 
is equated to the notion of individuals assuming control over their own lives, much charity-
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based "disability work" probably militates against this (ibid.).  A crucial point is that charity 
organisations, for their very existence, are dependent upon the reproduction of images of 
disabled persons which evoke pity and altruism; that is, on stereotypes such as dependency, 
damage and abjection (Marks, 1999a, p. 167).  This imperative to demean disabled persons 
within the ken of the general public routinely confirms and buttresses prejudices, thereby 
continuing the cycle of exclusion (ibid). The "fetishising" images of charity advertising have 
been linked to the role which pornographic imagery plays in gender oppression.  In both 
cases, close focus on the somatic "locus" of difference is present (the breasts, the impairment), 
in a manner which evokes an othering response.  Further, in both cases the circumstances in 
which the images are created, interpreted and dispersed are beyond the influence of the 
subject, and are located within broader relations of oppressive power (Barnes & Mercer, 
2001, p. 521).  The act of giving, comment Murphy et al (1988, p. 236), is not a gesture of 
unity with the receiver, but a symbol, and act, of separation.  Ravaud and Stiker (2001, p. 
496) locate charity organisations as one further means – beyond the organs of the state – 
whereby identity distinctions are established and maintained.  One must "qualify" for "charity 
support", via the appropriate assigning of a disabled identity, along with the donning of the 
host of wordless ascriptions which this entails (ibid.).  All such institutional categorising of 
citizenship, they add, calls forth social forces which militate against the possibility of 
"acceptance" of the other "in his or her irreducible difference", resulting in a loss of the rich 
benefits of exposure to multiple ways of being human (ibid., p. 496).    
 
As argued earlier, if disabled persons do, indeed, serve as ciphers for the disavowed, shameful 
existential parts of others, it is likely that instinctual impulses toward this group will be of a 
hostile nature.  At a conscious level, and via reaction formation, sadistic drives may be 
experienced as guilt, along with reparative, altruistic intents (Marks, 1999a, p. 167).  The 
"pay-off" of this psychic manoeuvre is considerable, allowing the guilt-ridden responsibility 
for hostility to resolve into an act which positions one as both powerful and generous 
(Shakespeare, 1994, p. 287).  Young (1994, p. 131), considering the political functioning of 
projective identification, writes of the "mapping" of internal processes onto groups, 
institutions, and organisations, in a manner which allows us to "experience the virulent as 
though it is benign and part of the definition of a good social order".  Charity organisations 
certainly fill this reassuring role, comforting us with the knowledge of social cohesion and 
generosity to the "unfortunate", whilst obscuring the abhorrent origins of preventable 
oppression.  The public is treated, via these indulgences, to the reaffirmation of a paternalistic 
assumption that disabled people are generally treated with kindness (Davis, 2002, p. 155).  I 
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term this very familiar stereotype the "fantasy of filled needs"; an idea that "things are in 
place" in our society to provide for "those in need", or "those who cannot provide for 
themselves".  The brutal, global truth of the indignity and naked suffering of disabled lives 
remains as unbelievable as it is obscure.   
 
Within the primal splits which characterise the Kleinian model of the emotional world of 
infancy, aggression and hatred are ever-present forces (Klein, 1959, p. 252).  In fact, it is the 
anxiety surrounding aggressive impulses which gives rise to the earliest defences of the ego 
(Klein, 1948, p. 27).  The familiar idealisation of disabled persons, as plucky, spiritual, 
"inspiring", or otherwise gifted, may embody the reformulated essence of aggressive 
impulses, with charity discourse providing the convenient, sanctioned means for their 
discharge.  The need to reshape internal hostility into the practice of public virtue, is captured 
in the American cultural phenomenon of the disability charity telethon.  Longmore (1997, p. 
140) describes the telethon as a moral allegory, a ritual of "cleansing and renewal".  This 
"moment" of generosity forms the (psychically) essential, defensive counterpoint to the 
looming knowledge of self-interest and conspicuous consumption, rendering the need for 
"equally conspicuous contribution".  The "unfortunates" here assume centre stage, 
"ritualistically enacting a reversal of everyday reality" (ibid., p. 136).  Whilst the material, 
evident aims of the telethon ritual are "the physical repair of those socially invalidated by 
disability", at a latent level the ritual performs the purpose of moral restoration for those who 
give, or simply observe (ibid. 140).  Needless to say, the intrinsic meaning-system regarding 
disability which is at play across the charity spectrum is one which identifies impairment as 
the cause of suffering and lack, making impaired persons available as helpless unfortunates in 
need of succour.  The message is that disability equals impairment (Hevey, 1992, p. 50), thus 
setting the scene for the wholesale splits of projective indulgence, and entirely circumventing 
any interrogation of society, let alone self.  It is at the telethon that temporary redemption is 
found, from the guilty, egocentric excesses of consumption, as well as the deeper, more 
haunting co-existence of "freedom", "opportunity" and "equality" with the horrors of social 
suffering.  To encapsulate, David Hevey (1992) writes:   
 
Charity advertising...represents the highest public validation of the isolation of 
disabled people.  It presents a solution to the "problem" of disablement by a 
disguised blaming of the victim.  It fails to find a solution because it is itself the 
problem...  
     (Hevey, 1992, p. 51 – my emphasis) 
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Having over the past segments reflected on aspects of modern, Western cultural responses to 
disablement, we return now to the more traditionally psychological terrain of the family.  
Here, we shall examine the potential impact of culturally condensed disability meanings 
within the dynamic, relational context of psychological development, with a view to 
unpacking elements of disablist ideology within the socialisation of disabled subjectivity.   
 
Disability and the family 
 
Attachment and infancy 
If we are to usefully make sense of the development of disabled subjectivity, it follows – 
certainly within a psychoanalytic frame of reference that the nature of early attachment 
relationships which involve disability should be central to our investigation.  This discussion 
is necessarily restricted to the systemic effects and management of congenital impairment, 
which certainly limits easy generalisability.  Yet, I believe there is much that can be learnt 
regarding disablist ideology broadly via an examination of the titrated, sensitive familial 
environment surrounding birth of a disabled infant.   
 
Within the limited psychoanalytic contributions to thinking in this area, a preponderance of 
writers utilise concepts borrowed from grief and bereavement theory, in understanding the 
responses of parents to the birth of an impaired child (e.g. Burlingham, 1961; Drotar, 
Baskiewicz, Irvin, Kennell & Klaus, 1975; MacKeith, 1973; Pinkerton, 1970; Solnit & Stark, 
1961).  These writers draw on Freud's (1923) work on mourning, viewing such a birth as an 
experience of object loss; that is, the loss of "the longed-for, healthy child" (Solnit & Stark, 
1961, p. 524).  The expectation, thereafter, is that the parents must traverse a stagewise 
mourning process, towards some sort of emotional resolution, if there is to be any hope of 
healthy relating to the child (Drotar et al., 1975, p. 711).  Drotar et al (1975, p. 711) describe 
some of the features of these stages as overwhelming shock, irrational behaviour, 
uncontrollable tearfulness, helplessness, denial, disbelief, sadness, anger, and anxiety.  During 
the course of this process, in their view, distressed mothers may experience violently negative 
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feelings towards self and baby, including hatred of the infant's malformation, extreme self-
blame, and a feeling of "not caring if the baby dies" (ibid.).  The "discrepancy" between the 
imagined unborn child, and the actual, disabled child, is so great as to embody an experience 
of trauma, which has the power to substantially disrupt early relating (Solnit & Stark, 1961, p. 
524), and lead to the family becoming "enveloped" in a state of "chronic sorrow" (Drotar et 
al., 1975, p. 710).   MacKeith (1973, p. 133) describes two primary types of maternal reaction 
– protection and revulsion – which may exist in complex relation to one another, singly or 
alternately showing in consciousness.  In her psychoanalytic work with mothers of blind 
infants, Burlingham (1961, p. 122) describes feelings of "injury, of hurt pride, of guilt, and of 
... depression", which may cause her to withdraw emotionally from the child, and, sometimes 
"irrationally wish for his [sic.] death".  Within a more psychiatric research frame, Fisman and 
Wolf (1991, p. 213) describe how the birth of a child with a pervasive developmental disorder 
has "a significant effect on family members", with disrupted parenting and marital discord 
rooted in maternal depression being a primary node of difficulty.   
 
As we shall see later, this "bereavement model" has also been used by psychoanalytic writers 
in conceptualising the process of "adjustment" to adventitious disability in later life.  In both 
situations, this attempt to "map" and "predict" the psychological sequelae of disability has 
been rejected in the most strenuous terms by disability studies authors, notably those 
supporting the social model view.   These authors argue that the "grief model" reduces 
complex, socio-political difficulties such as those rooted in discrimination and inappropriate 
service provision, to the "psychological problems" (such as "denial") of those who have failed 
to "come to terms" with their impairment (or, that of their infant) (Lenny, 1993, p. 234; 
Abberley, 1993; Finkelstein & French, 1993; Oliver, 1995).  Familiarly, experienced 
difficulties thus are attributed to individual factors growing out of bodily difference, ignoring, 
for example, the broad lack of understanding and appropriate social services geared to meet 
the complex needs of families with a recent, congenitally disabled addition (Ferguson & 
Asch, 1989, p. 113).  Consequently, the ''traditional" body of psychoanalytic and 
psychological theorising in this area has been relegated, by mainstream disability studies 
authors, to the rubbish-heap labelled "medical model".  Writers such as Ferguson (e.g. 
Ferguson, 2001) regard this "traditional" psychoanalytic view as malign, in its persistent 
"pessimism" regarding the outlook for families of impaired children (Ferguson, 2001, p. 375).  
Parents tend to be constructed, almost without exception, as overwhelmed by shock, 
disappointment and revulsion at their disabled infant, which Ferguson (the father of a 
congenitally impaired son), finds deeply offensive, and a destructive, misleading and 
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disrespectful distortion of the nature of real lives (see also Tregaskis, 2006).  For Ferguson 
(2001, p. 381), parents were placed in impossible double-binds by professionals, who tended 
to read a pathological meaning into virtually any form of response.  It is, indeed, clear that the 
observations of prominent early researchers such as Solnit and Stark (1961), were made in an 
academic environment virtually oblivious to the politics of disability construction.  The 
recommendation, for example, that parents not be forced to see their "defective" infant – 
before his or her certain institutionalisation – should they not want to, is both odious and, 
now, anachronistic.  Such a view betrays a disturbing ignorance of, or passivity towards, 
internalised disablist feelings within parents, as well as society at large, whilst the broad 
orientation over-validates negative parental responses to the exclusion of all else.   
 
It was argued earlier (see Psychoanalysis and disability: A brief history, p.73), that 
psychoanalytic thinkers have tended to approach the disability phenomenon via attempts at 
forging causal links between bodily impairment and (typically pathological) personality 
structure, in a manner which circumvents an interrogation of culturally condensed, oppressive 
responses to impairment (Watermeyer, 2002; 2006).  This orientation, in one important way, 
is mirrored within the "bereavement" accounts of childbirth summarised above.  In both cases, 
impairment is everything, foregrounded in a manner which tends to create immutable social 
"givens" attributable to unchanging bodily "realities".  The concerted exploration of social 
factors in mediating and shaping resultant lived realities is, in effect, eschewed.  Whilst some 
writers may object to this ascription, my view is that a passing reference to the potential 
impact of cultural or intersubjective factors is grossly insufficient.  An analysis which is 
almost entirely preoccupied with intra-individual, "impairment" factors (the "constancies" of 
loss, or grief), and displays no meaningful initiative in exploring ideological, systemic 
circumstances, in effect denies the profound attributive significance of those circumstances.  
Note, though, that this observation does not in any way imply a denial of the felt experience 
of any given parent of a congenitally impaired child, or of any individual's experience of his 
or her own impairment.  The route, from body to psyche, is negotiated within this 
"traditional" psychoanalytic paradigm via the concept of the "body ego", which is formulated 
as the earliest representation of ego functioning, arising as a "reflection" of bodily structure 
and sensation.  Freud (1923) writes:   
The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is 
itself the projection of a surface. 
      (Freud, 1923, p. 636) 
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 Orbach (1994, p. 166) writes that, while it is clear that the body and the incremental 
unfolding of instincts are essential to Freud's model of the developing psyche, the body ego 
remains a "rather undeveloped" notion.  It is this "undeveloped" construct which is elemental 
to positions which, in effect, excise the impaired body – be it that of an adult or infant – from 
the world of ideology.  "Disability", in this view, is an immutable, depersonalised constant; 
the "reality" of a "broken body" in the life of an impaired adult, as in the grief of parents at the 
birth of an impaired child.  Yorke's (1980) stated position is an informative example:   
 
If...we had considered cases in which early disabilities, such as congenital 
blindness, deafness, or deformities leading to early restrictions of motility, had 
continued into later life we would have found that deviations, defects, and arrests 
of development were intimately interwoven with the disability itself and ensured, 
inter alia, that the ego which the patient brought to the analytic task would be an 
abnormal one.    
        (Yorke, 1980, p. 191) 
 
The predominance of conceptual space made for the grief of parents construes the "meaning" 
of infantile impairment, the "reality" of "loss", as an entity largely independent of cultural 
factors, including, notably, the nature of interactions with health care professionals (see 
Dreger, 2006).  Whereas intra-psychic, historical factors within parents may be considered as 
mediating the degree of "pathology" in responses to an impaired birth, the "reality" of "what 
must be dealt with", remains construed as a constant.  The deep assumption at work here, is 
the irresistable equating of a "defective" body with the consistent "reality" of a maladjusted, 
or wretched, existence.  Writers drawing on Freud's (1923, p. 636) utterances on the formation 
of the body ego in buttressing this position may, however, be insufficiently aware of his later 
shift in emphasis toward the importance of the mother's physical care in enhancement of the 
body ego (Freud, 1933 cited in Raphael-Leff, 1994, p. 16).  Raphael-Leff (1994, p. 13) 
describes psychic representations of the somatic self (or "the imaginative body"), as 
something which "does not just spring from within"; instead, it is "a psychosocial product of 
its time and place".  The experience of the body is thus never a solipsistic process, divorced 
from the social milieu.  On the contrary, "we 'learn' our bodies through the hands, faces and 
minds of significant carers and their bodily ministrations" (ibid., p. 16).  In this "intra-psycho- 
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somatic" world, representations of the body are also multiple and fluctuant (ibid., p. 14, 16), 
as social saliences shift.  What is being created here is a conceptual picture of disability-
meanings which is far more fluid, and fundamentally shaped by intersubjective experiences 
borne of overt and invisible cultural assumptions.  Raphael-Leff (1994) elaborates: 
 
Indeed, right into adulthood, a web of associative connections link the flesh of 
our permeable bodies in our most intimate moments to the bodies of others.  
Even in the privacy of masturbatory acts and within the secret realms of bulimic 
activity or self-mutilating solitude, their imagined responses guide erotic fantasy 
or relentlessly dictate cruel standards.   
      (Raphael-Leff, 1994, p. 17) 
 
She goes on to reiterate the point, stating that the bodily self of fantasy is shaped and bound 
by cultural meanings and aesthetics, which are "as effective to psyche as Chinese foot-binding 
is to flesh" (ibid.).  The "malformed" body of the infant, within this view, only becomes 
imbued with meaning – with difference – via the mirroring afforded by a world of responses 
tainted, or distorted, by the feelings and anxieties which routinely compose the social milieu 
surrounding impairment.   
 
Lussier (1960; 1980) acknowledges his own erroneous assumptions regarding the 
compellingly credible "functional" relationship between bodily impairment and disturbed 
psychic development.  He recounts a psychoanalytic psychotherapy undertaken with a boy –  
Peter – who, from birth, had lived with underdeveloped and functionally useless arms.  
Lussier (1960) entered the therapeutic process with the assumption that it was the negotiation 
of loss – the loss of a "normal", healthy body – which would form the crux of analytic work, 
hence calling forth both the bereavement model of disability, and the concept of the body ego 
as a relatively asocial, functional product of soma.  As the therapeutic process wore on, 
however, profound social (in particular, parental) factors influential in the aetiology of his 
distress began to come to light; social stressors located largely within culturally condensed, 
systemic responses to the nature of his impairment.  It became clear that Peter's mother was 
deeply ashamed of his impairment; and thus, manifestly, of him (Lussier, 1980, p. 179).  As a 
baby or young child, Peter's mother would carefully cover his arms when they were together 
in public, and was unable to openly comfort him on the regular occasions when he was stared 
at (Lussier, 1960, p. 433).  Within the transference relationship, Lussier (1980, p. 180) began 
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to understand that Peter was showing him that he was "a physically complete human being", 
and that his body was "a complete unit, self-sufficient, integral, not mutilated".  Instead, it 
was his experience of maternal mirroring which was deficient and pathogenic, resulting in a 
stunting of his potential for growth and separation.  Movingly, Lussier (1980) concludes: 
 
...the boy, as shown throughout his analysis, seemed to have been much more in 
need of the confidence of his mother in him than in need of normal arms. 
      (Lussier, 1980, p. 179) 
 
Peter, it seems, had from somewhere – someone – received a fragment of validation which 
allowed him, through the course of the therapeutic process, to re-find his "whole" (bodily) 
self, thereby separating his own being from his mother's malignant ascriptions.  In an 
interesting parallel, Balikov (1960) reported a case of three sighted children born to blind 
parents, who had lived an extremely insular, isolated family life.  Remarkably, the children 
grew into seeming, and behaving, as if blind; for example, feeling their way around nursery 
school with their hands and feet, and reporting "not seeing" an object before it was explored 
with touch (Balikov, 1960, pp. 236-7).  Of course, this is an extreme example, with complex 
overtones of behavioural modelling as well as the possibility of unreported comorbid 
disturbance, yet the implication of an experience of the body, of its function, which is learned, 
remains.  Surely, cases such as these should sharpen and prioritise our exploration of the 
specifics of familial, cultural and resource-related circumstances in our formulation of 
accounts of the psychic sequelae of impairment.   
 
Let us return now to the disability studies critique of psychoanalysis' "grief and bereavement" 
model surrounding the birth of an impaired infant, and examine its positions more closely.  
Linderman (1981) plaintively voices the perspective of those affronted by the assumptions of 
psychoanalysis: 
 
How can we call such a daughter a 'burden'?  On what basis do textbooks 
repeatedly claim that parents of children with disabilities 'cannot make an honest 
attachment to their real child until they have withdrawn their affection from the 
normal, wished-for child'? 
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    (Linderman, 1981 cited in Olkin, 1999, p. 92) 
Specifically quoting Solnit's (1989) description of the "sad, resentful, discouraged" reactions 
of parents to the child they "did not expect", Yuker (1994), implores us to simply "stop 
studying the presumably horrible negative effects of a child with a disability on parents and 
siblings" (Yuker, 1994 cited in Olkin, 1999, p. 92).  Ferguson (2001, p. 375), likewise, pours 
scorn on such assertions, forcibly emphasising that parental reactions are "inescapably 
embedded within a sociohistorical context".  He regards the "persistent pessimism" and 
"horror stories" of psychoanalytic (and other psychological) writers as nothing short of 
slanderous to parents, and reflective of a profoundly destructive intellectual attitude (2001, pp. 
375-6).  The "logic" of these accounts, for Ferguson (2001, p. 379) reflects a simple reversal 
of an earlier, even more crude view: whereas religious or superstitious beliefs previously 
viewed disabled infants as "damaged" by the prior misdeeds of their parents, in the new 
schema it was the disabled child who brought "damage" and suffering to the family (see also 
Barnes & Mercer, 2005a, p. 6).  The alleged "tragic connotations" of such births, Ferguson 
(2001, p. 376) argues, remain "consistently presented as inherent and immutable".  Whether 
family researchers in the second half of the last century chose to focus on attitudinal 
categories (such as guilt, denial, displaced anger, or grief), or behavioural aspects (including 
role disruption, marital discord, or social withdrawal), the consistent assumption was that 
disability necessarily "distorted the connection between child and parent in ways that were 
both intrinsic and harmful" (Ferguson, 2001, p. 379).  With specific reference to the 
psychoanalytic literature, Ferguson (2001, p. 380) notes how, if parents expressed 
dissatisfaction with health professionals, perhaps regarding a lack of support, this would be 
interpreted as displaced anger, which was, in fact, directed at the "defective" child (see also 
Heifetz, 1980; Turnbull & Summers, 1987).   Such interpretation represents the withdrawal, 
from parents, of the opportunity to express whatever justifiable grievances they may hold 
toward an inadequate health care system (ibid.).  Harris and Wideman (1988, p. 117) concur, 
lamenting what they view as the use of theory by professionals as a mechanism for distancing 
disabled clients and their families; a mechanism for "lulling" the clinician's anxieties, rather 
than for illuminating experience.   
 
What writers such as Ferguson, Gill, Olkin and many others are responding to, is the tainting 
construction of disabled children and families as necessarily miserable, disturbed and 
unstable.  These representations re-make, in turn, stereotyped and irresistable assumptions 
about the souls within "marked bodies"; assumptions which settle in, unbidden and unseen, as 
lived, uncontested truths.  Their response is one of vociferous objection, seeking, 
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understandably, to evict stereotype.  But there exists, in their critique, a paradoxical danger 
arising from the need to forcibly – contrarily – re-author the gloomy, intellectual accounts of 
familial desolation.  Consider Olkin's (1999) words: 
 
Although initial reactions to the birth of a child with a disability may be stressful 
and negative, parents often quickly exhibit coping behaviours.     
      (Olkin, 1999, p. 95) 
 
Of concern is the following:  it is, as we shall see, a hallmark of disabled life within a 
prejudicial society, that constructions of experience, identity and self may, of necessity, be 
made in opposition to dominant stereotypes.  The question of exploring the shaping of 
subjectivity within congenitally impaired children is simply too crucial, too vital, for us to risk 
overlooking (for example) the potentially profound impact of unconscious conflicts within 
parents evoked by the experience of bearing an impaired child.  Ferguson and others object to 
the assertion that an impaired child brings disruption and struggle to the family; what is 
imperative for our purposes, is that we do not let this understandable need to rebutt 
denigrating assumptions about such families distract us from the business of investigating 
how the disruptions and struggles which may – do – occur, impact upon early relationships, 
and the delicate coalescing of selfhood.  The words of Miller (2006), an achondroplasic man, 
provide an interesting, first-person contrast: 
 
The birth of a disabled child to able-bodied parents is often met with 
disappointment, or even anger, due to the loss of the idealised child...The birth of 
a disabled child often leads to a period of grief.   
       (Miller, 2006, p. 218) 
 
The simple authenticity of Miller's (2006) words rings true, as does the proposition that 
adjustment to the birth of an achondroplasic infant would, to most couples, represent a 
complex, evocative and difficult experience.  For Ferguson and others, this simple observation 
is difficult to allow, as it represents a confirmation of a host of deeper, constrictive stereotypes 
used to justify ongoing stigmatisation, ostracisation and discrimination suffered by disabled 
individuals and families.  Not least, to much of the disability studies academy, it also 
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represents an endorsement of the reviled "medical model".  Yet, the need to overtly "value" 
families renders such critics unable to look directly at the (potentially) substantive 
unconscious emotional currents and distortions which surround infantile disability.   
 
By way of exemplifying the dispute between these academic factions, let us consider the 
following:  Ferguson (2001, p. 382) refers to the abovementioned study by Drotar et al (1975) 
as one telling example of the blatant pathologisation of parents, whose emphasis upon their 
child's capabilities is summarily dismissed as "denial", rather than constructive adaptation 
(Drotar et al., 1975, p. 711).  But whilst his critique is certainly accepted, there remains much 
that is moving and authentic in the accounts of the twenty couples interviewed by these 
investigators.  Further, in comparatively reading these opposing streams of theory and 
research, it is clear that the psychoanalytic model, with (if thoughtfully applied) its 
remarkable capacity for the fine description and investigation of emotional states, bears the 
promise of particularly precious knowledge regarding the conscious and unconscious psychic 
milieu within which disabled children develop.  As is so often the case, the unconscious 
conflicts evoked by disability have produced a potentially paralysing split; that is, between the 
"pathologising" and equally ardent "de-pathologising" of families, in a manner which will 
inevitably silence something of subjective reality.  In other words, the "de-pathologising" 
position risks disallowing parents from consciously acknowledging feelings which may be 
politically inconvenient or unpalatable, hence obscuring awareness of the intersubjective roots 
of disabled subjectivity.  There is, I believe, a precious baby in the psychoanalytic bathwater.   
 
Donald Winnicott (1947) provides a conceptual space for difficult feelings towards an infant 
which, I believe, places the foregoing in a new and important light.  He writes: 
 
I suggest that the mother hates the baby before the baby hates the mother, and 
before the baby can know his mother hates him [sic.].   
 
      (Winnicott, 1947, p. 200) 
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With these rather dramatic words, Winnicott (1947) introduces the idea of parental 
ambivalence towards an infant as a wholly normative, even necessary part of child-rearing.  
The presence of antipathy within the mother of a new-born, within this view, is nothing short 
of instinctually and rationally appropriate.  Amongst much else, the baby has been "a danger 
to her body in pregnancy and at birth", "an interference with her private life", a cause of pain 
to her nipples, the reason for immense fatigue; in short, the baby has replaced her needs and 
comforts with the prioritisation of her or his own (ibid., p. 201).  In many important senses, 
parenting involves making oneself available to be "used" – exploited – by the ever-demanding 
needs of a child; to Winnicott (1947, p. 201), the mother is treated as "an unpaid servant, a 
slave", who must love her child "excretions and all".  This crucially important corrective to 
the unidimensional, romantic idealisation of motherhood draws appropriate, empathic 
attention to the needs and struggles of mothers, in a manner which aims to provide an 
accepting "space" for her entirely natural hateful, resentful and disappointed feelings.  
Importantly, within the immense, guilt-ridden cultural evaluations of "good" motherhood 
placed upon women, such feelings are very often repressed, disallowed, or experienced as 
evidence of failure.  The implications of such cultural, and consequently intra-psychic, 
repression are powerful and potentially dire.   
 
It remains a reliable psychoanalytic axiom that feelings which cannot be consciously allowed 
and acknowledged will tend to be "acted out", in unconscious, symbolic ways.  Thus it is that, 
for Winnicott (1947, p. 202), the vital need for a culture of acceptance and tolerance of 
"unpalatable" feelings about parenthood has direct, even measurable implications for the 
psychological well-being of children, and hence of adults.  Ferguson (2001) and others, 
through the need to disavow pathologising ascriptions to the families of disabled children, risk 
silencing or de-legitimating the actual, felt experience of parents in situations of crisis.  Their 
focus on the resource-needs of parents is entirely appropriate, and an incidence of the 
contravention of citizenship rights to access, which requires urgent attention.  Further, the 
identification of overt or hidden "hateful" feelings towards a new-born disabled infant by 
Solnit and Stark (1961), Drotar et al (1975), MacKeith (1973) and others almost certainly 
carries the biasing influence of an approach to disability which fails to direct even basic 
attention at the world of systematic disadvantages under which disabled persons – and parents 
– suffer.  Yet, it is essential to recall that, across society, exposure to disability reliably evokes 
the projection of primitive parts of self; for parents additionally destabilised by the potential 
crisis of the birth of an impaired child, there is no reason why this should be any different.  
The mother-infant dyad, so fundamentally important in the coalescing of selfhood, exists as a 
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delicate state of merger, in which unconscious exchanges are as important as conscious 
ministrations.  There can be little doubt that, in this precarious relationship, the powerful, 
often primitive conflictual material evoked by the notion of bodily "defect" carries potentially 
profound, influential implications.  Set against the backdrop of these serious concerns, it is an 
odd and unfortunate paradox – for disabled infants as well as parents – that, in terms of the 
(largely understandable) political proscriptions of the disability studies consensus, we are 
"allowed" to feel ambivalence regarding our "normal" children, but not about those who 
happen to be disabled.  More paradoxically, this creates a situation in which, potentially, we 
actually selectively deprive the parents of disabled infants the legitimacy, the space, to 
process the extremely difficult, often conflicted feelings which are likely to be evoked around 
such a birth.  If our hypotheses regarding the nature of unconscious evocations relating to 
disability are remotely correct, it is likely that, within the disavowing milieu sketched above, 
these will be associated with extreme levels of guilt and self-recrimination, setting up 
dangerous and unstable splits which must impact upon relating.  Ironically, the position of 
Ferguson (2001) and others bears a resultant effect of diminishing our compassion for these 
troubled parents.   
 
It is useful, in elaborating this discussion, to further contextualise the debate within 
psychoanalytic theorising on normative aspects of child-bearing.  Sinason (1992, p. 258) 
describes how pregnant women naturally carry a range of fantasies regarding their bodily 
state, and the imminent birth, which may be completely forgotten afterward.  Reminiscent of 
our earlier discussion regarding psychic fantasies of monstrosity, it is unsurprising that the 
drastic bodily changes of pregnancy evoke rich fantasy.  A woman may have fears about 
"what" she is carrying, anxieties regarding how she will be represented by "whatever it is" 
that comes out of her, uncertainties regarding her entitlement or ability to perform as a 
mother, the effects of that "extra" glass of wine or cigarette, and so forth (ibid.).  Embedded 
within these fears may be primitive projections of the mother's split-off archaic aspects, such 
as shameful or subjectively heinous parts of self.  When a healthy baby is born, all such fears 
may be readily forgotten, as they have been disconfirmed.  However, when a "defective" child 
appears, he or she may, conversely, be experienced as a confirmation of the darker pre-natal 
fantasies carried by the mother; relating not only to the child's value, but also to her own 
(ibid.).  Besides the very real, stressful and trying challenges of learning about and accessing  
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the material needs of an impaired child, the result may be that parents are additionally 
confronted with, and destabilised by, their own archaic struggles to do with the "meaning" of 
their having produced such an infant.  Raphael-Leff (1994) describes the rich, archaically 
laden emotional bond between mother and infant: 
A mother's palpating hand, charged with affect, reflects her relation to male and 
female bodies, as well as the positive or negative forces unconsciously invested 
in her baby and feelings towards her own feminine bodiliness and fecundity, her 
unconscious representations of maternity, sexuality and gender...To a mother, the 
baby may at first signify completion of her own fertile identity; alternatively, 
representing some facet of her internal world she or he is greeted as a beloved or 
hated reincarnation for a significant figure in her emotional life.  She or he may 
be invested with an idealised female baby-self or ascribed repudiated aspects of 
the mother's self-image depending on her unique psychohistory. 
      (Raphael-Leff, 1994, p. 23) 
 
The ability of parents to tolerate and contain painful feelings, rather than exposing these to 
their infants, has been shown to be a crucial variable in supporting healthy development 
(Rustin, 1991, p. 46).  In order to do this, it is essential that parents do not deny the reality of 
their feelings, but instead are provided with an accepting relational place for their expression 
and digestion.  The concept of "maternal reverie" (Bion, 1962a) describes the intense, 
heightened and "tuned in" preoccupation of mothers with their infants, which is central to the 
development of an integrated sense of self (Rustin, 1991, p. 46).  The role of the mother here 
is one of willingly receiving and containing the infant's difficult or anxious feelings, whilst 
remaining as a secure and stable, caring figure (Holmes, 1996, p. 31).  Rather than deflecting 
or rebutting the child's difficult emotional material, it is held inside by the mother, 
acknowledged, and detoxified on the infant's behalf (ibid.).  In order to perform this critical 
containing role, the mother must be sufficiently supported and contained herself to be able to 
"allow" the baby to feel – to be – whoever he or she is, in a given moment.  If the mother 
retains anxious, projected fantasies about who her baby is, such as those described above, her 
capacity for acceptance and containment will, almost certainly, be reduced.  In addition, part 
of the achievement of "reverie" involves the mother's empathic imagining of the child's 
experience and needs, which is dependent upon positive identification.  The potentially 
anxiety-ridden "differentness" which some mothers of disabled infants may feel toward their 
baby may substantially disrupt this process, resulting, too, in an undermining of the mother's 
trust and confidence in her intuitive "knowing" of what her baby needs (Harris & Wideman, 
1988, p. 128; Lussier, 1980).  The intention here is in no way to pass judgment on mothers; 
very much the contrary.  Rather, it is to assert that, in a world in which profoundly negative, 
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often shame-ridden projections surrounding disability are our shared cultural legacy, it is 
unsurprising – even "normal" – that mothers of impaired infants should, if anything, grapple 
more than others with these difficulties.  These mothers are placed in an impossible double-
bind, between archaic fears, guilt-ridden maternal imperatives, the demands of political 
expediency, misattuned messages from health professionals, and probably very much besides.  
They need and deserve space, acceptance, support and empathy, in an environment which 
recognises that to be fearful or feel shame surrounding disability, is a normative point of 
departure for all.   
 
The paucity of psychological concepts within mainstream disability studies leaves the 
discipline sadly limited in its capacity to interrogate that most crucial of concerns – the 
socialisation of its constituency.  In understanding the links between generations, and 
consequently the links between the individual and the social, the theory of attachment must 
assume a central role (Kraemer & Roberts, 1996b, pp. 5-6).  Although attachment theory 
begins with the mother-infant dyad, its logic extends readily to include relationships between 
children and all other influential figures, with implications for the experience of self and other 
which extend throughout the life course (ibid.; Erskine & Judd, 1994).  Self-worth, insight 
into personal pain, the ability to articulate subjective states, and the capacity to work and love 
are all intimately related to the attachment framework.  Any political movement seeking to 
understand the oppression, internal as well as manifest, of its people, surely should expend 
resources in the investigation of this area.  At many stages of the unfolding of the early 
attachment relationship, common ("normative") anxieties and projections surrounding 
disability may, if not openly considered and thoughtfully addressed, threaten to disrupt 
healthy development.  For example, the importance of the appropriate allowing of early 
omnipotence, later dampened by the emergence of proprioceptive boundaries (Harris & 
Wideman, 1988, p. 128), may interact closely with the familiar, disability-related anxiety 
regarding the tension between agency and dependency.  It is natural, under the circumstances 
of current cultural mores, for a mother with a new, disabled infant to wrestle with fears 
regarding his or her later capacity for "independence", for "ability" to cope and survive in an 
unwelcoming, materially self-interested world.  The progressive, faithful allowing of growth 
toward a more bounded state, interacting evermore independently with objects in the world – 
that is, the incremental business of separation – may well present very particular difficulties 
for such mothers.  The role of the mother in mediating her infant's growing contact with the 
"outside" world is elemental here, and a difficult, evocative challenge for all mothers, 
involving negotiating the very delicate balance between care and intrusion.  A second 
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example pertains to the especially important infantile experience of the world, the mother, 
surviving the child's expression of aggression or destructiveness (Harris & Wideman, 1988, p. 
128).  The child needs to express aggressive impulses in an interaction in which the parent 
survives in an accepting, undefended way, thus showing that the object (the mother, the 
world) is robust enough to contain, to accept, the infant's darker emotional aspects (ibid.).  A 
key theme of the present work is the proposition that the de-realisation of experience, borne of 
the continued rebuttal and un-acceptance of subjective reality by an anxious and unready 
world, forms a central aspect of the social predicaments of disabled persons of all ages.  It 
should not be difficult to see how the roots of this alienation may develop within the early 
family milieu, with parents understandably struggling to contain complex feelings regarding 
their infant, who, like all babies, needs them to feel deep acceptance of him or her.  For much 
of the disabled population, I suggest, experiences of another who is truly able to "stand" one's 
subjective reality, thus providing moments of the precious resource of the attuned validation 
of self, are, perhaps at best, rare.   
 
In order, with new purpose, to begin to illuminate aspects of the experience of parents who 
discover that their new baby is congenitally impaired, let us reflect upon a handful of such 
accounts.  Rinaldi (1996) sensibly and succinctly directs our attention to the ubiquitous 
presence of cultural images which prize the "unmarked-beautiful-healthy-intelligent-'regular'" 
child, constantly reminding parents of the inequality, discrimination and struggle which is 
likely to be their child's social destiny (Rinaldi, 1996 cited in Avery, 1999, p. 116).  The very 
real, and rational, anxiety of many parents with children who are visibly different is that such 
difference will lead to painful interpersonal experiences which injure the self, and upset 
fulfilling psychosocial functioning (Parens, 2006, p. xiv).  The task, for a parent, of finding 
internal resources of trust which allow for healthy separation under such circumstances, is a 
deeply challenging one.  Abelow Hedley (2006) provides a moving account of the early stages 
of family life after the birth of her achondroplasic daughter: 
 
Everything was confusion:  how to react, how to proceed, what to do.  As the 
frantic days unfolded it seemed that all we could focus on was how to repair the 
flaws, and we would listen to anyone from a faith healer to a surgeon if we 
thought there was a 'fix' for her in it...There are dangers both social and 
emotional in being different and a certain amount of safety in being normal.   
      (Abelow Hedley, 2006, p. 43) 
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An aspect of parental experience described in a range of early psychoanalytic accounts which 
is regarded as especially offensive and loathsome by the disability studies consensus, is that 
of the fantasy of an unborn, "whole" and "healthy" child, existing as counterpoint to the real 
child.  Yet, it seems that evidence for this phenomenon is to be found elsewhere.  Sinason 
(1992, p. 131) relates the story of Steven, a congenitally impaired psychotherapy patient.  She 
describes how Steven's mother spoke of him "not as a boy", but rather as a "shadowy 
representation of the not-properly-mourned healthy twin of himself he should have been".  
During one session, Sinason commented on how Steven had grown over the holidays; his 
mother responded sadly, saying "Yes, he would have been so tall"; she notes:  "Her real 
speech was for the other Steven, the healthy one who has never lived or died and has not been 
put to rest" (ibid.).  Considering the heated and emotive controversy surrounding the issue of 
mourning sketched above, it is highly likely that many parents would be afforded – or would 
afford themselves – very little freedom to allow for emotional expression of feelings of loss 
surrounding the birth of an "unexpected" child.  The lack, or "circumvention" of such 
mourning may leave disabled individuals adrift in an identity-limbo, continually (perhaps 
unconsciously) aware of their presence as a disappointment, as an "accident", and of the 
consequent need to obscure the reality of their existence (Bowlby, 1979, p. 407).  It is in 
interaction with such lived, intersubjective dynamics that the "expressivist critique" described 
in an earlier section attains credibility and gravity.  An issue which deserves substantial 
attention is, quite simply, the nature and extent of exposure which new parents have had to 
disabled persons.  The ideology of segregation ensures that it is very much the exceptional 
individual who has experienced the privilege of contact with disabled individuals living 
whole, integrated and fulfilling lives.  Consequently, the imagined "future-space" of their 
new, impaired child, may only be filled with anxiety-ridden fantasies, of predominantly 
archaic and irrational origin.  In each of the situations touched upon briefly above, parents 
deserve to have their experience thoroughly normalised, in a manner which allows for honest 
reflection, towards the processing of anxieties, losses and projections, such that their children 
do not become the unconscious bearers of these.   
 
An important implication of the development of a clear, entitled, articulate and honest voice 
amongst parents of congenitally impaired children, will be the embedding of research 
paradigms in human development which make provision for a range of "non-normative" 
developmental pathways.  Most psychological theorising on child development is based upon 
data collection which excludes disabled children (Asch, 1984, p. 534; Watermeyer, 2002).  
 177
Conversely, research concerned particularly with congenital impairment tends, within the 
biomedical orientation, to focus excessively on "physiological factors", to the exclusion of an 
adequate consideration of intersubjective concerns – beginning with the maternal dyad – in 
shaping selfhood, as well as cognition.  Elsewhere, I demonstrate this point via a critique of 
Kenneth Wright's (1991) contribution to our understanding of the role of vision in early 
attachment (Watermeyer, 2002).  Wright (1991) is operating within a psychoanalytic 
paradigm, yet nevertheless falls into the "medicalising" snare of viewing congenital blindness, 
and its purported impact on selfhood, as a presocial "given" (for another example of this error 
with regard to blindness, see Omwake & Solnit, 1961).  Further, he traces the role of sight in 
the development of a "normal", "healthy" and "integrated" self, within the assumption that all 
who cannot traverse this path – say, due to congenital blindness – will necessarily carry a 
fragmentary and immature constellation of internal objects (Watermeyer, 2002).  With the 
best intentions, such research falls into the snare of not only exploring how development may 
occur, but inadvertently dictating how development should occur, in a manner which, a priori, 
condemns those with differing somatic pathways to a pathologised exile.  The emergence of a 
candid literature which describes the experience of parents of congenitally impaired infants – 
experiences both internal, and between – will, I believe, add to the impetus to develop more 
integrated, equitable and inclusive models of psychological development.   
 
In drawing this discussion to a close, the words of Harris and Wideman (1988, p. 119) capture 
the tone of my position.  In reviewing the subjective accounts of parents who have given birth 
to congenitally impaired infants, what they found was "an absolutely human mix of love, 
grief, sadness, hatred, depression, and hope..."  It is such honest, nuanced, "real-life" 
representations of life around disablement which are so sorely missing in Hollywood movies; 
it is essential that we ensure that disabled persons, and parents, are offered the opportunity for 
the authentic expression of subjectivity, without sanction or silencing from medical or 
disability movement quarters.  Amongst other things, we need to enquire, as deeply and 
openly as possible, how early interactions of an impaired infant with his or her primary 
caregivers are shaped and affected by the anxious evocations of disability, in a manner which 
does not collude with the alienating pathologisation of parents, but also does not shy away 
from the reality of trauma and ambivalence (Harris & Wideman, 1988, p. 118).  A common 
yet profoundly regrettable scenario is that in which the silence and withdrawal of support that 
so often surrounds an impaired birth is reflected, even tacitly justified, by the social modelist 
moratorium on personal, emotional expression.  There is no question that the potential 
disruptions to early development arising from the unconscious currents evoked by disability 
 178
may carry grave effects for the emotional development of the congenitally impaired 
(Watermeyer, 2002).  Recognition of this is possible without the imputation of blame; rather, 
an empathic, and richly rewarding discussion of the emotional realities of parents may ensue, 
to the benefit of families, the disability movement, and society as a whole.  Harris and 
Wideman (1988) encapsulate the crucial importance of an examination of parental experience:  
 
To minimise this process, along with its trauma and its transcendent aspects, is to 
diminish the large and substantial emotional work of which parents of disabled 
infants are amply capable.    
     (Harris & Wideman, 1988, p. 120) 
 
The dangerous binary which is reflected repeatedly throughout this work, is that between the 
social and the intra-psychic.  Here, too, it seems that the social modelist view is prepared to 
eschew the psychological, in a manner which may threaten the availability, and usage, of 
much needed psychological care by the parents of congenitally impaired infants.  We must, of 
course, manage to hold both material and existential levels, with the exploration of the 
unconscious meanings of impairment forming a central area of concern.  It is in this realm, I 
believe, that the aspects of disablism that most resist and retard change, are to be found.     
 
The body, ideology and surgery 
As health sciences advance, and the intersection of medical procedures with the dictates of a 
social world of narcissistic strivings and capital interests deepens, a range of surgical 
procedures aimed at "normalising" congenitally different children have arisen.  Surgeries such 
as limb-lengthening (for achondroplasic children), gender assignations (for children with a 
range of intersex conditions), and cranio-facial procedures (for cleft lip and palate conditions), 
are now increasingly available to children and parents (Miller, 2006, p. 212).  These are 
procedures which are not performed out of medical necessity, such as the saving or 
prolonging of life.  Instead, these interventions are undertaken for purely aesthetic reasons, 
aiming to shape a child's body into one which appears less different, or "less disabled" (ibid.).  
Thus, we are confronted with situations in which it is "body-ideology" alone – the prevalence 
of intolerance toward those with unusual bodies – that must be considered in weighing up the 
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 thorny question of whether or not to opt for surgery.  The hope for many parents is that 
medical intervention, leading to a more "normal" appearance, will facilitate better 
psychosocial adjustment in their child.  Yet, the slippery and subjective nature of these 
concerns, rooted so frequently in inaccessible, intra-psychic realms, means that it is often 
difficult for all involved to ascertain precisely whose needs are at stake.  To recall a theme of 
the previous section, there is evidence to suggest that visible bodily "abnormalities" as well as 
sensory or intellectual impairments within infants and children, may disrupt the process of 
attachment, and offset the likelihood of full and fulfilling familial relationships (Asch, 2006; 
Burlingham, 1961; Fisman & Wolf, 1991; A. Freud, 1952; Lussier, 1960, 1980; Sinason, 
1992; Watermeyer, 2002; Wright, 1991).  With particular reference to the current discussion, 
studies involving children with cleft palate, cleft lip, or other cranio-facial differences, have 
demonstrated a reduced level of parental play, touch, and smiling interaction with their 
children, as compared with control parents of nondisabled offspring (Rogers-Salyer et al., 
1987; Walters, 1997; both cited in Asch, 2006, p. 238).  "Marked and troubling" differences 
were noted in maternal responses towards infants with cranio-facial deformities, leading to the 
conclusion that these mothers, on the whole, were not as "comfortable", involved with", or 
"bonded to" their babies as the control mothers (Asch, 2006, p. 240).  In a six-year study 
involving in excess of 1200 Israeli families of children with atypical bodies, Weiss (1994) 
found that four-fifths of parents overtly rejected their children, isolating them from the family, 
or abandoning them altogether (Weiss, 1994 cited in Asch, 2006, p. 238).  Adrienne Asch's 
(1989; 2001; 2006) position on research such as this seems fluctuant.  In the later publication 
just cited, she gives substantial credence and relevance to research which shows up parental-
relational distortions arising from bodily anomalies.  Earlier, however, we find her position in 
a publication co-authored with Ferguson to be one which tends to reject such work, as a 
destructive, pathologising sleight on struggling parents.  Ferguson and Asch (1989, p. 115) 
critically categorise this area of familial research as tending to endorse some combination of 
stereotypes, such as the idea that parents shelter children from the world, parents deny, 
pretending that nothing is wrong, or parents seek ways to "fix" or minimise the bodily 
difference.  Ferguson (Ferguson & Asch, 1989, p. 114) remains infuriated by research 
paradigms which are suspicious of the pathogenic motivations of struggling parents.  He 
writes:  
As a father, I do not love my son in spite of his handicaps, as some abstracted, 
idealised version of reality.  The object of my affection is the flesh and blood Ian 
whom I dress every day, put in a wheelchair, and struggle to talk to in words he 
can understand.  Disability complicates the relationship but does not necessarily 
damage it.   
     (Ferguson & Asch, 1989, p. 114) 
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Operations such as limb-lengthening surgery and cosmetic interventions to reshape the 
genitals of persons with intersex conditions, are typically "intrusive, painful, time-consuming, 
emotionally wrenching, minimally helpful in improving the body's functionality ... and 
expensive" (Kittay, 2006, p. 90).  In the case of genital surgery, the intervention is regarded as 
creating "only a crude simulacrum of normalcy" (Frank, 2006, p. 80), and may in fact impede 
function (Kittay, 2006, p. 90).  Limb-lengthening surgery, aimed at (partially) "normalising" 
achondroplasic bodies, is a notoriously long-term and harshly invasive procedure.  Sanford 
(2006, p. 29) tells of having her first operation of many at eleven years of age, beginning a six 
year process of surgery, which would result in her gaining eleven inches of height, and a more 
normatively proportioned body.  In addition to these effects, she also sustained surgical 
complications leading to bilateral tears in her tibialis tendons, and no less than sixty scars 
(ibid.).  After finalising the agonised decision to undertake the intervention, Sanford (2006, p. 
34) experienced the immediate onset of excruciating pain, which was to be chronic for much 
of the duration of the treatment.  In addition, her legs were suddenly severely weakened, 
leading, with painful irony, to the onset of a period of substantial physical impairment (ibid.).  
She writes: 
 
After being subconsciously aware of the world's practical preferences for people 
of average size, I was now acquainted with its intolerance for the nonambulatory.   
       (Sanford, 2006, p. 34) 
 
The tone of Sanford's (2006) very candid and thoughtful account tells of the intervention as a 
process which subtly under-valued the richness of her identity, reducing her to someone 
unable to feel whole without a "normate" body.  She endured immense pain, remaining 
uncertain, in various respects, whether the benefits of the surgery had outweighed its personal 
costs.  In the case of intersex conditions, the decision to undertake genital surgery is often 
made by parents and doctors before the child concerned is old enough to be consulted (Frank, 
2006, p. 79).  As noted above, the intervention typically creates only cosmetically "normal" 
structures, thus creating a situation in which individuals remain marginalised from the society 
of "normal genitalia", yet have been surgically alienated from their own, familiar body 
(Frank, 2006, p. 80).   
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Considering psychological aspects and implications of limb-lengthening, Sanford (2006, p. 
29) warns that parental decisions to implement the surgery in order to ameliorate the effects of 
bodily difference upon their child's self-identity, are "dangerous".  She implies a scenario in 
which the intervention becomes framed as a panacea, which draws the child away from the 
development of his or her own intrinsic identity, thus leaving him or her "ill-equipped to face 
the challenges posed both by the procedures and by the rest of her life" (Sanford, 2006, p. 29).  
Efforts should, instead, be directed toward developing a strong, internal sense of self-identity, 
groundedness and entitlement within such a child, whether or not surgery is later opted for 
(ibid.).  In some cases, professionals may advocate surgery to reduce maladjustment within 
parent-child relationships based upon the child's "deformed" appearance (Asch, 2006, p. 240).  
Surgery, in these instances, may form a deeply harmful, concrete realisation of unconscious 
fantasies regarding unacceptability within the child, thus inflicting damage upon the very self-
worth it was intended to foster (ibid.).  Across a range of "cosmetic" interventions, it is likely 
that surgery will often unwittingly undermine a child's capacity to trust in his or her being 
loved and lovable (ibid.).  The implications of this, within a self already chronically subjected 
to the projections and denigrations of a world preoccupied with "surfaces", are potentially 
deeply hurtful.   
 
In an earlier discussion, the proposition that ego functioning is, via the distortion of the "body 
ego", necessarily warped by the presence of bodily "disfigurement", was problematised and 
disputed.  One position on this debate holds that, notwithstanding the disgust or disquiet 
which, for example, an intersex condition may evoke in family members or the broader 
community, the child concerned has only ever had a single – and hence normative – 
experience of embodiedness.  To the child, thus, it is any other experience of bodily shape or 
function which would be felt subjectively as "unnatural".  The intention here is not in any way 
to "deny" the reality of difference, but merely to show up the origins of subjective 
differentness as a social accomplishment.  Lussier (1980) was, it seems, taught this by his 
patient Peter.  His conclusion: 
The body one cathects from birth on, as it is and as it is perceived by the child, 
not the body as it could or should be, is what matters psychologically.  Any child 
is destined to invest, to cathect the body he has, as it is, which will soon become 
a basic part of who he is and this is the body that the mother has to acknowledge, 
to incorporate, to fuse with, in order to grant it psychological existence for the 
child, a safe, secure, existence.  Mental health grows on this soil.  
      (Lussier, 1980, p. 181)   
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The anxiety and aversion instinctively felt by some adults towards "malformed" children may 
obscure the realisation that changing a child's body, especially in the early years of cognitive 
development, will alter the most basic patterning of familiarity in experience; that is, sensory 
experience of the body (Asch, 2006, p. 241).  Young children may be bewildered, frightened 
or confused by the unexpected change in shape or appearance, with the assault on bodily 
integrity rendering unconscious fantasies of punishment or sadism.  In Peter, an older child, 
Lussier (1980, p. 180) detected what he understood as castration anxiety arising from the 
threat of surgery to fit him with prosthetic arms, thus "mutilating" the body he had known 
since birth.  In a world where "normalcy" is unquestioningly assumed to be desired, virtually 
above all else and by all, the recognition of normalising surgery as a castrating attack on the 
integrity of embodiment provides an important counterpoint.  This is particularly true 
considering the familiar association of impairment (especially of sight) with castration in 
psychoanalytic work (Watermeyer, 2002).  Lussier's (1980) insights direct us to look toward 
medical and cultural demands for the normalisation of impaired bodies for the origins of 
fantasies of castration, rather than in the intrinsic experience of those bodies by the 
individuals concerned.  The critique of narcissistic culture, and its henchman, neoliberal "for-
profit" medicine (Smart, 2003), implied by this recognition is glaring and considerable 
(Smart, 2003 cited in Frank, 2006, p. 70).   
 
Turning to a more specific examination of the ways in which decisions surrounding elective 
cosmetic surgery for congenital malformations are made, we return to the account of Sanford 
(2006).  She tells of her parents suggesting limb-lengthening surgery to her at age ten.  Her 
response was that she was "not interested", expressing the feeling that there was little point in 
changing who she was.  However, extended family members, teachers and acquaintances – all 
of "normal stature – quickly became very enthusiastic, describing the development as "a great 
opportunity" (ibid., p. 30).  Sanford describes how she felt that her achondroplasia could not 
be cured, as it was not a disease; to "cure" her of it thus, would be to "remove all physical 
evidence of an enormous piece of my identity..." (ibid., p. 33-4).  As we have seen, she later 
changed her mind.  Besides the voluble persuasions of friends and family, the authoritative 
manner and degree of scrupulousness with which surgical "possibilities" are presented by 
health professionals, is of immense influence (Mouradian (2006, p. 133; Engel, 1993).  As 
practitioners traditionally – philosophically – preoccupied with "cure", physicians may be 
personally animated or overly impressed with the emergence of new technologies or 
techniques, fostering medical encounters where the "correction" of difference is assumed as a 
universal priority (Morris, 2006, p. 11).  The incremental flowering of subjective meaning 
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surrounding being born "different" may not be conceived of in such interactions; nor the 
potential of surgery to invalidate these aspects of self (ibid.).  Instead, when a difference is 
"diagnosed" as "severe", the question is typically not "should something be fixed?" but "when 
should it be fixed?" (Aspinall, 2006, p. 15 – my emphasis).  As discussed earlier, surgeons are 
trained to "perform" interventions, not, lamentably, to reflect upon the psychosocial 
implications of the operations they perform (Marsh, 2006, p. 122).  Across a host of 
"disability interventions", including surgery, occupational – and physiotherapy, prosthetics, 
psychotherapy, the use of assistive aids, drugs, and much else, children are routinely subjected 
to life-shaping decisions made by well-meaning parents and professionals, who do not consult 
them (French, 1994a, p. 110).  Many disabled adults look back on the loss of childhoods spent 
in relentless hours of (at times militaristically applied) activities such as physiotherapy, to the 
detriment of healthy and fulfilling social and scholastic development (e.g. Oliver, 1996, p. 
107).  The promise of (even partial) cure assists in the management of personal anxieties 
evoked by "disfigurement" or "incapacity", with a seductive attraction which is difficult to 
resist.  The case of intersex-related surgery is one littered with incidences of adults who have 
grown up unaware that, as children, their genitals were surgically altered.  In many cases such 
individuals were never informed of their congenital condition at all, with accounts describing 
young lives imbued with a haunting, indefinable sense of difference.  Later, perhaps upon the 
advent of first sexual activity, these persons would discover that their reproductive organs 
were vastly different to those of others, and begin, often with rage, horror and immense pain, 
to piece together the story of how parents had "chosen" their biological form and gender 
identity (Frank, 2006, p. 79).  Parents, despite these later recriminations, undoubtedly act in 
what they believe to be their child's best interests.  Yet, what is demonstrated is the daunting 
complexity of the combination of intra-psychic responses, malignant cultural imperatives, the 
confusing directives of professionals, and the simple hope that their child may grow into a 
happy and well-adjusted person.  As argued previously, parents in such circumstances 
urgently need the support of accepting and non-directive psychological care, in order to sift 
through the multi-layered meanings and anxieties confronting them.  Abelow Hedley (2006) 
describes her quandary: 
 
I am a mother see-sawing between the nagging desire to alleviate some of my 
daughter's difference, to feel we are doing something – and the strong belief that 
I have to protect my daughter against those marauding, seductive, and 
unattainable notions of normalcy.   
      (Abelow Hedley, 2006, p. 44) 
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Bioethical dilemmas such as this position parents squarely in the crucible where bodies meet 
culture; where subjectivity and embodiment are imaginatively sculpted by the invisible, yet 
exacting dictates of a culture masquerading as "human nature".  Before them is the impossible 
task of deciding whether to bow to broader society's inability to re-own its indiscriminate 
disavowals, or to somehow find sufficient trust that their child will withstand the relentless 
torrent of unwanted abjection ascribed to him or her.  Tugging parents towards the former is a 
cultural phenomenon that exists all around us; the unspoken, yet palpable hegemonic sense 
that differentness is self-evidently intolerable, that we all just want it to stop.  And that the 
impossibility of a fulfilling life for those with unusual bodies is an intrinsic, constitutional 
reality, rather than a regrettable cultural accomplishment.  Asch (2006, p. 228) urges, in 
response, that all surgical procedures which alter appearance be delayed until children are old 
enough to participate meaningfully in decision-making.  She believes that such a course of 
action models to children the morality that "character, not outward form, is what ought to 
count" (ibid., p. 237).  Sanford (2006) articulates the conundrum at the heart of a parent's 
predicament: 
 
...the lines are so blurry, where cosmetic meets psychosocial meets medical 
necessity...she would bloody well get the very message I know we must never 
send:  we love you, you're perfect the way you are...now change.   
     (Sanford, 2006, p. 46 – my emphasis) 
 
Guilt 
The association of disablement with guilt – within disabled individuals, as well as "in the air" 
wherever images and ideas of disability prevail – is a familiar one in cultural as well as 
psychodynamic accounts of impairment.  Lane (1992, p. 11) describes how American mothers 
reliably experience "inexplicable guilt" upon discovering that they have given birth to a deaf 
infant.  The origins, implications and "relational exchanges" of this guilt are complex.  A 
persistent cultural belief, at times associated with religious doctrine, holds that illness or 
disablement is a punishment for moral laxity (Lane, 1992, p. 11; Avery, 1999; Barnes & 
Mercer, 2005b; Sontag, 1997).  We considered earlier how, within the unconscious 
metanarrative of cultural symbols, bodily impairment often recalls anxiety-ridden notions of 
"loss of control".  There is, of course, a logic to this, as the "crippled" image defeats our 
cherished, much-needed belief that our bodily destiny is controllable.  The flipside of this 
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routine, defended position is the implication that, when bodily function begins to "fail", it 
must be due to our own action; or, inaction (Murphy, 1987, p. 51).  As in any experience of 
trauma, it is often (unconsciously, psychically) "easier" to accept blame for, say, the birth of a 
child with a congenital impairment, than to entertain the fearsome alternative that events in 
the world –  including malevolent ones – are essentially random and beyond our control 
(Turnbull & Summers, 1987, p. 289; Sontag, 1997).  Returning to Lane (1992, p. 12), he 
muses that finding a self-blaming reason why one's child was born deaf may not only restore a 
sense of "cosmic" control, but also carries the critical, justifying means whereby deaf persons 
in broader society are ostracised and poorly treated.  That is, this logic provides a mechanism 
for "blaming" impaired persons for their "predicament", in a manner which deflects guilt over 
palpable social inequalities.   
 
MacKeith (1973, p. 134) – a psychoanalytic family researcher of the ilk much maligned by 
disability studies – asserts that guilt within parents relating to "causing" or "being responsible 
for" infantile impairment, exists in a complex tension with guilt arising from feelings of 
hostility or revulsion towards their infant (see also Klein, 1948, p. 26).  It is not difficult to see 
how this could be so; morally intolerable feelings of aggressive aversion transform into forced 
motivations to care, via reaction formation which carries the unspoken knowledge that the 
parent "brought this upon herself".  At this point, though, it also seems fair to acknowledge 
that Ferguson's (2001) protestation that any and all parental behaviours in such situations may 
be reframed as unconscious signs of pathology, is, indeed, an important ethical and empirical 
concern.  As was argued previously, however, the unspoken assumption, perhaps shared by 
parents and practitioners, that feelings of antipathy toward an infant are unnatural, perverse or 
blameworthy, is a misapprehension.  Furthermore, it is an assumption located at the core of 
the sexist denigration of women, mothering, and the work of motherhood, which afflicts many 
societies, and perpetuates forces of guilt and culpability which distort parental relating 
everywhere.  The too-often inadmissible conflicts faced by parents in such situations are 
demonstrated, sadly, by the fact that impaired children are reliably at higher risk for acts of 
violence and abuse (e.g. Friedrich & Boriskin, 1976).  In my view, the point here is in no way 
accusatory of parents; it is very much the contrary.  Such parents, as argued above, are in 
urgent need of support, acceptance, and the opportunity to process and understand the 
complex, often frightening, feelings evoked within them by the arrival of their infant.  Yet, in 
an ironic twist of "political correctness" which, by now, should be not unfamiliar, Ferguson 
(2001) and others, in their attempt to defend parents against the persecutory pathologisation of 
the medical model, may instead impart the imperative to a collective code of silence.  It 
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should be noted that it is not simply the more "florid" of negative feelings towards an 
impaired new-born which, in broad contemporary culture – as well as the disability studies 
consensus – are likely to evoke guilt within parents.  Many parents may subjectively view the 
common-sensically "normative" responses of loss, disappointment and grief as unacceptable 
signs of their "bad parenting", or, simply, their bad-ness.  The critique of Ferguson (2001) and 
others will, it seems, only add to the incipient guilt here.  The experience of a subtle 
awareness, perhaps only discernible via unconscious expressions, of a sense of growing up as 
a "disappointment" or a "trouble" to one's parents, is highly familiar within the disabled 
community.  Surely, it is the lack of the opportunity for entitled, normalising recognition of 
such feelings within parents which is at the root of the inadvertent projection which locates 
them within disabled "selves".  Whilst, after Ferguson (2001) we recognise that all parent-
child relationships are unique, and in some sense sacred, clearly it is not heresy to assert that 
the overwhelming majority of adults would not – in advance – choose the stress, anxiety, 
uncertainty, emotional pain, and physical work that may accompany the rearing of a disabled 
child.  Of course, the emotional landscape is vastly different when regarding real-life, ongoing 
relationships between individuals; that is, real parents, and their equally real "already born" 
disabled children.   
 
Guilt which remains unprocessed, or "un-understood" by parents may give rise to subtle 
forces which distort relationships, notably with regard to the development of healthy, robust 
psychic boundaries (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008).  In social systems surrounding impaired 
persons, the prevalence (conscious or otherwise) of feelings of "survivor guilt" over the 
perceived lack of functionality of "the disabled" is elemental (Sinason, 1992, p. 43; 1989).  In 
Sinason's (1992) view, this guilt may cause an avoidance of the recognition of difference, due 
to the painfulness of the "damage" which is at (subjective) the heart of this difference.  She 
provides the example of a residential setting for intellectually impaired persons, where the 
"guilt" of a care worker at not being impaired, becomes enacted as a collusory identification 
with the omnipotent self of a disabled resident.  Some variant of this scenario must pertain in 
parental relationships influenced by suppressed guilt, impacting upon separation – a process 
which, at the best of times, is thorny and emotionally taxing for all concerned.  As shall be 
argued later (Disability and the distortion of personal and psychic boundaries, p.260), the 
ambivalence engendered by guilt  may set the tone for a life, within a broader social world 
steeped in similar disability-related evocations, of confused and confusing relational 
boundaries.  Robert Murphy (1987, p. 92), from his own experience, remarks thus:    
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Indeed, a mutuality of guilt is the very life-stuff of the paralytic's family, just as 
it is, on a smaller scale, central to the cohesion – and turmoil – of all modern 
families. 
      (Murphy, 1987, p. 92)  
 
Sinason (1992, p. 43) construes the "loss" at the heart of the guilt of the other as a real 
representation of lived difference; an inequality which denotes the painful experience of the 
"afflicted".  In other words, the issue for her surrounds our inability to bear looking upon 
actual suffering, rather than a difficulty with the fantasies we carry about those viewed as 
impaired.  This position, in my view, represents a slight regression to the "modernist" trap of 
social model orthodoxy; that is, construing "impairment" as an uncontested, "presocial" 
reality.  Of course, it is not my intention to use this observation as a further means of "denial" 
of impairment-related struggle, but instead to focus attention on the centrality of fantasy in 
such interactions.  It is the unconscious evocations surrounding the idea of, say, intellectual 
impairment, which are at play in the intersubjective field.  This recognition is important, as it 
forms an essential stepping stone toward the principle of the self-definition of experience by 
disabled persons.  The fact that the archaically-informed "imaginings" of the observer may 
coincide with aspects of the disabled individual's self-defined experience, is merely the result 
of (culturally informed) coincidence.  As has been noted, it is the defining of subjective 
experience from without which is at the heart of all forms of human oppression.  Thus, it is 
essential that fantasies – perhaps guilt-ridden – surrounding "what it's like" to have an 
impairment, are explored, re-owned, understood, and withdrawn from the intersubjective 
arena, thus allowing the space for the self-definition of "disabled subjectivity".  The deeply 
charged, highly identified and diverse unconscious investments we all have in the "destiny" of 
our disabled imago, ensures that the pull toward wordlessly – thoughtlessly – "deciding" what 
disabled life is like, is virtually irresistable.  We need to empty our minds, as a human society, 
in order to begin to "hear" the experience of those we see as carrying such disquieting 
difference; in order to allow ourselves to be astonished, and to learn.   
 
The assumption that "to be disabled is to suffer", renders, ironically, a pressure upon disabled 
persons to display signs of pleasure, in order to "rescue" the observer from the clutches of his 
or her ominous fantasies.  Sinason (1992) relates the words of the mother of a multiply 
impaired son:   
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I try to keep him happy...Because I brought him into the world with all of his 
difficulties, so if I can't keep him happy what is the point? 
       (Sinason, 1992, p. 141) 
 
Here, the guilt-ridden struggles of a mother enter the intersubjective field as imperatives for 
her son to appear "happy".  He is, it seems, made consciously or unconsciously responsible 
for protecting his mother from her internal culpability – and perhaps guilt over feelings of 
antipathy – regarding him and his impaired body.  One finding of Drotar et al (1975, p. 714) – 
another "pathologising", yet not valueless study – was that a substantial proportion of 
maternal relationships with a disabled child remained "fraught with anxieties which caused 
some mothers to establish what they described as 'closer than normal' relationships with their 
children".  The allegation that this observation is "pathologising" will no doubt be heard, and 
probably has some substance.  But at our peril do we ignore the very real fact of situational 
stressors, discrimination, and impairment-related anxieties in such relationships which, surely, 
must have visible effects upon the negotiation of separation.  To eschew this recognition, as 
some disability studies critics would have us do, is to position parental relationships involving 
a disabled child outside of the realm of family mental health concerns toward which 
professionals are obligated to maintain awareness and sensitivity.  The question of relational 
boundaries, intimately interwoven with dynamics of guilt within familial socialisation, as well 
as the "real world" of socially created dependency emanating from a barrier-ridden living 
environment, must assume centre stage in an assessment of the social sculpting of disabled 
subjectivity.   
 
Thus, parents, family members and others may instinctually feel guilt because, in fantasy at 
least, they can do, share in, enjoy, perform or otherwise have access to things of which the 
disabled individual is denied.  They may, too, feel guilt arising from split-off, culturally 
inadmissible feelings of anger or resentment at the ways in which the disability impacts upon 
them, including both practical and emotional levels.  The malignant effects of sibling selves 
unconsciously forged upon "survivor" identity, manifesting in obsessive, reparative, or self-
punitive excesses, equally deserve our attention.  Conversely, the disabled individual may feel 
guilt over being burdensome and in need of assistance, requiring the occupying of a stilted 
role which is constantly grateful and beholden to others.  Or, guilt because he or she does not 
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"sufficiently" feel these things, but is in fact at times overcome with resentment and anger 
over the palpable reality of unnecessary and avoidable systematic exclusion from social 
processes.  In the lives of disabled persons occupying modern society, unfairness – that is, the 
experience of being needlessly, unjustly and hurtfully excluded – is a constant, axiomatic 
reality.  The need to be adequately "grateful" for the assistance, or mere toleration, one 
receives, very often reduces the capacity of disabled individuals to honestly and assertively 
express more "negative" feelings.  The protection of others from the rage, hurt or frustration 
of exclusion becomes a deeply socialised habit which is hard to break, recreating patterns of 
enmeshed, "un-real" relating, which militate measurably against the development of an 
articulate and entitled disability movement (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008; Watermeyer, 2009).  
In short, be it in the family, the school, the workplace or the community at large, disability is 
a hothouse for the distortions, silences, repressions and manipulations engendered by guilt.  
The implication here is not one of typecasting, but rather the stimulation of a rigorous 
investigation of the very real ways in which the "disability complex" may hijack love, 
kindness and tenderness, in a manner which fosters the chronicity of anxiety-ridden internal 
splits in all, and the distortion of relationships and socialisation.  
 
Some sense of the inevitable process of internal meaning-making which accompanies 
experiences of deprivation and othering is provided by the late Mairian Corker (1994), as she 
describes how the world responded to her deafness.  She demonstrates, I believe, that contrary 
to materialist orthodoxy, such experiences necessarily take up some form of residence 
internally, shaping selfhood in – probably – predominantly unconscious ways.  She writes: 
 
To stand a chance of furthering myself I was told that I had to be prepared to 
climb the precipice, suffer the cuts and bruises to my sense of humanity in 
silence and cope with my broken ears.  Only then could I attain the prize 
awaiting me at the top.  I dutifully climbed, feeling hollow inside, and was 
hurt...I realised that I was being offered the stick without the ice-cream “for my 
own good” (Miller, 1987).  The precipice became a different kind of symbol.  It 
meant that I became my broken ears and that there was nothing in between.  The 
chasm which had opened up between who I thought I was and who I actually 
was, was of such enormity that my roots had become shrouded in the mists of the 
past.  I had, in effect, lost myself.    
       (Corker, 1994, p. xvi) 
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The heady, bewildering and toxic brew of deprivation, guilt, duty, atonement, repression, 
stoicism and imputed shame described by Corker (1994) is surely not exceptional (see also 
Hogan, 1999).  At the heart of such accounts is often to be found the intolerable, threatening 
unconscious fantasy that one is, by one's very birth, a cause of pain to others, a 
disappointment, a trouble; someone who brings distress and sadness, not joy, energy and 
hope.  Again, this assertion does not stereotype or simplistically blame families; such a 
suggestion is borne of a poor understanding of the psychoanalytic model.  The pernicious 
force of the repressive silences surrounding disability in families lies not so much in their 
"content" (although this is also important), as in the shroud of silence in which these are 
clothed.  It is in the very act of repression, of silencing, that disability-fantasies and 
evocations are rendered, for all practical purposes, "reality" in the intersubjective arena, with 
no possibility of the honest exploration within which such imagery may be disconfirmed.  The 
fantasy of being "unwanted" (or "conditionally wanted") for example, exists, without 
question, in all children.  What the snares of disability fantasies and silences provide for is the 
fuelling of such dark suspicions via, inter alia, the enforced cultural disavowal of normative 
parental ambivalence surrounding disabled children.  It is in the "disallowing" that such 
fantasies find ready purchase and traction, at times fostering their lifelong enactment.   
 
Within the psychoanalytic model of selfhood, it is the incest taboo – Oedipal impulses – 
which form the unconscious template for guilt, inadmissible motivations, and the fear of 
punishment.  Murphy (1987, p. 93) regards the "transmutation" of impairment into guilt as a 
"neat inversion of the Freudian Oedipal drama".  In other words, here, within the world of 
primary process, the "castration" – the "punishment" of a "damaged" body – is the already-
accrued wages of a prior sin; the sin of desire for the disallowed.  Oedipus, after unknowingly 
killing his father and wedding his mother, blinds himself as punishment.  The literary-
symbolic and psychoanalytic resonance of blinding with castration is well established (e.g. 
Watermeyer, 2002).  It is significant that, in an act of the brutal self-recognition of 
undeserving and prohibition, Oedipus blinds himself, providing the resonant notion of an 
association between impairment and the deep internalisation of authoritarian disentitlements; 
prohibitions probably borne of unspoken familial projections and well maintained by the 
constant stream of evidence from an excluding society that one "does not belong", and 
certainly, "does not deserve".  It is often forgotten, as Murphy (1987, p. 94) points out, that 
Oedipus' father, after being informed by a soothsayer that his son would one day murder him, 
"crippled" the young Oedipus as punishment.  Murphy (1987, p. 94) provides ethnographic 
evidence of the broader incidence of this further association of "crippling" – as well as 
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"blinding" – as an appropriate punishment for incest.  In closing our discussion, Murphy 
(1987), never short of a startling, even daring assertion, concludes: 
 
Incest, or even the unconscious wish for it, is a dangerous game, and I would 
hazard the guess that the unconscious, diffuse sense of guilt that so often 
bedevils the disabled arises in the first place from the chimerical notion that the 
crippling is a punishment for this repressed, elusive, and forbidden desire.  There 
may be no such thing as Original Sin, but original guilt lurks in the dark recesses 
of the minds of all humans.  These ashes of our first love are the basic stuff of 
the indefinable, unarticulated, and haunting sense that the visitation of paralysis 
is a form of atonement – a Draconian penance.   
       (Murphy, 1987, p. 94) 
    
Identity politics and the movement 
One highly significant area in which the constructions of self and other of disabled persons 
play out is that of efforts directed at the mobilising of a politicised group affiliation, for the 
purposes of united advocacy.  Gains in this project have been, at best, variable; although the 
disability lobby has become a relatively visible and vocal one in a range of nations, few would 
disagree that a large proportion, probably a comfortable majority, of the world's disabled 
population either is not aware of the politics of disability, or chooses not to self-identify as a 
member of the movement.  In what is to follow, we shall examine possible reasons for this, 
and make a critical assessment of the strategies of minority politics which the movement has 
embarked upon, with a view to identifying the strengths and pitfalls of these.  Finally, we will 
chart future terrain, in terms of the re-conceptualisation of disabled "groupness", and the 
contribution which the "awkward" identity of disability has to make to the philosophy of 
identity politics.   
 
Watson (2002, p. 509) describes the key distinction between "essentialist" and 
"constructionist" approaches to identity within the social sciences.  As we have seen, the 
former provides for "natural" or "intrinsic" meanings to an identity, arising from shared social 
experience, shared origins, or shared physical nature.  This orientation is familiar in one area 
of feminist theory, which aims to promote the notion of a female subject, and hence a female 
identity, as the bedrock of its politics (ibid.).  Much disability studies writing, aiming to 
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develop group identification and solidarity within the disabled community, does so by taking 
such an "essentialising" position.  The latter constructionist view denies the "real" existence of 
any identity based upon shared, truly "held" characteristics.  Instead, identities are regarded as 
constructs which only find shape and meaning through binary relationships with their 
opposites; these illusory "identities" are thus not fixed, but temporally shifting, and composed 
of multiple superimpositions (ibid.).  In this paradigmatic world the idea of "female" as a free-
standing, self-circumscribing identity is unfeasible; "femaleness" only finds meaning in 
opposition to the multiple ways in which we construct "maleness" (ibid., p. 510).  The 
propagation of, for example, a "disabled" identity would be regarded here as a self-defeating 
illusion, serving only to shore up the very categorical assumptions which are at the heart of 
disablist oppression.   
 
The dilemma for the disability movement, though, is a thorny one.  Presenting a "united front" 
in advocacy battles for equitable inclusion dictates the need for a relatively essentialist model, 
which, whilst helpful in the mustering of political sway, inevitably masks the very substantial 
diversity of experiences and struggles within the group (Priestley, 1998, p. 85).  Conversely, 
an approach which aims to respect the uniqueness of individual experiences of impairment as 
well as oppression, inevitably dilutes the impact of a political drive for the addressing of 
collective needs (ibid.).  Prominent social model theorists, such as Colin Barnes (e.g. Barnes, 
1998) and Mike Oliver (e.g. Oliver, 1990) have, over the course of many years, expressed a 
deep concern that constructionist approaches reduce the substantive, material effects of 
disablism to the ephemeral level of thought processes (Priestley, 1998, p. 87).  Thomson 
(1997b, p. 22) has reasoned that the essentialist view is, notwithstanding its reifying 
difficulties, a necessary stage in the marshalling of a cohesive disabled minority.  Whilst the 
constructionist logic is powerful in its capacity to deconstruct, and hence destigmatise, 
categorical stereotypes such as those surrounding race, gender or disability, in doing so it 
works to erase the very categories which social scientists claim as significant markers of 
disadvantage (ibid.).  Thus, in freeing, say, disabled individuals from the "narrative of 
essential inadequacy", the approach simultaneously risks "denying the particularity of their 
experiences" (ibid., p. 23).  It is for this reason that the position of a "strategic essentialism" 
(as described earlier – see The vanishing – and reappearing – body, p.50) is advocated 
(Thomson, 1997a, p. 283).  This conundrum, though, may provide initial clues as to why the 
garnering of support and self-identification amongst the disabled community has been a 
sluggish and hesitant business.  Many disabled persons, in terms of group identity, seemingly 
find themselves between a rock and a hard place.   
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A range of factors militate against the successful shaping of the disabled community into a 
cohesive political sector.  Members of other marginalised minorities, such as racial or ethnic 
groupings, often share geographical, linguistic, occupational, cultural or religious 
associations, laying essential groundwork for the process of political conscientisation (Scotch, 
1988, p. 159).  The disabled community, by stark contrast, has a history of the most severe 
forms of social and political isolation, with the majority of individuals growing up in families 
as the single disabled member.  What this means is that, for those not subjected to the even 
greater material constrictions of institutional settings, most will live out entire lives 
surrounded almost exclusively by nondisabled persons (ibid.).  It is noteworthy, as the 
movement seeks political allies, that this isolation is an experience closely mirrored within 
minority sexual orientation groups (Samuels, 2003, p. 234).  Throughout the world, disabled 
persons are over-represented amongst the most impoverished, the poorly educated, and the 
unemployed – that is, those whose voices are heard most seldom within neoliberal society 
(ibid.).  The "social construction", thus, of disability as a secluded, profoundly individual 
experience, is a hegemonic reality to most, deeply socialised within disabled subjectivity.  But 
beyond this, even those disabled people shown the opportunity for political mobilisation often 
eschew this route, baulking at the movement's requirement that they "self-identify" as 
disabled.  Charlton (1998, p. 78) reasons that we should not be at all surprised by the fact that 
oppressed people of all kinds do not typically choose to identify with their oppressed status, 
since "all the signposts in their lives point them away from this kind of consciousness".  Who 
would choose to overtly adopt an identity which had been, and remained, the fulcrum of one's 
spurning by society?  A central effect of disablism upon the individual is the imputation of the 
conditioned shame of inferiority which, logically, implies a "survival" response of 
disidentification with the contaminated disabled identity.  For individuals who are faced with 
often overwhelming odds in the fight for a liveable existence, the "inviting" of victimisation 
which such an identification may imply, may seem absurd.  In many parts of the world, the 
"disabled community" exists only in the imagination of a handful of activists; there is no 
history, no identifiable "culture", and a constituency which is geographically scattered, and 
often hard to reach (ibid., p. 79).  Exclusion from education, as well as community 
concealment, are massive obstacles to the development of a "web of affiliations" (ibid.) 
between disabled persons, with variations in impairment further obscuring the key 
commonality, which is discrimination on the basis of bodily difference.  Davids (1996, p. 
221) states the situation bluntly, as it pertains analogously to race:  "...no one wants to be 
black, because to be black is to take on unwanted, desperate, and terrifying aspects of the 
white self".   
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As I have discovered as a disability researcher, it is common for disabled persons to assume a 
position which is critical, disliking, or avoidant of others with impairments (Low, 1996, p. 
244).  Self-descriptions may be given in a form which is overtly distancing, such as prefacing 
remarks with the qualifier that one is "unusual", or "not like other disabled people", who may 
be "too dependent", or "malingering" (ibid.).  Such "blending in" positions surely must 
obstruct the development of a united, articulate voice describing the inequalities disabled 
people suffer.  Lane (1992, p. 88) observes simply that colonised people tend to seek to fit the 
categories stipulated by their colonisers, as social subjugation has become internalised.  
Tragically, feelings of hostility or rage, thereafter, are directed at one another, rather than at 
the oppressive majority (ibid.; Glover, 2006).  The "pride" so essential in the forging of a 
minority front, is "no easy thing to come by", as disability has been "soaked in shame, dressed 
in silence, rooted in isolation" (Clare, 1991 cited in Sandahl, 2003, p. 44).     
 
The challenge of presenting the disabled community as a grouping which possesses real, 
relevant commonality, is not to be underestimated; the category is, at best, an unstable one 
(Davis, 2002, p. 23).  Social oppression, writes Susan Wendell (1997, p. 260), may well be 
the only thing that disabled people have in common.  Whatever the commonality, what is 
certain is that it will exist in constant tension with extreme diversity, in experiential, political 
and physiological terms (Vernon & Swain, 2002, p. 78).  Convincingly making the case that a 
category which contains this level of diversity – from attention deficit disorder to diabetes, 
obesity to facial scarring, achondroplasia to chronic fatigue syndrome – actually has an 
internal, essential coherence, is all but impossible (Davis, 2002, p. 24).  The disdainful 
resistance of social model proponents to the exploration of diversified, "situated" knowledge 
of disability – that is, of its more personal and experiential layers – is rooted in the fact that it 
was just such investigations which led to the "de-massifying" of the feminist movement, 
ending the era of unified hegemony (Thomas, 1999a, p. 102).  Such authors fear – and quite 
justifiably – that a too-close examination of disabled lives will show up more difference than 
commonality, dangerously setting back the development of united demands.  Like women, 
disabled people are certainly "not all the same".  But, as we have seen, the alternative of an 
"arid" and depersonalised materialism imposes a silence and orthodoxy from within, which 
confounds developing self-awareness, entitlement, and personal integration.  The need to 
defend an "essentialist" disabled category in opposition to a (equally essentialist) 
"nondisabled" category carries a host of contradictions (Tregaskis, 2004, p. 4).  To name but 
one, we return to Zola's (1988) timeous and wise observation that the universal nature of 
ageing forms an inescapable – even desirable – link between these two "groups" (Zola, 1988 
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cited in Williams, 2001, p. 139).  Yet, if disabled people are an identifiable "minority group", 
it is indeed a peculiar minority that putatively includes all of us – if not now, then at some 
time not too distant (Williams, 2001, p. 139).   
 
It is again the voice of Tom Shakespeare (2006, p. 80) which provides the clearest critique of 
social modelist attempts at forging disabled solidarity.  He writes: 
 
A strong political identity, which should be a means to an end, has become an 
end in itself. Rather than looking outward, the disability movement has often 
turned inwards. Rather than building bridges with other groups or seeking the 
integration of its members within society, the vanguard of the disability 
movement has often been separatist, promoting a notion of 'us' disabled people 
against 'them' non-disabled oppressors. (Holdsworth, 1993; Branfield, 1998; 
1999).  [We must]...offer an alternative to the prison of identity politics, which 
leads to the politics of victimhood and the celebration of failure. 
      (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 80, 82) 
 
Shakespeare's (2006) position is characteristically provocative, providing a welcome foil to 
the at times repressive directives of the social modelist vanguard.  Yet, I believe that he 
underestimates the gravity of the predicament so eloquently outlined earlier by Thomson 
(1997b).  Conscientisation and the validation and acknowledgment which emanates from 
group solidarity – from a recognition of shared struggle – both appear as equally crucial 
elements in the emancipation of minds and lives.  The identification of similarity, and the 
experience of accurate, empathic mirroring of subjectivity are indispensable ingredients in the 
fostering of the self-acknowledgement and psychic integration which are at the heart of 
individual, and thence political, change (Finlay & Lyons, 1998, p. 39).  Swain and French 
(2000, p. 569) present what they term an "affirmative model" of disability; they describe their 
model thus:  
It is essentially a non-tragic view of disability and impairment which 
encompasses positive social identities, both individual and collective, for 
disabled people grounded in the benefits of life style and life experience of being 
impaired and disabled.    
      (Swain & French, 2000, p. 569) 
Swain and French's (2000) "solution" to the stereotyping denigration of disabled persons is 
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the fashioning of an alternative "positive" image of disabled life, presumably in the hope of 
attracting the identification of disabled persons, as well as debunking destructive myths.  The 
difficulty with such an approach lies in the fact that, like so much of disability movement 
"orthodoxy", it seeks to overturn an oppressive binary by colluding with it.  Such attempts at 
"social engineering" risk replacing demeaning imputations with stoic imperatives, leaving the 
disabled community, as well as society as a whole, no closer to an integration of the authentic, 
nuanced voices of the silenced.  What emerges is a drama of conflicting stereotypes, or 
politically motivated phantasms, potentially tugging already battered individuals still further 
from personal "existential truths".  Those taking an "anti-essentialist", or social 
constructionist, view, meanwhile implore all to "undermine" the perceived voracity of 
concepts such as disability and impairment, showing these up as "empty and constructed" 
(Corker, 1999 cited in Watson, 2002, p. 510).  A compromise view, which makes provision 
for the existence of a self, albeit one composed of multiple and changing layers, is proposed 
by Charles Taylor (Taylor, 1989).  This "self" is shaped and modified as we continually locate 
ourselves (primarily unconsciously) in social narratives; narratives which are typically not of 
our own making (Somers, 1994 cited in Watson, 2002, p. 511).  This concept of self, 
embedded in what Taylor (1989, p. 36) terms "webs of interlocution", has the capacity to re-
introduce ontology into the – by now – bleak terrain of sociological thought; not least, that 
concerned with disability.  Representations of being, rather than an epistemology concerned 
only with action and materiality, are now brought into view, allowing self and identity to be 
both existential and political, with the body at centre stage (Somers, 1994 cited in Watson, 
2002, p. 511-12; Taylor, 1989).  The "disabled self" is here not restricted to definition in 
terms of impairment ("medical"), in terms of oppression ("political"), or in terms of a 
subjective account of ontology; as binaries are dissolved, all are included.  The process of 
openly integrating previously disparate, or devalued, aspects of ontology for disabled persons 
has been compared to the "coming out" process described by gay and lesbian people (Swain 
& Cameron, 1999, p. 68; McRuer, 2003; Samuels, 2003).  Swain and Cameron (1999, p. 68) 
define this process as "a declaration of identity outside the norm, or 'against the stream'", 
which demonstrates the integration of difference into a healthy self-concept.  This model 
seems helpful and appropriate, as long as it does not become reified into constrictive 
orthodoxy, or appropriated as a symbol of self-congratulatory multiculturalism, which is held 
up in denial of persistent inequality (McRuer, 2003, p. 97).   
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Nancy Fraser (1995; 2000) incisively observes that political groupings in search of 
recognition – that is, aiming to galvanise identity and solidarity – may in so doing unwittingly 
"marginalise, eclipse and displace" the drive for redistributive justice (Fraser, 2000, p. 108).  
The political routes undertaken by minorities such as the disability movement, she argues, 
often do not serve to "promote respectful interaction within increasingly multicultural 
contexts", but instead tend to "drastically simplify and reify group identities" (ibid.).  What is 
created in this melee of othering and counter-othering is a culture of separatism, intolerance 
and chauvinism, which ironically recalls the very patriarchal and authoritarian styles of 
engagement which the movement originally set out to topple.  To Margaret Somers (1994), 
the new categories spawned by minority interest "create a new shade of universalism that 
contains its own inevitable exclusions" (Somers, 1994 cited in Thomas, 1999a, p. 103).  
Fraser (2000, p. 108) refers to this untoward state of affairs as the "problem of reification", 
which results from "the politics of recognition" inadvertently displacing the "politics of 
redistribution".  Social model theorists, apt to their orientation, certainly set out with the clear 
priority of material redistribution, but viewed the route to this end as requiring the adoption of 
"recognition" strategies in the cultivation of groupness.  The result, in the words of critics 
such as Shakespeare (2006), has been the pitfalls of group reification delineated above.  In 
response to the impasse described by Fraser, some have chosen to abdicate from identity 
politics or cultural struggle altogether, viewing the enterprise as doomed to a perpetual and 
conflictual clamouring for legitimacy (ibid.).   
 
Fraser (2000, p. 108-9) does not advocate the wholesale abandonment of identity politics, nor 
does she assert that "recognition struggle" is always destructive.  Some approaches to the 
garnering of recognition are less pernicious, and represent attempts at emancipatory action 
surrounding injustices not amenable to redistributive remedies alone (Fraser, 1995, p. 69).  If 
"properly conceived", says Fraser (2000, p. 109), struggles for recognition can aid the 
redistribution of material resources and power, and "can promote interaction and cooperation 
across gulfs of difference".  But these outcomes are contingent on the careful rethinking of 
recognition strategies, in order that the snares of reification and displacement are avoided.  It 
would appear that, certainly within the orthodox, materialist "centre" of the disability studies 
academy, the mode of seeking – or demanding – recognition, is one which stridently reifies 
not only disabled, but also nondisabled "groupness".  In my view, the key reason for this 
divisiveness is the misguided, depersonalising resistance of the social model vanguard to the 
integration of more human, lived accounts of disabled struggle, carefully oriented to forge 
bonds of human commonality between the erstwhile deeply (conceptually) alienated 
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"disabled" and "nondisabled" constituencies.  In Fraser's (2000, p. 109) view, what is required 
is an account of recognition sufficiently flexible to accommodate complex, layered identities, 
rather than the enforcement of prescriptive values on in – and out-group members (see also 
Bickenbach, 2001, p. 565).  A thematic underpinning of the current work holds that the route 
to the integration of disabled subjectivity into the shared jumble of the human condition, is via 
the construction of bridges of commonality which surround suffering.  Disabled persons, as 
argued earlier, do not "suffer" from the existential trials of "disability issues"; rather, these 
individuals are exposed and subjected to a more direct experience of the universal strains of 
shame, guilt and abjection that compose the unconscious template of the human condition.   
 
Tracing the outlines of these experiences, whilst retaining a clear and rigorous analysis of the 
social origins of disadvantage, may serve to re-present disabled lives as not only "normal" and 
"human", but, in fact, well placed to throw precious light on those areas of human experience 
which modernity has so plainly sought to conceal.  Of course, it is not my intention to idealise 
this scenario; narcissistic culture is not simply going to "fade away" – probably quite the 
contrary.  Yet, it is my belief that it is crucial that we invest in human, personal 
conscientisation, and the development of insight into the nature and origins of internal, yet 
social, struggle.  It is this exploratory, rather than adversarial, attitude which will lead towards 
the flowering of a clearer voice less disrupted by internalised ambivalences, guilts and 
shames, and will grow the movement in the direction of burgeoning human commonality. It is 
precisely within this niche of need that psychoanalysis must be readmitted into the disability 
fold, harnessing its unique capacity for the tracing of links between ideology, socialisation, 
and subjectivity.  This moment offers much to psychoanalysis as a discipline, embodying an 
opportunity to develop more solid, persuasive theoretical foundations which interweave 
political economy with psychological functioning.  From a very "non-psychoanalytic" frame 
of reference, Fraser (1995) outlines the task for which I believe psychoanalysis is well 
equipped: 
 
...we should see ourselves as presented with a new intellectual and practical task:  
That of developing a critical theory of recognition, one which identifies and 
defends only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be 
coherently combined with the social politics of equality...how to conceptualise 
cultural recognition and social equality in forms that support rather than 
undermine one another.   
       (Fraser, 1995, p. 69) 
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Drawing on Hegel, Axel Honneth (1995, p. 14) envisions a "post" identity politics society, in 
which ethical cohesion and human solidarity are not found in the clamouring of an ever-
increasing welter of minorities, but in the principle of the recognition of the individual 
freedom of all citizens.  This is an imagined society which embarks from a "framework of 
ethical bonds", rather than the "acts of isolated subjects" (ibid.).  Honneth (1995) paints the 
vision as follows: 
 
As he [Hegel] puts it, the 'existence of difference' is what allows ethical life to 
move beyond its natural initial state and, in a series of rectifications of destroyed 
equilibria, ultimately leads to a unity of the universal and the particular...For 
only if the world-historical course of the 'budding of ethical life' can be 
conceived of as an interpenetration of socialisation and individuation can one 
assume that the organic coherence of the resulting form of society lies in the 
intersubjective recognition of the particularity of all individuals.   
       (Honneth, 1995, p. 15) 
 
Surely it is the theoretical "stewardship" of psychoanalysis which is best placed to explore, 
document, and facilitate such an "interpenetration".  The "healthy" form of political 
recognition advocated by Fraser (2000, p. 113) is, rather analogously, one based upon the 
principle of social status.  In other words, what requires "recognition", and our shared human 
investment, is not "group-specific identity", but the status of individual members of all groups 
as "full partners in social interaction" (ibid.).  Misrecognition, within this schema – and most 
importantly – does not imply a defamation of group identity; instead, it points to a universal 
experience of social subordination, or the experience of being "prevented from participating 
as a peer in social life" (ibid., p. 113).  It is within this realm, this direction, that the 
commonality of human experience is to be discovered.   
 
Contrary to the earnest, identity-reifying efforts of the social model vanguard, Davis (2001; 
2002) recommends that the disability lobby embrace its existence as a porous, contingent and 
shifting category (2001, p. 536).  The destabilising threat to the "minority identity 
community" posed by the "woolliness" of disability is, for Davis, evidenced by the 
conspicuous reluctance of other minority lobbies to form links with the disability movement.  
In some sense, disability risks "spoiling" the contrived neatness of minority categories of 
victim and perpetrator, through showing up the built-in self-destructiveness of identity politics 
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(ibid.).  The growthful direction ahead for the disability movement, to Davis (2001, p. 537), is 
not aiming to increasingly join the ranks of the burgeoning number of marginalised identity 
groups, but instead to use its unique position to drive a critique of identity studies, and 
identity politics, as a whole.  The dream of "inclusiveness" for this growing mass of minority 
interests is, to society, a forlorn one, since the list will always and inevitably grow longer, 
leading finally to the meaninglessness of particular identities (ibid., p. 537).  As "alterity" 
becomes increasingly subsumed under the rubric of "identity", surely identity must become 
ever-more meaningless, becoming "so broad a category that it cannot contain identity" (ibid.).  
As "identity politics" comes increasingly to explain everything, it will tend ultimately to 
explain nothing (ibid.; see also Thomson, 1997c).  Simultaneously, the "identity endeavour" 
tacitly endorses the unquestioned "ideal" of white middle class roles; the perpetuation of the 
hegemony of liberal principles, and the dream of a modernist utopia.   
 
The notion of group identity has, perhaps surprisingly, remained the single area not assailed 
by the deconstructive intents of postmodernism (Davis, 2002, p. 12).  No-one has dared to 
launch such an attack upon the sanctity of one's existence as, say, black, lesbian, or a woman 
(ibid.).  Now enter disability, the identity par excellence which invites such critique; a critique 
which will begin to reframe the notion of identity, as its contagion spreads and erodes the 
orthodoxy which is at the heart of the social affliction of separatism.  Disability may thus 
become the identity which ultimately links all other identities, and replaces postmodernism 
with what Davis (2002, p. 14) calls "dismodernism".  It is the very instability of the disability 
category upon which it must capitalise, through recognising that it is this character which will 
allow disability to transcend the pitfalls and shortcomings of mainstream identity politics 
(Davis, 2002, p. 23).  The instability of disability, then, becomes viewed as a subset of the 
instability of identity as a whole; it is this recognition which ushers in the "dismodern" era 
(Davis, 2001, p. 25).  It is the exclusivity of the "traditional" identity model which contains 
the roots of its own demise, via the paradox of ongoing proliferation of clamouring identity 
groups (ibid., p. 26).  With profound irony, it is the very "problem" of the category of 
disability being too large, too indistinct, which directs attention toward the corresponding 
reality with regard to identity more generally (ibid., p. 26).  Here is an identity able to 
confound – to baffle – convention by holding out a hand to humanity, saying "all are 
welcome", or, perhaps more correctly, "all are here".  An intriguing, even provocative 
synergy exists here between Davis' critique of the pull to an ultimately vacuous identity, and 
the Lacanian view of identity as an escape from intrinsic fragmentation.  The "manic 
optimism" placed in identity – that our inner fragments are in fact coherent, and able to be 
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bound into an authentic integrity (Frosh, 2006, p. 185) – seems analogous to the proliferation 
of identity politics, and equally (self-destructively) avoidant of the fearsome uncertainties 
which the recognition of commonality may hold.  If we are, indeed, "the same", then what is it 
that inheres in our "sameness", our "humanness"?  Of course, for Lacan, the answer to this 
question is by its very nature unthinkable; yet, by contrast, I believe there may be cause for 
optimism.  In the knowledge of truly shared struggle, there is immense potential for the 
identification and positive mirroring which engenders real inclusivity.    
 
To close this discussion, Davis (2002) captures the spirit of these daring times: 
 
The universal subject of postmodernism may be pierced and narrative-resistant 
but that subject was still whole, independent, unified, self-making and capable.  
The dismodern era ushers in the concept that difference is what all of us have in 
common.  That identity is not fixed but malleable...That dependence, not 
individual independence, is the rule...The watchword of dismodernism could be:  
Form follows dysfunction.   
     (Davis, 2002, p. 26 – my emphasis) 
 
Psycho-emotional aspects of disability 
The key assertion, around which much of the current work revolves, is the proposition that the 
disability studies movement, under the "auspices" of social modelist thought, is severely 
impoverished by its lack of any substantive theory of the psychological.  The materialist 
orthodoxy of the movement is preoccupied with the public world, and baulks visibly at the 
self-evidently truthful suggestion that disability and disablism have a private, internal and 
emotional narrative.  Take, for example, Gill's (2001) observation of the prominence of 
psychological struggle in disablist oppression, drawing on French (1993a) and Zola (1982):   
 
One does not venture far into an exploration of the disability experience before 
noticing that isolation, invisibility, tension, and struggle are recurring topics 
whenever and however disabled persons are asked about their lives. 
      (Gill, 2001, p. 351)  
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In its neglect of these realities, the social model approach has, I believe, tacitly endorsed the 
concealment of pain, illness, emotional struggle, shame, and every other aspect of subjective 
experience not plainly reducible to the materiality of "disabling barriers".  In this way its 
approach is painfully resonant with the silencing of disability-related struggle which is a 
hallmark of the social predicament of impaired persons in modern society.  Wendell (1997) 
describes this "social silence" as follows: 
 
Coming into the public world with illness, pain or a de-valued body, we 
encounter resistance to mixing the two worlds; the split is vividly revealed.  
Much of our experience goes underground, because there is no socially 
acceptable way of expressing it and having our physical and psychological 
experience acknowledged and shared.   
      (Wendell, 1997, p. 266-7) 
  
In beginning to describe the multi-faceted silencing of disabled subjectivity, I introduce the 
concept of "emotional oppression".  Through the enforced "repression" of disabled experience 
within and outside of the disability movement, the stifling of voices in the "real" world may 
imply a corresponding imperative to the smothering of self in the internal realm.  As we shall 
see, the socialisation of disabled persons is routinely steeped in imperatives towards the 
silencing of "disability-related experience", of which an anxious world, racked with 
projections, is typically deeply apprehensive.  The slippery question, if we are to  begin to 
conceptualize the intricacies of embodied, impaired subjectivity in a disablist world, is where 
this ongoing social silencing meets the internal, where "individual" psychoanalysis meets 
ideology; where socialisation meets subjectivity.  A theoretical framework for thinking about 
the internal, psychological nature of contextual and embodied disablement is surely essential, 
if we are to begin to understand disability and disablism not as simple, structural "entities", 
which operate on "dumb", homogenous persons, but as dynamic processes within which 
subjectivities undergo formation, interpellation, resistance, and probably much else.   
 
Whilst the "traditional" social modelist aversion to any analysis of the psychological has been 
clear and vociferous, a small number of authors operating from this materialist paradigm have 
sought to integrate some sense of the psychological into their model.  Most notable of these is 
Carol Thomas (Thomas, 1999a; 2002a), who includes her construct of "psycho-emotional 
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aspects of disablism" within her "extended" social model view (Thomas, 1999a, p. 46).  She 
defines this "psycho-emotional" layer of oppression as follows: 
 
...other dimensions of socially imposed restrictions...those which operate to 
shape personal identity, subjectivity, or the landscapes of our interior worlds and 
work along psychological and emotional pathways...not only a concern for 'what 
we do' and 'how we act' (are prevented from doing and acting) as disabled 
people, but also a concern for 'who we are' (are prevented from being), and how 
we feel and think about ourselves.   
      (Thomas, 1999a, p. 46) 
 
Quite correctly, Thomas (1999b, p. 48; 1999a) argues that such "personal" aspects of 
disability should not be viewed as the "natural" consequences of impairment, or as "private 
troubles" of disability which do not carry political relevance.  Two examples which she 
provides of these aspects of oppression include spending most of one's time at home because 
one feels ashamed of a facial disfigurement, or not disclosing one's epilepsy to a boyfriend or 
girlfriend due to the fear of a hostile or rejecting response (ibid.).  As discussed earlier (see 
Prohibiting the personal, p.42), Thomas views such struggles as "mixed in" with impairment 
effects, which may, as well, have psycho-emotional implications (ibid.).  These aspects 
combine in her "social relational definition of disability" (Thomas, 1999a, p. 156), which 
seeks to incorporate something of the intersubjective, emotional forces operating upon the 
disabled individual, while still holding firm to the structuralist  "core" of the social model.  
Following Thomas (1999a; 2002a), Reeve (2002; 2006) aims to operationalise these 
developments in studies which focus explicitly on "psycho-emotional" phenomena.  Her 
approach (Reeve, 2002, p. 498) to these dimensions of oppression is one which begins from a 
Foucaultian position, preoccupied with the "gaze" and "surveillance" which disabled persons 
suffer, presumably from within and without.  The intention to examine and theorise 
psychological experience spearheaded by Thomas (1999a; 1999b; 2002a) is highly 
commendable, and represents a significant break from social modelist orthodoxy.  But the 
undertaking simply lacks the basic conceptual instruments with which to begin to theorise 
observed phenomena (e.g. Reeve, 2002; Veck, 2002); in order to embark upon a 
psychological analysis, one requires the application of psychological constructs.  These, 
seemingly, are either unavailable to these authors, or located beyond reach by virtue of 
ideological contamination.  In describing, in approving tones, Thomas' (1999a) approach, 
Colin Barnes and others (Barnes et al., 2002a, p. 10) refer to her focus on "practices that 
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undermine the psychological and emotional well-being of people with impairments".  What is 
noticeable about this description, is how it expressly locates the subject of study as wholly 
"external" to the individual; that is, as something which "comes in from outside".  Now, 
whilst no-one would deny that "oppression" is something which (at least initially) "comes in" 
from the social world, what requires conceptual space and attention is the personal, 
psychological effects of such factors.  That is, we require a theory which sets out to construct 
a model of psychological personhood in the face of disablism; one which has the courage to 
examine disabled subjectivity in a manner which does not eschew the internalisation of a 
distorted and distorting social world.   
 
Analyses such as those of Reeve (2002) and Veck (2002) create a conceptual structure which 
leads us to the individual, but then stops short, consequently constructing the internal worlds 
of disabled persons as homogenous, with no personal narrative, no conscious and unconscious 
(Marks, 1999b, p. 611) meaning-making, and no temporality.  As a result, these accounts 
present as shallow, blandly ideological and lopsided, with no model of function within the 
individual able to "hold up" the argument.  Instead, Foucaultian "passives" are created, 
faceless individuals trapped in ideology and discourse, who are unable to bring resonant life 
to the lived, internal and intersubjective reality of embodied and contextual disability.  
Disability studies writers are, to some extent, understandably concerned about the danger of 
psychological pathologisation, which theorises internal realities in a manner which de-
emphasises oppressive social origins.  Yet, the result is inherently partial and unsatisfactory; 
Goodley & Lawthom's (2006b) edited volume on "psychology and disability" is a clear case 
in point.   
 
Veck's (2002) contribution concerns the experiences of a visibly physically disabled mature 
student, Ray.  The author's stated aim is "connecting relational and psychological processes of 
exclusion"; but again, the psychological is largely absent.  Ray's behaviour is regarded by 
university staff as difficult; the author calls for a need to "understand" psychological 
responses, but seems reluctant to apply psychological concepts.  The crux of this reluctance, I 
believe, relates to the "danger" of a recognition that Ray may, indeed, present to the world as 
a "difficult" person.  Further, and perhaps more provocatively, that interpersonal difficulties 
surrounding Ray are not reducible to prejudiced responses in that moment, but also relate to 
the nature of his socialisation, and relational dynamics of which he is a part.  If anyone is 
surprised that lives of relentless denigration, senseless exclusion, distorted socialisation and 
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countless forms of discrimination shape and affect personalities, possibly in maladjusted 
ways; well, I am not.  What the authors cited above fail to recognise is that it is in the nature 
of subjectivity, of personality, of complicity, that a crucial swathe of the sequelae of social 
abuse is to be found.  We need to get to close grips with Ray's "difficultness", trusting, as per 
a critical application of the psychoanalytic model, that sufficiently layered internal 
exploration will reveal quite clearly the "sense" in his behaviour, including unconscious 
communications, self-destructive enactments, repetitions, double-binds, disturbed introjects, 
and the like.  The key to this new direction of study is that these psychological phenomena 
are, at every stage, explicitly connected to aspects of the social world; to socialisation, 
identity, discrimination, and every other part of society's responses to the impaired body.  In 
this respect, such analyses will differ qualitatively from the "traditional" body of 
psychoanalytic research critiqued earlier.  The reactionary representation of disabled persons 
as a homogenous group of hapless, well-intentioned, misunderstood, necessarily "good" 
people carries, for me, sinister resonances of paternalistically idealising racial stereotypes.  
Getting to the heart of complex subjectivities, conversely, means getting to the heart of 
oppressive social forces, be they structural, symbolic or interpersonal.  The route thence is one 
which manages to develop psychological concepts which, whilst individual in nature, are 
expressly linked to the mechanisms of ideology operating via socialisation; from the family, 
to the school, to the society at large.   
 
Shakespeare (2006, p. 57) argues that Thomas' (1999a) position is "fatally flawed", as it fails 
to re-orient the disability-impairment binary, instead remaining locked into a perspective 
which is unable to comprehend the "socio-cultural experience of impairment".  Paterson and 
Hughes' (1999, p. 602) unrelated theoretical contribution attempts to address precisely this 
difficulty, with the notion of the "dysappearing body"; here, the invisibility of the normatively 
functioning body, due to factors such as discomfort, pain and disease is disrupted, and the 
body instead becomes "unceasingly present in experience, albeit in an alien and dysfunctional 
manner".  This concept aims to locate the experience of impairment as something which is 
"heavily culturally loaded", and shaped by socialisation (ibid. 603).  The specific, heightened 
consciousness of one's body as it "dys-appears" in the context of dysfunctional interfaces with 
the material and social world, is a consciousness imbued with meaning, with culture.   
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Returning to Shakespeare's (2006) critique, in his reading of Thomas (1999a) he sees no 
conceptual provision for the ill-effects of illness and impairment upon psycho-emotional well-
being (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 36).  I concur with Shakespeare (2006, p. 55) as he proposes the 
adoption of a model which views disability as always being an interaction between individual 
and structural factors.  The challenge before the disability studies discipline, and a central 
concern of this work, is how to begin to theorise this interaction in a manner which is 
rigorous, critical, nuanced and emancipatory.  Paul Hoggett (1992) has, at great length, 
theorised the importance of engagement, arguing that authentic relating to the world, and to 
self, is only possible if we are able and willing to acknowledge our limitations and 
disappointments.  It is this capacity to allow for recognition of confusion, darkness, and a lack 
of knowing, which is the great strength of psychoanalysis.   
 
Taking this fragment of psychoanalytic "wisdom", I now, over the course of the following 
three sections, briefly examine topics relevant to the development of a contextual psychology 
of disablist oppression, beginning with the oft-quoted but very poorly developed concept of 
"internalised oppression".   
 
Internalised oppression 
For what is being suggested is that the real persuasive power of the social 
environment, its most enticing hold over our lives, resides not in what it 
explicitly says to us, but in the way it enters unbidden and unnoticed into the 
foundations stones of our psychic structure.    
       (Frosh, 1991, p. 2) 
 
Stephen Frosh (1991) here locates the influence of unconscious internalisations as primary in 
channelizing how we "choose" to live our lives.  It is the refractory "code" of the lenses 
through which self and other are perceived which carries ideological capital, and produces a 
world in which oppressive distortions may present as self-evident, natural truths.  In his 
international research involving disability activists, Coleridge (1993, p. 212) arrived at the 
truly startling finding that, for the overwhelming majority of his respondents, social change 
was first and foremost contingent upon disabled persons achieving some form of 
emancipatory internal transformation.  This finding is particularly remarkable – even 
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refreshing – given the broad global influence of the materialist view, and reflects a clear 
recognition of the taut, constrictive hold which internalised disablist assumptions have upon 
the world's impaired community.  Within the disability arena, the concept remains sadly 
under-utilised and poorly developed, having initially emerged in theoretical approaches to the 
study of race.  Consider the words of assassinated anti-apartheid activist and black 
consciousness writer Steve Biko (1978):   
 
At the heart of this kind of thinking is the realisation by blacks that the most 
potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.  If one 
is free at heart, no man-made chains can bind one to servitude, but if one's mind 
is so manipulated and controlled by the oppressor as to make the oppressed 
believe that he is a liability to the white man, then there will be nothing the 
oppressed can do to scare his powerful masters.   
      (Biko, 1978, p. 92) 
 
Like Coleridge's (1993) respondents, Biko (1978) urges that we recognise that attending to the 
structures and materiality of oppression, whilst imperative, is not sufficient to dislodge the 
stubborn disease of racism.  As argued earlier, prejudices surrounding race or other identity 
markers remain continually invigorated through the personal meanings with which they are 
cathected, creating a potentially infinite, energetic drama of individual archaic repetitions 
played out upon the societal – the global – stage.   
 
For Frantz Fanon (Fanon, 1952; 1963), the political occupation of colonialism embodied a 
horrific, vicious enactment of the deeper, psychic invasion of black minds by the worm of 
self-hatred.  "Colonialism", he wrote, "forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the 
question constantly:  'In reality, who am I ?'" (Fanon, 1963, p. 203 – my emphasis).  The 
familiar experience of the contaminating force of projective identification – that is, a creeping 
uncertainty as to what is and is not me – is clearly in evidence here.  To escape this, Fanon 
argued that political and inner liberation must necessarily go hand in hand; the black man or 
woman must wage war on personal and social levels, always aware that these arenas are in no 
way interdependent (Fanon, 1952, p. 13; Davids, 1996, p. 205).   
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The central tenets of Fanon's (1952) argument, are the following:  through life under 
colonialism, the black individual comes to internalise the black-white political relation as part 
of his or her inner world.  Yet, at an unconscious level, he or she identifies strongly with 
whiteness – that is, with all that is valued and aspired to within a racist regime.  The "black 
self" is thus rendered an unwanted outsider (Davids, 1996, p. 214).  Fanon (1952) expresses 
this bitter truth thus: 
 
However painful it may be for me to accept this conclusion, I am obliged to state 
it:  For the black man [sic.] there is only one destiny.  And it is white. 
      (Fanon, 1952, p. 12) 
 
Disabled persons, as we have seen, live lives steeped in cultural and symbolic messaging 
which fervently values the "whole", "well", "perfectly proportioned" and "functional" body, to 
the silent, shaming denigration of all else.  The de-legitimation of difference, through subtle 
cultural as well as overt, medicalising or "rehabilitative" mechanisms, direct the impaired 
body exclusively and inexorably toward the only hope of partial salvation; a closer 
approximation of the shape and ways of being of the "nondisabled" body.  Like Fanon's black 
subject, the disabled individual's incipient selfhood grows in a world bathed in division; or, 
more clearly, in exclusion, in which the experience is one of being "shut out", and being 
required to strive for qualification – via normalcy – to be "let in".  Figures of identification – 
from comic strip heroes to television personalities, sporting stars to film and fashion icons – 
all come with "nondisabled-ness" as "part of the package" (Davids, 1996, p. 226), giving rise 
to the unconscious belief that the internal ideal is not the embodied, disabled self, but a 
nondisabled "prior" or "truer" self.  Conversely, the gaping lack is that of an experience of 
accurate, validating mirroring of the embodied, existential self; an authentic, nuanced 
experience of being valuable which facilitates the opening and integrating of rejected swathes 
of the internal world, with the concomitant uncovering of the ideological traps which obscure 
the ingestion of toxins of self-loathing.  Instead, all that is "good", all that is desirable, 
"normal", and something a child wants to be part of – a game, a school, a social group, a 
sports team, a bodily ideal; all that is aspired to in the labile, heady processes of self-
formation, exists at the opposite pole of a closely guarded binary.  The racialised picture, 
according to Davids (1996, p. 226) is further rigidified if the black individual is allowed some 
limited participation in "white" activities and the "white world".  This leads to other blacks – 
those who cannot participate at all – being denigrated as the bearers of "true" inferiority – the 
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internal split has become enacted, as self-hatred is lived as hatred of others who are like the 
disavowed self.  The familiar, dissociating attitude of some disabled persons (see Identity 
politics and the movement, p.191) is very resonant here, recalling phrases such as "I don't see 
myself as disabled".  Similarly routine is the experience of feeling complimented if 
nondisabled "others" forget that one has an impairment.  The ubiquitous devaluing of disabled 
persons thus, via internal channels, manifests in the destructive closure, separatism and hostile 
attempts at positive distinctiveness which are characteristic of all demeaned out-groups.   
 
Lane (1992, p. 32) sees "profound commonalities" between the cultural oppression inflicted 
upon colonised peoples, and that suffered by deaf communities.  He quotes psychiatric 
accounts of the "nature" and "personality" of the "deaf individual", which include 
"superstitiousness, paranoid symptomatology, impulsiveness" and "aggressiveness" (ibid., p. 
33).  These descriptions present as eerily reminiscent of colonial accounts of racist 
essentialism, pointing to the need for the institutional and professional "management" of 
"primitive tendencies".  In an analogous fashion, Sandra Lee Bartky (Bartky, 1990) traces the 
relationship between androcentric narcissism, alienation, and the internalisation of shame in 
the oppression of women.   
 
Marks (1999a, p. 24) asserts that the development of the concept of internalised oppression is 
essential if we are to better understand the relationship between the social exclusion and 
denigration of disabled people, and the experience of psychological difficulties – with the 
latter, as noted above, representing a particularly politically sensitive area.  Shakespeare 
(2006, p. 62) shrugs off all shreds of this constrictive orthodoxy, in stating that since disabled 
people are affected by physiological, psychological and external problems, any theory which 
chooses to address only the external is patently "an incomplete response to the challenge of 
disability".  In my own view, the theoretical construction of internalised oppression as 
pertaining to disability should begin, as with Fanon's (1952) work, with the internal splits and 
consequent projections which emanate from immersion in a world of social divisions.  The 
internalisation of self-denigration, simultaneous to identification with the nondisabled ideal, 
fosters unconscious collusion with relations of subordination, and the obscuring of avoidable 
injustices.  Until such internalisations, and the experiences of trauma with which they 
originally became unconsciously cemented, are consciously digested, there is little hope of 
escape from the clutches of repetitious relational enactments, serving only to recapitulate the 
legitimacy of the status quo.  It seems self-evident that the object constellations internalised 
 210
by many disabled persons carry the seeds of unconscious, self-sabotaging repetition.  A 
cursory examination of the distorted relational systems in which perhaps the majority of 
disabled persons undergo psychological development should verify this – from the guilt – and 
anxiety-ridden unconscious currents of families in distress to the controls and exclusions of 
forced rehabilitation, from the denigrating responses of schoolmates to the pathologising 
imputations of well-meaning parental figures, from the perplexing exile of special schooling 
to the confusion of a ubiquitous, yet unspoken shared shame, from the anxieties of parents 
regarding one's finding a mate, to the sinister institutional discourse of "realistic 
expectations"; the list is probably endless.  In such worlds, evidence of the splitting 
engendered by the existential conflicts which exposure to disability evokes is literally 
everywhere, making the avoidance of complicity extraordinarily difficult, especially in the 
absence of alternative views proffered by credible authoritative figures.  The business of 
"finding" the contradictions inherent in disablist self-oppression is an intricate, thorny and 
lifelong task, which involves somehow extricating oneself from systems of meaning which 
often surpass hegemony (Shuttleworth, 2001, p. 85).  Zola (1994, p. 65) identifies incisively 
that a critical feature of oppression is not only the loss of voice, but of "the tools to find it" 
(my emphasis).  Discovering what has been lost, in terms of selfhood, is typically a slow and 
an arduous process (ibid.).  Micheline Mason (Rieser & Mason, 1990) expresses with raw 
clarity what she began to discover through the unpacking of her socialised sense of self: 
 
A message clearly and firmly slipped into my unconscious saying that people 
would prefer it if I died...I am now 30 years old.  Only now am I beginning to 
realise that I do not have to smile all the time, and that I can achieve mediocrity 
without feeling someone will come along and 'put me out of my misery'.   
   (Rieser & Mason, 1990 cited in Sinason, 1992, p. 143) 
 
The scale and nature of distorted and abusive social worlds inhabited by disabled persons 
must point us toward an analysis of defence mechanisms employed in the business of psychic 
survival (Marks, 1999b, p. 614).  Such defensive strategies, or, put another way, the repetition 
of archaic object constellations, may take the form of excessive dependency and compliance, 
self-pity or self-hatred, hostility and entitlement, colluding with social denialism, persistent 
blaming of self or other, and the like.  Of course, it is utterly fundamental that such 
"behaviours" not simply be "interpreted" as defensive manoeuvres in a decontextualised way; 
our analysis must vigorously point toward social origins at every stage, beginning from the 
(psychoanalytic) premise that behaviour is inherently "sensible" and communicative.  
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Drawing on Marx, Charlton (1998, p. 35) describes the process of the internalisation of 
oppression as twofold.  First is the capacity of the dominant social class to instil its values 
within the broader mass of the population, through methods such as "double-speak", 
misdirection" (or victim-blaming), "naturalised inferiority" and "legitimated authority" (ibid., 
pp. 35-6).  These aspects together are termed hegemony.  The second arm of oppression is the 
psychological suffering and devastation inflicted upon, in this case, disabled individuals.  This 
active demeaning creates stagnant self-pity or self-annihilation, but more crucially, makes 
awareness of oneself, one's peers, and one's needs measurably more difficult. This Charlton 
terms alienation (ibid.).  It is this constriction of self-awareness, often wrought through the 
necessity of employing the rigid defences required to survive extremes of deprivation and 
mistreatment, which is the fulcrum of the chronic subordination of disabled persons.  It is this 
recognition which, in my view, locates the materialist aversion to internal inquiry as most 
dangerous.  The estrangement of disabled individuals from one another, precluded by the 
alienation which denigration brings, disallows identification and the growth of solidarity.   
 
Against the backdrop of the medicalisation of society, disabled persons may grow to project 
damage and defect into "dysfunctional" parts of the body, or the imperfect body as a whole.  
At the heart of the medical model is a logic which states that, for disabled people, the "source" 
or "cause", of difficulty, struggle and distress lies in the nature of the body.  Thus, it is the 
misshapen limbs, the poorly functioning eyes, the inarticulate speech centres, the inert 
muscles, which are the "problem", the rude intrusion which inherently precludes an equitable 
life.  Biomedicine teaches the dissection of the body into discrete, Cartesian functional 
systems, clearly circumscribing those which are an insult, an impingement and a nuisance to 
the dignity of normalcy.  Cultural messaging interfaces crisply, communicating that "of 
course" no-one would want a body part like this.  The "damaged" part, consequently, may 
become alienated from or "disowned" by the individual, and increasingly the location of 
projected psychic conflicts of all sorts.  Focus on the impairment as the exclusive "problem", 
thus carries a twofold function in the chronicity of subordination.  First, it deflects attention 
from the societal origins of disadvantage; and second, as noted by Charlton (1998) above, it 
provides a defensive pretext which tends to militate against the self-awareness which 
emanates from an examination of the authentic, internal concomitants of struggle.  In this way 
the internal rootedness of oppression remains obscured, and cultural accountability 
correspondingly obviated.  Coleman (1997, p. 225) observes that "stigmatised individuals 
sometimes blame their difficulties on the stigmatised trait, rather than confronting the root of 
their personal difficulties"; which, very often, will be of substantially socio-cultural origin.  
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Again, the oppressive fostering of splitting here is dangerous and profound, rendering such 
identity struggles as those of individuals sufficiently disidentified with their rejected body to 
regard themselves as "nondisabled inside".  There is no pathologisation implicit here; what 
must be confronted is the grave reality of struggle for individuals "occupying" a body that 
society, and consequently self, has come to hate.  Michalko (2002, p. 64) reflects upon his 
blindness in such a vein, recognising in retrospect how he had experienced his impairment not 
as part of himself, but as an intrusion upon, or a disruption of, his "true" being (see also 
Wilson, 2003, p. 29).  He warns of the destructive effects of ever-present constructions of 
disablement as a difference to be "prevented", rather than "lived-in" (ibid., p. 103).  Ussher 
(1989) has presented a comparable analysis of the ways in which oppressive gender constructs 
conspire to evoke splits within the growing female subject.  The adolescent girl separates self 
from body, the pregnant woman splits sexuality from motherhood, the archetypes of 
motherhood and menopausal redundancy threaten and deride the unique expression of self; 
everywhere are harsh dictates which derail individuation (Ussher, 1989 cited in Erskine & 
Judd, 1994, p. 2).  Disabled persons, similarly, are required to successfully occupy a world of 
irreconcilable dissonances between ideals and experience.  The tone is set, in such lives of 
ongoing persecution, for the resultant persecutory objects to be projected into parts of the 
body, the society, or the self, thus drawing the individual into the re-creation of oppressive 
relational systems.   
 
In the case of race, dislodging one's shame-ridden unconscious material and projecting it into 
one's black skin is not an efficient mode of psychic defence (Davids, 1996, p. 229).  
Successful projection locates the unwanted "psychic dirt" in another, thus bringing respite and 
equilibrium.  The "nondisabled" cultural consensus, then, projects its disavowed parts of self 
into the disabled community, who perhaps then individually project their split off psychic 
material into their own bodies.  As with racist projections, there is thus little reciprocity, with 
the oppressed minority left "swallowing" what has been successfully disowned by the 
dominant group, whilst redoubling efforts at approximating the ideal of normalcy, and re-
projecting shame and defect into those "more disabled" than he or she.  The choice, for those 
who form targets of projected shame, is either the employment of such frantic splits and 
deflections, or living with the intolerable mental pain of a deep narcissistic wound.       
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Mirroring 
Winnicott (1974) traces all apprehending, and consequent coalescing, of self back to the 
mutual gaze shared between mother and infant.  It is in the mother's face – her responsivity, 
expression, warmth and physical attitude – that the infant begins to "see" and "feel" whom he 
or she is.  For Winnicott, what the mother "looks like" to the infant depends on what she is 
seeing, as she observes her baby (Winnicott, 1974, p. 131).  The "good enough" mother 
validates the infant with her gaze, confirming and shoring up the child's being, aliveness and 
value (Erskine, 1994, p. 49).  But conversely, if the mother's face shows distraction, distress, 
bluntedness or sadness, the baby, instead of self-apprehension, is confronted with a premature 
experience of the nature, and needs, of the other.  The consequence is a disruptive 
impingement upon the child's incipient selfhood, replacing affirmation with self-
consciousness (ibid.).  In this non-loving look is the seed of the shame of objectification – of 
being "looked at", rather than kindly "looked after" (Erskine, 1994, p. 50; Wright, 1991 – my 
emphasis).  What may occur, if the disjuncture between mother and infant is sufficiently 
catastrophic, is that the baby "joins forces" with the mother's tacit view, turning upon, 
splitting off and rejecting his or her growing self.  The disowned self thereafter becomes 
experienced as a threatening and unwanted "other", regarded by the infant as per his or her 
fantasies of the mother's rejecting attitude (Wright, 1991, p. 46).  The infant has begun to 
assume what Winnicott (1960, p. 142) terms "the false self", which presents to the mother a 
synthetic pastiche of responses aimed at securing her positive regard, whilst becoming 
increasingly alienated from the internal source of spontaneous personhood (Erskine, 1994, p. 
50).   
 
This early experience forms the basic template for assumptions regarding one's relation to the 
world, to the other; one's place and value in the social milieu (Honneth, 1995, p. 173).  Of 
course, Winnicott's (1960; 1974) model is not intended as a crude categorical descriptor; all 
have aspects – moments – of selfhood which have been enlivened by attuned validation, and, 
in darker recesses, other parts of being which are shrouded in the disavowal born of maternal 
rejection.  The "false self" mode of functioning is one in which the major proportion of what 
is "shown" to the world is not continuous with internal, spontaneous being and responding.  
But my own view is that the basic capacity for the "reading" of social cues as evidence of the 
recognition of something shameful exists within all; that is, all have had the (formative) 
experience of being shown the self as unwanted, valueless, disgusting, or unworthy.  Now, 
what is significant about life with impairment within a disablist society, is that whatever the 
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more archaic experiences of rejecting misattunement which one carries are, these may be 
unceasingly recapitulated, confirmed and re-aggravated by the nature of ongoing "social 
mirroring".  The seeds of self-doubt regarding our worth and entitlement – there in all – are 
enlivened by a world which "carelessly" and unseeingly excludes, deprives and demeans.  It 
is, consequently, not simply the materiality of deprivation which disabled individuals must 
contend with, but as alluded to earlier, the personal meanings which are (consciously and 
unconsciously) made of this, emanating from the nature of formative relationships.  It is not 
hard to see how the "false self" persona (Winnicott, 1960) is evoked by lives of disentitlement 
and marginality, shaping disabled persons as appeasing, silently smiling, self-deprecating, 
accommodating, and the like.  The pernicious confirmation of one's most insecure, unentitled 
psychic parts may repeatedly batter and destabilise the clarity of thought and self-regard 
which is so necessary for self-advocacy.  This, too, is above and beyond the very real 
consideration of confused, anxious or subtly hateful maternal responses which are regularly a 
part of the unconscious currents of some mother-infant relationships involving congenital 
impairment (Lussier, 1980; Watermeyer, 2002).  In Lussier's (1980, p. 182) words, "One 
starts by loving oneself according to the love one has received in the pre-ego phase of life"; in 
particular, a child will relate to his or her body in the way that it was – consciously and 
unconsciously – related to by parental figures.  The extent to which internal reality, the "true 
self" (Winnicott, 1960, p. 143), is able to be authentically realised corresponds to one's 
capacity to express creativity; that is, to act creatively upon the world.  Conversely, "false 
self" functioning implies an attitude of compliance, which views the world as something 
which must be "fitted in" with (Hoggett, 1992, p. 10).  Within the disability arena, the 
deadening, dehumanising influence of lives of institutional control, or guilt-ridden deferring 
to the needs of others, are, I believe, well described by these concepts.  Here, creativity is 
stifled, passivity fostered, and narcissistic wounds re-infected by the projections and controls 
of the "normate" majority.   
 
As shall be apparent, Winnicott's (1974) view of the role of mirroring in the forging of the self 
contrasts starkly with the Lacanian theoretical picture, in which all the mirror may offer is a 
narcissistic self-delusion (Frosh, 2006; Lacan, 1977b).  In Winnicott's (1974) view, the mirror 
is the route to psychic wholeness, maturity and healthy self-expression; for Lacan (1977b), the 
subject simply fools him or herself that the seemingly cohesive identity image in the mirror is 
real and authentic, in a manner which provides refuge from the knowledge of certain 
fragmentation.  For Lacan, the coherent identity seen in the mirror is in fact a social construct, 
created via the collusion of a society preoccupied with surfaces, and desperate for narcissistic 
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indulgence.  But all know, at some deep level, that the self's cohesive image is a sham, barely 
disguising the disturbance and chaos beneath.  If Lacan's view is correct, and all coherent 
selfhood is an illusion, what the theoretical picture implies is a situation in which disabled 
persons are, by virtue of a demeaned social identity and gross material deprivation, simply 
more exposed to the universal "reality" of the fragmented ego than are others.  The 
narcissistic "props" and "benefits" of an in-group world bent on the collusory furthering of its 
own defended ends are far less available to those situated outside of the world of ideal bodies, 
or the trappings of wealth.  Further, according to Kernberg, what lies beneath the empty, 
materialistic facade of the narcissistic personality is primitive rage of the most crude, 
paranoid-schizoid nature (Frosh, 1991, p. 76).  This hidden "dissolving self", composed of 
projected aggression and violence, and profound splitting (ibid.), is (arguably) what the social 
"mirror' of the disabled body alerts the grandiose self to.  Disabled people, as harbingers of 
what lurks "at the edge of the mirror", may both evoke, and serve as projective targets for, the 
dark human truth of the fragmented, vicious, and loathsome self.    
 
As noted earlier, the fact that most (though not all) disabled people live out their formative 
years and beyond surrounded exclusively by nondisabled persons, must have profound 
implications for the fostering of entitled selfhood (Gill, 2001, p. 365; Michalko, 2002; 
Wendell, 1996).  Consequently, prejudices, values, expectations, and vocabulary (Ramlow, 
2003, p. 107) carrying meaning about impairment may be propounded without dispute by 
nondisabled persons, especially in the absence of a destigmatising disabled subculture 
(Wendell, 1996, p. 59).  Isolation and typecasting may be the only reality for such individuals, 
as the "spontaneous", creative, and "real" self becomes ever more obscured under layers of 
internalised self-denigration.  Preece (1995, p. 97) found a clear distinction between 
individuals impaired from birth or early childhood, and those sustaining impairment in later 
life.  The former showed markedly less confidence, with the experience of special schooling 
being associated with poor assertiveness and limited capacity for independent thought (ibid.).  
Disturbingly, activist groups representing a range of other political minorities manifest a 
pattern of dissociation from the disability movement, failing – or refusing – to recognise 
political commonalities (Gill, 2001, p. 366).  Disabled women, for example, have reported 
that a range of "progressive" women's organisations who lobby aggressively against sexism, 
racism and homophobia, nevertheless "openly convey defamatory views of life with 
disability" (Klein, 1997; Morris, 1991; both cited in Gill, 2001, p. 366).    
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Michalko (2002, p. 22) describes his early life as saturated with constant reminders of his 
status as "unfortunate"; as perpetually located on the wrong side of a raft of immutable 
dichotomies, as member of a vigorously "othered" outgroup of one.  Mairian Corker (1994) 
portrays her experience as similar, describing how she found refuge from imputations about 
her deafness in fantasy.  She writes: 
 
I subsequently retreated into and gained solace from a fantasy world peopled by 
characters who were more companionable than those who occupied the real 
world.  In this world, it did not matter what I lacked, because that could always 
be imagined and allowed to assume its proper place in the identity that was 
attempting to shape itself in spite of the wiles of the adult majority...I can 
remember feeling really confused, even angered by the dichotomy between the 
messages of the verbal and the more subtle communication of bodily language 
and facial expression, by the depth of a glance that could warm or freeze.  
       (Corker, 1994, p. xv) 
 
She describes how such "freezing" looks and other subtle forms of denigratory mirroring are 
often performed without awareness, and may be invisible to onlookers (ibid., p. 4).  Deaf 
persons growing up in such a social milieu may "become" the hearing person's behaviour 
towards them, and reciprocally (unconsciously) position all hearing persons as similarly 
prejudiced.    
 
Closer examination of patterns of communication of nondisabled persons towards disabled 
people reveals a picture of interactions which are abbreviated, and include: less eye contact, 
but more staring; less smiling, but more indicators of anxiety; less information seeking about 
the other, and more distancing speech patterns (Fox & Giles, 1996 cited in Gill, 2001, p. 359).  
Further, assessment of nondisabled individuals' expectations of disabled people reveals an 
image of social introversion, emotional instability, depression, and hypersensitivity (Emry & 
Wiseman, 1987 cited in Gill, 2001, p. 359).  What is described here appears as a world of 
responses not unlike those of the anxious, distracted, ashamed or depressed mother, speaking 
(at both conscious and unconscious levels) to those parts of self where certainty and trust are 
scant, and self-criticism never far away.  The institutional discourses of tragedy, 
medicalisation and otherness within which disabled children are so often immersed, writes 
Priestley (1999, p. 92), are in turn "reproduced through daily encounters with other children, 
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with adults and with a variety of institutional contexts" (see also Todd, 2006).  With emotive 
clarity, Mutua (2001, p. 107) describes the psychological impact of moving, as a physically 
impaired person, from a highly inaccessible to a more accessible environment (from Kenya to 
the United States).  Inaccessible public spaces provide for an unrelenting experience of 
wordless negation of one's experience and existence; as the world goes about its business, the 
built environment whispers "why are you here?"  This is a world devoid of cultural 
representations of one's narrative, clearly calling the legitimate inclusion of one's subjective 
life in the broad trawl of the human condition into question.  Because the experience of 
illness, pain or physical or intellectual impairment are so violently devalued, there is "little 
cultural representation which creates an understanding of their subjective reality" (Morris, 
1992, p. 1).  One oft-avoided area of denigratory mirroring is what has been termed "the 
discrimination of love" (Rossiter, 2001, p. 97).  The hegemony of the bodily ideal, in concert 
with the unconscious symbolic loading of the disabled body, lead to the construction of some 
(particularly visibly and intellectually) disabled persons as asexual, and beyond consideration 
as sexual or life partners (ibid.; Shakespeare et al., 1996).  Far from a recognition of such 
rejection as culturally condensed and partly based in prejudice, the unspoken consensus is one 
which visits the mental pain of such narcissistic wounding entirely upon the individual, as a 
"natural" and unalterable outcome of chance tragedy.  I end this discussion with the words on 
this topic of a severely physically impaired man, which demonstrate the superimposition of 
cultural oppression and the individual psychological narrative: 
 
My mother was also fearful that I might get hurt in pursuing romantic 
relationships.  She was so fearful that she told me 'don't even think about 
women'...I was so angry inside I sort of forgot the girl's rejection and focused on 
my own mother's rejection.   
      (Rossiter, 2001, p. 98) 
 
Disability:  What is development? 
An assessment of international development policy surrounding disability reveals that, 
notwithstanding the spread of the social model perspective, the majority of interventions 
remain locked into an individualistic, welfare approach which has limited promise in the 
furthering of a human rights agenda (Albert, 2005, p. 132).  The question of what, precisely, 
embodies "development" for disabled persons relates directly to the vexed issue of "needs", 
and how, and by whom, these are defined.  A fundamental principle, surely, is that a 
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programme cannot be regarded as "developmental" unless disabled persons are central in the 
processes of design as well as implementation (Coleridge, 1993, p. 7).  Whilst the "welfarist" 
approach is both oppressive and anachronistic, a key and recurring thread of the current work 
holds that the structuralist priorities of the social model are equally lacking, in failing to 
recognise or provide for more personal aspects of empowerment and growth amongst its 
constituency.  Quoting Lyotard, Fraser and Nicholson (1990, p. 22) celebrate the "postmodern 
condition" within development studies, as an era in which we are no longer convinced or 
subdued by monolithic, sweeping narratives of social "truth", such as the Enlightenment tale 
of progress, or the Marxian ideal of proletarian revolution.  Instead, development theory must 
re-create, observe and acknowledge individual subjectivity and embodiment, in a manner 
which foregrounds the self-authoring of culture.    
 
In a most illuminating and emancipatory social work text, Thompson (2003, p. 40) states 
bluntly that "existential freedom is a prerequisite for political freedom", and that "to deny the 
former is to foreclose the latter".  In opposition to the social model's at times vehement 
dictates, these words direct us specifically toward the personal, subjective realm.  Jenny 
Morris (1993b, p. 106) is equally unequivocal, stating that disabled persons' liberation from 
prejudice will never succeed if it is viewed as "solely a matter of changing others" (my 
emphasis). As alluded to earlier, the social model view may, along with its unquestioned 
"enlightening" influence, have failed to recruit a portion of the disabled population to the 
struggle through the alienation engendered by its rejection of aspects of their experience 
(Thomas, 2001, p. 51).  Oliver (1999, p. 185) remains steadfast on this issue, commenting 
forlornly that "the decline of Marxism and the rise of postmodernism has enabled researchers 
to solve their theoretical and individual difficulties at a stroke", freeing such workers to 
continue producing "stilted", post-structuralist, ideologically impotent knowledge with 
impunity.  But ever-more, the notion that "development" can occur in the absence of 
concerted efforts at human existential transformation becomes implausible.  Honneth (1995, 
p. 164) regards engagement in political action and the internal development of entitlement to 
recognition as inseparable, combining in the journey toward a new, more positive "relation-to-
self".  One of the major respondents in Coleridge's (1993, p. 13) exploration of the views of 
disability development workers stated simply that "if people feel good about themselves, they 
can begin to create change".  Courageously addressing the reality of dynamic relations of 
oppression, Coleridge (1993, p. 36) argues that "discrimination and prejudice create the sense 
of being disabled that leads to further discrimination and prejudice".  Of course, the 
ideological danger is that this correct assertion be used to support the prejudiced belief that 
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disabled persons are responsible for their own oppression; it is this considerable concern 
which has underpinned the excessive, and diversionary, caution shown around the issue of 
collusory relational dynamics.  Coleridge's (1993, p. 36) respondents emphasise repeatedly 
that the process of transforming attitudes must, at its core, incorporate the issue of the self-
regard and self-concept of disabled individuals.  He writes: 
 
The harsh reality is that if disabled people see themselves as victims, they will be 
treated as victims; if they are sunk in self-pity, they will be perceived as pathetic; 
if they are hostile towards non-disabled people, they will be shunned; but if they 
refuse to see themselves as victims, if they claim their own dignity, see 
themselves as positive and able to contribute, they will be seen as positive and 
able to contribute.   
      (Coleridge, 1993, p. 36) 
 
This is indeed a "harsh reality", which places severe and unfair demands upon disabled 
people, as upon members of all oppressed groups.  Significantly, all disabled activists 
interviewed insisted that their work is primarily with disabled persons; this in no way denies 
the reality of discrimination and prejudice – very much the contrary – but it does reflect the 
belief that those committing acts of discrimination will not change unless the process is begun 
by the oppressed minority (ibid., p. 39).  Finally, Coleridge (1993, p. 52) delineates what he 
considers to be the personal characteristics which signify the arduous movement from a 
position of "disempowerment" to one of "empowerment".  The "empowered" individual is:   
 
...open to change, assertive, pro-active, self-accountable, self-directed, uses 
feelings, learns from mistakes, confronts, lives in the present, realistic, thinks 
relatively, has high self esteem.    
 
By contrast, the person who has not yet moved to this "empowered position" tends to be: 
...closed to change, aggressive, reactive, blames others, directed by others, 
overwhelmed by feelings, avoids, lives in the past or the future, unrealistic, 
thinks in absolutes, has low self-esteem. 
 
      (Coleridge, 1993, p. 52) 
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In my view, the distinct danger to be avoided here is a misunderstanding which holds that, 
since it is the disabled individual's "task" to "achieve" a state of empowerment, the behaviours 
and ways of being listed as "un-empowered" are senseless, unjustified, irrational, excessive, 
or otherwise inappropriate.  Such individualising and pathologising views of the behaviour of 
disabled persons routinely rest upon a crass ignorance of the nature, the scale, and the 
complexity of social suffering under which disabled individuals may labour.  Instead of 
launching an investigation of these, stereotypes are employed which portray the individual as 
"another" dependent, embittered or manipulative "cripple".  Coleridge's (1993) position is 
courageous in that it shows up the harshness of disabled life, in which there is simply no 
choice but to work with struggle, despite the fact that capitulation, embitterment and hostility 
may well be no more or less than natural and human responses to the madness of oppressive 
predicaments.   
 
Paolo Freire (Freire, 1970) introduced a notion of empowerment via what he termed 
"conscientisation".  Freire's (1970) objective was the socio-political and personal 
emancipation of the poor of Latin America which, he believed, could be achieved through a 
process of critical reflection on everyday realities, in a manner which exposed the strands and 
mechanisms of oppression (Mercer, 2002, p. 231; Kalyanpur, 1996).  His approach stressed a 
"dialogic method", which facilitates self-understanding and the development of personal 
narratives (ibid.).  Freire (1970) describes conscientisation as “learning to perceive social, 
political and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of 
reality” (Freire, 1970, p. 19).  This enterprise fostered not only political mobilisation, but an 
internal emancipation from the self-blame and self-doubt engendered by relentless 
subordination.  I concur with Peters (1999, p. 103), in the belief that Freire's (1970) model has 
much to offer the disability movement.  At the heart of the concept of conscientisation is 
praxis, which combines both critical reflection and political action, emanating from a group-
based exploration of experiences of struggle (Peters, 1999, p. 104).  The gravity of the process 
of "reflection" required here is not to be underestimated; undertaking a direct examination of 
one's losses, experiences of trauma, and personal subjugation is a necessarily painful and 
gruelling challenge.  As the pain is uncovered, it is shaped into narrative which, through the 
action of group-based political struggle, begins to be amalgamated into the cultural discourse 
of the populace.  Disabled people, of course, are located at the epicentre of this model of 
development, growing in personal power and entitlement as the words are found to articulate 
the buried struggles which cement inequality.  It is the Freirian model which, in combination 
with the principles of psychoanalytic group psychotherapy, informed the philosophical 
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approach of the present study.  As already noted, though (see Identity politics and the 
movement, p.191), a key question within such a development agenda surrounds the 
conditioned wariness of many disabled persons to "disability-identity" affiliations of any sort 
(Low, 1996, p. 244).  This, and a host of other operational challenges in implementing such a 
model, will be discussed later.   
 
Disability and psychotherapy 
Of specific import, in light of the previous section's reflections upon the relationship of 
personal transformation to social change, is the place of psychotherapy in the unfolding story 
of the disability movement.  To say the least, psychotherapy has "a bad reputation" with large 
swathes of the materialist-dominated Western disability sector (Marks, 2002a, p. 2).  Mental 
health interventions are viewed as tending toward a pathologising and individualising 
attributional logic, which grossly underestimates, and largely fails to theorise, the realities of 
systematic exclusion and discrimination (ibid.).  Simi Linton (Linton, 1998, p. 294) points to 
three respects in which her reading of the basic tenets of psychology run counter to the core 
currents of disability studies.  First, psychology is viewed as responsible for the theoretical 
constructs and research conventions which circumscribe the notions of "normal", "deviant" 
and "pathology", which have impacted so massively upon the lives of disabled persons.  
Secondly, psychology's largely negative response to standpoint theory, and emphasis on 
empiricism, have militated against the undertaking of the sorts of analyses necessary for a 
vigorous interrogation of disability as a social construct.  Lastly, the discipline tends to train 
professionals to intervene at the level of the personal, the intra-psychic, in a manner which 
obscures the social contradictions implicit in unequal life circumstances (Linton, 1998, p. 6).  
Clinical experience, in my view, would tend to support these assertions, as awareness of 
disability as a marker both of oppression and complex prejudice remains extremely scant 
amongst psychological professionals.   
 
An initial, distinctly fraught question for our consideration is whether disabled people "need" 
psychotherapy.  It should be no surprise that a range of social modelist voices respond to the 
suggestion with deep suspicion.  Reeve (2004) asserts that, although psycho-emotional 
aspects of disablement operate at an emotional level, a visit to a psychologist is more likely to 
"add to", than resolve, such difficulties (Reeve, 2004 cited in Swain et al., 2006, p. 158).  The 
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need for therapy, within this logic, implies a "psychological problem" which requires 
addressing; hence, the expectation is that normative, even healthy responses to dehumanising 
living circumstances will be understood as the manifestations of a constitutional pathology, 
which requires treatment (Lenny, 1993, p. 233).  This concern is certainly realistic – as noted 
earlier (see Disability and the medical encounter, p.138), appropriate disability-related 
training, and the need for disabled representation within the body of mental health 
professionals, are issues which require substantive and urgent attention.  For example, 
McKenzie (1992) found that disabled persons who had been under the care of psychologists 
and psychiatrists found these professionals to have little insight into the lived realities of life 
in a disablist society (McKenzie, 1992 cited in Oliver, 1995, p. 263).  However, in terms of 
the "attitude" of the disability movement to the idea of psychotherapy, of note is the social 
modelist predicament of forceful disidentification with human experiences which approximate 
stereotypes about disabled people.  As we have considered at length, to recognise emotional 
struggle, publicly or simply to oneself, may be experienced as a confirmation of deeply held 
fears that one "is" what the stereotypes dictate: dependent, broken, ashamed, self-pitying, or 
whatever.  The split-off position of internal, emotional experience within the social model 
philosophy surely must create mirrored splits within individuals, which may position an 
enterprise like psychotherapy as evidence of failure.   
 
It is the profoundly compelling nature of impairment that causes psychotherapists, as all 
people, to be drawn to it as a central variable in the construction of meaning, and the drawing 
of attributions.  In other words, an interpretive trap which mental health professionals very 
routinely fall into is that which views the nature of impairment as the key – and often, the 
only – precipitant of emotional distress.  So unprocessed are our unconscious projections 
surrounding disability that it requires substantial, focused attention to counter-transference 
responses in order to disentangle fantasy from the lived reality of struggle.  The social model 
response to this very real difficulty has been at times to "deny" that impairment ever leads to 
emotional distress.  In one sense this response is understandable, as it is cognisant of the very 
real risk that attributions which begin with impairment inevitably remain locked into this 
explanatory view, hence eliding social factors altogether.  The result is the perpetuation, often 
within patient and practitioner alike, of an oppressive, self-blaming perspective on 
disablement, where "personal tragedies" need to be "dealt with" via processes of grieving 
(Abberley, 1993, p. 108; Swain, Griffiths & French, 2006).  Social model writers, 
consequently, remain adamant that psychological distress is caused exclusively by disabling 
environments (Swain et al., 2006, p. 161).  The fact that this statement is implausible, though, 
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does not negate the very substantive reasons for its propounding; that is, that all within 
disablist society, mental health professionals included, are unceasingly  pulled toward an 
oppressive view of disability which locates impairment as the definitive variable.  Joy Oliver 
(1995) found that disability counsellors schooled in the social model approach viewed 
environmental factors as pivotal.  She writes:   
 
It is evident that, in many cases, by removing the disabilities caused by the 
practical and social environment, the physically impaired person would have no 
more need of counselling than any other person. 
    (Oliver, 1995 cited in Swain et al., 2006, p. 161) 
 
Finkelstein and French (1993, p. 31) note that disabled persons may experience depression 
through having absorbed negative attitudes about disability from the cultural world, as well as 
struggle pertaining to the ongoing business of life in disabling environments, including poor 
access, prejudicial treatment, unemployment, and poverty.  This position is incontrovertibly 
true in its need to foreground oppression, yet falls squarely into the familiar impairment-
disability binary which is the Achilles' heel of the social model.  Impairment, consequently, is 
written out of the script.    
 
Some "rehabilitationist" theoretical offerings present a model of disability psychotherapy 
which aims to "manage" emotional distress via, for example, cognitive behavioural 
interventions, in a manner which potentially dampens or sidelines recognition of the 
oppressive origins of the difficulty (e.g. Vash & Crewe, 2004).  The critique of such work is 
directly analogous to the feminist interrogation of mainstream psychotherapy (e.g. Hollway, 
1998; Priestley, 1998), in the re-formulation of politically-based struggle as neurotic 
responses which require "re-shaping".  Here, "treatment" may be prescribed for the 
modification of "maladaptive" responses to environmental factors, in the absence of direct 
mobilisation toward the interrogation of such factors.  The error here is often one of emphasis; 
political action may not be excluded, but it is typically not sufficiently foregrounded.  The 
deeply socialised and unconscious self-blaming of some disabled individuals may interact  
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with such tendencies in creating a therapeutic discourse which is simultaneously supportive 
(rather than critical), individualising, and depoliticising.  Vash and Crewe (2004), in their 
influential volume entitled Psychology of disability, now in its second edition, exemplify the 
problem of emphasis, in writing the following:  
 
Contemporary understanding of disability, however, requires comparable 
recognition of the social dimensions of emotional distress.   
      (Vash & Crewe, 2004, p. 269) 
 
The identification of a need for "comparable" recognition of social factors implies, logically, 
that the initial analysis is predicated upon a foregrounding of impairment factors.  As noted 
above, my view is that accounts of disability which begin with impairment seldom "move on" 
to environmental concerns, instead becoming "obsessively" preoccupied with the irresistable 
notion of bodily "defects" inscribing presocial "damage" upon the emotional world.  Reeve 
(2000, p. 669) is correct in observing that, whilst mental health practitioners are often 
appropriately aware of the need to address racial or gender prejudices which they carry, no 
such intent is visible regarding disability.  She describes disbelief within some 
psychotherapists regarding the centrality of environmental factors, which probably manifests 
regularly in a "diagnosis" of "denial" (ibid., p. 673).   
 
Perhaps the most well-read text on the vexed relationship between disability and 
psychotherapy written from within disability studies is Olkin's What psychotherapists should 
know about disability (1999).  Due to its broad influence, I comment upon its approach in 
some detail.  Olkin's (1999) approach is one which strives to foreground environmental 
factors in the understanding of mental health difficulties amongst disabled people.  Whilst the 
perspective she takes is certainly critical, it also embodies a "modernist" position, in terms of 
outlining "methods" and "models" for "managing" disability.  Perhaps the need for these is 
inevitable, but their presence nevertheless somewhat confounds a vigorous tracking back of 
attributions to ideological sources.  A rigorous encounter with social difference requires a 
degree of thorough-going interpretation which leaves no stone of convention unturned, 
instead welcoming and exploring different ways of being, even in the face of the disquiet 
which these may engender.  A mode of engagement which supports disabled persons in 
strategies for "coping" with life in a disablist society, despite its emancipatory intentions, may 
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lead to prioritising the development of perspectives and lifestyle choices which carry the least 
disruptive effects when interfaced with broader cultural mores.  If meticulously applied this is 
the great strength of the psychoanalytic model, which aims not only to criticise, for example, 
cultural readings of disability, but to reach "underneath" toward an understanding of their 
psychic origins, with profound deconstructionist implications.  The disability phenomenon 
presents the opportunity for a mammoth critique of the "ideology of the body"; of course, a 
work such as Olkin's (1999) could not be expected to perform such an interrogation, yet it 
must be possible to create applied therapeutic principles which continually foreground the 
analytic imperative of subversion.   
 
Amongst much else, Olkin (1999, p. 67) reviews research which explores factors which 
mediate more positive attitudes towards disabled people.  These include similarity of 
appearance to the nondisabled majority, lesser severity of impairment, attractiveness, 
competence, and good social skills (ibid.).  Her intention in quoting such work is not to justify 
the attitudes evidenced; but conversely there is little overt problematising of these either.  
Instead, what is created is a mood which begins with the "cooperative" attitude shown by 
socially and occupationally successful disabled persons, necessary in offsetting the prejudices 
of others.  It will be clear that she concurs with Coleridge (1993) in this assertion, as well as 
the disability activists he surveyed; yet, in the clinical setting such principles carry a subtly 
different ideological valency.  As noted earlier, the recognition that some responses of 
disabled persons to the social world may be "maladaptive", and ultimately self-destructive, 
does not imply that such responses are not rational, meaningful reactions to the "madness" of 
society's multi-layered oppressions.  The observation that such responses are unhelpful must 
be accompanied by a close investigation of their social origins and communicative intent, 
such that meanings are not elided, but integrated.  In other words, whether or not a clinician 
regards it as "well adjusted" for a client to manifest a certain style of behaviour, the "sense", 
and unconscious "fit" of the behaviour with the predicaments and messages afforded by 
distortions of socialisation and mirroring must remain a central and salient focus of 
therapeutic work.  The applied nature of Olkin's (1999) work, seeking as it does to create 
models and principles for dealing with the likely "problems" of disabled lives, renders a form 
of "psychiatry of disability", which inevitably reconstructs subtle essentialist differences 
between disabled and nondisabled groups (see also Crisp, 2002).  This is entirely inadvertent,  
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and part of a critique of "categorisation" which may equally be directed at a range of 
psychological interventions, which cannot avoid reconstructing the "ill" and their "needs" in 
over-simplifying ways.  And yet the cultural hegemony of the devaluing of disabled lives is 
such that it is crucial that social critique be a constant companion to "interventionism".   
 
Psychotherapy which justifies the assignation of "subversive" should unpack the hidden 
contradictions of social oppression in a manner which harnesses new entitlement, and the 
"giving back" of hitherto unconscious negative imputations (Marks, 2002a, p. 5; Samuels, 
1993, p. 51).  Quoting Jean Laplanche, Frosh (2006, p. 175) observes our tendency to regard 
the presence of a coherent life-narrative as evidence of mental health; but herein lies the great 
contribution of psychoanalysis.  The sculpting of a coherent life story out of one's perpetual 
subjection to the slings and arrows of a hostile, self-interested society, may typically carry a 
defensive function (ibid.).  Psychotherapy which lacks the subversiveness of rigorous social 
critique may smooth over the contradictions of oppressive social life, creating a narrative 
which dampens cognitive dissonance, and hence relegates the causes of injustice to the 
shadows (ibid, p. 176).  Conversely, the psychoanalytic project aims to disrupt the ease of 
narratives borne of ideological sleight-of-hand, revealing, instead, the "necessarily 
fragmented" nature of psycho-social experience. It is the fault-lines in the narrative which 
draw interest and curiosity, leading towards the uncovering of the trauma which underpins the 
chronicity of inequality.  Samuels (1993, p. 52) sees the scope for political mobilisation 
inherent in psychoanalysis vividly, regarding the analytic setting as "a bridge between depth 
psychology and politics".  One particularly stimulating observation Samuels (1993, p. 55) 
attaches to his view, is the assertion that it would be greatly to the benefit of political 
organisations to pay more close attention to the psychological development of their members, 
for reasons as much to do with "effectiveness" as with "humanitarianism".  Samuels (1993, p. 
66) calls upon psychoanalytic psychotherapists to alter their interpretive "thrust", away from 
an exclusive, insular focus on the "analytic dyad", toward a view which more overtly connects 
the patient's conflicts to the political world.  This, he notes, would be "a modulation of 
feelings outward as well as inward..." (ibid. – my emphasis).  It is such a model, which 
provides thoroughly for an ontological history, but is equally curious regarding the 
interpretive significance of prevailing political realities, which is required in facilitating the 
personal and ideological conscientisation of disabled patients.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Research methods and issues  
 
Introduction 
In the course of this chapter I will describe the empirical study which forms the data-basis of 
the present work.  As shall become clear, the research endeavour within disability studies and, 
perhaps more especially, the health sciences concerned with disability, is an extremely 
politically sensitive and often controversial enterprise.  The political complexities of ascribing 
"needs" and deciding on the real nature of "problems" goes directly to the heart of disability 
oppression; questions of the legitimacy of research aims and methods, as well as researchers, 
abound.  These issues will be examined in some detail, forming something of a theoretical 
"tangent" from the main methodological narrative.  Part of my aim is making myself – as a 
researcher, a clinical psychologist and a disabled person – more visible to the reader, as befits 
a research orientation which allows and values the interpretive.  Consequently, I later provide 
a quite detailed description of my own orientation toward the collection and processing of the 
data.  The journey begins with some reflections on the role of qualitative research in political 
struggles, such as that pertaining to disability.    
 
Norman Denzin (cited in Jones, 2005) signposts the imminent era in qualitative research thus: 
 
The next moment in qualitative inquiry will be one at which the practices of 
qualitative research finally move, without hesitation or encumbrance, from the 
personal to the political. 
    (Denzin, 2000 cited in Jones, 2005, p. 763) 
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It is precisely with this tone that the current work embarks upon an investigation of intra-
psychic and relational dynamics surrounding the social experience of disability.  As shall by 
now be evident, it is my position that any theory which aims to describe, account for or 
combat prejudice and discrimination must recognise fully that the roots and consequences of 
this scourge reach deep into the realm of the psychological functioning of all participants.  A 
materialist-structuralist account of disablist oppression provides essential impetus for the 
reshaping of societal institutions, and the application of the principles of citizenship rights to 
those unjustly deprived and mistreated.  But a vision which addresses only the materiality of 
oppression will always fall short of fully illuminating the causes of the stubbornness of 
disablist prejudice, as well as eliding an investigation, and integration, of the human 
phenomenology of "otherness" which social disability affords.  The ironic and regrettable 
silencing of the personal experience of disablism has created a deep lacuna in the social 
theorising of the disability phenomenon.  This vacuum is not filled or mitigated by the largely 
decontextualised and solipsistic disability accounts characteristic of the tradition of medical 
sociology.  The key failing of this work lies in its inability to maintain theoretical threads 
which link the social with the intra-psychic; which view experience as rooted in subjectivity, 
and connect subjectivity to ideology.  It is with this challenge that qualitative research aims to 
move, with purpose and logical continuity, from the personal to the political.   
 
The study 
The present study aimed, via qualitative data collected within a group psychodynamic 
psychotherapy context, to explore the socially situated psychological experience of a sample 
of persons with severe physical impairments.  The intention was to gather data which would 
assist in the work of beginning to develop concepts which illuminate what have been termed 
the "psycho-emotional dimensions of disablism" (Thomas, 1999a).  Whilst my position differs 
somewhat from that of Thomas (1999a), who embraces an "extended" materialist social 
model account, I employ her term loosely to delineate a generalized category of yet un-
theorised psychological and relational phenomena which surround disablism and impairment.  
Some of the questions which motivated this study are listed below.  These questions are 
intended not as "problems", to which one anticipates finding "answers", but rather as areas of 
import and interest, which require the development of conceptual ideas for their further 
investigation.  The aim of this study is, first and foremost, the initial shaping of such 
conceptual ideas.  The value, or otherwise, of the concepts reached will be identified in the 
degree to which disabled persons find these ideas helpful, and illuminating of the often highly 
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confused and confusing subjective sequelae of systematic disadvantage.  Thus, key questions 
motivating the study included:   
 
• What are the conscious and unconscious processes which shape the often 
distorted relational dynamics which surround disability?   
• What cultural meanings regarding disability are at play in shaping the forging of 
identity of disabled persons in a prejudicial society?  
• What psychological pressures do disabled persons live with in a disablist world? 
• What is the relationship between individual and social factors in the experience of 
disability? 
• What are the lived effects of pressures to "normalise" upon disabled persons?  
• What are the effects upon disabled persons of the anxiety and avoidance which 
impairment often evokes in others?  
• What are the psychological mechanisms underpinning the perpetuation (or 
enactment) of stereotypes surrounding disability?   
• How do we develop a psychology of disability which theorises the individual, yet 
remains profoundly, rigorously contextual and political?  
 
The research process 
 
Background 
In a society where awareness of disability as a civil rights issue is in its infancy (Watermeyer, 
Swartz, Schneider, Lorenzo & Priestley, 2006), the systematic disadvantage afforded to South 
African students in higher education institutions remains extreme (Howell, 2006; 
Watermeyer, 2000).  Whilst access facilities vary greatly across nations and continents, 
accounts from many countries concur in describing the severe social and educational struggles 
experienced by disabled students (e.g. Low, 1996; Viney, 2006).  Everyday life for disabled 
students involves the rejecting of imputed negative identities, the experience of a myriad of 
forms of structural and procedural exclusion, the negotiation of prejudiced or hostile 
responses from others, the management of poor learning access, and very much else (Low, 
1996, p. 235; Watermeyer, 2000).  A key finding of Charlton's (1998, p. 4) international study 
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was that the experience of lived disability was remarkably similar for individuals across a 
broad range of cultural and political-economic environments.  It is my position that the 
anxiety-ridden evocations of disability (Marks, 1999a; 2002a; 2002b; Watermeyer, 2006) 
shape excluding or prejudiced responses to disabled people which, notwithstanding variation 
in cultural "content", have much in common.  
 
Setting and origination 
 
The research story  
The study was undertaken at a prominent South African university, where I was employed as 
professional clinical psychologist within a student counselling unit.  Management at the 
university's department for disability service and advocacy had, over several years, become 
aware of the lack of development of a relatively unified, visible and vocal disabled student 
population on the campus.  Disabled students were, instead, a fragmented group, who showed 
significant ambivalence regarding association with one another, or with disability-related 
staff.  Further, it was clear to staff at the university's Disability Unit that disabled students 
suffered a range of severe difficulties during the course of study, as well as campus life more 
broadly, of the nature of those listed above.  Yet, much-needed united action towards group 
advocacy for the needs and integration of such students had not materialised.   
 
Discussions surrounding this situation, as well as the stated need of some disabled students 
for a supportive group process, led to the decision to explore amongst students the desirability 
of establishing a group-based psychological intervention.  My own theoretical backdrop to 
this endeavour combined an awareness of the Freirian model of political conscientisation 
through critical literacy, with a strong personal belief in the incisive power of psychoanalytic 
concepts in interrogating social responses to disabled persons (Marks, 1999a; Watermeyer, 
2000; 2002; 2006).  First, disabled students were invited to voluntary individual interviews 
with myself, before the broaching of the proposed group process.  A group of 28 students 
responded.  In these interviews I chose to disclose my own status as a disabled person 
(partially sighted), and the fact that I had myself previously been a student on the campus.  
Further, I expressed a curiosity regarding the predicaments of disabled students at the 
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university currently, making careful provision for students to choose their level of disclosure.  
A small minority opted not to discuss such issues at all, or stated that no difficulties pertained.  
The majority of students, however, responded very positively, and had much to say regarding 
their position.  With this group, I then mooted the possibility of a group process aimed at 
jointly exploring students' experiences, towards a combination of greater self-understanding, 
and the interrogation of modes of exclusion to facilitate advocacy for improved access.  Up 
until this point, the group intervention had been merely an idea; it was the students' responses 
which would define its existence.   
 
After completion of the interviews, and the establishment of a core of students who expressed 
an interest in taking part in the group intervention, a venue and first session time was 
established.  However, between the interview period and this time of initiation, which 
included a short university vacation, I hypothesise that the ambivalence which I sensed in 
many students began to surface, and many chose later to forego the opportunity to participate 
in the group process.  After beginning with seven students, the final, stable group process 
comprised five members, and met for a total of 24 ninety minute sessions.   
 
During the initial interviews I took a position of trying to convey to students the 
foregrounding, in this initiative, of disability as an axis of discrimination and systematic 
inequality.  For example, I stated that I am aware that disabled students on the campus are 
subject to multifarious and complex disadvantage, which contributes to very high stress 
levels, and sometimes leads to students dropping out.  I added that it is in the nature of 
organisational discrimination of this sort that individuals tend to take on (or be saddled with) 
personal responsibility for the difficulties they face.  I took this somewhat directive stance in 
order to clearly differentiate myself from any semblance of "institutional authority" which 
may be viewed as regulatory or disciplinarian.  This was a tactical decision, which, I believe, 
did set up a certain transference dynamic surrounding my perceived political investment in the 
empowerment of disabled students on the campus.  The dilemma here speaks very directly to 
a fundamental difficulty with the harnessing of group solidarity amongst disabled persons (see 
Identity politics and the movement, p.191).  That is, it is extremely difficult to create an 
investigative space for the voicing of disabled experience which does not, in some way, carry 
the imperatives implicit in a perceived or overt agenda.  I discuss the problem of my "political 
countertransference" later (see Political investments and therapeutic boundaries, p.378).   
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Participants 
The participants in the group psychotherapy process by which the data was collected were 
five adults, of whom three were male and two female.  All had severe physical impairments 
(quadriplegia, paraplegia, hemiplegia and degenerative ataxia), and all had acquired their 
impairments in mid or late childhood, or adulthood.  This may be significant, as some 
evidence suggests that persons with adventitious impairments may be less vulnerable to the 
internalisation of disablist ideology than congenitally impaired individuals (Preece, 1995, p. 
97).  The candid and often highly insightful discourse of the group may be partly due to the 
fact that all members fell into the latter category.  We may speculate that the experience of 
"contrast" in how one is responded to by society before and after sustaining an impairment 
may show up the distortions of disablism more starkly, in a manner which enables clearer, 
more entitled articulation.  Three members were registered for postgraduate study, and two for 
undergraduate.   
 
Procedure 
The group sessions were facilitated according to the non-directive principles of 
psychoanalytically informed group psychotherapy (Corey, 2005).  All sessions were 
audiotaped and transcribed.  In addition, I kept a journal of "field-notes" (see An 
"interpretive" auto-ethnography, p.245), in which I recorded my own assessment of group 
process, transference dynamics, the development of unconscious themes, and my own 
hypotheses regarding the unconscious meta-narratives of life  in a prejudiced environment.  
These reflections were supplemented by fortnightly supervision with a senior psychodynamic 
group psychotherapist.  As the process wore on, my field-notes began to render crystallizing 
themes which, in final coding and data analysis, formed the skeleton of my resultant 
conceptual contributions.  The conceptual ideas I will put forward are meant in no way as 
exhaustive; rather, it is my intention to begin a process of the refining of salient themes which 
will be added to and modified, as per the extent to which these are regarded as relevant in the 
lives of disabled persons.  Some of the themes I critically examine are familiar in colloquial 
culture in relation to disability (e.g. see Disability and loss, p.302).  In such cases my aim is to 
examine the often oppressive meanings associated with such ideas, and perform a re-
formulation of their relevance in terms of what is shown up by the data.  Other ideas will 
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present as unfamiliar, and represent original thematic clusters which were shown up 
repeatedly during the group process (e.g. see Disability and the distortion of personal and 
psychic boundaries, p.260).   
 
Due to situational factors, including two group members finishing their time at the university, 
and the tragic passing away of another member, the process was ended after a period of 
approximately eighteen months.  As is so often the case with clinical psychological 
interventions at higher education institutions, the university's calendar serves to truncate the 
working process, which is punctuated by breaks for examinations and vacations.  After 
combining the products of thematic analysis of the data with my own field-notes, the resultant 
conceptual ideas were then "re-presented" to group members in individual interviews six 
months after conclusion of the group process.  The interpretive approach which I chose to 
take (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000), reaching beyond overt discourse to more unconscious 
processes, meant that the conceptual ideas which I arrived at were, in part, some "interpretive 
distance" from the manifest discourse of the group.  In order to assess the salience, the 
resonance, of what I had extracted from the group discourse, I thus interviewed each group 
member, gleaning responses to my conceptual ideas (Mercer, 2002, p. 243).  Interestingly, the 
overwhelming experience for me here was one of all having moved towards very similar 
understandings.  The "auto-ethnographic" mediation of my interpretation (discussed later in 
this chapter) presents the very real risk of "self-fulfilling prophecies", in which my personal 
view is grasped, even enacted, by group members seeking to make sense of what is often a 
bewildering and traumatic world.  This, though, is a concern which besets all forms of 
psychoanalytically informed work, and demands rigorous self-reflection and counter-
transference analysis.  
     
Ethical considerations 
 
Disability studies: Research and emancipation 
Research into disability has over recent decades been steeped in controversy, as the growth of 
the disability movement across society has become reflected in critical assessments of 
traditional models of researching disability.  Important questions have been lodged, including 
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the issues of who should perform such research, what its aims should be, and what ethical 
considerations should be borne in mind.  At times this encounter has had a distinctly vitriolic 
flavour, as a "traditional" body of researchers, located largely within medical and 
rehabilitative disciplines, have come to be seen by segments of the disability lobby as 
complicit in the perpetuation of oppressive, individualising models of disability (Mercer, 
2002, p. 228).  In response to this perceived lacking, the disability studies academy has ever 
more vociferously demanded the creation of a paradigm of research into the lives of disabled 
persons which expressly foregrounded societal barriers and discrimination as the key causes 
of disadvantage (Oliver, 1992, p. 102).  Too much existing disability research, according to 
this argument, fails to reflect disabled people's experiences accurately, and is alien to the 
needs and lived struggles of the community (Mercer, 2002, p. 229; Shakespeare, 1996).  The 
picture created of disability research was one of the exploitation of oppressed, often 
impoverished and marginal persons, whose life situations were in no way altered by the 
research outcomes (ibid.; Oliver, 1992, p. 105; Barnes et al., 2002b; Morris, 1992; Ward & 
Flynn, 1994).  Ever the Marxist, Oliver (1992, p. 102) conceptualises the issue of power in 
disability research via what he calls "the social relations of research production", of which a 
central tenet is the "firm distinction" between the researcher and the researched.  This 
distinction locates the researcher as a "specialist", who has "expert skills" in the area of 
disability, and consequently determines the topics to be examined and the methods to be used 
(ibid.).  The implication here is that such research, often located within health sciences or the 
maligned field of medical sociology, will produce accounts which serve to buttress and justify 
the continued medicalisation and control of disabled lives.  Discourses of rehabilitation and 
normalisation are closely associated with the "disability industry", which relies on the 
reconstruction of disabled persons as constitutionally flawed, and thus "in need of 
intervention".  For Oliver (1992), these "relations of production" must be challenged, in order 
that disabled persons may assume control of what is deemed relevant and influential in the 
shaping of experience; viz. physical and cultural barriers to equitable inclusion.   
 
Oliver (1999, p. 184) is searingly critical of what he frames as the ruse of "objectivity" in 
social research; this, in his view, is simply a justification for a self-serving abstention from the 
moral imperative to assume a partisan approach in championing the interests of the marginal 
citizens being "researched".  Exasperated, he concludes: "I no longer wish to operate within a 
research discourse which prioritises investigation over emancipation" (ibid., p. 184).  The 
alternative he demands is a "new epistemology" of research, which replaces the discourse of 
investigation with one which recognises research as a cultural phenomenon which actually 
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produces the world (1999, p. 188).  In Marxian terms, the point being made is quite clear:  the 
class that owns the means of production – of research, in this case – is consequently the class 
empowered to create "mental", and hence social, reality (ibid.).   
 
The protestations of Oliver, Barnes and others to the dominant current of disability research 
related to what they viewed as an excessive focus on the "personal" (see Prohibiting the 
personal, p.42), believing that it is the structural elements of societal exclusion which are at 
the heart of disablist oppression.  By contrast, to feminist disability studies authors, the 
palliative required to re-create disability research into a more emancipatory influence, was 
something approximating the converse (e.g. Morris, 1992; Thomas, 1999a).  Whilst these 
writers objected to the decontextualised solipsism of much existing disability research, in 
their view it was in the critical explication, not the avoidance, of the "personal" realm that 
liberation was to be sought.  For Morris (1992, p. 157) and others, disability studies stood to 
gain much from feminist discourse, notably with regard to the sensitivity of feminist 
methodology in showing up the landscape of the "personal".  The crux of this approach, in the 
words of Dorothy Smith (1988), lies in its creation of space for an "absent subject" that, 
during the research process, is filled with the actual presence and lived experience of the 
individual (Smith, 1988 cited in Morris, 1992, p. 159).  Further, the feminist approach aims to 
overtly connect the nature of subjective experience with the politics of everyday life – with 
the unequal, oppressive and discriminatory positioning of women, and disabled persons, in 
relational as well as structural systems.  As Morris (1992) comments, most of the legacy – and 
ongoing production – of medical and rehabilitationist research on disability fails in this regard 
(ibid.).   
 
The history of disability research, rooted as it is in the biomedical model, is overwhelmingly a 
history of nondisabled "professionals" researching disabled "subjects".  The "mutiny" at the 
Winnipeg conference of Rehabilitation International in 1980 (see Disability:  The 
international development context, p.14) may be viewed as an expression of the outrage felt 
by a quorum of the disabled community at this reality.  For some, the principle is simple:  
"...if a researcher is to empathise with those being researched, then it follows that their life 
history must be as near as possible to that of the people being studied..." (Barnes, 1992, p. 
117).  My personal view is that sharing a marginalised identity with the subjects of one's 
research enterprise may carry silences as well as illuminations, and requires substantial effort 
paid to reflexivity.  Conversely, there is little doubt that prejudicial and oppressive 
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constructions of disabled people have been propounded via the extraordinarily common 
phenomenon of decontextualised and uncritical disability research.  Furthermore, the inherent 
role split between nondisabled researchers and disabled respondents may serve (even 
inadvertently) to create and reify the illusion of constitutional, existential differences between 
the human "conditions" of these respective groups (Livia, 1996, p. 34).  Barnes (1992, p. 117) 
does mention the risk of a disabled researcher "going native", in un-reflexive over-
identification with the research subjects, which scuppers any claim the outcome may have to 
objectivity.  Further, he makes the extremely important point that having a disability does not 
at all imply solidarity with the struggle of disabled persons against oppression; nor does it 
"equip" one to perform quality research (ibid.).  The entire social modelist critique of 
disability research, nevertheless, bears a tone of subtly deriding the empiricist tradition of 
researcher objectivity and the requirement of a solid evidence base.  Instead, as we shall see, 
political commitment is ushered into centre stage, as the primary trait of a worthy researcher.   
 
What was beginning to emerge was the so-called "emancipatory model" of disability research 
(e.g. Barnes, 1992; Mercer, 2002; Oliver, 1992; 1999; Zarb, 1992).  This model centrally 
involves "a confrontation with power which structures the social relations of research 
production", locating the priorities of the "researched" as pivotal (Campbell Brown, 2001; 
Oliver, 1992, p. 110; Zarb, 1992).  Research, in this approach, becomes a goal-directed part of 
the development process, aiming to show up the landscape of disadvantage in stark relief, for 
the purposes of lobbying and advocacy.  Research and radical politics, thus, are deeply, 
deliberately intertwined.  Further, the process is conceptualised as one in which the self-
understanding of researchers as well as subjects is in the offing (Oliver, 1992, p. 112).  
Whereas prior research was construed as the study of disabled people, here it is disabling 
society which is "in the dock" for interrogation.  The move from a discourse of "research as 
investigation" to one of "research as production" involves embarking upon a study with a 
clear, political motive, which aims to present data directed at social change (Oliver, 1999, p. 
183).  This orientation fits into what Mercer (2002, p. 229) terms a "critical social theory" 
perspective; the "third wave" of social research philosophy, emerging in the wake of 
positivism and interpretivism.  Positivism, according to this framework, "had become so 
obsessed with objectivity that the critical potential of the 'sociological imagination' to expose 
entrenched power relations was downgraded" (Mills, 1959 cited in Mercer, 2002, p. 229).  
The precepts of critical social theory, thus, include anti-imperialist, anti-racist and feminist 
attacks on the reductionism and depersonalising reification of positivist, and, to a lesser 
extent, interpretivist research models (Mercer, 2002, p. 232).  Within the arena of disability 
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research, critical theory interfaces both with the theorising of the social model, and latter 
feminist approaches seeking to temper its materialist emphasis with a "politics of the 
personal".  As disability research became increasingly politicised, methodological criteria 
were downplayed (ibid.), in a manner which may have served to sacrifice rigour in the cause 
of pluralism and broad participation.  Combining the requirements of an "emancipatory" 
research philosophy with the stipulations of disciplinary evidence protocols began, it seems, 
to prove difficult (Stone & Priestley, 1996, p. 706).   
 
Examination of the "emancipatory" research movement's precepts does, however, seem to 
uncover evidence of contradiction.  The structuralist roots of the social model suggest 
direction towards an orientation which favours a positivist, evidence-based approach, 
particularly in view of Oliver's (1999, p. 191) gloomy exhortations of us to reclaim the critical 
edge of sociology from the "postmodern ruins".  The resistance of the social model vanguard 
to the incorporation of feminist research principles foregrounding the politics of the personal 
also seems to contradict their vehement rejection, expressed elsewhere, of research as 
"objective".  What emerges is a school which appears to seek structuralist truths by pluralist 
(or populist) means, whilst simultaneously placing an embargo upon the nature of the 
"realities" which its constituency may articulate.  Research based upon the "discourse of 
production" would, according to Oliver (1999, p. 188) evoke an "intellectual backlash"; he 
was not to be disappointed.  In speaking of his difficulty in managing the conflicting 
accountabilities one feels, as a researcher, to the disability movement and the academic 
community, Shakespeare's (1996; 2006) view on the "emancipatory" paradigm has become 
ever more critical.  He quotes Einstein in encapsulating his view, who instructed us to "Make 
everything as simple as possible.  But not simpler" (Shakespeare, 1996, p. 118 – my 
emphasis).  Later, he becomes more belligerent, stating that he simply "doesn't care" if his 
research is rated as "emancipatory" or not, professing to follow his own ethical standards, 
rather than bowing to orthodoxy (Shakespeare, 1996, p. 185).  Kicking against the political 
imperatives of the social modelist consensus, he rejects accountability to anyone except 
himself, his conscience, and his publisher (ibid., p.  186).  Becoming ever more critical, 
Shakespeare retrospectively evaluates the "emancipatory" social modelist research approach 
as having largely failed to produce good empirical work, due to the problematic reifications of 
its social model basis (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 10).  What we are confronted with is a hostile 
paradigmatic encounter between the political necessities of a movement justifiably desperate 
to change the miserable living circumstances of its constituency, the constraints of 
methodological theory, and the tempering influence of moderate researchers understandably 
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concerned about the distortions afforded by political expediency.  Clearly, the undeniably 
oppressive and individualising nature of the vast majority of pre-social model, medically 
oriented research into disability presented the necessity for the instigation of an adversarial 
assault based upon oppressed lives, rather than institutional discourses.  The challenge is to 
arrive at a model which combines a concerted recognition of the social origins of much of 
disabled reality, with methodological rigour, and the foregrounding of subjective concerns.   
 
The principle of feeding research findings back to respondents for verification (as performed 
in the present study), is an undoubtedly useful contribution, which is widely regarded as an 
important marker of an equitably conducted study (Mercer, 2002, p. 243).  The question of 
objectivity is more difficult, presenting the confrontation between positivist imperatives, and 
feminist rejections of the notions of value-free research and the "neutral researcher" (Mies, 
1983, p. 122; Wall, 2006; Barnes, 1992; 1996).  "Conscious partiality", in the form of 
vigilance regarding the presence of unequal or oppressive layering within the social fabric 
being explored, must be combined with a sober and humble readiness to be proven wrong, 
and surprised by emergent data.   Writing in the field of human development, but with a 
broader applicability to the behavioural sciences, Bronfenbrenner (1977, p. 513) describes our 
research predicament as being caught in an ambiguous landscape, "between rigour and 
relevance".  Narrowly scientific, empiricist work may render little direct social relevance, 
whereas research of a more discursive and feminist nature may offer limited defensibility 
(ibid.).  He comments on the short-sightedness of the indifference or brazen rejection directed 
at research rigour, which often leads to a reliance on exclusively existential analyses (ibid.).    
 
Data analysis 
 
Qualitative and interpretivist  
Having thus traced the cross-cutting political and intellectual investments in disability 
research methodology, I turn now to a statement of my own position.  Pivotal to the analysis 
are the tenets of an interpretivist approach, which construe reality as "created and social" 
(Ferguson, Ferguson & Taylor, 1992, p. 4 cited in Low, 1996; Berg & Smith, 1985).  
However, I view it as essential that a means be found whereby cognisance is simultaneously 
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maintained of the very real structural frame of constraints within which disabled persons 
dwell.  To add a further, complicating layer, as has already been argued it is my position that a 
substantive proportion of the psychological reality of subordinated social positioning is lived 
via unconscious channels (Marks, 1999a; 2002; Sinason, 1992; Watermeyer, 2002; 2006).  
The import of this in the context of the oppressive history of disability research is quite 
momentous, viz. the ("unthinkable") idea of interpreting meanings of respondent discourse 
which lie beyond consciousness.  It is these disparate strands and intents which I seek to 
weave into a coherent methodological orientation.  I deal, now, with each aspect in turn. 
 
The unifying belief of the interpretivist approach centres on the uniqueness of subjective 
reality, which is viewed as intersubjectively socially constructed (Mercer, 2002, p. 231).  
Versions of this reality, thus, are multiple; the "pluralism of ontology" (ibid.; Campbell 
Brown, 2001).  Located within the feminist tradition, the approach is curious regarding the 
discursive origins and meanings of every day experiences in the social milieu, rather than 
intent on the establishment of functional explanations (ibid.).  Within the field of disability 
research specifically, Ferguson, Ferguson & Taylor (1992, p. 295) regard the particular value 
of the interpretivist approach as lying in its emphasis upon the "inescapable contextuality" of 
knowledge and beliefs, creating an unencumbered space to be filled with the subjective 
realities which grow out of discursive immersion.  Disability, here, is construed not as a fact 
or an entity which awaits "discovery", but rather a socially situated experiential meaning set, 
which awaits description (ibid., p. 296).  The "interpretation" of data within an interpretivist 
framework is, in the influential words of Norman Denzin (1998, p. 317), "an art", for which 
there is no ready formula or mechanical method.  Like storytelling of any sort, it can only be 
learned through its doing (ibid.).  Consequently, the researcher – the teller – is in no way 
invisible.  Instead, he or she is carefully, overtly situated in relation to the data, with this 
identity structuring the relationship between researcher, text, and reader.  The "writing self" 
presented by the researcher is one which, by virtue of its positioning, experience and 
reflexivity, claims a degree of insight and authority vis-a-vis the research material (ibid.; 
Wall, 2006).  But the knowledge is produced collaboratively, and thence refined through the 
interactive building of consensus between researcher and participants (Schwandt, 1994 cited 
in Mercer, 2002, p. 231).  Rather than hypothesis formulation and subsequent testing, the 
emphasis is on an inductive generation of concepts (Mercer, 2002, p. 231), which are 
reflected upon and repeatedly elaborated.   
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Richardson and St. Pierre (2005, p. 961), with rich irony, describe qualitative research writers 
as "off the hook"; that is, relieved from the impossible task of writing as "disembodied and 
omniscient narrators claiming universal and atemporal general knowledge".  In short, they are 
rescued from being required to "play God" (ibid.).  Implicit in the recognition of this role is an 
experience of being both humbled and empowered; one is positioned in the seat of co-
creation, but simultaneously made visible as a creator, with a unique view, history and bias.  
The encounter with "data", thus, is as much an encounter with self.  My own "standpoint" will 
be described and considered in the following section.   
 
In an earlier section (see Disability and psychotherapy, p.222), I cited Samuels' (1993, p. 55) 
astute remark that political movements would do well to make provision for the psychological 
well-being of their members.  Such movements are conceived in suffering, often exist in 
circumstances of ongoing trauma, and accordingly are composed of a human constituency 
which carries the wounds and fatigue of struggle.  One early position on the relationship 
between politics and social research held that those struggling for political rights had no need 
of research, because surely people who are "oppressed" know it, and hence continually battle 
against subordinating social forces (Bury, 1996, p. 111).  Such an assessment bears the 
hallmarks of a structuralist analysis which, by its nature, lacks and eschews psychological 
concepts.  A consideration of the psychodynamic model of mind, which incorporates 
normative, continual tensions between consciousness and the unconscious, along with an 
awareness of the psychic implications of trauma, must bring one to a view which recognises 
that it is arguably especially difficult for those in the midst of struggle to fully comprehend 
their predicament.  When trauma is ongoing – when life in a hostile society must continue to 
be lived – the subjective nature of struggle often precludes the conscious processing of 
emotional material, as human energies may be all but exhausted on the business of survival.  
Thus it is that oppressive social splits will tend to create internal splits, as defences are erected 
to protect an already stretched and demoralised ego from the unconscious tide of personal 
meanings attached to experiences of trauma or deprivation.  Patricia Hill Collins (1990) 
expresses the point simply:  "Groups unequal in power are correspondingly unequal in their 
ability to make their standpoint known to themselves and others" (Hill Collins cited in Morris, 
1992, p. 159).  But the question then, as posed by Frosh (2006, p. 13), is who is able to own 
the knowledge required in order to confidently pronounce on the nature of the unconscious 
processes of others? This question raises both psychological issues and far-reaching political 
ramifications.  Surely, at the heart of all prejudice, all dehumanisation, is the consistent 
feature of individuals being coercively defined from without; that is, having some 
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combination of one's identity, worth, ability, nature, or needs determined by a dominating 
"other".  And yet, the "reality" of that very dehumanisation may be well obscured within 
members of the subordinated group, due to the necessity for occupying a psychic reality 
which is liveable.  This, then, is the conundrum that faces us.   
 
With surprising ease and clarity, given the political sensitivity of the area, Hollway and 
Jefferson (2000) approach this difficulty via their notion of "the defended subject".  For these 
writers, all members of subjugated groups encountered in research (or elsewhere) are 
constantly engaged in conscious as well as unconscious meaning-making surrounding their 
social predicament (ibid., p. 26).  In other words, as defended subjects, all are differentially 
invested in the assuming of positions in available discourses, in order to protect vulnerable 
parts of self from the corrosive or overwhelming knowledge of demeaning treatment.  The 
defensive need to disrupt psychic links for the purpose of self cohesion (Bion, 1959) may lead 
to subjects not knowing the meaning or origin of experienced feelings (Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000, p. 26).  Unconscious motivations, thus, are harnessed in the disguise or reformulation of 
deeper responses to social suffering, in a manner which may obscure the clear apprehension 
of injustice.  Similarly, the meanings or triggers of action may be poorly understood, as 
multiple narratives, both conscious and unconscious, continue to relate to experiences from 
the outer and inner worlds. 
 
In light of the "hidden" nature of important aspects of social suffering, including the 
internalisation of oppression, it follows that brief data collection methods, which allow little 
space for the observing of psychic processes, will be distinctly limited in showing up such 
phenomena.  The psychoanalytic method, in both individual and group contexts, provides for 
an observation of psychic functioning through the course of an unstructured process, within 
which unconscious symbolic communications, as well as manifest utterances, may be heard.  
The duration of time available for such observation is a key issue which distinguishes such 
data collection from, for example, a semi-structured interview procedure.  But, perhaps more 
importantly, the analytic relationship which develops between psychotherapist and patient, 
and between co-members of a therapeutic group, allows for the cumulative growth of a sense 
of safety and familiarity which renders the more aversive reaches of self, beyond 
consciousness, increasingly available for exploration.  A key aspect of interpretive awareness 
maintained by the psychoanalytic psychotherapist pertains to the nature and functioning of 
defence mechanisms, which provide clues as to the structure of the ego, and the ways in 
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which everyday struggles are psychically managed (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 33).  By 
creating an environment for free association, the psychotherapist is eliciting a narrative which 
is not structured simply in conscious, didactic terms, but also according to an unconscious 
"logic"; a pathway of symbols and associations directed by emotional motivations (ibid., p. 
37).  As a psychoanalytic psychotherapist and a researcher, I thus aim to maintain an 
awareness of the socially constructed nature of the disability phenomenon, whilst 
simultaneously "holding" in my mind the incipient, structural "realness" of barriers and 
hostility which the research subjects face daily.  My over-arching attitude, lastly, is one which 
is thoughtful and curious, but also careful, surrounding my hypotheses with regard to the 
ways in which suffering "settles" within psychic space, and is unconsciously defended 
against, enacted, discharged, or otherwise integrated into self and identity.  My aim is the 
development of a strongly politically, socially and temporally situated psychology – rather 
than psychopathology – of disability.  Such a psychology is necessarily intersubjective, 
because as has been argued, it is in this realm rather than upon some mythic foundational 
plane that disability derives meaning, and thence shapes identity, self, and further 
engagement.  Selfhood is forged in the intersubjective space, and disability, first and 
foremost, alters, distorts, mediates and shapes the character of that space, in terms of cultural 
as well as unconscious-developmental meanings.  Logically, then, it is within this realm, 
where the significations of incipient selfhood are lodged, that we should begin.   
 
Researcher's orientation to data 
In light of the foregoing, it should be amply clear that my presence in this work – as 
researcher, psychoanalytic psychotherapist and disabled person – is one of clear "visibility", 
built on a belief in the need for rigorous self-reflection upon the evocative issues at hand 
(Hertz, 2006, p. 539).  My background in disability studies research and advocacy certainly 
locates me with a political agenda; the implications of this will be considered later (see 
Political investments and therapeutic boundaries, p.378).  This orientation intersects with my 
own extensive self-exploration, via more than a decade of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, of 
the unconscious meanings, relational distortions and real-life dilemmas of disability.  The 
issue of commonality of experience deserves a further moment's attention here.  It is my 
position that, notwithstanding the extraordinary diversity in the embodied nature of 
impairment, a commonality of the experience of difference and discrimination is to be found  
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across such variation between disabled persons.  Charlton's (1998, p. 4) international study, as 
we have seen, provides singular, but dramatic evidence of this postulation.  To some extent, 
the reliability of this assertion will be tested by the current investigation, and others like it, as 
a shared "psychology of disablism" begins (I hope) to take shape.   
 
 The extensive knowledge, academic, anecdotal and experiential, which I carry regarding 
socially situated disability may serve to show up hidden aspects of experience within 
participant narratives, but also may serve to obstruct my clear "hearing" of the unique nature 
of individual standpoints.  The "emancipatory" model of disability studies research, this time 
expressed in the words of Colin Barnes (1996, p. 110), charges researchers to espouse 
"commitment", not "value", "freedom" and "engagement", not "objectivity", and "solidarity", 
rather than "independence".  The stage, in my view, is set in assuming such an orientation for 
the mis-hearing of subjects whose conscious experience does not fit this description of 
political intent.  It is essential for a researcher, whose antennae may well be helpfully 
augmented by political awareness, to retain the "not knowing" mental space required in order 
to allow the coalescing of accounts which are politically inconvenient, or otherwise novel 
(Casement, 1992).  The post-structuralist view of research writing, in addition, serves to free 
the researcher from the impossible – though nevertheless nagging – imperative to 
"conclusively" circumscribe and account for the subject matter at hand (Richardson & St. 
Pierre, 2005, p. 962).  Along with this freedom, it is the great strength of the psychoanalytic 
view that it provides theoretically and technically for uncertainty, for silence, and for a lack of 
knowledge.  I thus attempt to position myself as open to the resonance of familiarity, but 
equally ready for that which is not yet knowable.  It is both the manifest accounts of 
participants, and the unconscious metanarrative of process, which is a focus of study.  This 
metanarrative includes speculation on the psychic structures and assumptions underpinning 
statements, the mode of relating and social positioning which prevails, and the unconscious 
views of selfhood which are subtly described as the substrate to real life, everyday events.  
My aim in this awareness is to apprehend something of the ideologically obscured forces 
which socially position individuals in complex, often unconscious ways.  My position thus, is 
(again) carefully, but also unapologetically, interpretive.   
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The use of data 
Due to the strong, stated influence of my own theoretical background, personal insights and 
political bent, it is clear that the "idea clusters" which are the subject of the balance of this 
work are a combination of data and "intra-researcher" factors.  I consider this in the following 
section (see An "interpretive" auto-ethnography, p.245).  We have considered at length why 
the area of psychological aspects of disability and disablism is as poorly conceptualised as it 
is; what this reality implies is that the current work is by its nature exploratory, as I attempt to 
create useful ideas "from the ground up".  As I attempt to synthesise ideas from psychology 
and psychoanalysis, philosophy and politics, my conceptual discussions will track back to, 
and be demonstrated by the data, but not be reducible to it.  As alluded to earlier, the validity 
(or otherwise) of the contribution will be shown up in the extent to which the resulting 
(growing) conceptual picture is experienced by other disabled persons and researchers as 
illuminating, and stimulating of further investigation, writing, and development.   
 
An "interpretive" auto-ethnography 
Auto-ethnography is defined by Ellis (2004, p. xix) as "research, writing and method that 
connects the autobiographical and personal to the cultural and social", including such features 
as emotion, embodiment, self-consciousness and introspection.  It is generally comprised of 
self-narrative, but an account which, in telling one's own story, forms a critique of the 
"situatedness" of self within the social milieu (Spry, 2001 cited in Jones, 2005, p. 765).  The 
genre aims to express multiple layers of consciousness, in a manner which describes 
connective threads between the internal and the cultural; that is, the ideological (Ettore, 2005, 
p. 536; Ellis & Bochner, 2000).  Now, my approach in the current study does not involve 
writing in the first person, or writing about my own experience, save in the special area of 
researcher reflexivity.  My introduction of this methodological format is, instead, to draw 
clear attention to the manner in which my reading of the data, notably with regard to the 
interpretation of unconscious processes, is enriched by my own experience, and my own 
analysis.  What I am referring to is not discontinuous with the principle of self-awareness and 
constant self-examination required of any trainee or practitioner psychotherapist working 
within a psychoanalytically oriented frame.  Through this method I hope, to some degree, to 
bridge the gap between the intra-psychic and the social, via the careful employment and 
modification of my own formulations surrounding the interplay between subjectivity and 
social positioning.  As has been discussed (see Psychoanalysis and social critique: 
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Depoliticisation or subversion, p.61) the "pull" of analytically informed work tends to be 
oriented toward sense-making with an intra-psychic attributive bias.  Through the use of my 
personal conceptualisations of the mutually constitutive relationship of inner and outer 
realities, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of both psychological and contextual essentialism, in the 
understanding of the experience of disability.  The "findings" of the study are thus as much 
mine, in the sense of being artefacts of my own psychological reality, as precipitates of the 
realities of the participants.  I thus draw upon the extensive interrogation of my own socially 
situated experience not as a data set, but as interpretive tool in unpacking possible 
underpinnings of the respondent data.  The juxtaposition of my own insights, I believe, 
contributes greatly to the "thickening" of interpretive formulations, which may then be 
"tested" and modified through further discursive exploration.  It is through "reaching inside" 
my own narrative that I seek clues in "reaching into" the narratives of participants.  
 
Through the keeping of regular field-notes (Warren et al., 2000, p. 185), I continued my own 
"researcher narrative", in which concepts were born, elaborated or rejected.  These notes were 
composed of an amalgam of my own thoughts, clinical material, counter-transference 
responses, and a record of process interpretations.  The "free writing" of these notes created a 
rich thought-environment of associations, which contributed to the data set, and often 
uncovered meaning-links hidden within the material.  Ellis (1991) suggests that a social 
scientist who has personally "lived through" an experience, and carries subjectively important, 
unanswered questions about it, may usefully "employ" his or her own introspection as a data 
source (Ellis, 1991 cited in Wall, 2006, p. 3).  Whilst the risk of an "individualising" and 
"decontextualising" bias is one requiring strong vigilance (Bochner, 2001 cited in Wall, 2006, 
p. 9), the rich specificity of a closely analysed narrative account also holds great promise in 
tracking socialisation's shaping of subjectivity (Muncey, 2005, p. 7).   
 
Limitations 
Over the course of the preceding sections, many of the limitations of the study have been 
described, as these form central aspects of the method and philosophy employed.  It is not the 
intention of the investigation to "produce findings" of a necessarily generalisable nature.  Nor 
is it stipulated that the small sample group, augmented by my own experience, is necessarily a 
representative one.  Rather, in a field as yet un-conceptualised, the intention is to begin 
circumscribing idea-clusters which, over time, will be refined into useful, illuminating 
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concepts.  As has been argued, it is in the nature of disablist oppression (as in other forms), 
that the effects and management of struggle are often obscured.  Further, the intersubjective 
distortions and subtle social situating of disabled persons are often difficult to identify, and 
may, through familiarity, be mystifyingly disguised as normalcy.  The challenge confronting 
this area of research revolves around whether it is possible to "unlock" some of the hidden 
dynamics of oppression at the interpersonal and intra-psychic level, in a manner which 
facilitates the growing consciousness, and hence "separation", of disabled persons.  My 
concern, thus, is with the mechanisms of oppression; notably, the "emotional oppression" 
mentioned earlier (see Psycho-emotional aspects of disability, p. 201).  The disability studies 
literature shows a range of accounts of awakening consciousness pertaining to how one has 
been oppressively positioned, how one has colluded, and how marginality has been 
reproduced.  Developing an understanding of the mechanisms whereby ideological forces are 
"real-ised" in the lives of disabled people, it is hoped, will assist in the escaping from such 
snares, toward the growth of a more entitled, integrated, creative and valued self.   
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CHAPTER SIX   
 
Group psychotherapy with severely physically impaired adults:   
Conceptualising aspects of clinical material 
 
Introduction:  Disability and anxiety 
F: ...the difference is then how people manage that anxiety...There are some 
people who come and confront it by sort of revealing their anxiety, but I think 
they would probably be the smallest minority.  And some people who...try and 
disarm it in some way...we feel a little bit like we're tiptoeing around something.  
And...then some which are far more rare for me...is a more confrontational way 
of dealing with it...where people come and...need to...understand why I'm 
disabled ... the conversation moves to trying to find the blame for being disabled.  
And that, often times, either is God or the disabled person...and there's obviously 
the other which is just avoidance, when people try not to talk to you and try not 
to engage.   
 
Within the social-relational spaces surrounding group members on campus, in social settings, 
or in public places, dynamics of anxiety were ubiquitous.  The experience often described was 
one of being surrounded by a social world of individuals feeling awkward, subtly hostile, 
embarrassed, "at a loss", or "off balance" in the business of relating.  Melanie Klein (1948, p. 
40), in her investigation of the psychic underpinnings of anxiety in young children, found that 
anxiety was only alleviated through an analysis of sadistic fantasies and impulses.  It is thus 
aggression – or, more accurately, the fear of its consequences – which are at the root of a 
proportion of manifest anxiety.  Freud's (1933, p. 253) association of altruism with repressed 
sadism (see Reaction formation, p.104) fits well with this analysis, and clearly, if disabled 
persons do indeed "carry" our most shameful parts, the impulse to obliterate these individuals, 
and what they signify, should not surprise us (Watermeyer, 2006, p. 38).   
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The implications of the capacity of visible disability to evoke anxiety are multifarious and 
significant, and form a socio-cultural backdrop which mediates much of the relational 
phenomena described in the present work.  To begin this discussion though, it is useful to 
contemplate the personal, experiential implications of "carrying" with oneself the "cause" of 
the fear and unease of others, as one moves through the world, forced to continually occupy a 
milieu in which easy, trusting, robust and authentic relating is rare.  There is meaningful 
"messaging" regarding the nature of the self implicit in the experiences of mirroring at work 
here, ranging from disgust or pity, to the communication that one is "unmanageable", "un-
containable" or "too much to bear".  The self, in such circumstances, lives under a more or 
less consistent assault from overtly deriding, or subtly devaluing imputations, as one is forced 
to "field" the psychic "excess" of others.  One clear "demand" which emanates from such 
treatment, is the imperative to diminish – to silence – evidence of the projected psychic pain 
which is imputed to the "soul" of a "damaged" body, to which issue we now turn.   
  
Imperative to silence 
J: One thing that I have found, though, with my past peers ... I get a very 
standard response.  It's like, how are you doing, a standard response, and like, 
I'm fine.  And when you say you're fine it's got absolutely nothing to do with how 
you're actually feeling.  And, you know, conversation generally doesn't go past 
that...There's only one person that knows me the best, and that's myself.  Every 
other person... gets a sliver, but they never get a big piece.  
 
As individuals all subject to the inevitably bumpy process of development, inner aspects of 
selfhood which carry shame are a universally shared legacy of our humanity.  As corollary, 
the conflict between disclosure and disguise of those parts of ourselves we deem less 
admissible is an ongoing aspect of social life.  Is what is "inside us" palatable, tolerable, 
acceptable, loveable to others?  Assessments of this are related to the extent to which we are 
prepared to take risks in relationships, towards the garnering of validation and acceptance – 
the experience of being "seen" – which is so crucial to psychic integration.  This universal 
"challenge" of being human is, I argue, substantially amplified and rendered more salient by 
cultural constructions of disability.   
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As quoted earlier, Wendell (1997, p. 266) describes how, in her experience, "coming into the 
world" as a disabled person involves encountering profound social resistance to the "mixing" 
of "worlds"; the "normal" and the "not normal".  The result of this resistance is that much of 
disabled people's experience may go underground, due to the fact of there being no socially 
sanctioned means of giving it expression; the chance of having one's physical and emotional 
experience acknowledged is, by virtue of this fact, foregone (ibid., p. 266-7).  The threatening 
loss of control symbolized by the suffering of the body is, for Wendell (1997, p. 267), 
"despised, pitied, and above all, feared" (my emphasis).  The urge, consequently, to protect 
others from this "danger", but also to protect the self from the responses of others, is constant, 
and extremely hard to resist.  Group members described a "disability narrative", composed of 
the continuous stream of everyday experiences within which disability was a salient variable.  
These included experiences with a positive, negative or neutral valency, with the common 
denominator being that, in anecdotal accounts, impairment would cease to be the "elephant in 
the room".  Of course, experiences of struggle such as discrimination, social shunning or other 
demeaning treatment, systemic exclusion and struggles for access, impossible inconvenience, 
and impairment impacts such as pain or fatigue are ever-present parts of life in a disablist 
society.  This "metanarrative" to engaged social life continued upon a subterranean path, ever-
present and changing, but to an overwhelming degree, unspoken.  Even the starkly limited 
admission into the "mainstream" afforded to group members, was regarded as contingent 
upon this constriction of expression; not remaining silent would clearly make an already 
highly taxing set of circumstances measurably "worse".  The hidden "disability layer", it 
should be noted, is not composed of experiences which are in any way qualitatively different 
or "set apart" from the "everyday" subject matter of common small talk.  Rather, this is the 
very material, lived "fibre" of ongoing engagement with life, entirely analogous to discourse 
regarding the daily experiences and tribulations of nondisabled persons.  Murphy (1987, p. 
87) remarks on this code of silence in his own life with the simple observation that no-one has 
ever asked him "what it is like" for him to live with quadriplegia.  The reason for this Murphy 
cites is that to do so would "violate all the rules of middle-class etiquette" (ibid.).  He seems 
to be alluding here to the "normative" constraints upon personal disclosure which are a 
general feature of "polite" conduct, thus applying to all.  Yet, what is noteworthy about the 
predicaments of disabled persons is the fact that so much of life is "excommunicated" by this 
censure; so much of life is "unspeakable".  Olkin (1999, p. 77) regards the "requirement" that 
disabled persons "regulate affect" as a common aspect of life in modern society – a constraint  
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which, for Fanon's black figure, was the first hurdle to overcome in the advance to 
emancipation (Charlton, 1998, p. 74).  In Fanon's analysis, it was the "mechanisms of 
concealment" which alienated the colonised not only from one another, but from their own 
internal life and potential (ibid., pp. 74-5).  To a large extent, the "duty" to remain silent is 
part of the "normalising" which is a requirement of inclusion.   
 
The capacity to listen to the experience of another is, in practice, a demonstration of the 
willingness and strength to "tolerate" what one imagines is "inside" the other.  In 
psychoanalytic terms, this recalls Bion's (1962a; 1962b) notion of "containment".  In Bion's 
theoretical schema, the containing, accepting state of "reverie" offered to an infant by a 
mother with adequate psychic capacity to ingest her baby's unmanageable feelings, 
consequently buttresses the infant's growth, integration and learning (ibid., p. 36; Rustin, 
1996).  This early relating provides an important template for later psychic functioning; the 
concept of containment, and what it provides, has relevance throughout the life course.  In 
fact, Hinshelwood (1991) describes Bion's concept of "container and contained" as a 
mechanism whereby the notion of projective identification may be operationalised in the 
analysis of relationships between groups (Hinshelwood, 1991, p. 191; Young, 1994).   
 
Rustin (1991, p. 48) expresses what we need from others as an experience of being thought 
about; that is, having our experience known, accepted and "contained" in a manner which 
assists the psyche in the development of greater integration – that is, self-acceptance.  If we 
consider social responses to impairment, what emerges is that, as modern society, we are 
largely unable to "think about" disabled experience.  The "un-containability" of such 
subjectivity, further, seems manifestly demonstrated by society's failure to recognise and 
address the human needs of disabled persons.  Experience must be "thought about", accepted 
and validated, if the needs and "realities" of that experience are to be rendered real, and 
thence addressed.  Conversely, if, as seems to be the case, perceptions of disabled experience 
are so saturated with threatening projected fantasies that such "thinking" cannot take place, 
humanity remains disregarded.  In addition, it is important to note that these considerations 
concern only material deprivation; we have yet to consider the psychological ramifications of 
being experienced as "un-containable".   
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The implication here is not that disabled people, as individuals, are "impossible to contain".  
Rather, I suggest that, due to the archaic unconscious evocations associated with disability, 
individuals will often struggle to contain and accept others when impairment is visible.  These 
hesitant, furtive responses are probably so familiar to the congenitally impaired individual as 
to be indiscernible; as the accommodations of the "false self" to an un-containing world are 
(barely) "second-nature".  Disabled persons, in this model, are seldom afforded the experience 
of being emotionally "held", since this is contingent upon the opportunity for authentic 
expression; instead, such individuals may constantly be required to perform some of the 
"holding".  Individuals who repeatedly receive the tacit message that their inner life is 
somehow dangerous or toxic, will tend to internalise that assessment.  In other words, it is the 
containment of others which supports us in the accepting of self, and the inner reclaiming of 
alienated, shame-ridden parts of ourselves.  If – to echo Fanon – disability experience is 
relegated to these shadowy recesses, the "reality" of the social brutality suffered by this group 
will, also, remain obscured.   
 
In Bion's (1962a) view, it is not "knowledge" carried by the analyst (or the mother) which 
facilitates emotional growth, but rather a listening stance which communicates openness, 
acceptance, and a readiness to be surprised (Frosh, 2006, p. 14).  Frosh (1991, p. 77) attributes 
the violent nature of narcissistic pathology to disruption, in the modern world, of the 
conditions which facilitate the growth of a secure and cohesive self; that is, the conditions we 
may call reverie and containment.  The nature of modernity, it seems, does not provide well 
for the presence of a "processing", "containing" other, who is able to recognise and validate 
(in this case) social distress.  The cultivation of such acceptance would seem to contradict 
much of what neo-liberal, autonomous and narcissistic modernism is comprised of, with the 
disabled figure arising as the dreaded nemesis to the heart of its project.  The (perceived or 
actual) "chaos" of the narrative of bodily frailty makes the story exceptionally hard to hear to 
the Enlightenment mind, causing the teller to be relegated to the dehumanised ranks of those 
devoid of "proper" stories, and hence of "proper" lives (Frank, 1995, p. 97).  The positivist 
bulwarks of modernism and progress are incapable of "containing" these stories, or those who 
live them, as their very existence flouts the cultural stipulations of the age.  In the lives of 
disabled persons such as those who participated in the present study, the physical experience 
of exclusion – "nowhere to be" – is mirrored by an ongoing psychic experience of "overflow", 
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of "being too much", of "not fitting"; of being matter out of place (Douglas, 1966, p. 39; see 
also Kitchin, 1998).  The universally human shame of not having a place to contain one's 
innards, one's products – the secretions of experience – is continually inflicted via the 
culturally condensed rejection of lives.    
 
In a most unfortunate parallel, the social model, by denying or negating the legitimacy of 
personal, emotional and impairment-based experience, makes disabled persons themselves 
fully responsible for "containing" these aspects of life.  The imperative of the social model is 
to vigorously point to material barriers, whilst protecting others from the (possible) emotional 
implications of, notably, impairment.  Disabled people, in terms of the provisions of the 
original social model schema, must show impairment to be something completely "normal" 
and "adjusted to", where its only effects are those of prejudice.  This is probably true for many 
impaired persons, but has an oppressive implication for many others, for whom the reality of 
struggle, in Susan Wendell's (1997, p. 266) words, "goes underground". 
 
Trauma and its re-enlivening 
L: You know, I know these are pessimistic emotions that are not unique to people 
with disabilities, but I think they're probably magnified to a degree. 
 
R: You lose out on the ability to recognise yourself as valuable, as worthy, yeah, 
and I think that was...a core part of that early [post-accident] process was 
figuring out a way of... almost like a lexicon, a language...that would allow me to 
recognise...again who I was.  And...the only discourse available to you at that 
moment is...the survivor.  You know, in the early days, the fact that you didn't die 
becomes...a great achievement [small laugh]. 
 
F: I think one other thing that has been my experience of being disabled is the ... 
the huge amount of time you spend on the very mundane things. And just the 
huge amount of time I spend waiting for stuff to happen…kind of in limbo...and it 
means that ...it's almost like there's an unhealthy amount of time to chew things 
over. When you're in, kind of, emotional turmoil, you really have the space to 
torture yourself. And not to go and do something which would take you're mind 
off it for a while.  
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It is my position that one source of the perennial, splitting conflict between "experiential" and 
"materialist" accounts of disability arises from the fact that disability so often involves 
trauma.  Life in a hostile, denigrating and depriving world will visit trauma upon those it 
mistreats.  We know too that trauma, almost by definition, is difficult to "think about" (Bion, 
1962b), as it confronts us with realities beyond the bounds of our comforting expectations, 
and hence defences.  The prevalence of collective, traumatic suffering amongst disabled 
persons may present a form of "performance anxiety" (see Pressure-anxiety, p.377) to 
theorists and other writers, who may be constricted by an anxious concern regarding "doing 
justice" to the gravity of struggle at hand (see Dalenberg, 2000).  The psychically 
destabilising, evocative power of disability, in concert with this "performance anxiety", and 
the enormous diversity in forms of impairment, may render it extremely difficult to commit 
generalising descriptive statements about the nature of "disability trauma" to paper.  Also of 
note is the widespread history of disabled persons' experience having been oppressively, 
discursively defined from without.  The high incidence of individual "autobiographical" 
accounts of disability, which have been heavily criticised, is one consequence of this, which 
has led to a fragmented literature on "disability trauma" with limited political efficacy.  
Conversely, materialist accounts have the necessary "categorical power" required for political 
advocacy, but also embody an enactment of the internal alienation of disabled persons (as 
other oppressed minorities) from the subjective nature of lived experience.  Evidence of the 
sense that "much is at stake" with disability writing is to be found in the splitting which 
inheres in the discourse of "acceptance and denial" (see Acceptance and denial, p.307), which 
presents a uselessly limited, binary repertoire of being, into which disabled persons are 
discursively forced.  Either "option" provides no space for the uniqueness of individual lived 
experience.  To summarise, the conflicting forces tugging at one's sleeve as one attempts to 
produce writing on this issue, include a constrictive "reverence" for trauma (Dalenberg, 
2000), the anti-subjectivity orthodoxy of the social model, the categorical and semantic 
requirements of political expediency, and a concern that one may provide data available for 
misappropriation in support of stereotyping; together, these are formidable concerns.   
 
In psychoanalytic (rather than psychiatric) terms, "trauma" is defined as any event – of 
internal or external origin – which one's psychic defence system is not competent to shield 
oneself from (A. Freud, 1967 cited in Judd, 1994, p. 87).  Applying this construct, an 
experience of "trauma" exists as much in the shifting of meanings as in the occurrence of 
acute events; thus, a "realisation" may be "as traumatic" as an accident.  The word "trauma" is 
drawn from the Greek word for "wound", and denotes a piercing; in the current sense, of the 
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psyche's protective apparatus (ibid., p. 88).  According to Davis (2002, p. 156), the hegemony 
of "ableism" creates a systematic silence around the reality of trauma inflicted upon disabled 
persons by a hostile society.  This climate, he argues, makes it "comfortable" for us to regard, 
for example, systematic violence as merely "accidental".  He writes: 
 
One of the reasons why there is resistance to calling attacks against people with 
disabilities 'hate' crimes is because the general ideology toward people with 
disabilities rules out hate as a viable emotion.  But the 'hate' toward people with 
disabilities is a much more subtle and ingrained hatred.  It is a hatred of 
difference, or the fact that someone cannot see a clearly posted sign, cannot walk 
up unblocked stairs, needs special assistance above what other 'normal' citizens 
need.  This kind of hatred is one that abhors the possibility that all bodies are not 
configured the same, that weakness and impairment are the legacy of a cult of 
perfection and able embodiment.   
       (Davis, 2002, p. 156) 
 
As we have seen, "traditional" rehabilitationist and psychoanalytic models of "disability 
trauma" have relied upon an oppressive, victim-blaming logic which tends to view 
psychological states as the pre-social "sequelae" of bodily impairment (Asch & Rousso, 1985; 
Watermeyer, 2002; 2006).  The challenge, then, is to begin to conceptualise disability trauma 
in a manner which avoids such simplistic, impairment-based reductionism.  This directs us 
towards the realm of individual psychological development, which carries the familiar snares 
of pathologisation and decontextualisation; that is, the lack of a critical analysis of oppressive 
social forces.   What is required is an analysis which is able to examine psychological – that 
is, individual – states, whilst retaining a rigorous, contextual critique of social factors, and 
hence overcoming the perennial, distorting splits which have so dogged disability theory.  
Thomas (1999b, p. 47) describes a precisely analogous dilemma as she considers the 
challenge of developing a psychology of identity development in relation to disability; in 
other words, engaging with the issue of "personal identity formation", but with a "heavy 
sociological slant".  She offers no ideas regarding how this could be done without falling into 
an approach which individualises disability.   
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The model which I propose is one which begins from the (already established) premise that all 
humans, by virtue of the nature of identity development, and in terms of the Freudian 
"conflict model" of mind, carry unconscious psychic wounds.  As has been discussed at 
length, any argument for some qualitative difference in psychic functioning or subjectivity 
between disabled and nondisabled persons is fallacious (Watermeyer, 2002), as such a view 
inevitably tracks back to a pre-social cause-effect logic which ignores ideology.  Instead, all 
carry philogenetically equivalent, hidden parts of self which bear the scars of contextual 
misattunement, of shame, self-loathing, fearful inadequacy, and the like, which have origins 
beginning with the nature of the most primary of attachment relations.  But where we must 
begin to theorise upon the question of "disability difference" is in the systematic ways in 
which disablist prejudice and oppressive social positioning selectively enlivens and confirms 
these split-off, malignant aspects of self within the disabled individual.  I propose that what 
cultural formations surrounding disability produce is an experience of systematically perverse 
social mirroring, which acts to re-evoke, confirm and aggravate the most vulnerable, 
wounded, or self-attacking parts of the self-identities of persons with impairments.  I term this 
mirroring systematically perverse because its "perversion" is unconsciously mediated by 
precisely the sorts of shame-ridden existential conflicts which its action "speaks to" within the 
psychological lives of those it targets.  Via projective identification, the distorted mirroring 
directed at disabled persons works to evoke, to enact and realise, precisely those parts of the 
psychic self which dominant group members seek to disown.   
 
As we saw earlier (see Psychoanalysis and disability: A brief history, p.73), Freud's (1914, p. 
561) view on disability, though at times somewhat ambiguous, largely construed impairment 
as something which would be used as a "pretext" by the ego for the living out of what were, in 
fact, repressed psychic conflicts of a more constitutional nature.  In continuing this discussion 
regarding the purported relationship between physical characteristics and psychic functioning, 
he writes:  
 
We may be tempted to believe a neurotic woman patient when she tells us that it 
was inevitable she should fall ill, since she is ugly, deformed or lacking in 
charm, so that no one could love her; but the very next neurotic will teach us 
better – for she persists in her neurosis and in her aversion to sexuality, although 
she seems more desirable, and is more desired, than the average woman. 
      (Freud, 1914, p. 561) 
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What Freud (1914) seems to be supporting here is a view which construes the presence of 
neuroses as common across bodily differences, with situational factors selectively enlivening 
(as well as creating) disturbance.  Such factors, as we have seen (see Culture and prejudice, 
p.147), may exist in the form of differential, limited access to "worldly" narcissistic supports 
for the containment of incipient layers of disturbance, as well as denigrating imputations 
inflicted upon the "pariahs" of society.  Young (1994, p. 139) describes how research into the 
psychic effects of catastrophic events demonstrates that the trauma functions like a "homing 
device", and "ransacks...the history of the victim until it finds a congruent, early experience" 
(my emphasis).  The new event then "latches on" to this psychic part, in a manner which 
attributes meaning; typically of a type which confirms, solidifies and empowers split-off and 
destabilising aspects of self.  Acute experiences of trauma leading to adventitious impairment 
are very relevant here, though not exclusively.  For complex, systemic and cultural reasons, 
such emotional trauma may often not be effectively psychologically processed (see 
Acceptance and denial, p.307).  The primitive, malignant meaning-position which such an 
acute experience may take up in psychic space thereafter, may coalesce meanings regarding 
identity which "set the tone" for the ongoing denigrations of prejudicial mistreatment. In 
other words, the un-digested trauma may lend credence to social ascriptions of brokenness 
and damage, which are directed at the body, but felt as the self.  Clearly, though, even in the 
absence of such acute trauma, the ongoing trauma of demeaning social responses will 
continually "ransack" the psychic space of disabled persons, seeking alliances with mutinous 
parts of the self.   
 
If we believe that political activity inevitably activates, and is mutually constitutive with, 
early infantile and developmental conflicts (Parin, 1985, p. 66), then surely the nature of 
oppressive political relations must equally – if not more directly – engage with individual 
psychological characteristics.  Correspondingly, Raphael-Leff's (1994, p. 14) psychoanalytic 
work in child-bearing shows up how the "body work" (rooted in cultural meanings) of 
pregnancy and birth conjure a host of body percepts retained from different developmental 
phases.  The evocativeness of reproductive changes, mediated by the cultural significations 
these carry, selectively "enliven" various parts of the developmental self, both "healthy" and 
"disturbed".  The social model's circumvention of all things psychological creates a disabled  
 258
figure which is artificially homogenous; oppressed, yet unfeeling, without character or unique 
patterns of response.  The key issue is the failure of such a view to recognise that trauma – or 
"life stressors" – are made sense of psychodynamically in terms of personal meanings.  That 
is, in terms of (probably largely unconscious) pre-existing fears, vulnerabilities, suspicions 
regarding one's "true" nature, and the like.   
 
The picture beginning to crystallise, thus, is one in which traumatic events are in the essence 
of the ongoing treatment afforded to impaired persons within a disablist society.  But beyond 
this drone of discrimination, for some impaired persons, perhaps especially those with 
lifelong congenital impairments, a history of traumatic attacks upon the self is likely to have 
been even more direct, specific, and hurtful.  Consider, for example, the heightened likelihood 
of parental separation difficulties and childhood "parentification", the incidence of false self 
pathology, controlling (reaction formation-based) parenting bent on repair, moral and 
rehabilitative imperatives to be more "normal", exile to special schooling or other institutional 
care, receipt of familial-systemic projections of damage, and a host of other destructive 
influences on the development of a robust self.  It is then left to a discriminatory world to 
manifest a consistent pattern of directed re-traumatisation, recapitulating and confirming fears 
regarding unworthiness and unacceptability, re-opening old wounds and re-evoking malignant 
self-object experiences.  The internal chronicity of battles relating to trying to feel legitimate, 
entitled, whole and healthy may, consequently, be hard to escape.    
 
 Though not assuming a psychoanalytic stance, Paterson and Hughes' (1999, p. 603) notion of 
the "dysappearing body" intersects well with this formulation.  Consider the following extract:  
 
When one is confronted by social and physical inaccessibility one is 
simultaneously confronted by oneself; the external and the internal collide in a 
moment of simultaneous recognition.  When one encounters prejudice in 
behaviour or attitude, one's impaired body 'dys-appears'. 
     (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 603) 
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As one's lived body "dys-appears", we may assume that the range of differing, fluctuant 
aspects of the body ego (see Monstrosity, p.119 and Attachment and infancy, p.162) forged in 
formative moments of physicality may be selectively re-evoked and enlivened by social 
experience.  In concert with this, impaired modes of being are constantly de-legitimated by 
the "carnal information" inherent in socially produced embodied norms of functioning (ibid.).  
Impairment, thus, settles in experience as a blight upon conventions of functioning which are, 
a priori, hostile to alternate forms of physicality.  The impaired body is excluded from making 
a contribution to shared "carnal information", and is therefore denied a home in the social 
world (ibid., p. 604).  What is rendered, to Paterson and Hughes (1999, p. 604), is a form of 
"homelessness", wrought of the fact that the "information that animates the world is 
dominated by a ... specific hegemonic form of carnality, which excludes as it constructs" (my 
emphasis).  The parallels between this theoretical formulation and the prior consideration of 
"containment" (see Imperative to silence, p.249) are clearly apparent.  The disruptions 
afforded by bodily "dysappearances" to the possibility of the experiencing of an ongoing, 
continuous "stream" of self (Winnicott, 1974), seem immense.   
 
To close this discussion, Davids (1996) echoes my position by problematising Fanon's (1952; 
1963) analysis of racial oppression, pointing out that he fails to bring to life the unique 
meanings of social mistreatment in the context of psychological development.  "Fanon's", 
writes Davids (1996, p. 227), "is a passive, idealised child, the innocent victim of a 
malevolent split permeating down from the social".  The passivity of his subject obscures to 
Fanon the crucial issue of the child's own awareness of colour, and the way that difference is 
psychically appropriated in the manifesting of unconscious conflicts (ibid.).  Fanon's victim of 
oppression is a unidimensional "uncomplicated" subject, whose form, in my view, separates 
him or her from the commonality of the human condition.  The idea of disablist mistreatment 
enlivening destructive aspects of the internal world brings disabled persons into the picture as 
unique, fallible, quintessentially human individuals, not the simplified victims of a uniform 
oppression presented to us by the social model. The important paradox here lies in the fact 
that it is in the personal malignancy of oppression – the emergence of human abjection which 
oppression stimulates – that the universality of human subjectivity is to be found.  Instead of 
separating out disabled people, such an approach directs us toward beginning to value the 
contribution which an analysis of disabled experience will make to our common appreciation 
of the human condition.   
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Disability and the distortion of personal and psychic boundaries 
Introduction 
Through the course of the group process, the issue of personal and psychic boundaries – their 
maintenance, and their distortion – began to emerge as pivotal to developing an understanding 
of the psychological, relational circumstances surrounding disablement.  As we begin this 
discussion, Robert Murphy's (1987) words set the scene:  
 
...it [his paralysis] has visited upon me a disease of social relations no less real 
than the paralysis of the body.   
     (Murphy, 1987, p. 4 – my emphasis) 
 
Robert Murphy (1987) refers here to his often agonized personal wrangle with relational 
distortions which emerged with his burgeoning impairment.  Much of what I suggest 
regarding psychological-relational dynamics surrounding disability in the current work point 
towards the "common denominator" of a distortion of personal and psychic boundaries 
(Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008).  The psychoanalytic critique of disablism (Marks, 1999a; 
Watermeyer, 2006) relies heavily upon the notion of psychic material moving between 
individuals, through such processes as projective identification, and via the "perforation" of 
the "psychic skin".  Accepted cultural norms of etiquette and respect for privacy are, in the 
case of disability, routinely flouted.  It is, for example, difficult to find a visibly disabled 
person who has not had the experience of being asked the question "so ... what happened to 
you?" by a stranger (Slack, 1999, p. 33).  The level of intimacy and shared history in a 
relationship required to ask a correspondingly personal question to a nondisabled person 
would be considerable; yet, such intrusions occur routinely, and may go unproblematised.  
There are clues, I believe, in such anomalies which alert us to the subtext of control and 
defensive psychic appropriation of the disabled figure as a counterpoint to dominant 
narcissism.  The respectful maintenance of clear boundaries would preclude such 
appropriation, by blocking the ascriptions required to "create" disabled persons as the 
custodians of shame and damage.    
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Disability discrimination is by its nature subtle and nebulous, creating subordinating 
meanings which may be so disguised as kindness, or some other "normative" intent, as to slip 
into an oppressive "home" in the self unnoticed.  It is slippery and difficult to see, and 
consequently, difficult to resist.  Gill (2001, p. 366) observes with keen insight how disabled 
persons "rarely encounter the clarity of contempt associated with racism and homophobia", as 
such sentiments are typically actively repressed by others.  Furthermore, undermining 
ascriptions made to disabled persons are, until critically considered, not as clearly "illogical" 
as racist rhetoric, as the presence of impairment  imbues such ideas not only with a 
"rationality" (ibid.) but, more sinisterly, with an admirable empathy.  It is, in Gill's (2001, p. 
366) view "more difficult to refute a distortion of fact than an outright fiction".  Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, it is often extremely difficult for disabled persons to grasp the 
political reality of their predicament, as subordination emanates not from "prejudiced 
villains", but from persons with whom they may identify deeply (ibid.).  Family members, 
friends and other "good people", who believe in justice, may, confoundingly, be the source of 
only subtly visible devaluing attributions.   
 
In a paper entitled The Exceptions, Freud (1916) presents reflections on a profile of 
psychological functioning which he believes to be closely associated with physical 
impairment.  In patients with a congenital impairment, or an incapacitating illness of early 
childhood onset, Freud (1916, p. 591) noted a conspicuous resistance to acceptance of the 
reality principle.  These individuals took the position that they had "suffered enough", and 
thus should be allowed to remain un-subject to such rules; they should be allowed the status 
of "exceptions".  In analytic work, such patients showed marked resistance to relinquishing 
the pleasure principle, rejecting the delayed gratifications which follow the painful embracing 
of psychic reality.  Of this group, Freud (1916) writes:  
 
They say that they have renounced enough and suffered enough, and have a 
claim to be spared any further demands; they will submit no longer to any 
disagreeable necessity, for they are exceptions and, moreover, intend to remain 
so...Their neuroses were connected with some experience or suffering to which 
they had been subjected in their earliest childhood, one in respect of which they 
knew themselves to be guiltless, and which they could look upon as an unjust 
disadvantage imposed on them.    
     (Freud, 1916, p. 591) 
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The figure Freud (1916, p. 593) chooses to animate this discussion is Shakespeare's Richard 
III, who believed that nature had done him a "grievous wrong" by denying him the physical 
beauty which is required to win human love.  This "wrong" led Richard to believe himself 
entitled to reparation, whilst simultaneously exempting him from the responsibility of treating 
others in a scrupulous manner (ibid.).  His logic, thus, was one of "I may do wrong, since 
wrong has been done to me" (ibid. –  my emphasis).  As is by now familiar in psychoanalytic 
accounts of disability, Freud (1916, p. 593) then conflates psychological phenomena 
purportedly of "bodily" and "cultural" origin, by locating Richard III's "neurosis" as an 
enormously amplified version of a universal human struggle.  He reasons that all of us, at a 
pre-conscious level, demand reparation for the ways in which we have been short-changed by 
nature, with bodies and minds that are replete with imperfections.  The fact that we were not 
born beautiful or of exceptional intellect inflicts wounds upon our narcissism, and creates 
within us the firm conviction that "it's not fair".  Freud (1916) asserts that women, due to their 
"universal" fantasy experience of having been mutilated and hence diminished in infancy, are 
particularly prone to the assuming of the position of "the exception", and the consequent 
claim to exemption from "the importunities of life" (ibid.).  The embitterment, holds Freud 
(1916, p. 593), of so many daughters in relation to their mothers emanates from a deeply held 
reproach at having been brought into the world as female rather than male.   
 
Rosemarie Garland Thomson (Thomson, 1997b, p. 37) slates Freud's (1916) essay as rank 
essentialism, reading that, for Freud, "deformities of character" are the results of physical 
impairment, rendering a universal psycho-pathologisation of disabled people.  Lennard Davis 
(2002, p. 123), equally critical, regards Freud's (1916) formulation as a malignant 
reinforcement of stereotyping, not least that applied by United States judges and jurors in 
cases of litigation surrounding the Americans with Disabilities Act (see Disability: The 
international development context, p.14).  The overwhelming proportion of failed attempts at 
using the provisions of the ADA reflect, for Davis (2002, p. 148), a prejudicial suspicion 
amongst legal authorities regarding disabled persons who want "a free ride", "special 
treatment", or recompense of some form for the rude "injustice" of impairment.  The anxiety-
ridden logic at work here surrounds the fear that one "exception" allowed will lead to a tidal 
wave of others, resulting in the inundation of officials, the draining of resources, and a 
fantasied descent into generalised chaos.  Seeming to support Freud's (1916) "essentialism", 
Jacobson (1959, p. 139) provides a psychoanalytic account of her work with impaired persons 
who regard themselves as "exceptions".  Drawing expressly on Freud's (1916) essay, she 
asserts that women, and disabled people, will tend to possess "defective" superegos, which 
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fail to fully subject them to the laws of morality and fairness.  In addition, this lack occurs in 
association with a masochistic need for punishment, based upon unconscious self-hatred 
(ibid.).  This hatred toward the self may be cloaked, or warded off, by "unconscious rebellion 
and scorn of the laws which others must obey" (as in Freud's [1916] picture), or may be 
utilised as a defence against such rebellion, manifesting consciously as a sentimental belief 
that one was "chosen" to suffer (ibid.).     
 
Clearly, what Freud (1916) is referring to, is a distortion of boundaries; in particular, the 
purported demands of disabled persons to be exempted from the moral limits set on others.  
As identified previously, and as in so much of his writing, Freud's (1916) position on this 
issue seems indistinct; whether so by inadvertency or design is an important question for our 
consideration.  Freud (1916) begins by referring explicitly to disabled persons as manifesting 
of what I shall term "exceptionalism", but then positions such neurotic phenomena 
(qualitatively, if not quantitatively) as a universal artifact of development.  What remains 
unclear, though, is whether Freud (1916) necessarily intends eschewing the influence of 
discrimination and politics in shaping the experiences of self of disabled people.   
 
In the face of the virulent feminist critique of the Freudian notion of penis envy (Freud, 1925), 
Juliet Mitchell (1974) reinterprets Freud's intention as diametrically opposite to that attributed 
to him by such criticism.  For Mitchell (1974, p. 54), the "penis" of penis envy was a symbol 
of the political reality of male power in a patriarchal world.  The body – that is, bodily 
differences between men and women – was being interpreted, as a mode of making sense of 
political realities.  Freud was, in fact, positioning himself as a critical social commentator, 
pointing to the particularity of gender inequality he saw around him.  The "envy" felt by 
women was thus not so much of an organ, as of a social status.  And further, the 
psychological realities of women were not viewed as a product of the nature of bodies, but of 
the manner in which such bodies were socially positioned.  Thus, it was politics that imbued 
the female form with incompleteness, and rendered masculine anatomy the object of envy.  
As a corollary, the "exceptionalism" of women was not an artifact of body shape, but a 
response to the asymmetric nature of gender relations.  The demand to be indulged was 
therefore borne of a combination of, firstly, the (largely unconscious) recognition of structural 
unfairness, and secondly, the sedimented nature of gender culture and socialisation, which – 
we may surmise – created a field of "spongy" limits around the assumed "frailty" of the 
female ego and physique.  Now, if we apply an analogous logic to Freud's (1916) utterances 
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on the topic of disability, what emerges is a picture of selves whose "difference" has been 
imbued with psychic meaning via the systematic distortions in treatment characteristic of 
disability oppression.   
 
In the sections to follow we will examine at some length the relational distortions – the 
distortion of personal and psychic boundaries (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008) – which prevail 
around physical difference.  If, as Lussier (1980, p. 181) would inform us, the body is 
increasingly cathected by the developing child as it is, rather than as it should be, then from 
where might the shaping of "exceptionalism" emanate, but from culture?  If Freud does 
believe that impairment leads, unmediated, to self-entitlement, or the female "lack" of a penis 
leads, equally unmediated, to penis envy, then how would he argue this?  In order to make 
provision for such a state of affairs, we would need to revert to a simplistic, essentialist view 
of the body ego as a pre-social, ahistoric reflection of anatomy.  Further, we would have to 
endorse the, frankly, preposterous idea that body-image in general is not profoundly mediated 
by culture.  If we disbelieve this in the case of the nondisabled body – and I assume we do – 
then, surely, we should do the same in the case of the congenitally impaired body.  My own 
emphasis in this regard is upon an examination of how unconscious conflicts stimulated by 
exposure to disability systematically maintain a culture of permeable boundaries in 
relationships surrounding people with impairments.  The question for our consideration 
concerns what the origins are, in this population, of the belief that one is inferior, and thus 
deserves a special dispensation.  As Jacobson (1959, p. 139) notes, the "entitlement" of the 
"exceptions" is a conscious disguise for a deeper, masochistic self-loathing.  Is the lack of 
belief in one's ability to "stand up" to the clear limits of social rules not an artefact of the 
denigration implicit in ascriptions of lack, frailty and damage?  The self-hatred of which 
Jacobson (1959, p. 139) speaks may, in women as well as in disabled persons, be an effect of 
the construction of both of these populations as inherently incapable, inferior and incomplete, 
rendering the emergence of narcissistic entitlements which barely cover the miserable 
internalisations of self gleaned from the projections of the social world.  Notably, Jacobson 
(1959, p. 139) refers to the presence of a "defective" superego as a concomitant to the psychic 
attitude of the "exception"; yet clearly, the "defect" of which she speaks is not one of 
insufficient stringency.  On the contrary, what we see is an especially punitive, authoritarian 
superego, which is "managed" via quite crude devices of reaction formation, which may 
transform self-loathing into prerogative, whilst simultaneously enacting suspicions that the 
self is fundamentally lacking, and hence must live on "charity".  The deeply socialised links to 
cultural formations such as disability altruism are concrete representations of the hegemonic, 
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invisible status of such projective dynamics, which take up residence unbidden and, perhaps 
for lifetimes, unseen in the core of the self.  The self-punitive excesses of the superego in 
some disabled persons (see On being un-disabled, p.310 and Disabled superego, p.299) bear 
rich testimony to attempts to evacuate the self of the stubborn imputations of 
"exceptionalism", inability, and the need for benevolence.   
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Within Heinz Kohut's (1966; 1972) model of the role of primary narcissism in self 
development, what the "exceptions" manifest psychologically are the implications of 
inadequate positive participation of important others in the process of developing self 
cohesion (Kohut, 1966, p. 68; Frosh, 1991; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).  Narcissistic 
entitlements to "special treatment" here are the outcome of disapproval and rejection by early 
self-objects suffered by a child, whose psychic life thereafter is characterised by a need for 
escape from the abjection which inheres in the self.  The early self, thus deprived, falls under 
attack; what happens is that its normative, healthy, grandiose and idealising inclinations 
become repressed, instead of realistically modified (Frosh, 1991, p. 103).  What we see here is 
the lack of provision of adequate narcissistic needs to the young child in order for him or her 
to fully internalise, and trust his or her capacity for accordance with, the reality principle.  
Instead, the result through development may be a taut vacillation of the ego between 
overestimation of the virtues of the self, and intolerable feelings of inferiority (ibid.).  Frosh 
(1991) summarises the psychological picture:  
 
Thus the exhibitionism and grandiosity of the child remain in action in a 
repressed form, unrealistic and unrealised in any healthy way, with failure and 
rejection experienced as deeply shameful and disturbing, and with chronic 
manipulativeness and avoidance of dependency the only possible paths to 
interpersonal stability.   
      (Frosh, 1991, p. 103) 
 
The salience of this model to the question of the disabled self and the purported incidence of 
"exceptionalism" is, I believe, profound.  It is, as has been argued, very difficult for parents 
socialised within a segregated, disablist world to have healthy "faith" in their disabled child's 
capacity to grow, separate and develop.  This seems very likely to present difficulties with the 
nourishing of a child's healthy narcissistic needs, such as the subjective strength required to 
separate, and to survive disappointment.  The distorting possibilities are of unhealthy 
indiscriminate "indulgence", or, equally, of a reactionary, withholding spartanism.  The 
picture which takes shape, thus, is of disabled persons as a systematically intersubjectively-
psychologically disadvantaged group, often deprived of the narcissistic resources all humans 
need, by force of the disruptive unconscious material evoked in others (including parents) by 
the presence of bodily difference.  Beyond this, and as we shall see, is a world of unreal, 
"enmeshed" or "patronising" relating surrounding disabled persons, which repeatedly mirrors 
the implicit message that one is not able to perform in the "mainstream"; that one is 
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"different", and requires special "support" due to one's inherent "dependency".  The crux of 
the issue is that these undermining meanings exist everywhere – in intersubjective spaces, in 
cultural representations, in parents and families, and in disabled persons themselves.  If 
reactionary exaggeration of ability or personal value occurs in opposition to cultural 
denigrations, then this must be carefully separated from the rational, enraged, and hence 
politically entitled, response to disablist exclusion which must also prevail.  There is 
dehumanisation implicit in one's being constructed as an "exception", as it robs not only one's 
rightful place within the common stream of the human condition, but also one's belief in the 
rightful ownership of such a place.  What is so fitting, so mystifying and confounding, in the 
lives of disabled persons regarding the "exceptionalist" logic of "it's not fair" is that, in real 
lives, and in the most brutal fashion, it really isn't fair.  For all human beings, the question of 
what one deserves, what one is entitled to or may ask from the world, is one with deeply 
rooted psychic connections, and complex, conflicting answers.  In the world of disability, the 
atmosphere is perpetually thick with cross-cutting and contradictory, yet forceful, projected 
imputations regarding one's entitlement.  Such meanings span the helplessly dependent pathos 
of the disabled figure in charity advertising, the authoritarian imperatives to normalise of the 
rehabilitation discourse, the vicious accusations of "freeloading" evident in popular culture, 
the relentless call to greater "independence" evident everywhere, and the religious or quasi-
spiritual disability rhetoric of redemption and "overcoming", amongst very much else.  This is 
a world of chronically, severely, and often perversely, disturbed boundaries.    
 
The relationship of psychic boundaries and anxiety 
When psychic boundaries – within as well as between us – are contravened, or threaten to fail, 
or become murky and indistinct, anxieties tend to arise, borne of a threat to psychic cohesion 
and equilibrium.  Not being able to clearly "see" the limits of oneself, or the far reaches of 
reflected internal threats, brings the fear of danger from malevolent forces based upon the 
indistinctness of power and locality.  The power of disability to evoke projections means that 
exposure to disability often triggers boundary-less dynamics of relating, rendering anxiety, 
and possibly subsequent needs for control.  As a group therapist, I am compelled by disability, 
as projective identifications are activated in drawing me into the vicarious gratification of 
needs I ascribe to the other, whilst I simultaneously have a need to subdue, control and 
protect.   
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The concept of the "healthy" boundary is that which is associated with the depressive position 
(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 126), which signposts a level of psychic maturity at which the 
ego "can define the boundary between what is inside and what is outside, and can control the 
transactions between the one and the other" (Rice, 1965 cited in Palmer, 2002, p. 162).  It is, 
in my view, precisely such reflexive, "depressive position functioning" which is often 
prohibited amidst the heady atmosphere of archaic evocations surrounding disability.  Anzieu 
(1985) introduces the concept of the "skin-ego", which is a fantasied membrane separating 
inner, mental contents from the outside world (Anzieu, 1985 cited in Hinshelwood & Chiesa, 
2002b, p. 16).  We may speculate that experiences of intrusion upon the physical space of the 
infant or child are reflected as disturbances or distortions of this membrane, rendering 
uncertainty regarding the bounds and "ownership" of mental contents and mental space.  It 
should be clear that such a developmental milieu may have significant implications in shaping 
congenitally disabled persons as psychically receptive to the unwanted emotional parts and 
social roles of others.   
 
As was argued earlier (see Monstrosity, p.119), the "freakishness" of the impaired body has 
the power to pose an acute threat to internal, conceptual boundaries within the observer, such 
as those between male and female, sexed and sexless, animal and human, self and other, 
experience and fantasy, and so forth (Fiedler, 1978, p. 24).  This destabilisation raises the 
threat to internal equilibrium of malignant, split-off parts of the self, rendering the need for 
"further" boundary contravention in the form of projective identification, as the psyche 
struggles to regain the sense of control brought by "clear separations".  Paradoxically, it is 
through the need to be "separate" (distinct, different) from the disabled individual, that the 
observer coerces him or her into a narcissistic form of merger, via the re-creation of the 
disabled figure as a custodian of projections.  Disabled persons, consequently, may 
chronically be socially located in a confused space as regards where they begin and end, as 
parts of the self are inserted, extracted, controlled, appropriated, re-defined, and categorized 
by an incessantly invested social world.  There is, thus, a continuum from the spectacle of the 
show freak to the personal encounter with disability, in which the assumed bodily and psychic 
integrity of the observer is challenged by a confounding destabilising of the "typical" 
(Mitchell & Snyder, 2001, p. 210).  The subversive force to the psyche of this challenge is 
often too much to bear alone, as the conflicts it enlivens render psychic compromises 
unfeasible, and evacuation and control become the only workable courses of action.   
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Being real 
L:  Yes, it's...authenticity.  I mean, I think that's the heart of the problem...I feel 
like, if there is an answer to that...that would be the holy grail in terms of 
finding...a normal way of negotiating relationships...Spontaneous...I think 
spontaneity is the heart of it.   
 
Group members described moving in social worlds in which they were seldom related to in a 
manner which felt natural, spontaneous, robust, and real – in short, in a manner not 
substantially impacted upon by projections.  It is a reliable truism that when one party in an 
interaction slips into relating of an un-real, un-separate nature, the other participant – 
knowingly or otherwise – is almost invariably drawn into collusion with this.  Dynamics of a 
complex, collusory mutual "protectionism" thus take root, stilting communication and 
contact; this is a mode of relating particularly difficult to shift.  The "silence" around real or 
imagined "disability experience" may take many forms, and, in the case of the disabled 
individual, often spreads to constraints upon self-disclosure of a more general nature.  
Projections occupying the silence may (for nondisabled others) be of the form of an 
assumption that what is unspoken is a dreadful reality which "we all know about", and thus 
requires no explication.  Nondisabled persons may make pre-conscious sense of their own 
avoidance via the generally irrational idea of "protecting" disabled persons from something 
they would clearly not want to be reminded of.  Self-circumscription by disabled persons is 
thus rendered immensely difficult, as this must be performed in the face of (probably) 
contrary projections, and within a manner which concurrently manages the hyper-vigilant 
anxiety of others, who may be tremulously awaiting confirmation of their fears.  This 
attribution of meaning, with consequent implications for anxiety in relating, is largely 
unconscious, yet palpably felt in the moment of contact.  The awareness, within that moment 
of relating, of the need to subtly "reassure", to contain something of the anxieties of the other, 
militates directly against the "showing" of self and experience, since – as group members 
described – one will then simply "have to do more looking after".  Such a turn of events may 
lead, for the disabled speaker, to an even greater experience of being "un-seen", as energy and 
attention turn towards the nature – the self – of the observer, visibly manifest in his or her 
disability fears.  The predicament of disabled persons in this world of non-real relating is, 
therefore, one of a rock and a hard place.  Either one placates and protects the other, colluding 
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with and reproducing unrealness, and hence remaining invisible; or, one may attempt to show 
authentic experience in a manner which may evoke splits, manic impulses toward reparation, 
anxious withdrawal, or even sadistic prejudice (for evidence of the latter, see Cahill & 
Eggleston, 1994 cited in Gill, 2001, p. 261).  The common denominator in both scenarios is 
that the self of the disabled person remains largely unacknowledged.   
 
Gill's (2001, p. 361) assessment of available research is that, whilst disabled people report that 
the need to placate others creates a disquieting disconnect between public and private 
personas, most choose to weather this internal stress rather than continually face manifest 
confrontation.  Frosh (1991, p. 99), quoting Miller (1979), describes how narcissism within 
parents may lead to "false self" (Winnicott, 1960) psychic structures within children, resulting 
from the domination of the intersubjective space by parental needs for recognition and 
gratification.  As has been described (see Mirroring, p.213), conformity, inauthenticity, and 
barriers to true intimacy are the result.  The picture of interactions in the "mainstream" world 
described by disabled group members was one strongly analogous to this, where 
accommodation and silence became second nature.  Interestingly, evidence from group 
members also concurred with research literature in portraying young children as far more 
likely to relate to a visibly impaired person in a "refreshingly" robust, real and honest way 
(Coleman, 1997, p. 220).  Children do not typically eschew physical differences, but also do 
not avoid attending to them, often responding with interest and questioning curiosity, but not 
stigmatisation (ibid.).  Hahn (1997) found that, in order to "read" the attitudes of others, 
visibly disabled persons tended to develop a particular proficiency in discerning non-verbal 
cues (Hahn, 1997 cited in Gill, 2001, p. 361).  Observation, by Braithwaite (1999), of 
nondisabled persons in the presence of visible impairment rendered much evidence of 
discomfort, expressed through such behaviours as fidgeting, minimal eye contact, staring, 
physical distancing, expressions of sympathy, avoidance, or acting as though the impairment 
does not exist (Braithwaite, 1999 cited in Gill, 2001, p. 361).  In response to this "affected" 
treatment, disabled persons employed a range of strategies to promote acceptance, including 
making conversation about "normal things", sensitively managing curious questions, and 
"taking control of helping behaviours in ways that signal their full personhood" (ibid.).  
Similarly, Fox and Giles (1996, p. 266-7) summarise research assessing the "unusual" aspects 
of nondisabled non-verbal interaction when in the presence of visible disability; these include 
shorter interactions that end prematurely, increased physical proximity, less smiling, and 
heightened galvanic skin response.  With regard to verbal behaviours, nondisabled persons 
often expressed opinions relatively unrepresentative of their own, which were more similar to 
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those of a disabled interactant, or used lower verbal immediacy (a measure of psychological 
distance indicated by word choice) in such interactions (ibid.; see also Hordon, 1994).  In 
Sinason's (1992, p. 139) clinical experience, "fake cheerfulness" is the most common means 
whereby disabled persons deal with the silencing exclusions of everyday interaction – a 
strategy which is "often encouraged and rewarded as a sign of genuine good humour".  
Disturbingly, it is abused and disabled children who are the only two statistically significant 
groups who produce "big smiles" on their drawings (ibid.).  What this points to is the extent to 
which the relational defences of the intersubjective world must extend into the psychic lives 
of disabled people, where a systematic lack of containment (Bion, 1962a) and accurate 
mirroring (see Imperative to silence, p.249) must serve to limit the psychic resources required 
in order to maintain contact with the more traumatic or dysphoric aspects of experience.   
 
R: Yes,...because I'd cultured my own behaviour in a way of...pretty much 
whatever the nondisabled students I was around felt like doing, I'd sort of modify 
my behaviour so that it gels with what's going on...we are the minority, and so 
we just sort of gel in.  It's not something that I question, really, it's something I've 
done all my life.   
 
Murray (2006, p. 39), in a first-person account, describes how the "deep pain" of disablist 
exclusion lies in "the denial of access to 'ordinary' relationship".  Murphy (1987, p. 121) 
concurs, referring to the prevalence of a "forced artificiality", involving "joviality", the 
"pretense of humour", and "effusive friendliness", all of which rob the disabled individual of 
real social engagement, along with the realisation of self which this brings.  The essence of 
authentic relating lies in the capacity to "feel real"; to have, in the presence of another, a 
reasonably continuous access to one's internal stream of being (Ashforth & Tomiuk, 2000).  It 
is the safety – the containment (Bion, 1962a) – of trusting relationships which allows 
subjectivity to come into relief, in order that it may be recognised, processed, and integrated.  
If this is to occur, the intersubjective milieu must be relatively free of silencing, or any form 
of protectionism, so that attention may be focused inward.  The (hypothesised) systematic 
lack of such relating in the lives of disabled persons, with the "de-realising" implications this 
brings for subjectivity and psychic integration, must embody a substantial obstacle to the 
development of a clear and articulate voice of the experience of disablist exclusion, which is 
so important to the business of advocacy for social change.  Undoubtedly, such relating is 
dynamic and may be deeply socialised.  As a result, it is participated in – and hence 
perpetuated – by all concerned, as in the following:   
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F: ...kind of hyper-managing your relationships like this, means that you create 
the room to have...'normal'...relationships, but only up until a certain point, and 
then...people...they realise that they don't have access to parts of you that they 
would with other people...I feel it creates a certain...glass ceiling to 
relationships.  Yeah, you hit...a line in the sand.  
 
In order to "break the spell" of disability projections, it is "robust friendships" which are 
(universally) needed, not "kid gloves" (Coleridge, 1993, p. 39).  Simi Linton (2006, p. 17) 
viscerally captures her experience of this need for realness.  She relates how, soon after an 
accident in which she suffered a spinal cord injury, she was telephoned by an old friend.  "I'm 
OK", she said, to which her friend loudly exclaimed "You're fucking paralysed!"  After 
everyone had "been so nice", this friend's honest, real response to her experience was a 
profound signal of inclusion; of "normalcy".  A similar sentiment is expressed in the 
following, in which a group member describes an incident in a "disability awareness" seminar 
which he chaired: 
 
R: Then one guy put up his hand, and he says, 'I avoided you last year because 
I'm terrified, not just scared, I'm terrified of what you represent'; and that was 
refreshing, so I could just take it from there.  That was real.  I said 'great', this is 
the kind of response I want.  You're expressing what you, and probably what a 
lot of other people feel.  
 
Over-politeness, as much as outright discrimination, is a signifier of difference, which 
imposes silences around the illusion of intrinsic human otherness, whilst in so doing 
prohibiting the form of contact which is the only route to the de-mystification of projections.  
"Stifling pity", as much as overt hatred, has the capacity to be "murderous" to the "very  
nature" of the objectified individual (Byrom, 1999, p. 
 
Being seen 
F: For me it would be quite a simple thing for a person to do...you know, take a 
functional limb, say, if you're right handed, tie it behind your back.  Spend a day 
with it like that...just one day...Get some kind of idea of, you know, the life that 
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I've been forced to lead...You wouldn't even have to have an impaired leg like 
me, or be treated weirdly by people.  But just for a day, and you know, what's the 
big issue...in twelve and a half years I haven't got one person to try. 
 
Sally French (1999, p. 21) describes how, as a disabled person, an ongoing social experience 
is that of having to explain oneself, or "re-present" oneself in a form more manageable to 
others, whilst rarely having one's experiences seen, validated or confirmed.  The constant 
corollary of not being allowed or able to be "real", is the experience of not being "seen".  
Underpinning the quotation above is the ongoing experience of an often highly salient layer of 
subjective narrative being unspeakable, and hence going unseen and remaining un-integrated 
into one's social persona.  Even before considering human relating, the physicality of 
occupying a built environment which presents constant, maddening and cruel barriers to 
participation in essential, everyday affairs renders the unspoken, yet palpable message of 
unwelcome; of not belonging.  The non-validation of internal experience, in this way, is re-
capitulated by a material world which was all-too-clearly constructed with only the needs of 
others in mind.  Susan Wendell (1997) expresses this symbolic experience of the world thus:  
 
Much of the world is also structured as though everyone is physically strong, as 
though all bodies are 'ideally shaped', as though everyone can walk, hear and see 
well, as though everyone can work and play at a pace that is not compatible with 
any kind of illness or pain, as though no one is ever dizzy or incontinent or 
simply needs to sit or lie down.   
      (Wendell, 1997, p. 266) 
 
The "carnal information" (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 604) of the experience of impaired 
embodiment thus occupies a shadowy, illegitimate status; it is, in terms which are deeply 
cultural, yet experienced as instinctual, simply "not OK" to not be fully able to see, hear, 
walk, speak, or whatever (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008).  The experience of the impaired 
body's "dysappearance" (Paterson & Hughes, 1999) triggers cultural mores bent upon 
concealment, as material and social worlds combine in creating an environment for (in this 
case) physically disabled individuals which embodies a failure of "containment" (Bion, 
1962a) which reverberates through all levels (physical, relational, intra-psychic).  As we have 
seen, even in academic and public discourses of identity and civil rights, disabled people 
remain largely an "ignored population" (Mitchell & Snyder, 1997, p. 11); in a host of ways, 
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the world – the Other – remains unresponsive.  In the face of the Other, writes Michalko 
(2002, p. 93) the carnal difference of impaired embodiment is constructed not as an addition 
to the human condition, but as a distortion.  It is the fact that disability "difference" does not 
"count" as "real" embodied subjectivity that relegates it to the shadows, leaving disabled 
persons to dwell, at least partially, in an unseen borderland.  Experience, here, is not by its 
nature novel and salient, but rather a sullied, depersonalised analogue of an unseen ideal; to 
Michalko (2002, p. 93) the difference of disability is difference that "does not make a 
difference" (my emphasis; see also Magee & Milligan, 1995).  Against this backdrop, the 
universally daunting developmental challenge of securing the resources to "gather up" one's 
experience towards psychic integration and wholeness, seems most especially thorny for this 
population.  It is, bluntly, extremely hard to find one's way to feeling whole if one has spent 
one's life steeped in signs denoting that one simply is not, and cannot, be so.   
 
Axel Honneth (1995, p. 174) regards "freedom" or "lack of coercion" as far more than the 
absence of external forces or influences upon behaviour – a position in which he seemingly 
differs from the social model orthodoxy.  Instead, to Honneth (1995, p. 174), a key signifier is 
the absence of "inner barriers", "psychological inhibitions" and "fears".  Further, and most 
interestingly, he construes these latter aspects as "a form of trust directed inward", which 
lends individuals a confidence in the articulation of needs, and the exercise of abilities (my 
emphasis).  This "confidence", or, as he puts it, "these unanxious ways of feeling with 
oneself", are parts of a positive self-relationship which can only grow upon the foundations of 
experiences of recognition (ibid.).  What Honneth (1995) is suggesting – a position with 
which I concur – is that it is essential for individuals to receive an accurate experience of 
being seen if self-knowledge and psychic integration is to follow, leading, most significantly, 
to the self-definition of one's experience, and hence oneself.  The impetus of prejudice and 
discrimination is contingent upon social forces which have the power to define the nature of 
individuals from the outside.  As long as social formations deny such individuals from 
experiences of apprehending and validating the self, the successful countering of stereotypes 
will be limited.  In short, we need to be seen, in order to see ourselves more clearly, such that 
we may make ourselves more seen.   
 
Whilst it is clear to see at a manifest political level why materialist authors advocate that the 
disability movement not show or articulate the internal, personal experience of disability and 
impairment, it is possible to speculate upon the more latent underpinnings of this policy.  
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Here, I dare to make a simple interpretation of this position.  As we have seen, there is good 
reason to believe that those who do disclose such culturally "unpalatable" subjective material 
will not be "met" or "accepted" by the cultural majority, but instead are likely to be subjected 
to heightened exclusion, disqualification, or stigmatisation.  The question emerges, then, as to 
whether the social modelist position reflects something of the nature of the "emotional 
oppression" of disablism (see Psycho-emotional aspects of disability, p. 201).  Shame and 
concealment of the self is, as has been argued, part of what is engendered by oppression.  Is 
there, in the social model moratorium on the "personal", something of the knowledge that 
one's already precarious societal belonging is contingent upon the continued protection of 
others from the "complicated", "messy" and "ill-fitting" vicissitudes of impaired life?  Perhaps 
proponents of the social model seek to construe the world as "less complicated" for the benefit 
of the dominant groupings in society, as a necessary stage in gaining political rights before the 
possibility of being known, and feeling an authentic sense of belonging, becomes even 
remotely feasible.  Of relevance to this discussion is the seldom-recognised fact that the 
pathologisation of disabled people has been as much of a psychological as of a bodily nature 
(see Written on the body, p.10).  This, surely, is a key reason why psychological concerns 
have been entirely elided within disability studies.  The psychological dimensions of 
oppression, in the form of a litany of assaults upon the self, are less articulated, but ever-
present, and particularly harmful in their silently hegemonic nature.     
 
Manic defence 
In the quotation below, a group member compares himself to an acquaintance who also 
suffered a spinal injury.  Whereas for the group member such an injury led to permanent 
quadriplegia, that of his acquaintance proved, in time, to be minor, and resulted in no 
permanent impairment.    
 
R: ...so he was fixed, and I can't be fixed.  And I think that's a big thing for 
people; and I think sometimes there's a collective feeling in society that...it's a 
failure, because we couldn't fix you.  And we're sorry, and because we couldn't 
fix you we don't know what to do with you... 
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The anxiety associated with disability phenomena – or more accurately, with fantasies about 
the nature of disability phenomena – often tends to evoke responses which may be described 
as manic defences (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008; Watermeyer, 2009).  The essence of a manic 
defensive response involves managing what feels like an emptiness, a frightening lack or 
void, with a "doing" response.  A familiar situation is that of a disabled person being gently 
coerced into receiving – and appreciating – unwanted and unsolicited assistance with an 
everyday task, such as crossing the road or pouring a cup of tea.  What may have occurred 
here is the rearing, within the observer, of an anxiety-laden sense of perceived lack, of a 
shameful inability or deprivation, which must be filled.  The feeling is managed through 
action.  The action, in this case, embodies a contravention of psychic and personal boundaries 
– the observer has not engaged with the disabled person to ascertain clearly what the nature of 
his / her experience is, but rather has assumed that experience, and furthermore has annexed 
responsibility for its "remedying".   
 
In various ways, members of the group communicated the oft-learned lesson that, if disability 
experience is shared, others cannot retain psychic boundaries.  In other words, as described 
above, when an experience which relates to disability or impairment is spoken about, resulting 
anxiety elicited within the observer tends to lead to pre-conscious feelings of helplessness, 
which in turn may be managed through unsolicited actions, or "helping" responses.  Where 
such responses are not feasible, or cannot be construed as helpful in a manner which renders 
the defence a watertight one, the strong feelings at play may instead be managed via 
withdrawal, subtle blaming, dissociation, or a range of alternative modes of distancing.   In 
short, it appears through these interactions that it is extremely difficult, within a society such 
as ours, for individuals to "see" disability, without needing to intervene upon it; to alter, 
remedy, obscure, or repair it.  What is crucial here, is that this "doing defence" tends to leave 
the experience being described – lived – by the disabled person unrecognised and unheard.   
 
To exemplify some of the dynamics surrounding this "flight into action", I provide the 
following anecdote from my teaching on a postgraduate university programme in clinical 
psychology (see Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008).  A very insightful student, C, told of how she 
struggled to manage her partially sighted housemate's transport needs.  C had a car and a 
driver's licence, while her friend Z could not drive due to her impairment.  C described Z as 
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always very polite surrounding her need for lifts, but also worried that Z harboured other 
feelings, perhaps anger, behind her courtesy.  Simultaneously, C was aware of having 
difficulty being "real" in her responses to the situation; she found it difficult to say "no" when 
it was inconvenient for her to provide a lift, and at times felt resentful.  Interestingly, neither 
of C and Z's other two (nondisabled) housemates had cars, and they regularly also called upon 
C for lifts.  However, the emotional valency, the meaning and evocations, surrounding these 
favours felt entirely different – and innocuous – to C.  Class discussion surrounding the 
situation led to consideration of the dynamic of a "doing defence".  This response – providing 
lifts even against one's own needs and wishes – tends to address the pragmatic difficulty, and 
circumvents or forecloses discussion of what is below; that is, what it is like for Z to occupy 
the space of someone who must be constantly polite and courteous as she asks for access to a 
structurally unavailable, unreliable, yet essential resource.   Clearly, what is primarily at fault 
is the prevailing social order in South Africa which fails to provide accessible, efficient 
transport to all of its citizens, but examination of the impact of this discriminatory backdrop 
on personal relationships is informative.  Of course, it is not my intention to cast blame on C – 
she is, with the best intentions, caught in the midst of unreal relating along with all other 
participants.  Rather, I wish to highlight how practical, discriminatory, inter-personal and 
intra-psychic factors combine in leaving Z's experience of her world, of herself, relatively 
silenced.   The key to relating which is more informed, in which the needs and predicaments 
of all participants are more fully present, lies in being able to know about and discuss 
disability experiences without needing, as a first port of call, to intervene upon them; to be 
able to hold clear boundaries.  Such discussion would then form a more solid, a more whole 
and respectful, platform for later decisions regarding such issues as assistance, mutual 
support, and the business of ongoing relationship.  Very often, in accounts of group members, 
the work of caring for, examining and nurturing relationships through honest and real 
communication became lost or distorted under the weight of ongoing, cross-cutting pressures 
to do with the boundary confusion which surrounds help and assistance.  Such relating may 
leave disabled people feeling split and uncertain regarding the realness of the relationship, the 
honesty and trustworthiness of positive regard, and lead to further hesitancy regarding real 
communication.   
 
It seems that allowing the lack to be real in the interpersonal space, and openly confronting 
the insolubility of so many situations of contextual disability, simply feels unbearable.  
Rather, what is harnessed is a need, in the face of our fears of disability, to maintain a fantasy 
that things are soluble, that the world is fair, that the lack can be filled; what I term the fantasy 
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of filled needs.  This is a familiar cultural phenomenon, composed of vague, and quite 
illusory, yet firmly held beliefs to do with "special" services, facilities and provisions "out 
there" in society for those who are "less fortunate" by virtue of impairment.  Again, the 
resultant experience for the disabled person is that the layer of disability and impairment 
experience which simply is – and will probably remain – an insoluble lack, is rendered 
invisible by attachment to the notion of the "just world", and consequently goes underground.  
Further, accepting assistance, or reassuring the other when it is not available, may, to the 
disabled person, accompany feelings of a subtle form of self-betrayal, through a tacit 
collaboration around the fantasy of difficulties being soluble, of needs being "fillable".  
French (1993b, p. 75) describes the irresistible nature of this fantasy of solubility to the 
broader population, in her account of her experiences as a partially sighted student having to 
negotiate a course in statistics.  After her many requests for additional tutorial assistance from 
her university had been disregarded, she undertook to obtain tuition elsewhere, at personal 
and financial cost.  After she finally passed the examination, her lecturer commented "in a 
jocular and patronising way", that her worries had "clearly been unfounded" (ibid.).  She 
comments:  "Our successes serve to reinforce the erroneous assumption that we really are 'just 
like everyone else'" (ibid., p. 74-5).  What French had met during this experience was a social 
system highly attached to a fantasy that whatever difficulties may confront her were soluble, 
and by implication, that her concerns and worries were of her own making.  This de-
legitimating, even demeaning response left her not only unprovided for in material terms, but 
also alienated and invalidated as an individual.   
 
At the heart of the broader population's inability to cease acting or resisting, and begin 
listening, is a combination of two sets of factors.  The first, as referred to above, is a complex 
of projected fantasies regarding what impairment experience is like; the spectre of universal 
anxieties to do with damage, adequacy and defect.  The other intolerable knowledge set 
surrounds the appalling reality of unnecessary, arbitrary and unjust deprivations inflicted on 
disabled people by a brutally unconscious society.  This knowledge lurks unexplored within 
the pre-conscious, never far from triggering an avalanche of guilt-ridden implications, to do 
with complicity in the humiliation of others, who might, again in the pre-conscious, simply be 
hapless victims who share the same humanity we do.  Using this picture as a point of 
departure, it is not difficult to make sense of the vast range of defensive responses we 
apprehend surrounding the reality of disability-related disadvantage, be they quizzical, 
questioning, diminishing, victim-blaming, denying, confused, angry, hostile, impatient or 
patronising.    
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There are, in my view, notable parallels between "assimilationist", normalisation and 
rehabilitation discourses and policies, and the manic defences of everyday interactions around 
disability sketched above.  Both attempt to provide resources toward "making normal", 
intentions we may represent symbolically as "filling a void".  But in doing so, both also may 
silence the lived reality and elaboration of "being different".  By their nature, these forces 
militate against the voice of "irreducible difference" (Ravaud & Stiker, 2001, p. 496), or, the 
right to "be as one is".   
 
Solutions, entitlement and passivity 
L:  You know, the reality I see is that I pose some...opposition, to these solutions, 
because, it feels like this person doesn't know what it's like to...spend a day in my 
shoes.   
 
F:  ...a lot of the way that people who really care about me interact with me is to 
offer those [solutions]...a way of showing that you care is to provide answers.  
Which, of course, ends up in this strange cycle of...needing to thank people for 
caring, and for providing the answers, and explaining why you...don't or can't 
make that choice...it becomes more work if people try and provide you with 
answers than if they didn't.   
 
J:  ...you get the problem-solvers.  Well, some of them have valid points.  But 
often you see people listening, and they're trying to say 'well, what about this?', 
and as you talk they're trying to work out how to overcome it [laughs].  And so 
I've had this conversation with people, and they go 'Yeah, but, but, but', and I go 
'Yeah, but, but, but', and they say 'well what about...', and then at the end of the 
day they sort of go 'Yeah, OK', [sighs].  And they're kind of...deflated.  
 
A key assumption underpinning the postulations of this section is the following: when people 
suffer chronic deprivation of needed resources which are readily available to others, the 
material nature of the situation may be internalised, causing it to become increasingly difficult 
for such individuals to feel deserving.  In the case of disabled people, socialisation 
surrounding the issue of deserving – of what one is, and is not, entitled to – is likely to have 
been distorted in some way.  The reality of senseless exclusion, the reactionary 
permissiveness of family members and others, awareness of the stereotype of the "entitled" 
disabled person; all such issues impact upon the clarity with which one holds the question of 
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deserving.  It should not be surprising, thus, that at times we see conditioned distortions of 
deserving amongst disabled persons, including self-denial, spartanism and the acceptance of 
marginal and impoverished lives, as well as the stereotype of passivity and entitlement (as in 
Freud's "exceptions").  At an unconscious level, entitlement often carries a substantial degree 
of reaction formation, in terms of presenting a response which intra-psychically acts to 
manage looming, internalised and malignant forces of self-deprivation, and of "not 
deserving".  The stereotype of the "passive victim" is closely associated with that of the 
"entitled" disabled person.  The stubborn resilience of this particular prejudice is surely not 
surprising, considering the fact that most disabled people live lives of continuous 
discrimination and deprivation, in which there is little prospect of change.  The form which 
such deprivations take, in the experience of group members, is often one of an "insane", 
seemingly casual and arbitrary, yet brutally policed distinction between the "haves" and the 
"have nots".  Consider, for example, the distinction between those who may go to a club, 
restaurant or bar, onto a beach, to the home of a friend, to a theatre or cinema, and those who, 
due to the discriminatory nature of the built environment, simply cannot.  The experience here 
is one of a numbing, senseless eviction from access to sharing in that most basic of human 
resources, social contact with others.  As with any trauma, this experience is not simply 
"integrated" in a sterile fashion, but rather is made sense of in ways which shape entitlements 
of the self.  Meanings are found which relate to individual history and, in particular, if our 
experiences are of being deprived and demeaned, such are the interpretations of events to 
which we will be drawn.   
 
Finkelstein and French (1993, p. 32) point out that, due to immersion in disablist cultural 
meanings, disabled persons "frequently" think of themselves in ways similar to that of the 
dominant ("narcissistic", "normotic") majority.  There is, consequently, immense potential for 
the "self-fulfilling prophecies" of internalised cultural scripts (ibid).  Passivity and 
acquiescence, according to Marks (1999a, p. 44), may be a defence against rage at the 
constant experience of being unseen, excluded or negated.  But as expressed in the quotations 
which opened this section, the experiences of group members uncovered a dynamic 
relationship, both overt and intra-psychic, between the manic, "reparative" needs of others, 
and the withdrawal of disabled persons into a passive, and at times rageful position.  In the 
lives of disabled persons an extremely familiar, seemingly consistent experience is that of 
"solutions" to practical difficulties being mooted by nondisabled others.  "Why don't you try 
this?" or "what about doing it this way", and "haven't you thought of that", are the ongoing, 
mild "confrontations" of others.  To begin, these questions often carry the unspoken 
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assumption that in the life of the disabled person concerned options, resources and 
possibilities are not, as a rule, being explored or utilised adequately.  Group members 
described how, unseen to this observer, life was saturated with a daily onslaught of intractable 
dilemmas, exclusions and discomforts.  Against this backdrop of constant, numbing and 
insoluble barriers to inclusion, the "hopeful" or "cheery" assertions of the nondisabled 
observer represent a defensive affront, which unconsciously attends to internal narcissistic 
needs, rather than practical ones.  Such "solutions" may be experienced by the disabled 
individual as an exhausting further sign of the chronic un-recognition of struggle in a disablist 
world, compounding despondency and evoking rage.  The lives of group members were 
punctuated by a barrage of constant challenges to "make the impossible possible", to find 
ways of doing what needs to be done without the necessary resources.  Further, whilst some 
suggested "solutions" were, in fact, feasible, the careful planning, organisation and 
preparation which these would require was utterly unrealistic in light of the massive, time-
consuming and physically taxing demands upon everyday life afforded by disablism and 
severe impairment.  The psychic crux of the "solutions" discourse is control, which must be 
exercised in the face of the destabilising evocations which disability brings.  One group 
member compared his feelings regarding "solutions" to the response of black consciousness to 
"white liberalism", as in the following: 
 
F: You know, the notion of black consciousness, the attack on white liberalism ... 
It's like 'you guys, I know that you're trying, but you...reaffirm everything that the 
harsh oppressor says about us by trying to be positive...but [small laugh] in this 
deeply patronising way'.  It's a...deeply disabling experience.  Like of somebody 
coming to the townships and explaining to you how to ...solve your problems.    
  
The psychic "flipside" of the "positive" imperatives to action of the "solutions discourse" 
relate, we may hypothesise, to a base fantasy of despondent inactivity, of "deathly inertia", or 
capitulation to depression.  The imperative to action and normalisation is a manic response to 
this universal imago.  The feeling – perhaps associated with Freud's death drive (Freud, 1920) 
–  is one of wanting to simply "lie down and give up".  The looming, even inviting spectre of 
this capitulation creates the need, within the observer, for disabled persons to realise its 
opposite.  Winnicott (1963, p. 181) describes a dynamic within the attachment dyad in which 
the gratification of instinctual needs – such as through feeding – actually embody a defensive, 
silencing elision by the mother of apprehension of the infant's experience.  In association with 
this idea, Winnicott (1963, p. 181) relates how, within the therapeutic dyad, satisfying patient 
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needs may "eliminate" the object for the patient, and hence obstruct relating.  In the current 
discussion, what this points to is how the positing of "solutions" – that is, illusory 
"satisfactions" – may, for disabled persons, embody a moment of having contact between 
internal life and the social world severed, as the out-flow of experience is inundated and 
repelled inward by the blunt weight of "solution".  Burlingham (1961, p. 131), in her work 
with congenitally blind infants, found that guilt and signs of withdrawal within mothers 
rendered a withdrawal and passivity amongst infants "way beyond" that which might have 
resulted from impairment.  She also noted a strong relationship between physical dependency 
and the concealment of aggression (see also Sinason, 1992, p. 21).  A hostile "giving over" of 
control, rendering a passive stance, may also form an enactment of control continually being 
"taken away" by the realities of a disablist world.  Anger, therefore, may be expressed in one 
locale, although accumulated across a range of unseen sites of discrimination, leading to such 
expressions being branded as irrational, maladjusted or disproportionate – what Olkin (1999, 
p. 77) refers to as "decontextualised rage".  Some early accounts viewed catastrophic episodes 
of rage amongst institutionalised persons with cerebral palsy as a function of organic, 
neurological damage (Sinason, 1992, p. 226).  However, Sinason (1992, p. 226) re-interprets 
such rage as a rational response to the control, guilt-ridden permissiveness and over-
protection to which such persons are often subject, within families as well as institutional 
settings.  Passivity, within this view, may be understood as a defence against the 
repercussions which such rage may evoke from a social milieu unable to view "disabled 
behaviour" as coherent, goal-directed and rational.  This surprising, unconsciously motivated 
reluctance to "read" the behaviour of disabled persons as sensible was pervasively 
experienced by group members, expressed in the ready directives of "problem-solvers".  The 
appalling contradiction of the social suffering of disabled persons would, perhaps, be brought 
dangerously near consciousness by such a recognition, leading instead to a style of psychic 
compromise which locates the disjuncture of rationality within the disabled individual.    
 
The reality of limited choices 
M: But, I think, in terms of disability and managing being disabled in society, 
there are very stark prices to be paid no matter which fork of any road you take.  
You make a choice, but it's kind of...between evils.  Most of the time you're on ... 
the losing side, and the choice is just...what form of losing you're going to be 
doing.  It's constant compromise...although often times I recognise what the 
choices are in terms of being in those relationships.   
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As has been argued, a defining environmental factor underpinning all of the relational 
phenomena under discussion is the lack of access to adequate and appropriate resources and 
services for people with impairments.  What this may create in the lives of disabled people is 
a range of compromising situations in which the way relationships are managed becomes 
affected by the reality of needs for assistance, or other essential resources.  Murphy (1987) 
comments on this from his own experience, referring in particular here to transport-elated 
dependency:   
 
In all this, they [people with mobility impairments] are passive recipients, 
waiting for the world to come to them – in its own time, if at all.   
      (Murphy, 1987, p. 77) 
 
Later, and in more general terms, he describes the distorting effect of physical dependency 
upon social relationships: 
 
[dependency is]...a condition that warps all one's other social ties and further 
contaminates the identity of the dependent...[dependence]...assails and tests even 
some bonds that we hope are impermeable, such as those of marriage.   
      (Murphy, 1987, p. 199) 
 
The need for assistance – rooted in inequitable social process (Berg, 2005; Briggs, 1993) – 
may position disabled people in the role of having to manage multiple relationships, 
particularly in terms of monitoring, understanding, negotiating and preventing controlling or 
enmeshed modes of relating, which tend to emerge around disability.  That is, disabled people 
often may find themselves receiving assistance which also affords a level of gratifying 
control, or "psychic pay-off" (Marks, 1999a, p. 22) to the "helper".  Such patterns of relating, 
if not addressed, may tend to become amplified and entrenched over time (see Shaw, 2001).  
A natural response to this situation may be to regard the disabled person concerned as 
responsible for drawing boundaries, for assertively framing the relationship appropriately, in a 
way which suits him or her; conversely we may regard the disabled person as to blame if he 
or she finds the relationship problematic.  But what this view fails to recognise adequately is 
the reality of very limited material choices which disabled people live with.  In the example 
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cited earlier (see Manic defence, p.275), someone in the position of the disabled person Z may 
well be forced, to some extent, to "go along" with a relationship (or way of relating) which 
does not feel right to her, simply because functioning in her life requires that transportation to 
(in this case) her university is utterly essential.  Disabled people inhabiting an inaccessible 
environment may regularly find themselves in situations where help and assistance are so 
needed, so indispensable, as to substantially compromise the work of understanding, 
modifying or choosing relationships.  In a world of universally accessible and available public 
transport, Z's ability to see, interrogate and understand the nature of her relationship with C 
would be greatly enhanced, as she would be operating and thinking from a position of equal 
power.  But the overwhelming majority of engagements between disabled and nondisabled 
persons are markedly asymmetric in terms of social, educational and vocational status, as well 
as access to material resources.  This continual state of affairs serves to  structurally "muddy 
the waters" of bounded and assertive relating (Eberhardt & Mayberry, 1995, p. 630).   
 
As we all know, relationships are bewilderingly complex at the best of times.  Also very 
relevant here is the reality that in an uncertain (that is, discriminatory and inaccessible) world, 
in which constant hard work and creativity are required to simply manage, and in which 
consequently little time and energy is surplus, one cannot reasonably be expected to be 
capable of exercising the sophisticated levels of insight necessary to unpick such 
relationships.  The picture which emerges is one of interlocking social forces drawing 
disabled people away from realness in relating, away from the psychic centre, and an ongoing 
dialogue with internal experience.  There is a sad irony here.  Disabled people who, because 
of the necessity of assistance from friends, family members, health practitioners or carers, 
have a particular and critical need for skills surrounding the management of bounded, clear 
and assertive relationships, tend to have undergone experiences of socialisation which fly 
directly in the face of these needs.  In short, disabled people find themselves in complex, often 
intrusive relational situations, and have classically been socialised in a manner which 
obscures this, instead fostering placation and accommodation, leaving the self under constant 
threat of being undermined, or even annihilated.  One need not look beyond the charity and 
volunteer cultures surrounding disability to apprehend weighty evidence of this.  The tacit or 
overt imperatives exercised upon many disabled people throughout the life course require 
appeasement and accommodation; it is not difficult to see from here how the stereotype of 
"manipulative" disabled people has coalesced. In a world of minimal or unreliable access to a 
resource as essential as transportation, disabled people may be drawn into a mode of relating 
which incorporates pragmatic trade-offs.  For example, one may decide to tolerate, even 
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affirm, a relationship with a controlling and intrusive figure – these sorts of responses are 
never unfamiliar in the lives of visibly impaired people – in order to maintain access to a 
resource which that individual may be able to provide.  Such trade-offs may be conscious and 
deliberate, or occur more unconsciously, as products of lengthy processes of socialisation in 
which the intersubjective space has been perverted by demeaning ascriptions, narcissistic 
investments, and self-fulfilling cultural prophecies.  Morris (1993b, p. 102), from a non-
psychoanalytic perspective, describes how treatment by the nondisabled world may leave one 
feeling enraged or undermined, without it necessarily being clear why these feelings have 
coalesced.  Such, it seems, is the subtlety and embeddedness of demeaning representations 
and dynamics, that strong emotional responses may seem unreasonable not only to others, but 
to the disabled individual as well (ibid.).  There is testament here to the rank, unprocessed 
nature of culturally conditioned prejudicial responses to bodily difference.   
 
Collusion and complicity 
Whilst the foregoing underscores the reality of limited choices available to disabled persons, 
which may force individuals into collusion with oppressive relating, such relationships are 
also reciprocal at an intrinsic level.  To begin with, it must be said that unpicking the 
complexities of the relational distortions surrounding disability is as – if not more – 
bbewildering a task for nondisabled as it is for disabled people.  It is pivotal, if we are to make 
inroads in understanding the psycho-emotional and relational complexities of the disability 
phenomenon, that we begin by firmly eschewing the oft-cherished (often materialist) 
assumption that disabled people are simply passive recipients of a unidirectional "force" 
known as "oppression".  Temperley (1984) describes feeling a distinct "unease" at the tone of 
some feminist writings, which seem to endorse this populist maxim.  Temperley comments as 
follows:  
 
It seems to me fatally easy for a group that has been disadvantaged or exploited 
to idealise itself and to believe that, once the privileges of the oppressors are 
removed, the hated qualities associated with those oppressors will cease to be the 
social problems they were before.   
      (Temperley, 1984, p. 25) 
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A theoretical view which fails to make provision for the role played by disabled people in 
relations of oppression serves only to reproduce the malignant, dangerous illusion of an 
essential separateness or difference between disabled and nondisabled people.  In addition, it 
demeans disabled people by constructing them as victims, whilst simultaneously arguing that 
their victimhood and trauma has not wrought any effects on their personhood and capacity 
for, or style of, social relating.  This, of course, is a nonsense.  Relations of oppression, be 
they between race groups, men and women, or disabled and nondisabled people, are 
inherently bi-directional and dynamic in nature.  Furthermore, these modes of relating 
incorporate ideological mechanisms of socialisation, interpellating individuals into (partly) 
unconscious perpetuation of relations of power. Young (1994, p. 127), in describing 
projective identification, which is at the very heart of social oppression, emphasises the 
unconscious "collusion" of the recipient.  Rather than a feeling or attribute being "put inside" 
another, the dynamic involves eliciting something from the recipient's pre-existing repertoire 
of psychic materials, which is then exaggerated, with the product being experienced as of 
internal origin.  The uncertainty regarding the origins and meaning of emotional responses 
experienced by some members of oppressed groups (e.g. Morris, 1993b, p. 102) seems 
helpfully accounted for by this.  What has occurred is that projected materials have found a 
home inside the recipient, where these may become intermingled with disallowed emotional 
responses, guilt, and superego imperatives for control.  It is the ambivalence and uncertainty 
engendered by such projective identification which renders members of oppressed groups 
available and vulnerable to the sickening imputations of a proportion of the dominant 
majority.  What the foregoing informs is the reality that all must change if change is to come 
about.  As corollary, all are complicit until that change occurs.    
 
The threatening spectre of this hitherto unexplored complicity has been a key factor in 
provoking disability studies' careful circumvention of the personal and psycho-emotional.  As 
argued above, a substantial tract of disabled reality – of disablist oppression – has thereby 
remained obscured.  Part of hearing the experience of disabled people is hearing the internal 
conflict, the ambivalence, the collusion, the confusion; exploration of these aspects is 
essential in the process of giving disabled people back their alienated, colonised experience.  
Understanding and integration of this experience will embody a fuller and more 
compassionate apprehension of self, incorporating the clearer emergence of the universality of 
human suffering, loss and hope.  If psychoanalysis, and, in particular, object relations theory 
is to take an invigorating part in this process, the means must be found whereby clear focus is 
directed not only at the difficulties underpinning the ability of the individual to "have", but 
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also those which buttress the unwillingness of the world to "provide".  Our analysis of the 
phenomenon of disability oppression must interrogate both sets of variables, constructing a 
model of dynamic interplay between the intra-psychic and the socio-political, which 
integrates the reality of deprivation with complexities of self-punishment, reaction formation, 
un-containment and the enactment of projected fantasies.    
 
Disability and transitional space 
As we have seen, the power of disability to evoke primitive unconscious conflicts may trigger 
and rigidify narcissistic defences within the observer, involving regression to a paranoid-
schizoid mode of functioning characterised by splitting, projection and projective 
identification.  Within this mode mental space is limited, emotional responses may be felt as 
overly immediate intrusions, and separateness, or the unknown, are intolerable.  Splits 
between self and other are marked, with the other being forcefully controlled, through the 
defining inherent in projections.  The fact that unconscious, perhaps shame-ridden conflicts 
have been brought to salience and light by the trigger of disability imagery, means that the 
projective recipients of these materials must be related to as disavowed and othered, yet "un-
separate", utterly controlled extensions of the psychic structure.  Any self-definition of the 
other under such circumstances will threaten the utility of the projective defence, and this 
must consequently be decisively quashed.  What is occurring here is that the observer has 
been thrown back into the ambiguous, fraught world of a disturbed and unpredictable 
transitional space (Winnicott, 1974), in which threatening psychic materials enlivened by the 
omen of disability urge a return to the omnipotence and omniscience of a unitary, un-separate 
world.  The realness of the outside world, along with the relatively clear boundaries which 
this informs, have become extremely difficult to tolerate, rendering psychic reality ever-more 
an admixture dominated by the dynamic consequences of the emergence of infantile psychic 
experience.  Transitional space, during early development, is an arena in which parent and 
child engage in the work of constituting the child-self and the self-in-relation, through play, 
communication and growing symbolization (Harris & Wideman, 1988, p. 129; Winnicott, 
1974, p. 3; Young, 1989).  The integration of ego during this process is necessarily partial, 
rendering psychic elements which exist on a continuum from those defined wholly internally, 
to those substantially mediated by the nature of external reality.  We have already considered 
the susceptibility of the congenitally impaired child to the development of a "false self" 
(Winnicott, 1960 – see, inter alia, Mirroring, p.204; Imperative to silence, p.259), arising 
from a strong subjective discrepancy between the "active, constructing self" and the 
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diminished, stigmatised view of disabled life communicated to him or her (Harris & 
Wideman, 1988, p. 129).  The defensive carapace of the false self which may arise as a result 
of relational disturbances surrounding infantile impairment is, it seems, likely to be 
confirmed, elaborated and further embedded by the psychic regressions which disability may 
evoke in the other throughout the life course.  Reversion of the other to the ambiguous 
transitional world of early life embodies a need to expend new energies upon the negotiations 
of inner and outer reality, perhaps leading to a predominance of apperception over perception, 
to the detriment of the likelihood of the disabled other being "seen" as unitary, separate, and 
self-defining (Winnicott, 1974, p. 3).  In short, boundaries between self and other are 
distorted, opening the way for psychic colonisation, and consequent silencing.   
 
The discourse of independence  
L: ...I think it's also a psychological...fear that we all have, that we're...less 
than...we want to be.  It [dependency] speaks to that basic insecurity...And I 
would term my disability...hyper-dependent...that hyper-dependence I think 
becomes like the high water mark of our insecurities...you really are stripped 
back to an infantile state, and so...everything that gives you value in society is 
stripped away...in a moment...but I think it also speaks to a very deep fear we 
have...that we've...failed in a very profound way...that we've failed full stop.   
 
R: ...after a lot of work I manage to transfer myself onto my bed and then back 
onto my chair, which is an incredibly difficult process for me...it took me...about 
six months to get that right.  Well the problem is when you're getting out of bed 
into your chair, and by the time you get into your chair you feel like getting back 
into bed. And I realised that actually...it's not where I really need to put my 
energy every day. 
 
T: And so as part of my rehab as well I had to learn to take off and put on my 
shoes, but I obviously don't have any hands and so I had to use my mouth. I had 
to use my teeth to undo my shoes, to put them on again.  It was just insane, I was 
literally completely exhausted after doing that. 
 
It is a commonly held assumption that disabled persons value, and hence strive for, 
independence above all else (French, 1993c, p. 44).  Whatever the expressed position of 
disabled people on this issue, what is clear is that the construct of dependency is a highly 
contested one, and the psychological reasons – across society – for its forceful eschewing, are 
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complex and layered.  As has been noted in the previous section (see Disability and the 
distortion of personal and psychic boundaries, p.260), one reason why disabled persons may 
seek physical independence relates to the manner in which the power differentials which may 
inhere in assistance distort and confuse relational boundaries.  Examples of such potentially 
malignant distortions include the patronising gratification of needs for control, the imperative 
to cheerful gratitude, and the silencing of anger or hostility.  Disabled persons may be 
thoroughly socialised into the experience of self as dependent on the benevolence of others, 
through the discourse of charity, as well as the cold reality of lives of deprivation and 
voicelessness (Charlton, 1998, p. 3).  Treacher (1989, p. 140) demonstrates how the notion of 
the "independent" subject is a culturally specific one, mobilised by a range of discourses, 
including neoliberal autonomy, some strands of feminism, and much of the theory and 
practice of the humanistic psychology movement.  Dependency, in many of these thought 
environments, is viewed as "toxic" and destructive to the human spirit (ibid., p. 142).  Noted 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1993) underscores just how clearly culturally situated the 
discourse of the independent subject is; he writes:  
 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgment and action organised into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of the world's cultures. 
    (Geertz, 1993 cited in Hughes, 2001, p. 25) 
 
As expressed in the last two participant quotations above, the disability studies literature 
contains a number of experiential accounts of the "normalising" drive to rehabilitate leading 
to punitive and excessive strivings for "independence", often in the performance of everyday 
personal tasks.  Health care discourses within rehabilitation settings, it seems, may direct 
overly fervent attention towards an illusory "independence ideal", in a manner which may 
obscure or marginalise psychological needs for quality of life, fulfilment and balance.  French 
(1993c, p. 44) cites examples including some strikingly similar to those above.  In such cases, 
a basic task such as removing one's socks, for a severely physically impaired person, may 
become a "rehabilitative goal" which requires the expending of large amounts of physical and 
emotional energy, to the detriment of time and resources being available for the developing of 
more subjectively meaningful pursuits.  Corbett (1989) presents the picture as follows:  
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The basics of self-help, which are second nature to the able bodied, might be an 
intolerable chore to some people with disabilities.  Why should they bother with 
them?  A narrow focus upon basic skills impedes the quality of life and inhibits 
self-expression. 
    (Corbett, 1989 cited in French, 1993c, p. 44) 
 
The question arises, especially in light of the foregoing sections, as to whose psychic needs 
are being filled by the, at times, manically driven securing of fragments of "independence"?  
The rehabilitation model inevitably informs an orientation of both practitioner and client to 
"trying" ever harder to effect personal physical adjustment to impairment, whilst the cultural 
imperatives towards such "betterment" are seldom interrogated (Phillips, 1985, p. 48; Ingstad 
& White, 1995).  In pervasive cultural representations as well as the rehabilitation discourse, 
the ability to walk, perhaps with crutches and immense physical exertion, is often prized 
above adjustment to wheelchair use (ibid., p. 50).  What emerges is the operationalisation of 
culturally informed anxieties regarding difference, which manifest, inter alia, in health care 
policies which regard alternative lifestyles as at best a final port of call; at worst, as evidence 
of failure.  Some writers have argued that the insistence upon striving toward such 
independence embodies a form of oppression of disabled persons, which inherently devalues 
lives characterised by difference (Shearer, 1981; Sutherland, 1981; both cited in French, 
1993c, p. 45).   
 
Within the social model perspective, dependency does not exist in an ahistoric sense, but 
rather is a product of systematic distortions in the management and distribution of social 
resources (Oliver, 1993b, p. 50; Marks, 1999a, p. 105).  Further, the inherent inter-
dependence upon which society rests is held as proof that "independence" is a relative, rather 
than categorical, concept (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 81).  The view thus propounded by French 
(1993c) and others, is one which rejects the proposition that nondisabled persons are 
"independent", instead arguing that, against the backdrop of universal inter-dependence, it is 
the specific "dependencies" of disabled persons which are selectively disallowed by a 
prejudicial society (French, 1993c, p. 46).  As a partially sighted person in an occupational 
setting, French (1993c, p. 46) describes how it quickly becomes evident that all employees 
have various "limitations", and consequently require assistance, advice and support from one 
another.  But there is one "crucial difference"; she writes:  
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...able-bodied people’s problems are regarded as normal and acceptable, and thus 
they can ask assistance of each other without feeling guilty or inferior.  Disabled 
people can ask for help too as long as they steer clear of any problems directly 
associated with disability...thus disabled people are often expected to cope with 
their limitations in a way not expected of other people.   
      (French, 1993c, p. 46) 
 
Asch (2001, p. 313) notes wryly that all in modern societies are dependent upon a range of 
service providers to perform tasks for which we are ill-equipped – from car mechanics to 
computer technicians, plumbers to lawyers; yet, the normative status of these needs renders 
them invisible as evidence of dependency.  However, the need for qualitatively 
indistinguishable services such as assistance in dressing or washing required by physically 
impaired persons is construed as a shame-ridden signal of failure (ibid.).  The lack of access 
to such personal assistance is a contravention of human rights, bringing into relief the socially 
inflicted dependency of individuals unjustly deprived of free choice in the management of 
their lives (Litvak & Enders, 2001; Shaw, 2001).  The rise to prominence of the modernist 
notion of individuality has, as has been argued (see Narcissism, normalcy, modernity, and the 
market, p.147), carried a particular significance in the marginalisation of disabled persons.  As 
we grow and develop, the imperative of modernism stipulates the progressive achievement of 
the trappings and deportment of an illusory autonomy (Taylor, 1989, p. 36), against which the 
disabled figure is situated as a demeaned counterpoint (Watson, 1998, p. 148).  Popular 
psychology has enthusiastically taken up the vision of "self-reliance" as a cornerstone of 
psychic health, which is regarded as integral to successful and responsible adulthood (ibid.).  
All such propositions, however, fail to recognise the relative and constructed nature of 
achievement of the independence "ticket" to societal legitimacy.  Of course, clear recognition 
must be given to disabled individuals' desire for independent functioning, with the provision 
of equitable access, universal design and appropriate, client-driven rehabilitation forming 
central aspects of an anti-discriminatory societal response to impairment.  However, the 
independence construct must be applied with critical care and vigilance, surrounding the 
oppressive and controlling potentials of the normalisation discourse.   
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Tom Shakespeare (2006, p. 146), watchful as ever regarding the replacement of oppressive 
social structures with constrictive political orthodoxies, regards the reasoning that all are 
vulnerable, dependent and in need of some form of care as somewhat disingenuous, even trite.  
The "conventional dependency" experienced by all is, in his assessment, "very different" from 
the pervasive dependencies of some severely impaired individuals (ibid.).  For Shakespeare 
(2006, p. 146), the disability movement, by taking a largely deconstructionist position on this 
issue, risks eliding a recognition of the very real personal experience of extreme dependency, 
including the inescapable reality of inequalities in the giving and receiving of care.  Group 
members in the present study provided a strong and layered account of the often exhausting 
interpersonal complexities of negotiating relationships with employed care workers, with 
concomitant implications for quality of life.  As was seen, the imperatives to "normalise" – 
not simply during rehabilitation, but implicit in ongoing cultural discourse – were very 
familiar irritants, which at times presented difficult challenges to the maintenance of robust 
self-worth.   
 
Marks (1999a, p. 93) interprets the cultural view of dependency as repellent, as an artifact of a 
narcissistic drive to disavow split off, unmet dependency needs experienced during infancy.  
Disabled persons may enliven unconscious fears of a return to an infantile state of precarious 
dependency, mobilising the often shame-ridden, manic imperatives to control.  Frosh (1991, 
p. 98) echoes the assertion that underlying the "glitter" of narcissistic society is an extreme 
fear and loathing of being dependent upon others, as such dependency would open the way 
for a repetition of the experience of maternal rejection which – threateningly – occupies the 
psychic shadows.  The language of autonomy and independence, in this schema, represents a 
desperate attempt to escape the dread of infantile vulnerability (Treacher, 1989, p. 143).  In 
Klein's (1957, p. 181) theoretical system, the profound destructiveness of infantile envy is 
intimately bound up with the hatred of dependency.  The impulse of the infant is to mutilate 
and destroy the breast, expressly for the "powerful" ease with which it provides, and holds 
control of all that is good (ibid., p. 183).  The demeaning attacks upon the "dependencies" of 
disabled people by society may, ironically, reflect envy of the fantasy of an idealised 
dependent state, in which primitive needs are accepted, and filled.  Of course, this envy also 
incorporates hatred, directed at internal, split off infantile dependency, as well as that 
projected into the disabled individual.  Hoggett (1992, p. 23) explains envious hatred as 
stimulated by a sense of absence or longing, which resonates with infantile emotional needs.  
Thereafter, envy may be interpreted as "both a desperate attempt to deny this sense of lack 
and an attack upon the things which prompt it" (ibid.).   
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Due to the anxieties evoked by the dread spectre of impairment, assistive technologies for 
impaired persons may, at times, be culturally construed as a "disability panacea", which 
happily "makes the problem go away".  Whilst there is no doubt that a range of technologies 
are of immense value to many people with impairments (Seelman, 2001) – to begin, the 
adapted personal computer with which I compose this text – such "interventions" are too often 
used as evidence of an illusory "equality", which denies both difference and the material 
impact of discrimination.  Typically, the latest device is heralded as the "new saviour" of 
disabled persons, whilst the applied practicality of usage, as well as the general availability of 
such products, is inadequately and uncritically assessed (Roulstone, 1993, pp. 243, 247).  
French (1993c, p. 44) recounts her experience of the library at the university where she was a 
student acquiring specialised computer technology, which would provide sight impaired 
persons with access to the cataloguing system.  She sketches a familiar scenario in which, 
with much fanfare, the university publicly celebrated its achievement of "equal access".  In 
actual fact, the paradoxical – but equally familiar – reality was that the system provided only 
partial, and highly laborious, access (ibid.; Litvak & Enders, 2001).  Of greater significance, 
though, was the experience, reported by a host of contributors to the disability studies 
literature, of such interventions de-legitimating the needs for personal assistance which 
inevitably remained.  French (1993c, p. 44) describes the imperative to "gratefully" make use 
of such technology, as it has "been bought for the purpose at great expense" (ibid.).  It is clear 
to see how, at an intra-psychic level, disabled persons are here invited into collusion with a 
fantasy which denies difference, whilst simultaneously circumventing social accountability 
for the stubborn reality of inequality.  Assistive technology, for many or most disabled 
people, will never replace the need for personal assistance; instead "it can isolate the disabled 
individual, and firmly locate the problem of disability within the individual, thereby inhibiting 
societal change" (ibid., p. 46).   Further, according to Shakespeare (2006, p. 49), the social 
model approach has colluded with such accounts through reinforcing the "fantasy" of a 
barrier-free and completely equitable Utopia, in which impairment exists, but not disability.  
The reality underscored by French (1993a) and others shows that there is a manifest 
materiality to the functional limitations of impairment, which is not always amenable to 
intervention; to reject this formulation is to elide the challenge of interrogating (and 
personally processing) our cultural discomfort with the universal human traits of dependency 
and difference.   
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Control 
F: The thought of never being secure...and maybe I'm generalising here a bit, 
but that is one of the characteristics of what it feels like to be disabled. It's never 
having absolute security...and so to live your life having experienced, you know, 
complete security, probably means you now fill...quite a different space.  
 
L: It's...predictability...there's just a higher level of predictability about your 
place in the world and your interaction with the world when you're not disabled.  
  
A profound, shared aspect of life with disability for group members was the experience of 
endlessly being required to relinquish control.  Being embedded in complex systems of 
assistive relation, as well as dealing with the daily myriad of entirely unpredictable, stress-
inducing difficulties presented by a prejudiced and barrier-ridden environment, meant that 
managing the inner experience of "un-control" was a constant challenge.  Oliver (1995, p. 
261) found that it was this lack of control over the physical and social environment, rather 
than the experience of impairment, which was at the root of manifest emotional difficulties 
amongst disabled respondents.  Group members described the issues of control and 
management of personal and psychic boundaries as deeply interwoven, as the measure of 
control available was often contingent upon successful relational negotiation.  Often, 
however, a chronic lack of the experience of mastery of one's environment was described, 
leading to the aggravation of culturally imputed self-judgments regarding the demand for 
autonomy.  The lack of an accessible built and cultural environment, at times unreliable 
access to personal assistance, and the exhausting physical work of life with a severe 
impairment, was experienced as severely foreshortening opportunities for the expression of 
identity.  Such expressions as personal lifestyle options, spontaneous choices regarding how 
to proceed with one's day, preferences in the pursuit of relationships, and much else, were 
overcome by the pragmatic needs of functional survival in an unready and un-containing 
social world.  Murphy (1987) describes this deadening of ongoing self-expression in his life: 
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This loss of spontaneity invaded my entire assessment of time...It rigidified my 
short-range perspectives and introduced a calculating quality into an existence 
that formerly had been pleasantly disordered... 
      (Murphy (1987, p. 76) 
 
Echoing group members, Murphy (1987, p. 76) mentions such everyday activities as going 
outside for fresh air, getting a snack, going shopping, or to visit a friend; all such enterprises 
now required careful planning, substantial effort and, most of all, the cooperative support of 
others.   
 
The immense emphasis on autonomous control in the modernist western world shows in clear 
relief the subjective struggle for selfhood which is implied for those deprived of access to the 
trappings of narcissism required to bolster the social self.  Again, we see how disabled 
persons may be appropriated as bearers of a consciousness of the universal struggles 
disavowed by others, through the denial of access to the material means of narcissistic 
defence.  Mutua (2001, p. 112) highlights this extreme contrast in access to what we may term 
the "materials of narcissism", by comparing how disabled persons are often expected to be 
thankful for "just" having some form of basic access, whilst products, technology and living 
spaces are meticulously, indulgently designed in terms of not only the needs, but the wants of 
the nondisabled majority.  Offering a contribution that fits interestingly with these reflections 
on disability and social narcissism, Hunt (1998, p. 11) remarks that disabled persons have a 
"special insight" to offer the human world, through the experience of living the "passive 
aspect that is one half of the human reality".  He writes: 
 
Those who lead active lives are perhaps especially inclined to ignore man's 
[sic.] need to accept passivity in relation to so many forces beyond his control.  
They may need reminding sometimes of our finiteness, our feminine side in the 
hands of fate or providence.   
       (Hunt, 1998, p. 11) 
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Finally, like Toombs (1994, p. 342), group members described life with a severe physical 
impairment as maddeningly truncated, slow and laborious.  The sheer physical demands of 
embodied life with, for example, quadriplegia, mean that immense time and energy is 
expended upon the banalities of existence, such as dressing, washing, eating, routine physical 
procedures including toileting, and the like.  In the words of Toombs (1994, p. 342), disability 
"truncates the forward directionality of time, pulling one back to an enduring present".  Given 
the substantial impairment-related physical demands of life for group members, the 
inaccessibility, hostility and overwhelmingly excluding nature of the physical and social 
worlds presented to me as disturbingly brutal manifestations of the "careless" unconscious 
hostility of dominant society.   
 
Depression and suicidality 
F:  I think my own journey is particularly lonely because...I feel I see the 
dynamics that other people...don't, and often times choose not to.  It's the 
Pandora's box kind of moment, of kind of recognising...the real unhappiness of 
what's going on, rather than the surface unhappiness of it all. 
 
M: ...and I think there's something there as well in terms of us developing an 
alternative, collective voice.  You know, it's the same reason...why the long 
awaited for revolution never happened, that that level of passivity becomes 
expressed in...the least destructive form of self-hatred you can find...whatever 
that expression might be...I don't think that disabled people are even that 
enabled, I don't think we've even been able to express in material ways...or.... 
through beating people up...There's no...literally no lower power person to take 
it out on.   
 
G: ...and then...we won the case, my mom was fine which was my big concern 
and I sort of decided that I would give it five years and then I'd call it a day, I 
don't want to live like this. And I was pretty adamant about that...And so my 
mom arrives home and she's been at the shops, and sees me floating in the pool. 
And I'm like thinking 'oh well that didn't work'. And that it's quite ironic that I'm 
so disabled I couldn't even kill myself [everyone laughs]. But she arrived and she 
was totally freaked out.  
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The despair experienced by group members at various times of life tracked back, for the most 
part, to an excruciatingly painful awareness of a lack of authentic, real relating from others, in 
concert with the constant othering of denigrating imputations.  In the first quotation, F reflects 
on his understanding of how the relational space around him has become profoundly distorted 
since he became impaired, starving him of un-affected, honest contact.  Living in the teeth of 
a gale of projections requires the constant re-girding of self, especially when one is afforded 
limited access to the distractions, escapes or materialist opportunities for dissociation 
available to those not disadvantaged by exclusions based on disability or class.  In the second 
excerpt, reference is made to this material deprivation, which may sideline disabled persons 
sufficiently as to render even simple expression of one's experience of injustice through social 
action impossible, or inaudible.  In her view, the proneness of group members to depression 
and suicidality (all had experienced this), emanated from the constant need to be "nice", 
whilst internally managing powerful feelings of rage and loss at relentless experiences of 
denigration and exclusion.  As argued earlier (see Lives not worth living, p.123), it was the 
imputed meanings implicit in such exclusions, as well as overt experiences of discrimination, 
which tended to evoke despair.  However, and most malignantly, what such experiences 
would lead to was a vulnerable uncertainty regarding self-worth, as the mirroring of society 
served to confirm and resonate with psychic parts hostile to the self, paving the way for a 
growing confusion regarding the "real" meaning of impairment; that is, whether it did indeed 
(as per society's prejudices) imply an inherent devaluing of the self.  Material aspects of the 
social experience of disability were thus, subjectively, very difficult to decisively separate 
from archaic internalisations regarding personal worth and entitlement.  There was, thus, a 
litany of practical "exclusion issues" to deal with, but each of these also carried an emotional 
weight of meaning, which demanded time and energy in its addressing.  The bioethics debate 
surrounding whether disabled lives are "worth living" represents a highly amplified version of 
the cultural contestation of meanings of impairment which continued daily in the lives of 
group members.  What is referred to here is the battle to interpersonally, as well as intra-
psychically, subdue or evict projected meanings which portray one's life as inevitably abject.  
As has been discussed, a "damaged" body does not lead in an unmediated fashion to a 
defective body ego. But damage to the body – in a cultural context of meanings – does have 
the capacity to disrupt one's ability to defend the self against universal anxieties regarding the 
value, nature and beauty of the self.  Coleridge (1993, p. 37), in no uncertain terms, recounts 
his experience that rejection, in the lives of many disabled persons, has "catastrophic" results.  
Dismissal by a subtly or bluntly recoiling social world, he writes, "provokes despair and 
retreat, which in turn widens the gap and produce[s] further rejection and stereotyping" 
(ibid.).  In my subjective view, the robustness of self displayed by group members in the face  
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of discrimination was remarkable; yet it was the very consistency with which all had to deal 
with (often subtly) perverse mirroring, which rendered the experience at times intolerable.  
What I perceived was the difficulty of maintaining a battle fought on two fronts, inner and 
outer, in which the re-aggravation of denigratory inner voices was an ongoing source of 
instability to personal identity.   
 
Clearly, the under-diagnosis of depression (see Lives not worth living, p.123; Olkin, 1999, p. 
47), as well as the pervasive pathologisation of anger amongst the disabled community both 
represent risk factors pertaining to mood disorder.  In addition, some impairments (such as 
dementia or Parkinson's disease) may produce depression-like symptoms leading to difficulty 
in diagnostic differentiation, and consequent under-diagnosis of mood problems (ibid., p. 
210).  Research into the "quality of life" of persons with severe physical impairments such as 
quadriplegia too often makes little or no reference to the contravention of citizenship rights, 
nor to the crucial variable of the degree of political conscientisation of respondents (e.g. see 
Bach & McDaniel, 1993; Ingstad, 1995).  Within such research, it is "adjustment to injury" 
which is incorrectly regarded as the appropriate primary focus of attention, rather than 
"adjustment to marginalisation".  In my vicarious exposure to the responses of social 
networks to the onset, and chronicity, of severe physical impairments amongst group 
members, it was very clear to see how a logic which attributes subjective struggle to "naked" 
impairment, rather than a depressive illness, may readily obtain.  Further, the implicit 
meanings of social mirroring, couched within the invisible hegemony of the medical model, 
repeatedly sow the seeds of a hateful self-blame, engendering the pull toward depression and 
inertia.  With particular reference to disability, Charlton (1998, p. 77) names nihilism as a key 
aspect of oppression; in particular, a form of "alienation in its most desperate stage".  Its range 
of social manifestations, including suicide, crime, domestic violence and substance abuse 
serve, via externalisation, to conceal the reality of one's oppression from the self (ibid.).  
However, in the experience of M above, she reflects that disabled persons may be so 
socialised into self-blame as to lack any external channel for such "acting out" of aggression 
upon others.  In summarising her position, Adrienne Asch (Asch, 2001, p. 315) asserts that, in 
a world where all human life, regardless of health status, was appropriately valued, disabled 
persons would be no more likely to consider suicide than any other portion of the population.  
With characteristic vehemence, she then adds: 
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In a world that still systematically reduces the life chances for people with 
disabilities, the disability rights movement should fear a right to physician 
assistance in dying when there is so little medical or social assistance in living.   
     (Asch, 2001, p. 315 – my emphasis) 
 
Disabled superego 
L: But that doesn't change the fact that you've got a conditioned mind.  You 
know, you say something, and all of a sudden, you're hearing yourself, and 
starting to judge yourself...it's like, you're just not good enough, you don't 
deserve to have good experiences.   
 
R: I've got a mind that likes to try and solve problems.  I think up problems just 
to solve them...And then I find myself confronted with my disability, and trying to 
work out, how can I actually solve the problem, and I would just beat my head 
again and again against the wall, because there was no logic...It's like...a 
conundrum. 
 
J: I don't want to just be an equal human being or a...good disabled person... 
For a disabled person being exceptional, not just because they're disabled, but 
because they're exceptional, is kind of read as...a larger feat.  But it means that 
the things I ask of my self are that much more intense, the road I walk is that 
much more...steep.   There's very little room there for...fallibility.    
 
F: But you see, where I'm coming from...I always feel I have to achieve, achieve 
and achieve, and I'm never happy with who I am...The disability makes it worse. 
I feel like...I'm never good enough. And that I have to not have ataxia in order to 
be good enough...That's how I feel, but I'm trying to change it.  
 
As touched upon earlier, one reading of Freud's (1916) essay on "the exceptions" views 
impairment (or femaleness) as leading to "defective" functioning of the superego, based upon 
the "inapplicability" of laws of morality and fairness (Jacobson, 1959, p. 139).  My own 
impression from the data collected in the present study is, if anything, the converse.  The 
multi-layered cultural imperatives placed upon disabled persons, incorporating a host of 
demands to normalise, change, "improve", and otherwise strive for the "overcoming" of 
impairment, seemed to consistently feed and revitalize the most stringent internal controls 
upon the self.  The language of "solutions" (see Solutions, entitlement and passivity, p.282) 
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served to invigorate the superego, through always directing attention at "what is wrong", or 
should be done differently – that is, reasons why subjective struggle is ultimately the fault of 
the individual.  Similarly, a familiar, colloquial discourse concerning disability presents a 
hegemony of ideas such as the moral directive to strive for independence, to "not make 
excuses", to transform "adversity" into "challenge", and to "refuse" to be "held back" by 
impairment.  In a world which reliably ascribes disability-related struggle to individual factors 
it is extremely difficult to escape the nagging sense that:  if one just goes about it the right 
way, is adequately assertive, asks in the proper manner, plans things more carefully, is more 
strategic, works harder at maintaining relationships, is more grateful for what one receives, 
and doesn't complain or be negative – amongst much else – one might find that one's 
difficulties are, in fact, largely of one's own making.  The malignant potentials of such 
ascriptions of blame to the self, especially in the context of substantial, ongoing subjective 
trauma, are considerable to even the "healthiest" mind.  The oft-quoted, even hackneyed 
notion of "victim-blaming" comes here into disturbingly vivid relief.  Narcissistic culture 
creates an impossible ideal – the illusory state of normalcy – as a baseline criterion for 
legitimate, inclusionary personhood, drenching those who fall conspicuously outside of the 
curve in failure.  In the face of damning unconscious and overt imputations, it may be 
immensely difficult for disabled persons to find the "thought space" to separate from these 
projected accounts of the self, being drawn, instead, into fulfilling the dynamic of projective 
identification by attempting to actively (even manically) "disprove" denigrating ascriptions.  
As should be clear, I regard it as elemental that this punitive superego structure be viewed not 
as a "pathology of disabled persons", but as the internalised psychic consequence of lives of 
damaging exposure to discrimination.  Although, of course, it should be held in mind that all 
such self-punishment tracks back to abuse of some form, recapitulated by the internalisation 
of the authoritarian other.  In addition, this particular juncture is one which shows up the 
ideological dilemmas of psychoanalysis as it is currently, predominantly, "enacted" – that is, 
the question of whether its operationalisation upon the current subject matter would 
effectively yield nothing but "individualisation", or whether some real subversion of the 
heinous cultural hegemonies at work here is feasible.  One part of such hegemony is a 
positioning of disabled persons which militates against the capacity for self-compassion, 
through the inhabiting of a world which is bent upon obscuring and denying the reality of 
deprivation through discrimination or exclusion, or even the lived experience of impairment.  
This is internalised oppression; that is, a scenario where ideology has become internal, in a 
manner which maintains an interior surveillance which prevents the breaching of codes of 
silence surrounding the proximal, undeniable reality of symbolic and manifest violence.  To 
the extent to which such internalisations predominate in the inner world, a full, authentic, self-
acknowledging and nuanced experience of self will be precluded.   
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According to Davids (1996, p. 231), projected "psychic dirt" almost inevitably contains 
psychotic aspects of the projector, with the consequence being immense resistance to social 
change, as such change is contingent upon the "taking back" of disowned psychic materials.  
If psychic, and hence social, change is to take place under such circumstances, it will 
necessarily involve "great pain, anguish, and upheaval" (ibid.).  If this account is correct, the 
investment of the dominant majority in the "retention" of received projections by the disabled 
community is immense; the alternative being a threatening onslaught upon psychic 
equilibrium.  What this state of affairs points to is the "psychic payoff" accrued to the 
dominant majority by its (predominantly unconscious) ensuring of the maintenance of 
internalising forces of self-blame amongst the disabled minority.  The individualising 
ideology of the medical model serves to shore up frontiers which force, and keep, unwanted 
psychic matter "inside" the target population, as waves of denigration and self-blame 
destabilise internal defences, leading to the perforation of boundaries.  It is manifest 
oppression which renders disabled persons continually available as projective containers for 
the abjection of others; demeaning material circumstances pave the way for the gratification 
of narcissistic needs for self-exculpation and aggrandisement.  The continued "functionality" 
of the projection depends upon the collusion of all in a fantasy that "some" humans, by virtue 
of "constitutional factors" carry such inherent, internal shames, whilst others do not (ibid.).  
Recognition of the universality of shame or wretchedness upsets the split, unfastening these 
fragments of experience from their psychic moorings, and "re-levelling" the intersubjective 
space, in a manner which exposes narcissistic structures to the marshy underpinnings upon 
which they are founded.  Christopher Lasch's (1978; 1984) model of narcissistic culture 
bemoans the erosion of the "traditional" superego, founded upon paternal authority and the 
moral centrality of the family (Frosh, 1991, p. 66).  But as already noted, there is a case to be 
made for the heightening of superego imperatives within narcissistic culture, in terms of the 
ever-more stringent requirements of the normate ideal.  Yet, perhaps what we see is the 
disavowal – the projection – of superego imperatives into those who so palpably fail at the 
business of approximating the idealised human phantasm; viz. the disabled community.  What 
disablism does, against the society-wide backdrop of viciously authoritarian obligations to 
"measure up", is turn on incipient failures, as a proportion of any population will do when 
fighting for selfhood under siege by a debasing, punitive authority.  Within a social world 
dominated by a cultural hegemony which disrupts containment of its own humanity, it is 
inevitable that someone will have to be found to carry the humiliation of the collective.   
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Disability and loss 
Introduction 
Within medical and rehabilitation approaches to disability, the idea that disablement is 
necessarily associated with the psychic experience of loss is at least implied, and generally 
apparent (e.g. Solnit & Stark, 1961; Vash & Crewe, 2004; Siller, 1969).  Similarly, public 
discourse and media representations of disabled people remain firmly attached to the 
construct of disabled life as incomplete, lacking, and constantly aware of what is lost, or was 
never had.  As we have seen, psychological accounts of "adjustment" to disability have drawn 
on bereavement models, involving the expectation of stage wise progression through 
processes of "mourning" after onset of an impairment (Gill, 2001, p. 357; Oliver, 1995; Olkin, 
1999; Watermeyer, 2009).  Subsequently, the individual concerned is regarded as "needing" 
to move, within a process of psychological "working through", to a point of overcoming his / 
her "denial" of the "reality" of impairment, to a place of "acceptance", which allows for 
development towards creation of a new mode of living (Lenny, 1993, p. 234).  The gaze of an 
anxious and unready world upon the lives of people with impairments, carrying as it does 
waves of disowned and projected human vulnerability, is steeped in assumptions surrounding 
the intractability and misery of loss (Watermeyer, 2000; 2009).  The logic of disability loss 
seems no logic at all, but rather a self-evident "reality" emitting from the juxtaposition of 
culturally condensed (illusory) in-group bodily and performance ideals with unconsciously 
mediated, often sordid fantasies of what disabled life may be like (Marks, 1999a; 
Shakespeare, 1994; Watermeyer, 2009).  It is unsurprising, thus, that this "disability loss" has 
been largely rejected by the disability movement, and notably by writers within the social 
model perspective (e.g. Abberley, 1993; Finkelstein & French, 1993; Lonsdale, 1990; Morris, 
1989; Oliver, 1990; also see Watermeyer, 2002).   All too familiar to swathes of the disabled 
community is the exploitation of assumed loss in the sentimentality and othering publicly 
exercised by certain disability-related charity organisations.  Rituals of public benevolence 
such as the telethon (see Charity discourse, p.159) are, for their own existence, necessarily 
bathed in presuppositions regarding the "losses" of the "unfortunates" presented as stimuli for 
the generation of "much needed kindness" (Longmore, 1997, p. 140; Michalko, 2002; 
Thomson, 1997b).   
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The disability movement's vehement rejection of the ascription of loss by broader society 
emanates from an awareness of how the loss discourse situates disabled people as vulnerable 
and incomplete, feeding and justifying segregation and other forms of social control.  Media 
representations of disabled lives nearly always – and often spectacularly – miss the 
opportunity for presenting accounts and images of disabled people simply going about the 
business of life, full, as it is, of the universal ups and downs of muddling through.  Instead, 
the spectre of "tragic", numbing loss is never far away, regardless of whether the account is 
overtly concerned with deficits and dependency, or the "courageous" and "inspiring" 
overcoming of "adversity" (see Artistic and literary representations, p.157).  The perceived 
loss seems to seep through the essence of the life under scrutiny, not limiting itself to 
particular instances of inaccessibility or impairment effects, but rather saturating the whole 
individual in a manner which colours subjectivity and identity completely.  Disabled people, 
in contemporary culture, have become the personifications of loss (Marks, 1999a; 
Shakespeare, 1994).  Being utilised as receptacles for the projection of feelings of loss 
involves being positioned as having "something missing" and in need of intervention, 
benevolence or consolation in order to mitigate the inevitable emptiness and desolation which 
attend such a life (Watermeyer, 2006).  As shall by this point be clear, it is not my intention to 
support a dissociation of disabled persons from experiences of selfhood such as those 
pertaining to loss; rather, it is to critique the selecting out of disabled persons from the rest of 
humanity as the, ostensible, primary custodians of loss.  The phenomenon of loss with which 
we are dealing refers to a ubiquitous, even essential, aspect of the human condition.  To be 
alive, to grow and develop, to hope and relate, means inevitably to experience loss.  At issue 
here is the manner in which access to that part of human experience in which one's losses 
dwell is distorted and perverted in the lives of disabled persons, through the deeply prejudiced 
constructions and controls exercised upon this group by a defended society.   
 
The loss discourse 
R: It's like with old friends of mine I used to know, and they'll see me at a party 
or something, and they can't relate.  To them it's ... the whole tragedy.  And so 
they ask me how are you doing and how's your work and stuff, and they want 
reassurance from me that I'm OK, which I'll duly tell them, and that's kind of 
that.   
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F:  Oh, yeah, people pray for you.  I've been prayed for so many times it's a 
miracle I can't walk.  And people can be...incredibly rude and invasive about it.   
G: I think, in my case, if I could move my arms, I could be seen to be doing 
something, but what I can do, people just don't see...they have no idea what I'm 
capable of or not capable of.  All they see is me being fed and watered...not... 
doing anything else.  Like a big...baby...I guess that's how they see it.   
 
Evident throughout accounts given by group members was the ubiquitous presence, in the 
social world, of powerful ascriptions of loss.  The cultural imago of disability is one 
inseparably cemented to human loss, in a manner which opens the intersubjective space to 
waves of unmitigated projection, richly evident in the sentimentalising, "indulgent" tone of 
much popular disability discourse.  Most of the history of psychology has, inadvertently or 
not, concurred with these representations, foregrounding the purported loss of the healthy 
body, of perfect function, or of the "wished-for child" (Olkin, 1999, p. 78).  Insightfully, 
Olkin (1999, p. 78) identifies that the "repertoire" available to disabled persons within this 
structure of projected assumptions is one of "suffering, loss and mourning", or "continual 
pluckiness".  The hegemonic construction of disability generates a view of impairment as the 
"negation" of the natural, allowing little or no conceptual space for an "additive" subjective 
difference.  For example, apprehension of the world as a blind person, for Michalko (2002, p. 
27), embodies a qualitatively different, novel and valuable addition to the store of human 
experiences of social life; in his experience, it is, however, construed simply as lack – of 
knowledge, of normalcy, and of ability.   
 
An instructive example of the application of psychology's loss and mourning model to 
disability is provided by Thomas and Siller (1999).  Drawing directly on Freud's Mourning 
and melancholia (Freud, 1917), these authors assert that patterns of emotional response to 
disablement "frequently" follow "identical lines" to those of losses such as bereavement 
(Thomas & Siller, 1999, p. 186).  Key aspects of the adjustment process, in this view, include 
"shock, expectation of recovery, mourning, defence (either healthy reality formation, or 
neurotic use of defence mechanisms), and adjustment" (Kerr, 1977 cited in Thomas & Siller, 
1999, p. 186).  The trauma of the onset of disability thus is framed as demanding the 
performance of the "work of mourning" by the afflicted individual, in order that object loss 
may be absorbed, and a positive experience of self reconstituted (ibid., p. 187; Castelnuovo-
Tedesco, 1981).   
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After more than two decades of research designed to validate models such as that of Thomas 
and Siller (1999), however, little evidence has emerged of any orderly or characteristic 
sequence of unfolding psychological reactions to disability (Gill, 2001, p. 358; Finkelstein & 
French, 1993; Oliver, 1995).  Instead, disabled persons have been found to follow largely 
unique and individual styles of managing their life situations (Oliver, 1995, p. 261).  
Notwithstanding the time elapsed since writing, Oliver's (1995, p. 261) observation that 
psychological support for disabled people not rooted in a stage-wise grief model is relatively 
rare, remains overwhelmingly true.  Deeply interwoven with the assumed need for grieving is 
an individual, medical account of the "real problem" of disability; one which, familiarly, 
largely elides contextual factors.  Crucially, the grief model facilitates interpretations 
regarding an individual's internal state, or relations with others, in terms of the degree of 
"successful" or "adequate" progress made through the pre-ordained stages of adjustment (Gill, 
2001, p. 357).  Needless to say, the groundwork is thoroughly laid here for victim-blaming 
and pathologising attributions of what are – in all likelihood – profoundly social troubles.  As 
we shall see, the denigrating and deeply individualising label of one who is "in denial" awaits 
those who intrude upon social harmony with signs of poor adjustment.   
 
The disability studies literature contains, in a range of forms, adversarial responses to the 
imputation of loss.  Amongst these are empirical studies which have produced evidence that 
many disabled people do not identify the onset of, or life with, a disability, as loss (e.g. 
Campling, 1981; Finkelstein & French, 1993; Lenny, 1993; Morris, 1989).  Disability may be 
experienced as an enrichment of life, possibly leading to the questioning of hitherto invisible 
assumptions regarding the human condition and the workings of society.  As we have seen, 
many writers have persuasively argued that the voicing of disabled subjectivity carries much 
potential benefit in the broad creation of a more human, caring and critical society (e.g. Davis, 
2002; Michalko, 2002).  At the core of the present work is the idea that disabled people must 
be afforded a silent, unitary and non-judgmental space in which to define and articulate their 
own subjectivity; a space uncontaminated by the symbolic violence and control of demeaning 
assumptions.  Of course, there could be no justification in questioning the accounts of 
disability experience in the above studies, but of interest is their emphasis as defiant 
counterpoints to stereotype.  Of concern is the possible extent to which such constructions – 
politically highly necessary – require an evacuation of accounts of disability which do carry 
aspects of loss and struggle.  As has oft been pointed out, the question of whether such 
struggle is construed as attributable to impairment or disabling barriers remains of key 
political significance.  But disability research which expressly eschews loss serves to collude 
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with the perpetuation of a false binary, which – again – embodies a silencing of real lives.  
Many authors have criticised "phenomenological" or "experiential" accounts of disability as 
supportive of medical, charity and dependency discourses (see Prohibiting the personal, 
p.42); perhaps these narratives have fallen into the same binary snare, but in the alternate 
position.   The path, though, to a clear, nuanced and measured voicing of disabled 
subjectivity, surely is not the reactionary emphasising of the "positive” in response to a 
damning "negative"; what is required is an overturning of the dynamic discourse which 
underpins both accounts.  Quoting the work of Arthur Kleinman and his colleagues, Rod 
Michalko draws attention to the formidable issue of where the "truth" of subjective  "social 
suffering" lies; that is, the question of whether it is possible to escape suffering whilst steeped 
in cultural meanings which attach it to the very foundations of the self (Michalko, 2002, p. 
67).  Kleinman et al write, p.  
 
Social suffering is a feature of cultural representation both as spectacle and as a 
presentation of the real...how we 'picture' social suffering becomes that 
experience, for the observers and even for the sufferers' perpetrators.  What we 
represent and how we represent it prefigure what we will, or will not, do to 
intervene.  What is not pictured is not real.  Much of routinized misery is 
invisible; much that is made visible is not ordinary or routine.   
   (Kleinman et al., 1997 cited in Michalko, 2002, p. 67) 
 
In other words, the representations of disabled life which predominate within society – that is, 
the grief and bereavement model – create exclusive spaces for the imagining of disabled 
subjectivity, which, in turn, inform social policy and resource provision responses.  The more 
we "imagine" the suffering of disability within a particular thought paradigm, the less we are 
able to hear.  It is my position that the discourse of loss, incorporating the use of ideas of 
mourning, denial and acceptance, has functioned culturally as a means of achieving mastery 
over the dissonant and frighteningly unknown phenomenon of disability (Watermeyer, 2009).  
The illusion that what has been "lost" can be circumscribed from without, to the extent of 
defining a process which must be negotiated in order to "integrate" this loss, serves as an 
essential vehicle for observer control needs surrounding disability, towards the stilling of 
unconscious anxieties raised by disability images.  Typically, ideas regarding the overcoming 
of "denial" pertain purely to the imagined experience of impairment, whilst the lived reality of 
discrimination remains unconsidered, unnamed.  This fact attests to the profound extent to 
which cultural constructions of disability, incorporating such ideas as loss, are mediated by 
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irresistable fantasies – projections – about impairment, rather than any grounded sense of the 
lived nature of disability.  The "losses" to be dealt with, thus, are experienced as an affront by 
the disabled community because they exist in the minds and taxonomies of the observer, and, 
to some extent, for his or her benefit.  The benefit here pertains to a "psychic payoff" (Marks, 
1999a, p. 22) which arises out of the opportunity for a simultaneous distancing and 
indulgence of unconscious losses which are at the heart of the narcissistic mode of being-in-
the-world (Frosh, 1991, p. 70).  The high valency of resonance between such split-off wounds 
and the visible and salient "damage" of the "broken body", ensures that disabled persons 
function as a psychic lightning rod for "unthought" loss (Bollas, 1987).  Disabled people's 
rejection of such ascribed loss, arising as it does out of a recognition that "this is not mine", 
provides a neat and confirmatory enactment of the "denials" which seem self-evidently to 
accompany such tragedy.  Further, the rejection relates to the clear knowledge that any 
recognition – or admission – of loss by disabled people will tend to operate as a confirmation 
of expectations, serving thus to usher in a pre-existing and highly elaborated stereotype, 
which may cover, and hence silence, the individual entirely.   
 
Acceptance and denial 
M: And I think because...there's that desperate search for meaning...everybody 
around you [is]...desperately trying to find that same thing.  Like, 'where's the 
silver lining here?'...so there's this...sense of desperation to the whole 
conversation...  
 
L: I think, before there was this whole thing of we need to accept it. And then, 
saying I'd accepted it, when I knew I hadn't accepted it, and fighting with myself 
to accept something that I know I can't accept, because I can't accept it. Are 
there to many 'accepts' in that sentence?  
 
The central imperative placed upon disabled people within the grief and bereavement model is 
to "achieve" an imagined existential location of "acceptance".  If problems, difficult feelings 
or "poor adjustment" is in evidence, this tends to be attributed to the individual's ongoing 
"denial", based upon a lack of adequate "dealing" with loss.  But as shall become clear, the 
discourse of "acceptance and denial" (as I shall term it), is an inherently dynamic 
phenomenon, which fluctuates within the intersubjective space, often serving the containment 
needs of the observer.  Sinason (1992, p. 141) teaches us how individuals who witness 
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suffering, or are witness to experiences which evoke their own suffering, and cannot bear it, 
will tend to encourage "happiness and smiling".  Her extensive experience in institutional 
settings for elderly and intellectually impaired persons bear rich testament to these manic 
demands for the disguising of evidence of loss.  In a deeply moving account of her 
experiences as a partially sighted child entitled Can you see the rainbow?, Sally French 
(French, 1993b, p. 69) describes constantly being surrounded by "anxious relatives who were 
trying to get me to see things".  One can well imagine the fretful fantasies of the grown-ups 
around her, as they struggled to digest the unthinkable idea of their beautiful niece or 
grandchild being unable to see such things as rainbows.  She describes being positioned with 
great precision, her head tilted by a gentle hand to exactly the right angle, before the adult 
would point to the sky, saying "Look, there it is; look, there, there...there!"  She was acutely 
aware, even as a toddler, of the intense anxiety which would be evoked if she could not see 
what was being pointed out (ibid.).  Quite quickly she learned that the best option for all 
concerned was for her to simply say "yes", perhaps exclaim with fabricated delight, and thus 
allow relations to overcome the impasse (ibid.).  In this way, French (1993b, p. 69) was 
taught to deny her disability for the benefit of those around her; in the light of her – certainly 
not uncommon – familial circumstances, denial of disability was an entirely rational choice of 
action.  It is not difficult to see how such pressures extrapolate to the broader society in every 
sort of relational context, with the disabled individual disguising or denying the lived reality 
of both disability and impairment in order to protect the feelings of others.  In French's 
(1993b, p. 69) experience, even adults not emotionally involved with the question of whether 
she was able to see tacitly "required" denial, through a strong tendency towards disbelieving 
her, or interpreting her "not seeing" as manipulation or mischief.  The pressure to deny 
continued for her throughout adulthood, though becoming steadily (and perniciously) more 
subtle and difficult to identify (ibid., p. 74).  She writes:  
 
Disabled adults frequently evoke anxiety and embarrassment in others simply by 
their presence.  Although they become very skilful at dealing with this, it is often 
achieved at great cost to themselves by denying their disabilities and needs.  It is 
not unusual for disabled people to endure boredom or distress to safeguard the 
feelings of others...In situations like these reassuring phrases like 'I’m all right' or 
'don’t worry about me' become almost automatic.   
      (French, 1993b, p. 74) 
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John Bowlby (1979, p. 405) directs attention to evidence that parents may, at times, press 
their children to "shut off" from the conscious processing of painful information.  This may 
relate to knowledge, or the direct experience of events, which parents wish had been kept 
from their children.  Of course, a key question in such circumstances pertains to who is being 
protected by such silence.  In a case such as that described by French (1993b), parents and 
others may be operating from within a pre-conscious fantasy of protection of the child – from 
loss, failure, misconduct – which, in fact, manifests as an imperative to denial.  Familial 
hierarchies may be substantially disturbed by such protectionism, as children learn to function 
as containers of the feelings of others.  Bowlby (1979, p. 405) describes how situations where 
a child is subtly coerced into protecting adults from perilous knowledge are strongly 
associated with a range of psychological difficulties, including chronic distrust of others, 
inhibition of curiosity, distrust of one's own senses, and an experience of the world as unreal 
(ibid.).  The essence of what he is referring to is the experience of "seeing", or perceiving, one 
reality, and being told that another reality pertains.  In light of what we have seen, the 
incidence of this "template experience" throughout the life course of many disabled persons 
seems likely to be pervasive.  What this amounts to, at its foundation, is the systemic 
withholding of containment; that is, a moratorium on what one is "allowed to feel".   
 
In cases of the adventitious onset of impairment such as those of group members, the acute 
trauma experienced by the entire social system tended to create a similar milieu, of projection, 
protection, uncontainment and silence.  The following excerpt is representative: 
 
R: Yeah, like this guy came in and said 'you're never going to walk again', and it 
just didn't sink in at all. He said 'you won't be able to move your arms again'; 
yeah, right. You can't comprehend that. It's impossible, it doesn't make sense...it 
just doesn't gel. And then, also the reaction of other people is very strange. And 
suddenly you're this [horrified sound] tragic figure and people you've known all 
your life are coming in and walking out crying and you think 'what's going on?' 
It's very odd. And there you are comforting them...[It's] very paradoxical. One of 
my best buddies came, he stayed a bit. And he kind of said I want to come and 
talk to you, I'm battling with this. And I remember being in hospital, my head 
kind of still in traction, and I'm like 'don't worry Doug, I'm strong, I'll be fine'. 
And he's cracking up by my bedside...but...you lose a lot of people you're 
involved with because they can't handle the situation.  
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From the first moments of regaining consciousness in his new life as a quadriplegic man, R 
became aware of the pressures to contain others, as familiar faces above his bed crumpled and 
turned away.  In the midst of the denuded, seemingly boundless and chaotic feelings which 
reverberate through a social system after a traumatic accident, a tone was immediately set 
which required him to safeguard contacts by reassuring those around him.  In time, though, 
much of this safeguarding proved ineffective, as others tended to withdraw – this is common 
in circumstances of the traumatic onset of severe impairment (Braithwaite, 1990, p. 469).  
Against this background of horrendous, primitive pain, the individualising imperatives of the 
discourse of acceptance and denial are shown up as a ludicrous and atrocious miscarriage of 
equity.  Further, the violent marginalisation of R's own feeling response to what is, in fact, his 
predicament alone, is all too evident.  Health professionals in acute care settings dealing with 
such trauma have been shown to share deep pessimism and emotional avoidance around the 
newly impaired, compounding the culture of silence (Basnett, 2001, p. 454).   
 
What these disabled people have been symbolically taught by the shaping of relational 
dynamics is that their inner experience and nature is intolerable to others.  It is upon this 
marshy, false ground – this most insecure base (Kraemer and Roberts (1996a) – that self must 
somehow develop, and find solidity.  Behaviour labelled as individual "denial" is likely, in 
fact, to be a complex struggle with the "titrated" losses and shames of entire social systems of 
narcissistic denialism, channelled through the bodies and minds of disabled persons by virtue 
of the cultural meanings of non-normative "carnal information" (Paterson & Hughes, 1999).  
Above all, such meanings are not solipsistic in their emergence and course, but deeply social, 
dynamic, and interactively pragmatic (Rapley, Kiernan & Antaki, 1998, p. 809).   
 
On being "un-disabled" 
L: The problem with this idea of heroes...there's pressures put upon you to be 
Superman, like 'you're amazing', or like 'I'm your biggest fan', and we've never 
even met before.  And so you do so much, and there's just not a balance.  You 
can't be just a regular guy trying to get on with your life...they elevate it to that 
status ... And that gets in the way of just...being.   
 
G: And so...you work harder to be seen that you can do it.  Or you try to.  And 
even in yourself, it's like, 'am I wasting my time, am I not?'; 'am I tired, how tired 
am I?'   You can get quite confused about it.   
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J: ...it's almost a case of if you can't join them you try and beat them...'if an able-
bodied person can climb Kilimanjaro, then so can we'.  I think it has...a 
psychological flavour of 'we're going to do things you recognise', but, because 
we're doing them everyone recognises that it's fundamentally different...And I 
think that's a process of trying to find...a positive way of being different. 
 
In Moby Dick, Herman Melville's Captain Ahab lives a life predicated upon the need to resist 
categorization; that is, to repeatedly, infinitely prove that he has not become what the world 
expects him to be (Kriegel, 1987, p. 34).  As a disabled man, Ahab feels the strong currents of 
cultural expectation that would construe him as broken, useless, and defeated – his life is thus 
an exhausting, yet tireless, project of overturning these anticipations.  Along quite similar 
lines, F.D. Roosevelt knew all too well that, if he was to lead the United States, he would 
have to present a convincing, vigorous "un-disabled" counter-narrative of his life to the 
American people (Finger, 2006, p. 64).  To replace the colloquial attributions of tragedy, loss 
and shame, Roosevelt formulated a story of triumph over impairment, presenting himself as a 
man who had been galvanised, not weakened, by his disability (ibid.).  In addition, he took 
great pains to ensure that "disabled" images of himself were tracked down and excised from 
public view.  What Ahab and Roosevelt's stories show up is the phenomenon of disabled 
persons being made responsible for "undoing" the perceived or real implications of their 
impairments.  In a culture which celebrates the "supercrip" (Marks, 1999a, p. 75), disabled 
persons are drawn into lives of attempting to disprove that which is contained in the hail of 
projections launched by society.  In other words, one may be drawn away from what is 
internally real by irresistable, profoundly evaluative social forces which dictate what one 
should try not to be.  More specifically, this may mean striving to disown parts of experience 
or self which in any way hint at, or resonate with, the stereotypes directed at one each day.  
These are forces which militate strongly against the capacity for self-empathy – against the 
ability for recognising, in a compassionate and candid way, what one's struggles and 
experiences mean to the self.   
 
The evidence of an awareness amongst disabled people of a need to avoid being squarely 
positioned within pre-existing stereotypes is to be found in the sometimes self-punitive 
excesses of "anti-stereotyping behaviour", often to be found in popular media (Watermeyer & 
Swartz, 2008).  These stories deal with fiercely "independent" disabled people undertaking 
fantastic physical challenges, in a manner which seeks to overturn stereotyped assumptions 
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concerning their abilities, or lack thereof.  The media experience is a familiar one; viewers' 
hearts are warmed by the reassuring knowledge that, despite their "challenges", disabled 
people, in their remarkable resilience, have the character and courage to "overcome" their 
deficits.  What is at work here is, in my view, an amplified version of an everyday 
predicament which disabled people find themselves in.  This position is one ensnared within 
an absurdly limited, split repertoire of identity ascriptions; the "hero(ine)" who "overcomes", 
or the helpless invalid (ibid.).  Under the rubric of the former, the stereotype-busting 
behaviour referred to above may be interpreted as a response to assumptions regarding severe 
vulnerability, dependence, inadequacy, or whatever; in "managing" these, the individual 
eschews every last fragment of such human fallibilities, in performing superhuman feats.  
Ironically, it seems likely that such exceptions, reassuring though they may be to the observer, 
serve more to confirm the rule, the stereotype, than to overturn it (ibid.).   
 
The centrepiece of my approach to psycho-emotional aspects of disability (Reeve, 2002; 
2006; Thomas, 1999a) is the notion of being drawn to define oneself in opposition 
(Watermeyer, 2009).  The barrage of stereotyped expectations and demeaning assumptions 
under which disabled people survive, create a climate in which the disproving of negative 
imputations must, of necessity, often take precedence over the exploration and expression of 
aspects of the self.  If this work of resistance were not undertaken, the extraordinary 
robustness of disablist prejudices would, it seems, simply cover disabled individuals 
completely.  Instead, it is left to such individuals to strive not only to overturn expectations of, 
let's say, dependency, but to attempt to ensure that no shred of evidence may be found in their 
behaviour to support attribution of such a trait to them (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2008; 
Watermeyer, 2009).  Any hint of dependency needs will, most likely, not be fed into a 
nuanced and integrated picture of the individual concerned, but rather tend to contaminate and 
colour the full human impression, rendering "dependency" as an essential and enduring part 
of ascribed identity.  Of course, in practicality it's often impossible for disabled people, 
notwithstanding ongoing efforts and awareness of the implications, to fully avoid displaying 
behavioural evidence which may touch upon incipient stereotypes.  Inhabiting an inaccessible, 
inequitable world of disablist exclusions makes this so.   
 
In essence, what we see here is a form of oppression in which disabled people are, if 
demeaning stereotyping is to be contested, precluded from being allowed to show or 
communicate universal aspects of human emotional life, such as loss.  In a deep, yet somehow 
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familiarly resonant irony, persons forced to occupy positions of material deprivation and 
ostracisation by a disablist world, are simultaneously disallowed from articulating – even 
consciously experiencing – the possible emotional implications of their predicament.  As in 
all such situations of identity in which binary tensions are created, a proportion of disabled 
people negotiate their worlds by capitulating to imputed stereotypes – that is, allowing 
behaviour and utterances which may re-evoke and confirm depersonalising prejudices; these 
persons "become" "the Disabled" characterised in the stereotyping of society.  For these 
people, perhaps there is some experience of acknowledgement or mirroring buried between 
the disablist assumptions which may surround them; that is, some experience of real, human 
struggles being partially "validated", as if by coincidence, through the ascription of a social 
identity with suffering at its centre.  Or perhaps a form of internalised oppression is at work, 
in which disabled people have, through life-long subjection to distorted and malignant 
socialisation, come to experience themselves as nothing more or less than the stereotypes 
dictate.  The same distorted socialisation may support the alternative, anti-stereotyping (and 
often self-harming) position, for reasons that pertain as much to the looming fear of fulfilling 
internalised stereotypes, as the threat of imputations from the social world.   Here, individuals 
may seek to excise the presumed, demeaning implications of impairment, not only from the 
minds of others, but also from one's own mind.    
 
Thus it is that a continuum of disabled individuals, from those engaged in the most vigorous 
"stereotype-busting" behaviour to those quietly smoothing over the jagged edges of 
interpersonal misattunement, are not attempting to "overcome" their impairments, but instead 
are attempting to overcome imputed stereotypes.  The need to do this may, too often, result in 
the de-prioritisation of more intrinsically fulfilling styles of living.  After Kohut (1966, p. 68; 
1972), we may construe the cultural milieu surrounding disability as one in which the 
withholding of appropriate narcissistic ("selfobject") experiences from disabled persons 
renders potentially tortuous attempts at re-creating a positive self, interspersed with 
capitulation to the denigrations of the world.  I hasten to indicate that this view in no way 
represents a categorical judgment, let alone "pathologisation" of the life-activities and 
strivings of disabled persons.  Instead, it is simply my intention to direct concern toward the 
very real, conflicting and bewildering imperatives placed upon disabled persons by the 
incipient dismissals of society; the authentic – and, doubtless, diverse – nature of individual 
motivations can only be ascertained by introspection.  My application of Kohut's (1966) ideas 
on early narcissism is intended as drawing attention to the immediate, intersubjective 
dynamics which shape the positioning of disabled persons, rather than an assessment of more 
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enduring personality attributions.  However, as I have argued (see Trauma and its re-
enlivening, p.253), my position is one in which ongoing, systemic distortions of relational life 
around disability afford the selective confirmation of the more disturbed aspects of self which 
all carry.   
 
In one key respect, then, "identity" within the disability realm operates in a manner inverse to 
the norm.  Instead of carrying points of identification along with elements of othering, 
"identity" here is predominantly about rejecting ascribed difference (Watson, 2002, p. 515); 
in essence, identity is about "what I am not", rather than "what I am".  The "adaptation 
narrative" (Michalko, 2002, p. 139) implicit in "stereotype-busting" serves only – like all 
"mime" – to underline difference and the internalisation of the attribute of lack (Taussig, 
1993, p. 13).  Mimesis would not occur without the implicit recognition of inferior difference; 
in the act of imitation, such difference is re-created and confirmed (ibid., p. 17).  So it is that 
disabled persons are called to "remake" themselves as "able-bodied".  In the "inimitable" 
words of Murphy (1987, p. 20), the "first commandment" of illness or infirmity is "get well" 
(my emphasis).  In psychoanalytic terms, Taussig's (1993) ideas reflect the inevitability of the 
unconscious enactment, in which strivings to evacuate derided aspects of the self incorporate 
an in vivo manifestation of just those characteristics.  Freud (1909 cited in Sinason, 1992, p. 
42) captures the double-bind as follows:  "...the thing which is warded off invariably finds its 
way into the very means which is being used for warding it off".   
 
Disability, entitlement and loss 
M: ...what I think...is that if I was more accepted in society, that I wouldn't be 
feeling the loss as much as I do...because...I would have a lot more support 
around me.  As a community, that would be helping me get through this, but as it 
is it's just like 'this is your problem, now cope with it'.  The best thing would be if 
I could just like say to some guy, 'you know I really wish I could move today, it's 
really crap that I can't move at the moment'.  And to turn to anybody and be able 
to say that.  To say this is how I feel.   
 
R: ...I don't know if I would use the word acceptance. I'd use the word...adapting 
...Yeah, and saying, well, this is what I have to deal with and I make no excuses, 
I have to do this now. And I'm going to do it.  
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J: [on the disabled community]...there's...so much trauma...And it confirms in my 
own mind a suspicion...that...great people are really forged out of fire, it's really 
when you're going through those amazingly trying periods in your life...where 
those people who are phenomenal people because they are forced to make 
difficult decisions about who they are, and who they want to be.  And they 
become very conscious about that journey.  But on the other hand they are 
broken people, they are scarred people.  You know, that's kind of the price you 
pay for the knowledge you get, you pay the price.   
 
Throughout the group process, there was seldom doubt regarding the ongoing reality of losses 
experienced by members.  But the losses described were complex; a layered amalgam which 
incorporated impairment, but was typically flavoured, and given personal meaning, by social 
ascriptions.  The malignant cultural attributions to the impaired individual suffered by group 
members created a complicated, highly ambivalent relationship with the notion of loss, 
perverting clear, self-empathic experiencing of subjective struggle.  At the best of times, 
acknowledgment of loss to the self is a painful and risky experience; but it is way more 
hazardous when such "real-ising" may bring renewed force and certainty to the stereotyping 
one suffers, as well as heightened, anxious suspicion regarding the correctness of such 
stereotyping.   
 
The essence of the affront, the oppression, of the loss discourse for disabled persons is that, 
like all humans, these individuals must and do hold loss, but typically not the losses attributed 
to them.  Some losses relate directly to disability, some do not; often disability and 
impairment are interwoven with identity and experience in a complex narrative which renders 
separation or identification of "disability losses" meaningless.  The very real danger for 
disabled people is that this sphere of human experience, of self, may be rendered less 
admissible or possibly banished entirely from view, under the host of moral imperatives 
exercised by a medicalising society; to overcome, normalise, disguise, defeat, disown, defy, 
or otherwise void, the perceived emotional trappings of disablement.   
 
Within the Kleinian view of personality, authentic relating centres upon the ability to allow 
oneself and others to be in touch with, and communicate, loss (Frosh, 1991, p. 75-6).  When, 
in relationship, we are positioned in a manner which permits the conscious elaboration and 
communication of loss, we become more real and internally whole, fostering a healthy 
entitlement based on compassionate self-insight.  Bringing loss to light and consciousness is 
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constrained, to a greater or lesser degree, by the conditioned shame which is our universal 
(human) legacy.  A cultural environment in which Western morally coded ideals of autonomy, 
performance and perfection predominate, serves to cement this shame, in a manner which 
may feed into a punitive, internalised self-alienation.  These constraints confront us all; what 
is at issue, though, is the extent to which an especially severe sanctioning of expressions of 
loss – positive and negative – is imposed upon disabled people.  The incipient presence of 
loss-related stereotypes in the social world serves, for disabled people, to heighten the 
pressures of what is and is not permissible, in terms of the familiar imperative to "successful 
normalcy".  The human struggles are universal, but our anxieties surrounding disablement 
manifest in the selective disallowing of entitlement of disabled people to have, show and 
communicate these.  In mediating the extent to which any individual feels free to think and 
talk about loss, an important consideration may be whether he / she feels that the disclosure 
will contaminate his / her identity in the view of the listener.  We need to know, if we are to 
show difficult, even shameful, parts of self, that we will "remain the same" to the other, and 
not become viewed as somehow sullied, or saturated with the pain or loss we are negotiating.  
The courage to describe the experience of loss incorporates a trust that the listener will hold 
onto the knowledge that "this is not all that I am"; again, these are universal human 
challenges.   For disabled people, however, the risks of this already delicate social situation 
are often amplified, by the fact that it is not simply the utterances of the disabled individual 
which are at play in mediating his/her social identity, but also the evocation of pre-existing 
disability-fantasies of loss and struggle within the listener, which are sparked by a 
conversation which touches on loss.  In short, a range of self-fulfilling prophecies about the 
experience of being disabled are often waiting, in the mind of the other, to be confirmed.  At 
both a conscious and unconscious level, the position which disabled people may be drawn 
into assuming is one of defending against welling negative imputations or ascriptions in the 
other, as a sort of preparatory default.  The painful reality is that, as unconsciously mediated 
prejudices surrounding disability remain largely entrenched and uninterrogated, the constantly 
attendant vision of the disabled person for whom loss is "all" that he or she is or could be, is 
never far away, and slips neatly into place unbidden, even unnoticed.  Disabled people may 
consequently be left in a paradoxical and invisible borderland, carrying attributions of (inter 
alia) "losses" which are not theirs, and living with the invisibility or concealment of 
experiences of loss which are real, unique and human aspects of identity.   
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The silencing of social forces is considerable, yet the concealment of emotional experience 
such as loss may be viewed as a form of collusion with disablism; a pandering to the fears and 
prejudices of the majority, in a manner which does not track accountability back to oppressive 
cultural formations which may be implicated in creating the "losses" at hand (Abberley, 1987; 
Csordas, 1988; Oliver, 1986).  Instead, it may be interpreted as a sort of "walking on eggs" 
around the awaiting threat of prejudiced assumptions.  It seems intuitively true that, as long as 
such self-censorship is maintained, life will continue to be breathed into the dynamics of 
constructed difference which such unrealness is a response to.  It is the mode, the tone, of 
such social spaces which disabled people may be forced to occupy, which is most disquieting.  
This is a hesitant and ambiguous place, not truly "being", yet searching for authenticity, whilst 
anticipating rather than relating; a place of inherent relational compromises.  Disabled people 
coerced into occupying this borderland must surely find it harder to develop a grounded and 
confident voice; one simultaneously aware of the internal implications of oppressive 
phenomena, and clear and coherent entitlements to inclusion.  Finding such clarity in the 
midst of the cauldron of cross-cutting, deeply conditioned and unproblematised cultural 
associations to disability – to which disabled persons are themselves equally subject – must, 
at the best of times, be challenging.  But being required, in addition, to cater to the prejudices 
of others through selecting out aspects of relevant experience surely embodies a diminution of 
self, and the losing of ground in disabled people's struggle for an autonomous and audible 
voice.  This, though, in no way elides the reality that moving towards finding such a voice is a 
very difficult task.  Internalised uncertainties regarding justice and entitlement are as much a 
barrier to the clear articulation of experience as anticipated othering; the two concerns are 
one, mutually constitutive, and often experienced as continuous.  Finding one's way to solid 
ground in the midst of this gallery of voices, past and present, is the work of an internal 
reclaiming of self.    
 
In stark contrast to the social modelist call to eschew all evidence of loss, my own position is 
that personal and group empowerment for the disabled community is to be found via the 
deliberate and thoughtful claiming of loss (Watermeyer, 2009).  The notion here is one of 
disrupting the stereotyped meaning splits between stoic strength and misery, by turning, 
carefully, to internal referents rather than external constraints.  This means embarking on the 
work of weaving a more overt narrative of personal meanings in which losses and hopes are 
mingled and interwoven.  The identity of "disabled", in this schema, has varying salience, as it 
relates closely to some losses, less or not at all to others; the enforced attachment or 
dissociation of loss from disability is rejected. Instead, loss and other painful aspects of our 
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existence are welcomed back, reclaimed as precious and hitherto colonised, and honoured in 
one's own words, as disabled subjective life assumes its rightful place within the continuous 
stream which is the human condition. The project of reconfiguring a world of visible and 
invisible, active and structural forms of discrimination and exclusion can, surely, only be 
possible if the nature of disabled life in a disablist world becomes more fully known and 
described – the present research enquiry is a response to this logic.  There are many layers to 
this experience, and it is both naive and unjust to assert that disabled people simply "know" 
what is wrong with the world, what it means to individuals, and what ought to be done.  There 
is much that we do know, but there is also much that we all need to find out for ourselves.  It 
seems clear that allowing the development of an understanding of personal meanings of loss 
must form one crucial arena of this work.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
 
G: ...well, I think it's a process of grappling with meaning, you know ultimately 
that becomes my way of finding control.  It's understanding...the nature of the 
dynamics which lead to...the way things happen.  In many ways it allows me to 
normalise my life.  Because...if you don't understand these dynamics as having 
these kinds of root causes, you end up being...sucked that much more into them, 
and...in many ways...I end up feeling more disabled when I don't feel like...I get 
it.  That's been an over-arching experience from the initial injury...initially the 
ways a lot of people reacted to me just didn't make sense at all.  But then slowly, 
over time, you start to understand the patterns.  
 
The basic social institution is the individual human heart.  It is the source of the 
energy from which all social action derives its power and its purpose 
   (Dass & Gorman, 1985 cited in Coleridge, 1996, p. 96) 
 
Concluding reflections  
The essence of the psychological predicaments of people with impairments within disablist 
society which the study brought to light, may be succinctly expressed as follows:  The 
physical experience of homelessness manifested by a discriminatory material world is 
mirrored and recapitulated by an experience of psychic homelessness; of "nowhere to be".  As 
the physical and cultural misattunements of a barrier-ridden world repeatedly exclude, reject 
and deprive the disabled individual, so the social world denies the disabled self recognition 
and containment, the experience of being seen and known, and an accepting place for 
authentic relating.  The experience of bearing signifiers of dreaded human frailty brings with 
it a constriction, in the other, of psychic space available for the business of human contact.  
As the insufficiently containing mother, due to her overwhelming internal concerns, cannot 
make psychic space for her infant, so it is that the dominant cultural milieu cannot make space 
for disabled life, as exposure to impairment renders the intersubjective field thick with 
unconscious struggle, projection, and defensive alienation.  The distortion of psychic 
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boundaries in the lives of disabled persons may exist as a broad social system of interlocking 
constraints on self-expression, which extend across social environments, as well as the life-
span.  The obscuring of self is common across social groupings which suffer oppression; yet 
in the lives of disabled persons it is typically people with whom one is deeply identified who 
may most powerfully constrain one's self-realisation.  The extreme evocativeness of the 
impaired body may render relations – in the family, the school, the workplace, the social 
world – ridden with the protection, collusion, guilt, reparation and repression characteristic of 
false self dynamics.  Finding clarity on where one's psychic self begins and ends may, in the 
context of such a milieu, be especially difficult for disabled persons, as parts of self are 
continually inserted and extracted by a deeply unconsciously invested social world.  The 
silencing censure on disability-related subjectivity – in particular, that relating to oppression – 
renders a substantial layer of experience, and hence of self, "unspeakable".   
 
Cultural representations of disability have tended, subtly or overtly, to construe disabled 
subjectivity as somehow intrinsically different, and separate, from the broad trawl of the 
human condition.  As has been argued, such a pernicious misapprehension reflects defensive 
needs for distance from the looming threat of unconscious materials which the disabled figure 
evokes.  With the universal human commonality of subjective struggle in mind, the picture 
which begins to emerge is one in which the material discrimination of disablism tends to 
concretise – to realise – human abjection in the lives of the disabled minority which exist, in 
fact, within all.  One may make sense of this postulation as a form of projective identification 
upon a society-wide scale, in which disabled persons are appropriated as the projective 
containers of the psychic "excess" of a narcissistic world.  In the face of such appropriation, it 
may be extremely difficult for disabled persons – as for members of all oppressed groups – to 
locate, realise, process and voice the deep, authentic nature of experience and self.  The 
accessing and integration of self is fostered through accurate mirroring from an empathic and 
inclusive world; in the lives of the severely, visibly disabled participants in the present study, 
such attuned responsivity was chronically thwarted by unconscious "noise" which tended to 
inundate the intersubjective space.  If one combines this lack of acknowledgement, of 
authentic relational contact, with the constancy of prejudice and denigration (overt, subtle, 
symbolic) present in the narratives of group members, one apprehends a psychic predicament 
of the continual internalisation of attacks upon self-identity, in which injustice, unfairness and 
misrepresentation are commonplace.    
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Robert Murphy viewed his paralysis as a "splendid" arena within which to study the place of 
the individual within human culture (Murphy, 1987, p. 4-5).  To Murphy it was clear that the 
relationship between, on the one hand, "society and its symbolic standards for acting and 
evaluating", and on the other, the "strivings and interests of ordinary people", was one of 
unremitting conflict.  The individual and societal realms, far from being sensitively adjusted 
(attuned) to one another, are inherently at odds, thus typically rendering human history a 
contradiction of both human intentions and cultural values (ibid.).  The lives of disabled 
persons, within Murphy's  schema, embody the denuded reality of this cruel conflict; in his 
view, disabled people represent "humanity reduced to its bare essentials" (ibid., p. 5).  The 
study of the tenuous, perilous position of disabled people on the margins of society will thus 
reveal much regarding the hidden nature of all social life (ibid.).  It is, perhaps, in such lives 
that the brutality implicit in modernist mores comes into haunting relief.  Later in the same 
work, Murphy (1987, p. 157) underscores the centrality of the existential, the intra-psychic, in 
social oppression, commenting that the "most lasting" benefits of struggle against domination 
are the "transformations of consciousness of the combatants".  Such "transformations", in the 
lives of disabled people, must incorporate escape from the imperative to live lives devoted to 
the constant disproving of negative imputations, in which self is lost amid the clamour of 
conflicting accounts of the true nature of identity.   
 
The ongoing nature of material deprivation and symbolic violence sustained by the disabled 
minority tends to perpetuate the societal status quo, as this constant challenge to well-being 
militates against the clear recognition of ideologically obscured, although everyday, 
disadvantage.  Most of the energies of the participants in this study were taken up by the 
business of survival in a hostile world, leaving little for the purposes of resistance and 
interrogation of lived predicaments.  A constant exposure to denigrating imputations will, for 
any population, at times draw the individual into conscious or unconscious self-injurious 
ruminations, as the "conundrum" of deprivation seeks resolution in self-blame.  Murphy's 
(1987, p. 4-5) reflections on the conflict inherent in the relationship between individual needs 
and cultural currents is illuminating, in demonstrating how the intolerance at the heart of the 
modernist ideal is shown up in the case of the disabled minority.  The "societal container" 
which is co-constructed by dominant cultural forces within society, is receptive to the needs 
of individuals in a highly conditional manner.  The carefully designed, technological 
responses to individual "wants" so characteristic of modernity are, it seems, reserved for those 
afforded inclusivity by virtue of a temporary ability to avoid flouting the prescriptions of the 
normate ideal.  In turn, it is these "trappings of narcissism" which have psychic utility in 
 322
reinforcing defensive systems which disavow the "excesses" of human frailty, of struggle.  
This combination of othering and material deprivation locates the disabled minority as a 
docile receptacle for the "psychic dirt" of a mainstream culture seeking, in fantasy, to overturn 
its mortality.  But in the very act of re-creating this hegemony of the normate, dominant 
cultural forces prepare for themselves the shunning and cruelty that awaits all in the wake of 
the breakdown of the body.  The anomalous cultural location of age-related disability as 
simple "ageing" forms a clear demonstration of pre-conscious awareness of this contradiction.  
In the case of the disabled community, the (incipient) malevolence which cultural forces hold 
toward individual interests is brought into dramatic relief, heightening states of paranoia 
regarding individual abilities to fulfill the conditions of inclusion.  Such anxieties, though, 
will only serve to further rigidify forces of othering, reinforcing the individual's safe distance 
from the "abject".  The "societal container", thus, offers experiences which selectively enliven 
this abjection in some, whilst providing the means for narcissistic defence, and the disavowal 
of human struggle, in others.  The disabled minority, thus, arguably is required to contain the 
"excess" of all, whilst offered the least material and relational means for the digestion of 
these existential materials.  The "imperative to silence" surrounding the subjective life of 
disabled persons – that is, their "emotional oppression" – forms a key aspect of this cycle of 
deprivation.   
 
The picture of subjective life with impairment in a disablist society which was provided by 
the data in this study, is one which portrays such lives as psychologically gruelling.  Constant 
attacks upon selfhood from the social world, in addition to the everyday challenges of human 
life, demanded of the individual a great deal of psychic integration, of awareness and 
flexibility, of tolerance of ambiguity, and of the capacity to independently contain primitive 
anxieties.  For any human individual in such circumstances, being able to live in an open, 
engaged and hopeful way will require immense personal effort and courage, since little 
containment is provided by the material and social world.  The symbolic experience of being 
unmanageable – un-containable – by the world was consistent, requiring repeated effort at 
turning toward inner resources in order to make sense of often painful lived realities.  Against 
this backdrop, the lack, within the social model movement, of any substantive theoretical 
approach to the psychological predicaments of its constituency represents, in my view, a 
serious obstacle to the development of a conscientised, articulate and united movement for 
social change.   
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With Danermark and Gellerstedt (2004), the findings of the present study suggest that 
injustices to the disabled minority cannot be adequately accounted for solely by cultural, 
economic or biological mechanisms, but must instead combine levels of analysis, mechanisms 
and contexts in the creation of an integrated model of disadvantage (Danermark & 
Gellerstedt, 2004 cited in Shakespeare, 2006, p. 54).  The ubiquitous presence of splitting 
surrounding a field so ridden with (manifest and perceived) trauma has been discussed at 
length, and has formed a key determinant of the various modes of reductionism which 
characterise biological, materialist and cultural approaches to understanding the marginality 
of the disabled community.  The work of Irving Zola is exemplary here, in rejecting the 
"monochrome" languages of medical or social models, in favour of a broad-based curiosity 
regarding experience, analysis, and political strategy (Zola, 1982; 1988; 1994; Williams, 
2001).  Such flexibility, and willingness to incorporate diverse disciplinary contributions, is 
essential if a coherent "psychology of disability" is to be developed, which rests upon a 
consensual theoretical base, and is able to "contain" a significant proportion of the lived 
reality of the disabled community.  Surely, such a psychology must be built upon the "bridges 
of commonality" which connect all humankind; that is, the universal existential conflicts that, 
according to the present study, are manifested in the lives of disabled individuals via the 
workings of disablist ideology.  As in racism, it is essential that a psychological account of 
disability foregrounds the universality of human struggle, and thence accounts for dynamics 
of the psychic appropriation of oppressed groups in its managing.  In other words, a 
"psychology of disability" is by no means restricted to being a "psychology of disabled 
people".   
 
What a growing recognition and voicing of disabled subjectivity will render is a rich store of 
existential narrative on the human condition, as well as an incisive critique of the 
underpinnings of modernist society.  The "grotesque" or "carnivalesque" body bears, in its 
very nature, the capacity for social critique, via the transgressing – the confounding – of 
dominant social categories.  The implications of insights gleaned from the lives of those most 
directly oppressed by the "ideology of the body" have rich relevance to all, as all are 
ultimately subject to the prescriptions of the normate.  The ("uncanny") instability of the 
disabled identity is what will allow disablement to transcend the illusory surfaces of dominant 
constructions of identity, beckoning all to a united humanity which transcends and defies 
categories.  This is the vision of what Davis (2002, p. 4) terms the "dismodern" age; here, "the 
instability of disability...becomes a subset of the instability of identity as a whole" (Davis, 
2002, p. 25).  Wendell (1997, p. 267), with a similar tone, notes that "the oppression of 
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disabled people is the oppression of everyone's real body" (my emphasis).  The rich potential 
of the subjectivity of disabled people lies, for Wendell (1997, p. 274) not only in the fact of 
their having experiences not available to the nondisabled majority, but in their ability to 
"transcend cultural mythologies about the body, because they cannot do things the able-
bodied feel they must do in order to be happy, 'normal' and sane".  Disabled people, thus, must 
carry and know what lies "behind the mask" of the narcissistic ideal; that is, what of humanity 
is most routinely lost amongst the hubbub of commodification, competitive autonomy and 
"normotic" constriction.  If disabled people were to become truly heard, this would render "an 
explosion of knowledge of the human body and psyche" (ibid.), releasing creativity and 
imagination from the constrictions of normalcy.   
 
At the end of this journey, we return to George Eliot:  
 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like 
hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that 
roar which lies on the other side of silence. 
      (Middlemarch – George Eliot ) 
 
The "roar" of which Eliot speaks is the existential muddle, the hum, of ordinary life within the 
human condition, which is inevitably characterised by loss as well as hope, love as well as 
hatred, and disintegration as well as wholeness.  The "integration" of the disabled minority, 
consequently, is one which must occur on multiple planes – material, cultural, psychic – and 
for all, as lost fragments of experience and self are re-gathered, within a uniting vision of the 
common fallibility of humanity.   
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APPENDIX  
Group psychotherapy with severely physically impaired adults:  Aspects 
of process 
 
In this chapter I explore noteworthy aspects of process which emerged from the psychotherapy 
group, and attempt interpretations of these which relate to the lived experience of disability 
described by group members.  Later, I pay particular attention to features of my 
countertransference experience within the group, drawing some tentative conclusions regarding 
these pressures in clinical work with disabled clients.  If disablement does, indeed, carry the 
powerful unconscious evocativeness I have described, then it follows that issues within 
countertransference will require central attention in clinical work with this population.  But there 
are a number of other ways in which disability has the power to upset and test the constancies of 
the psychoanalytic therapeutic frame, as we shall discover.    
 
The italicised quotations provided in this chapter and the next are verbatim utterances of 
participants – these are more frequent in the following chapter, which will deal with "content" 
rather than "process" aspects of the psychotherapy group.  The initialled "names" I provide to 
refer to group members are fictitious, and used merely for convenience.   
 
Inconsistent attendance 
M: So what I was wondering was, is this more or less par for the course in terms of 
bringing together disabled people, or are we doing particularly badly? 
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Attendance at group sessions was unpredictable throughout for, I believe, manifest, practical 
reasons as well as unconsciously motivated ones.  To begin with the former, severe physical 
impairments, such as advanced ataxia or quadriplegia, may present a life-routine which is highly 
complex, unpredictable, labour-intensive and often interminably tedious.  As a quadriplegic, for 
example, performing everyday tasks of rising, washing, dressing, eating and otherwise preparing 
for the day – all of which involve essential assistance from personal attendants – can be 
exhausting, and fraught with unexpected complications.  Fatigue, susceptibility to infection, 
difficulties with bodily temperature control, muscular spasms and pain, as well as the structural 
uncertainty afforded by dependence on assistance, are routine and daunting challenges to 
functionality.  The myriad of wholly avoidable structural barriers of life on an inaccessible 
university campus add incalculably to such difficulties.  In terms of facilitating a group 
psychotherapy process, these realities had to be appropriately recognised and validated, whilst 
retaining a sense of commitment and accountability to other members to attend, as well as an 
"interpretive space" to make sense of the multiple determinants of missing a session.  Of course, 
ambivalence is an inherent aspect of the process of group maturation; yet, supervision discussions 
rendered the assessment that forces pulling members both towards, and away from, attachment to 
the group process were especially amplified in this case.   
 
My experience of the pattern of attendance was that of a "patchwork", which allowed stories and 
experiences – particularly of trauma – to be broached, briefly ventilated, and then discontinued.  
The developing of links, thus, between the materiality and history of life-worlds, and the largely 
split-off emotional meanings of these, was disrupted (Bion, 1959).  The inaccessibility of, I 
believe, highly threatening internal material was safeguarded by the discontinuities in narrative 
afforded by shifting attendance, and hence shifting attention.  I also felt that I was being 
unconsciously protected from exposure to what lay below the accommodating silence which 
disablist society so often demands of disabled persons (French, 1993b).  For myself, as well as for 
participants, a process of what Sinason terms "modulation of trauma" was being performed 
(Sinason, personal communication; 1992).  Later, I shall consider in more detail the issue of the 
"imperative to silence" imposed upon disabled persons by a social world in the grip of anxiety-
ridden fantasies about the "abjection" of disability.  But for the current discussion, the relevance 
of this idea is to be found in the dramatic contrast between an external social environment where 
disclosure (even to the self) is denied, and the allowing, "listening" space of the group process.  
The silence of the outside world, which may impute disability-related experiences with shame, 
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may be internalised, rendering the reactive splitting off of these aspects of self, in a manner which 
is associated with the pathologising "diagnosis" of disabled persons as being "in denial" (French, 
1993b; Watermeyer, 2000; see Acceptance and denial, p.307).  A "permissive" relational space 
may, consequently, be experienced as destabilising, even (unconsciously) traumatic.  I had the 
persistent hunch that group members unconsciously felt that I was, even to the point of 
irresponsibility, naive to what I was "letting myself (and them) in for".  The experience, against 
the backdrop of a deeply avoidant, disregarding world, of someone who "suddenly" wants to 
know, may feel jarring and incongruous; even obtrusive.    
 
A further interpretation of the "patchwork" attendance surrounds the unconscious communication 
to myself of the extreme unpredictability, and (external, and consequently internal) lack of 
control, which pervaded the private lives of group members.  These circumstances were vividly 
described in many discussions.  The picture created was one of worlds which felt incomplete, 
unreliable, unpredictable, slow, and laborious; where one is "let down", forced to "make do", and 
constantly expects to be accosted by disruptions which cannot be predicted or avoided.  The 
uncertainty of attendance, and how to manage the issue therapeutically, left me feeling anxious, 
inadequate, and unsure about "what will come next", "how things will be", or "if things will be 
alright".  The attendance pattern, thus, seemed to be both a manifest product of the materiality of 
life experience, and a symbolic communication (or projective identification) of its emotional 
evocations.  In my "professional" uncertainty, I was reminded of the host of material difficulties 
which members faced on campus, each of which was able to make a day feel impossible.  For 
example, the question of whether lifts are available and in working order simply dictates the 
movement possibilities of wheelchair users.  One group member – C – an especially tall 
quadriplegic man, related how the lifts in one campus building he regularly had classes in were 
unusually small.  This being the case, what was required of him several times a week, was to wait 
outside the lift until the doors opened, and then request that all occupants vacate it, as it would 
barely contain him alone.  C's personal assistant would then squat above him on the arms of his 
wheelchair, and they would proceed to the upper floor.  The absolutely endless number of such 
stressors, complicated by anxieties to do with entitlement, are additions to the everyday, 
demanding reality of university study.   
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"Socialising" 
Over the course of the first quarter of sessions, a pattern of light, "socialising" banter 
intermingled with discussions of more gravity, to the irritation of some members.  These same 
members, though, at other times engaged in similar "lightening" of the discourse.  Part of this 
dynamic was, I believe, a manifestation of ambivalence regarding the contemplation of struggle.  
Group members expressed a strong, even urgent conscious need for the opportunity to tell of their 
experience, but simultaneously "spoilt" the opportunity for doing so.   The effect of this pattern 
was, again, to evoke anxiety in myself.  I was repeatedly pushed into a position of doubting my 
professional capacity to perform the work, as well as its feasibility in the abstract.  It was 
extremely difficult to hold onto a "process perspective" in the face of my anxiety regarding 
whether this was "really therapy".  The casual relating, as was confirmed much later, also simply 
reflected a need for contact; in particular, for relating in a clear, real, uncomplicated and inclusive 
way.  This experience, for group members, was quite rare, with most interactions on campus 
being deeply coloured by anxiety, projection, avoidance, or other relational distortions arising 
from the effects on others of visible impairment.  The issue of protection (of self, one another, 
and me) from trauma is also relevant here, with the socialising behaviour creating a "safer", but 
un-therapeutic environment.  Repeated comments regarding my "excellent" memory, 
communicating both appreciation and a subtle, unconscious apprehension, further pointed to this 
interpretation.  What I heard in these comments was that the experience of having one's unheard 
narrative listened to carried great import, and was an exceptional, even peculiar, contrast to 
everyday life.   
 
Physical boundaries and the frame 
The thorough maintenance of the clear physical, and hence psychological, boundaries dictated by 
the psychoanalytic frame may be profoundly challenged by severe physical impairment.  
Consider, for example, the fact that a quadriplegic person requires assistance in tea-drinking.  
Each session would begin with tea and coffee being made, typically by myself and D, the one 
group member with fully functional upper limbs.   Thereafter, and during the early part of 
discussion, D and I would "feed" the two quadriplegic members their drink.  Compared to the 
clarity of distance afforded most psychotherapists by the analytic frame, this is intimate, personal 
contact.  It felt as though, for these moments, I was drawn from the realm of "talking", and into 
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that of "living", as I confronted my own anxieties about being depended on, "getting it right", and 
being a "good" therapist.  In the act of holding a cup while another drinks, there is uncertainty 
regarding the amount of time one tips the container, and to what angle.  The evocations here 
regarding feeding, control, intrusiveness and accommodation speak for themselves, with the 
physicality of this enactment serving to amplify the salience of all.     
 
A further example concerns G, a female member who uses an electric "scooter" for mobility.  At 
the end of a session, and after other group members had left the room, she discovered with 
sudden and intense anxiety that the scooter's battery had inexplicably run flat during the session.  
The sessions were held in the late afternoon, and we were thus two of perhaps only a handful of 
people left in the building.  The only solution was for me to push G, on her scooter, out through 
the building and into the parking lot, where the bus for disabled students awaited her.  Later, on 
reflecting upon the experience, I became aware of the complex and ambiguous nature of the 
feelings it had evoked.  I had felt initially helpless, battling to contain internal anxieties to do with 
the seeming intractability of the situation, which I partly projected onto her as shame or 
humiliation.  I was struck by the great volume of these feelings, which had, although only for 
moments, filled the intersubjective space in a manner which had rendered me incapable of clearly 
discerning their origin.  That is, situations such as these, where anxieties are high, make it 
extremely difficult to see to whom such feelings belong.  Further, immersion in a social milieu 
which is (probably quite consensually) attributing such feelings as shame to one's experience, 
must render it extremely difficult to retain clarity on the nature of one's own meanings.  Scott 
(1969) describes the point in relation to the projections which abound surrounding sight 
impairment: 
 
A major component in the experience of being a blind man [sic.] is defending the 
self from imputations of moral, psychological, and social inferiority.  For some this 
defence succeeds and for others it fails, but for all blind men it is another fact of life.   
 
       (Scott, 1969, p. 117) 
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I believe that what Scott (1969) is referring to here is the very difficult task of achieving and 
retaining contact with the authentic, nuanced reality of one's own emotional experience in the 
face of an ever-present drone of heavily charged assumptions from the interpersonal milieu.  
What both examples demonstrate is how I, as a psychotherapist, am not protected by the frame as 
one typically would be, in a manner which renders it more difficult for me to maintain the 
distance of an observer.  This absence of clear boundaries left me vulnerable to manic, defensive 
impulses to act (to fix), rather than simply to witness and interpret; of course, I had to act, but 
also aimed to reflect.  Psychoanalytically informed psychotherapy is about staying with feeling, 
with meaning.  But the practical dilemmas presented by the physicality of disability tug one 
toward action, and simultaneously towards merger which may tend to elide understanding.  In 
clinical practice involving disabled children, a very familiar experience is of family systems so 
racked with the ongoing practical requirements of managing the complex needs of an impairment, 
that simple conversations regarding "what it's like" to live with disability are seldom, if ever, 
embarked upon.  The boundary-crossing of the situations described above embodies, I believe, an 
enactment of boundary contraventions that are an elemental aspect of relational distortions 
surrounding disability (see Disability and the distortion of personal and psychic boundaries, 
p.260).  Visible disability tends, as we have seen, to evoke the projection of split-off existential 
conflicts.  The result, in a thoughtless moment, may be the experiencing of a disabled stranger as 
the personification of one's projections; of dependency, brokenness, shame, or whatever.  It is this 
positioning of the disabled individual which then provokes manic reparative (or "curative") action 
from the observer – plainly visible in feelings of helplessness, the intrusive providing of 
unsolicited assistance, and the like.  What has occurred here is a boundary contravention, in 
which internal conflicts within the observer are "place" within the disabled individual, after 
which, in a moment of fantasied "merger", the observer begins acting on behalf of the disabled 
individual, in terms of the fantasied "needs" which emanate from the projected conflict.  The 
"reality" of a need for assistance in, say, tea-drinking, forms an "authentic" template which 
confirms the validity of the projected assumptions of the dynamic, re-conjuring the disabled 
figure as "needy' in the ways we imagine.  I argue that, at the level of symbols, visibly disabled 
persons are constantly penetrated by projected conflicts, which perforate boundaries and justify 
not only psychic intrusion, but the myriad of material, controlling intrusions ubiquitously visited 
upon this community.   
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Shula Wilson (2003, p. 56) believes that fetching any, but especially disabled, psychotherapy 
patients from the waiting room may "feed the client's helplessness and dependency and delay 
autonomy".  My critical view is that this position may be somewhat short-sighted, and partly a 
result of the spectre of evocations which surround an un-critiqued stereotype of dependency.  
Clearly, there will be those clients who are unable to, say, come directly to the consulting room 
unaided, and there will be others who may require a variety of other forms of physical assistance 
discontinuous with the dictates of the frame, such as those described above.  Surely, it is the 
notion of – the need for – that most slippery of characteristics we call "independence", which 
must be vigorously interrogated (see The discourse of independence, p.288).  If escorting a 
patient to the consulting room is considered "infantilising", surely, since some patients will need 
this and much else, we should closely examine the cultural grounds upon which such an 
attribution rests.  Wilson's (2003) approach is, in my view, somewhat mechanical, prescribing 
"solutions" which do address the physical, but not the psychic roots of potentially malignant 
assumptions.  Of course, it is doubtless true that, for some, the experience of being escorted 
would amount to inappropriate infantilisation, but what emerges, nevertheless, is evidence of the 
universally unpalatable flavour of intractable physical dependence.  Later, Wilson (2003, p. 56) 
addresses the "problem" of wheelchair-using clients positioning themselves too closely to the 
therapist's chair.  I do not believe that these practical issues would have the import Wilson (2003) 
attributes to them if the underlying issue, to do with a more universal anxiety regarding boundary 
transgressions, was courageously and candidly explored.  What Wilson (2003) seems to be trying 
to create is an anticipatory climate of "kid gloves", in which the "messy" experiences of a lack of 
control and clear boundary – which, I believe, are at the heart of disabled life in the modern 
society – are not allowed to be "lived" in the consulting room.  Psychoanalytic boundary 
stipulations may at times militate against authentic, real and robust relating around the lived 
materiality of struggle and circumstance, whilst simultaneously (unhelpfully) protecting the 
therapist from "getting things wrong".  As has been argued, base responses to disability, 
manifesting in layered prejudices, are in the very fibre of our societies, and there is no reason at 
all to assume that mental health professionals are an exception.   
 
Interpretation 
The issue of the interpretation of the conscious discourse of members of oppressed groups is, as 
we have seen, a highly politically fraught one.  The risk is of the misappropriation of 
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psychoanalysis as a frame for victim-blaming, via the attribution of social troubles to intra-
psychic origins.  What, then, is the position and utility of psychodynamic interpretation in the 
work of subversive – that is, emancipatory – psychotherapy?   
 
In the early phase of sessions, I was shown a powerful mix of readiness to articulate untold 
accounts of trauma, and deep ambivalence.  These stories included the accidents, illnesses or 
diagnoses experienced by group members, but always with a strongly psychosocial, meaning-
oriented slant.  In other words, without in any way denying the base reality of impairment, it was 
in the context of the reverberations of trauma within the family, the school, and other social 
networks that stories were structured.  The "untold" nature of these stories – we will consider 
examples later – brought a sense of image-based memories being unearthed, in a manner which I 
experienced at times as "like a movie".  Pictures of a beach, the silhouetted face of a man against 
the sky, a hospital, the misery of family members, a rehabilitation pool; the image-memories were 
told and re-told, seeming to become slightly more animate in the telling.  These accounts were of 
an acute trauma (a spinal injury, a stroke) which, for a range of reasons relating to cultural 
responses to disability and disease, had remained relatively unprocessed.  This initial, socially 
engendered split had, I believe, set a tone for the silencing of disability- (that is, oppression and 
impairment) related struggle in an ongoing sense.  What seemed to be happening as stories were 
told and re-told, was the beginning of a process of "real-ising" a split-off, silenced tract of 
experience, locked in trauma, and thereafter muffled by the imperatives of disablist culture.  This 
process of "real-isation" certainly did not call for interpretations of unconscious process; rather, 
what was required was a simple holding and witnessing.  In the face of the defensive "de-
legitimation" of disabled experience (see Disability and the distortion of personal and psychic 
boundaries, p.260) in everyday discourse, disabled persons may be required to psychologically 
swim against powerful conscious and unconscious cultural currents in order to maintain stable 
contact with the reality of disability-related struggle.   
 
In situations where oppression – trauma – is ongoing, the appropriateness of an interpretation 
hinges upon whether it is able to allow material elements to remain fully real, whilst including 
commentary on the nature of unconscious processes.  Consider the following crude, yet 
instructive example:  F, a quadriplegic man, telephoned me after missing two sessions, to say that 
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he would not be able to attend "today" as he was ill.  It was Thursday, and our meeting day was 
Wednesday; F believed that "today" was Wednesday.  F was clearly in the midst of severe 
physical struggle, including intense fatigue and chronic, burning pain in his legs.  If not for the 
fact of F's extreme, ongoing physical difficulties, I would have been drawn to thinking, and 
acting, interpretively, and making sense of his oversight in terms of ambivalence.  Making such 
an interpretation would, I believe, have embodied a misattuned, non-validation of the physical 
reality of his impairment.  The clinical picture of a combination of the ongoing trauma of 
exclusion, social shunning and discrimination of every sort, along with such impairment-based 
suffering, is one in which there is so much experience to be processed at a surface level, that it is 
not yet possible, or appropriate, to attempt moving into the symbolic realm.  Put simply, one is 
required to attune to the (hitherto avoided or silenced) conscious, before beginning to think about 
unconscious processes.  In my view, the legacy of psychoanalytic theorising on disability 
critiqued earlier (see Psychoanalysis and disability: A brief history, p.73) often made this very 
error; that is, making sense of disabled experience in terms of repressed unconscious phenomena 
(e.g. denial, shame) in the absence of a rigorous, critical and candid assessment of the everyday, 
manifest lives of social trauma to which disabled individuals are subject.  The crux of the point is 
that experience must be seen before it may be questioned, interrogated or understood in any more 
depth-oriented way.   
 
However, on the opposite side of this delicate dialectic is the very real risk of the "materiality" of 
(especially) impairment leading to the creation of a collusory defence which avoids emotion, 
instead focusing exclusively on physical, pragmatic elements of exclusion.  This is the essential 
failing of the social model as a framework for conceptualising disabled experience.  In short, the 
model makes provision for the interrogation of modes of exclusion (or "barriers"), but not for the 
layer of personally, historically situated struggle which "naturally" emanates from such factors.  
The tension is between the as if understanding of historical, unconscious factors and the "as" 
recognition of the reality of material struggle.  Of course, this logic pertains to all 
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy; its key significance here arises due to the almost 
ineffable tendency of cultural meanings surrounding disability to mobilise splits, which typically 
obscure the situational level.  Working prematurely with the as if often represents nothing more 
than fearful defence within the clinician regarding the injustice of continual, demeaning 
exclusion.  As is familiar from clinical experience, psychological formulations of disabled 
individuals which begin with the neurotic – that is, with the as if logic of complicity – result in a 
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dead-end of victim-blaming.  In my experience, it is essential that material persecution be fully 
acknowledged before internalised persecution may be usefully examined.   
 
Psychotherapy with disabled persons: Countertransference 
considerations 
 
Introduction 
The very substantial challenges in the area of countertransference which face a psychoanalytically 
oriented psychotherapist working with disabled clients are, in my view, a highly instructive, 
microcosmic representation of the unconscious patterning of disablist prejudice within society 
more broadly.  Of course, as alluded to earlier, there should be no shame for clinicians in the self-
recognition of anxiety and prejudice; this is a universal legacy of segregation, and thus beckons 
all to self-reflection and growth.  The danger of a form of complacent denialism of the reality of 
such deeply conditioned prejudices is one demanding real vigilance (Reeve, 2000, p. 678).  We 
are only beginning to consider these deeply evocative issues during the current era; as 
professionals, as society.  Thus, therapeutic work may be viewed as a process of the clinician 
"working through" his or her personal evocations and assumptions surrounding disability, via a 
concerted, honest, and highly reflective focus on countertransference.  As "healing" professionals, 
clinicians, like members of the broader society, carry needs to know, control, distance, subdue, 
repair, alter, reject, modify, rehabilitate, disguise, minimise, exaggerate, idealise, or denigrate.  
The evocative power of disability raises in all an "unconscious profile" of such needs, in response 
to the deep psychological phenomena with which physical "damage" resonates.  If reflected upon 
enough, what occurs in therapeutic work with disabled persons promises to tell us much about 
how the psychological aspects of oppression work "out there".  In the following sections, I 
provide a brief discussion of these issues in the present study.    
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Pressure-anxiety 
From the outset, I was aware of inordinate levels of anxiety within myself regarding the 
possibility of "harmful" misattunement.  That is, my own awareness of disability oppression and 
politics rendered within me a paradoxical "paralysis" surrounding the fear that I would "miss", or 
not sufficiently acknowledge, some atrocious experience.  What was at work here, I believe, was 
an unconscious communication of the experience of having suffered silently, within a world of 
overt and subtle avoidance and negation of the reality of struggle.  It should be unsurprising that, 
in therapeutic work with members of a brutally silenced minority, one finds oneself afraid of 
silencing.  Further, it is in the nature of therapeutic work involving trauma that a certain 
excessive, even defensive "reverence" or respect for the gravity of (fantasies regarding) what has 
been suffered intrudes disruptively upon the possibility of authentic empathy (e.g. Dalenberg, 
2000).  In addition, I hypothesise that the apprehension I carried regarding the risk of "re-
obscuring" experiences of suffering pertained to my own unconscious wish to, in fact, do so.  
Whilst my own political orientation towards disability may appear as a defining variable, I do not 
believe that it is so.  Instead, what is of note is the ubiquitous presence of anxiety-ridden 
assumptions of excess; that is, of splitting.  My particular countertransference predicament locates 
me as one struggling to see emotional resilience in the face of social brutality, whereas other 
circumstances may render a corresponding difficulty with "seeing" the reality of oppression, or be 
"obsessed" with impairment in a manner which elides all else.  My experience of feeling "not 
enough" as a therapist, or an empathic listener, bears relation to the loss of boundaries which so 
often characterises relating to disabled individuals.  My own unconscious projections of damage 
render a "manic defence", involving feelings of helplessness and a need to repair; but by their 
nature, the conflicts which are the subject matter of my projections are intractable, rendering 
predictable feelings of inadequacy.  As an adjunct to this, the unconscious habituation of just such 
relating within group members (from the opposite vantage point) is likely to have contributed to 
this dynamic.  Finally, the "unheard" nature of the layer of disability experience which was 
slowly being uncovered contributed, I believe, to a shared sense of precariousness and danger 
regarding the material being "held".  The cultural avoidance and silencing of the layer of 
experience which pertains to disability (oppression as well as impairment), must surely manifest 
in a burgeoning internal sense of that experience being inadmissible.  The ongoing experience of 
an absence of mirroring – of being truly seen and validated – contributes to an entirely sensible 
expectation of not being seen, which has direct relevance to psychotherapy.   
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Ironically, though, what was lived out at times within the therapeutic relationship was another 
form of social silencing, paradoxically enacted via my over-anxious need to hear perfectly, and in 
effect, to pre-empt, negate, and "speak for".  There is a dialectical tension here which deserves 
our attention.  In circumstances in which we work therapeutically with members of oppressed 
minorities, it is common cause that a working knowledge and a degree of personal, internal 
reflection regarding the nature of social predicaments suffered by minority members is essential 
in "opening our ears" to the experience of oppression, whilst simultaneously avoiding or 
overcoming the snares of our own prejudices (e.g. Marks, 2002a; 2002b).  Consider, for example, 
the wealth of theoretical investigations of feminism into psychotherapy.  Perhaps the present 
work may be construed as a corresponding form of ideological conscientisation, pertaining to 
disablism, rather than sexism.  However, at the heart of the dialectic is a structural tension 
between "understanding" the shared predicaments of members of a minority, and hearing – 
allowing – the unique nature of an individual's account to unfold.  This challenge is at the heart of 
the countertransference jumble of disability-related therapeutic work.   
 
Political investments and therapeutic boundaries 
J:  I mean is the purpose of the group, to talk, to talk openly and in a safe 
environment about our own experiences or is it...to have some kind of forum where 
we actually...try and make a difference to the other person, or are we actually going 
to...influence things, you know, to better ourselves and for future generations...what 
is the purpose of this, what are we doing here? 
 
Now, in my role as a disability service provider at a university, I want to 'share the 
wealth' with my students – people who have been indoctrinated...Never has even one 
of our students expressed awareness of such terms as 'social model' or 'medical 
model'.  They believe that their disabilities belong to them individually and it is up 
to them to 'adjust', 'adapt' or be granted 'special' treatment to support their efforts to 
'overcome' their 'challenges'.   
 
      (Gordon, 2002, p. 33-4)  
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As a psychoanalytic psychotherapist working with disabled people, I regard it as essential that I, 
and others working in the field, have a thorough and critical awareness of disability oppression; 
how it works, what it rests upon, and how change might take place.  However, within my 
personal tussles with countertransference, what this consciousness – or conscientisation – sets up 
within me is a confusion regarding the ownership of stories, and the boundaries between patient 
and therapist needs.  The anxiety regarding my need to "know" sketched above interacts here with 
my (also partly obsessive) investment in particular political "outcomes" within the therapy.  
These may involve the patient "seeing through" obscured modes of oppression that he / she has 
suffered under, and, through an "internal emancipation" taking up an appropriately "critical", 
politically resistant position.  Alternate to this inadvertently "controlling" therapeutic stance, the 
(presumed) commonality of experience between patient (or subject) and therapist (or researcher) 
who share a marginalised identity, may create a misleading, collusory assumption that "we all 
know".  In other words, a relational defence arises, surrounding shared "in-group" knowledge 
which, in fact, is never articulated.  Roman (1993) describes this experience as follows:  
 
This cogent feeling of similarity distanced me from countering their assumptions 
and distorted realities.  This affective pull of sameness blurred my vision.  The 
participants' stories resonated so closely to mine that I maintained a 'racially 
privileged naivete'.   
 
   (Roman, 1993 cited in Hurd & McIntyre, 1996, p. 81)  
 
Whilst the political stances inherent in my personal orientation may be highly defensible, even 
desirable, at issue is the fact that they are mine, and embody a philosophical position which I 
have been led to by my own experience.  Of course, the "politically correct" position may not – 
will not – fit with the experience of all to the same degree (if at all), or in the same way.  More 
important still is the fact that if I do not take great care as a psychotherapist, I am at risk of subtly 
"delivering" a world view, in a manner which obviates or negates an individual's developmental 
process.  In evidence here, I believe, is not just my personal political investment in disability 
emancipation (considerable though this is), but a further example of unconscious enactment 
which serves, via control, to allow me to constrain the "free" telling of stories.  The usual 
challenge of the analyst, to wait, to postpone understanding, to not know (Bion, 1988; Casement, 
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1992), is amplified; instead, I agree too quickly, explore too little, step in too fast – I'm vigilant, 
manic and anxious regarding the looming threat of re-traumatisation.  In the words of Foster 
(2001, p. 85), my own depressive anxiety has contributed to my forging of "sentimentalised" 
client relationships.  All of the aforementioned pressures militate against simple listening, and 
relate, I believe, to my own anxiety regarding what may emerge should I retire to a neutral, 
listening stance, and allow patients' experiences to come independently into full elaboration.  
Analysis of these anxieties which I carry exposes a struggle – not discontinuous with the 
underpinnings of current bioethics – with simply believing that life with a severe physical 
impairment is survivable.  Taking that purely listening stance would mean assuming a position of 
"giving back" each individual his / her experience, the right to finding one's own style of 
redemption; to finding personal truth, and possibly a degree of peace, which all seek.  What my 
difficulty in granting this humanity reflects about what lurks beneath common, everyday anxieties 
surrounding disabled people, and the way we manage these anxieties, is sobering, to say the least.  
There is a dehumanisation of sorts at work here, based on boundary contraventions, control, and 
projective identification, in which disabled people are not so much appropriated for the psychic 
needs for catharsis and evacuation of others, as used as instruments for the protection of others 
from their own fantasies about impairment.  It seems that it is extremely difficult for us, due to 
the nature of our unconscious fantasies about disability, to allow people with impairments to 
possess, to feel, to circumscribe and articulate, their own psychic reality.  We need to know, to 
decide in advance; surely this is the essence of stereotyping, and the myriad of social controls 
which emanate from it.   
 
The function of our projections, however, is not only to give voice to our own disowned torments, 
but also to preclude the incidence of open space which may be filled with the experience of the 
other.  What is created in the lives of disabled people is an intersubjective milieu which 
precludes, obviates, stifles, deflects or dampens the question "Who are you?"  At the core of any 
form of prejudice is the predicament of having one's experience, oneself, defined by others. An 
array of interlocking forces is at work in cultural formations around disability to ensure that self-
definition is constrained.  Within the psychotherapeutic frame, this may mean that the therapist's 
difficulty with the idea that disability is survivable, may render him or her unable to entrust 
disabled individuals with their own healing, with their own path.   
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And yet it would be foolhardy and self-defeating to simply "put away" one's political investments 
as a psychoanalytic practitioner.  We would, then, be left locating disturbance or difficulty 
internally, denying the ongoing structural and relational implications of the consistently "mad" 
nature of constructions of disability in the outside world.  Surely it is not the purpose of our 
discipline to simply "deal with" clinical implications of social reality, rather than assume a more 
critical, subversive and ideological role in the "real world" (Samuels, 1993).  Is psychoanalytic 
work limited to the business of "taking back projections" and "owning feelings" in a manner 
which disperses "persecution complexes"; or is it about facilitating the directing of rage toward 
where it is due? Perhaps it is important to observe that subjugation seldom (if ever) leads to a 
psychologically sterile subordinacy, but rather to a variety of forms of disturbance, including 
complex systems of displacement and enactment.  It is thus dangerously naive to construe 
therapeutic work as a simple process of "coming out" to an "empowered" position which "gives 
oppression back".  Indeed, such a view represents a miscarriage of the analytic task of 
exploration, toward individuation.  Thompson et al (1994) offers the following helpful 
observation:  
 
Conscientisation is not intended to be a crude process of trying to win someone over 
to a particular ideology.  Rather, it is a question of deindividualisation. 
 
 (Thompson et al., 1994 cited in Thompson, 2003, p. 223 – my emphasis) 
 
This process, to Thompson (2003, p. 223), is one of facilitating an understanding of how the 
position of an individual mirrors the broader cultural and political landscape.  Most interestingly, 
Thompson (2003, p. 224) adds that a "crude approach" to such work is to be carefully avoided, as 
this may "undermine professional credibility" and lead to "alienation and mistrust".  There is, 
amidst these directives, a clear critique of the "de-psychologising" impetus of the social model 
approach.  Epitomising the misapprehension at the heart of the social model, Swain and French 
(2006, p. 155) regard the topic of "counselling and disability" as a direct reflection of the  
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"individual-society divide".  For these writers, examining the internal will only – ever – serve to 
elide the political.  Samuels (1993, p. 6) stridently, even scornfully, rebuffs such a position, 
countering that rejection of the clinical enterprise forecloses what is, in fact, the only real 
connection between our understandings of individual and cultural spheres of life. 
 
The position I began to reach was one of viewing "intra-psychic" and "political" aims as mutually 
constituting aspects of a dialectic.  A position which prioritises either will often function as a 
defence against the reality of the alternate realm.  Nevertheless, increasingly it became clear that 
intra-psychic constellations had to change before political contradictions could be clearly, 
consistently seen.  It was thus very important for me to "manage" my own, politically motivated 
(and defensive) need to point out such contradictions, so as to allow a more personal, internal 
process of unfolding awareness to take place.  My "blundering in" with such observations tended 
to create an experience for group members of not having their current reality heard, in a manner 
which diminished exploration, trust, and separate relating.  Gordon (2002, p. 36), whose frank 
description of such "misplaced politics" opened this section, encapsulates the issue thus:   
 
After all, if I assert that his view of himself [sic.] as a disabled person is incorrect 
and that my view of his experience is the accurate one, then I become just another 
oppressor who considers his ontological frame to be a symptom of dysfunction.   
 
      (Gordon, 2002, p. 36) 
 
The difficult lesson for me, thus, was to let the group process "be" what it was; to let individuals 
exist "where they are", no matter that such a place may be far removed from a politically critical 
one.  An important possibility for contemplation is the idea that political fervency within the 
clinician may, in part, relate to an appeasing of guilt, which manifests in a drive to bring 
oppression into relief, hence situating the therapist in defensive opposition to the "heinous" social 
realities under discussion.  "Revolutionary" intentions, it seems, will always fly in the face of a 
therapeutic stance which – appropriately – values ambiguity, ambivalence, and nuance.  Such 
controlling "merger" will tend to rob the "other" of untethered ownership of his or her internal 
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experience, hence disallowing this material from surfacing in consciousness in an unaffected, 
uncontaminated manner.  Within psychoanalytic theory, the technical issue of "holding" both 
personal and political realms, in a manner which remains unintrusive, respectful and affirming of 
a unique standpoint, is one which requires substantial further attention.   
 
Our most damaged selves, and the struggle of "not knowing" 
Later (see Solutions, entitlement and passivity, p.279), we will consider how the anxiety which 
emerges within an observer regarding the threateningly "uncertain" bounds and implications of 
impairment, may lead to manic refuge in the positing of "solutions".  In the therapeutic 
environment, similar dynamics, such as the need for subjective control, render the task of "not 
knowing" for the clinician particularly difficult in the face of images of impairment.  At the heart 
of the psychoanalytic psychotherapy model rests a contradiction which is especially salient in the 
realm of clinical work with individuals who suffer prejudice.  On the one hand, the challenge to 
the analyst is to "not know" – to postpone formulations regarding the nature of internal life in 
order to better "hear" the patient in an uncontaminated manner (e.g. Casement, 1992). The 
capacity to be open to having one's expectations and biases confounded or exposed is an essential 
element in the "humility" required of the reflexive analytic worker.  Uncovering the nature of 
subjectivity "near its source" involves immense care taken in eliminating disruption of the flow of 
psychic material.  This ability for "allowing" experience to come to light is surely of particular 
relevance in the realm of disability-related work, where, as in cross-cultural psychotherapy, the 
presence of (often barely visible) assumptions within the clinician – and consequent need for the 
conscious suspension of such assumptions – is essential if subjective life is to be heard clearly.  
And yet, on the other hand, the clinician is expected to "see beyond", to hypothesise, imagine and 
reconstruct inner reality from the signs implicit in symbols and process.  As is by now clear, the 
fantasy-evocations surrounding disability are of a rich and archaic order, presenting the risk of 
complex projections based upon the "certainties" of embedded cultural assumptions regarding 
evidence "written on the body".  Anxiety within the clinician is likely to be managed with 
distorting attachments to "memory and desire" (Bion, 1988).  The need to not know, but also the 
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 difficulty of not knowing, are, in my view, substantially amplified within such therapeutic work.  
It's particularly hard not to know because of our fear of what we will find; yet, with deep paradox, 
we actually do "know" what we will find, because it is ours.  Wilson (2003, p. 94) falls 
somewhat, in my view, into this snare.  She writes:  
 
For the therapist, realising the degree of the client's limitations can be likened to a 
mother realising the limitations of her impaired baby.  
 
        (Wilson, 2003, p. 94) 
 
In this passage, it seems as though fantasies regarding the nature or implications of impairment 
(within therapist and mother) have been "indiscriminately" allowed to colour growing 
impressions of the nature of subjectivity and potential.  Clearly, with empathic good intentions, 
Wilson (2003) aims to "reach" the "reality" of the experience of her patient, yet her route toward 
doing so is (potentially definitively) mediated by invisible cultural assumptions regarding the 
import of impairment.  Similarly, in the case of the mother, a "recognition" of the implications of 
impairment forecloses consideration of the crucial impact of cultural assumptions upon the 
socialisation and self-formation of her baby.  The logic is irresistable, viz. the "condition" is 
palpable, and the "experience" and the "condition" are conflated.  Thus disability renders struggle 
which renders experience, and since I can "see" the disability, I thus believe that I can 
circumscribe experience.  It is only through an especially rigorous regime of "not knowing" that 
the realisation of such invisible cultural assumptions, set in place via socialisation and social 
construction, may be derailed.  Further aspects of this process may then involve the conscious 
consideration, interrogation and neutralisation of such assumptions.  Reeve (2000, p. 674), who 
performs training of mental health professionals for work with disabled clients, comments that: 
"Unfortunately, my personal experience is that some counsellors believe that they already 
'unconditionally accept' all people, and therefore don't need DET [her training programme]".  
Traditionally, it seems that psychoanalysts working with disabled patients have foregrounded the  
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"problem" of the patient being able to believe that his or her body was not repugnant to the 
clinician, with the clinician's actual feelings or presumptions regarding the "living" of such a 
body going largely unexplored (e.g. Ogden, 1974, p. 431).  The evidence that mental health 
professionals tend to under-diagnose suicidal depression in persons with severe impairments, at 
times viewing impairment as reason enough to rationally desire death, provides an important 
perspective here (Herr & Phil, 1992, p. 15).   
 
What emerges throughout the foregoing is a picture of countertransference phenomena which, if 
unprocessed, will render a mode of relating to disabled people as if "they" were extensions of our 
most damaged selves.  Evidence of this mode of relating is readily to be found in everyday 
constructions of disabled people, typically embodying a binary between the "tragic", "dependent 
invalid", and the superhuman, "inspirational" disabled person who "overcomes adversity".  
Remaining separate – resisting control – means not knowing the destiny of our most damaged 
part, and this is unbearable.   Not being able to see the edges of our struggle, because it is 
continuous with the imagined feelings of the other, as we, in fantasy, drain into the cavernous 
experience-bodies of those so frighteningly different, yet so similar to us, rouses annihilatory 
fears rooted in the experience of boundlessness.  "Controlling" psychological and psychoanalytic 
theories of disability (e.g. "rehabilitation psychology", the "bereavement model", and the 
discourse of "denial") may be understood as defensive responses to the experience of not being 
able to manage "not knowing".  Instead, the oppressive compromise is for us to "know" the worst, 
whilst merged and colonising, yet publicly disowning, controlling, and subduing.  The essence of 
insight-nurturing psychotherapy is a combination of curiosity and neutrality, both of which are 
disrupted by the disability phenomenon.  The presence of projective identification, which 
reconstructs the other as the shameful or "bad" self (Klein, 1946) also reduces resources available 
to the ego, leading to poor reality testing and pathological judgments about self and other (Main, 
1975 cited in Young, 1994, p. 130).    
 
At many points during the group process I was aware of my own "growth", occurring via 
continual reflection on the countertransference, which exposed not only my disability prejudices, 
but deeper anxieties rooted in my history which were pointed to by disability imagery.  As I 
commented in one supervision session, it felt as though "I am the one in therapy".  The protective 
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hesitancy of group members in describing their traumatic experiences, in combination with this 
uncovering of my own evocations, rendered a profound reflection (in my interpretation) of the 
"caring for" performed by disabled persons in the outside world.  This, I believe, incorporates the 
lived, adult manifestation of false self dynamics based upon the neediness exposed in others by 
contact with disability.  Put another way, highly visible impairments, such as those of the group 
members, have a Rorschach-like evocative effect on the social world, rendering the need for 
containing management of the unconscious "psychic fall-out".  One consequence of this 
"projective effect" (to be examined more fully later – see Disability and loss, p.302), is the 
motivation group members felt to disguise or otherwise dampen evidence of loss, struggle or 
difference which would evoke such anxious responses in others.  There was clear awareness that, 
if disability experience was too visible in the interpersonal space, this negative emotion would be 
returned to the individual as projection, but enormously elaborated with the conflicted or abject 
unconscious struggles of the other, leaving the disabled person doubly burdened, negated and 
unseen.      
 
Davis (1997c, p. 54) interprets Medusa, in Greek mythology, as the ugly, malformed, "disabled" 
counterpoint to Venus' physical perfection.  In the narrative, Medusa is punished by Athena for 
"lying with" Poseidon; Athena transforms her into a winged monster so ugly that she turns 
onlookers to stone.  Later, Athena has her killed by Perseus, who decapitates her, and then 
contains her remains in a "magic purse" which protects onlookers from the deadly power of her 
appearance.  Medusa and Venus occupy opposite ends of a dialectic, which joins "beauty and 
ugliness, desire and repulsion, wholeness and fragmentation" (ibid.).  For Davis (1997c, p. 54), 
the Medusa story is an allegory of the encounter of a "normal" individual with the threatening 
spectre of the disabled body, in which the visual is a central, abominable force.  The "normal" 
person, upon seeing the disabled body, is "turned into stone".  The subversive disabled body, 
consequently, must be decapitated, and then "contained" within a "purse" of rationality, which is 
the device whereby it is subdued, controlled, and reformed (ibid.). The chaos of the malformed 
body issues shock-waves which render the ego vulnerable to a terror that its brittle, cosmetic 
identity (in Lacanian terms) is about to be undone, to be mutilated and perforated by the 
fragmentary instability at its core (Davis, 1997c, p. 64; Lacan, 1977b).  The association of 
disablement with punishment for sexual deviance also appears clearly here.  It is at our peril, in 
my view, that we as clinical professionals, as well as members of society, underestimate the 
power of these disruptive fantasies.  
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Denied separateness 
The "din" of projections which characterise relating surrounding disability embodies, as has been 
outlined, a contravention of psychic boundaries, in which aspects of the self (of the observer) may 
come to be experienced as characteristics of the disabled "subject" (Young, 1994, p. 130; Klein, 
1946).  But what, then, does it mean to occupy – was many visibly disabled persons must – a 
more or less constant social space of "un-separate relating"?  Let us consider children 
experiencing separation anxiety difficulties, rooted in overinvolved, enmeshed and anxious 
parenting.  As will be attested to by clinical experience, the growing sense of selfhood of such 
children may be stunted by the lack of "faith" in the child's capacity to grow, cope and develop 
which is implicit in the parent's anxiety surrounding separation.  Through the enmeshed nature of 
relationships with parents, such children lack the experience of being seen and accurately 
mirrored as separate, unitary individuals.  The lack of such validation leaves the child with little 
to "go on" in the business of girding him or herself for venturing into an unknown world – put 
simply, everyone need someone to "have faith" in him or her, in order to confront the challenges 
of growth and change (Salzberger-Wittenberg, Henry & Osborne, 1983).  The invisibility of the 
incipient selves of such children is often mistaken for being very loved and sensitively cared 
about, whereas it is (to some extent) the projected aspects of self of parents which, in fact, are 
being "cared for".  Being "loved", "cared for" or "looked after", and being invisible and silent are 
things which regularly co-occur.  Consider, for example, what is in common between such 
enmeshed parental relationships and the charity and welfare discourse surrounding the 
"neediness" of disabled persons.  Further, it seems highly likely that, in the lives of disabled 
people, such experiences of un-separate relating are continuous and superimposed; from the 
separation difficulties with parents engendered by anxieties regarding whether disabled children 
will cope and be accepted in the world, to patronisation and control by charity or health workers.  
The silencing which is inseparable from the imperative to appease, is re-evoked across temporal 
and socio-cultural contexts.  What may be occurring at a deeper level is a form of "enmeshed 
compromise", where the loss of a clear boundary by the "other" draws the disabled individual into 
an equally inauthentic, placating role.  This dynamic is directly analogous to the manner in which  
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the enmeshed parent draws a tacit agreement from his or her child to "not be real" (see Being 
real, p.269).  The compromise is encapsulated in Skynner's (1991) bleak but incisive critique of 
the dangerous irrational factors which draw individuals toward mental health professions; the 
dynamic of projection is, I believe, directly analogous.  Skynner writes: 
 
The mental health professional automatically selects the ideal clientele in which to 
study himself or herself vicariously and discover what is missing...though the 
knowledge cannot benefit us...until we acknowledge the fact that our work, however 
useful, has also been an evasion of the truth about ourselves...I'll look after you if 
you'll look after the bit of me I can't look after. 
 
   (Skynner, 1991: xviii cited in Marks, 1999a, p. 109) 
 
Occupying a psychic space in which one is so constantly subject to the intruding emotional 
"jetsam" of others, must, as in the case of the child with separation anxiety, create immense 
confusion regarding the ownership of feelings, and consequently, the nature of self.  If self, as 
Winnicott (1974, p. 131) would have us believe, is coalesced in the mirrored constructions of 
others, then who, or what, we are – or are allowed to be – is defined and constrained by the 
constructions of others.  The question thus arises:  is it possible to have a life, a self, which is not 
saturated with abjection, if abjection is the primary characteristic attributed to one?  The intrusion 
of the "psychic dirt" (Davids, 1996) of others not only coerces the individual into tacit 
"ownership" of this material, but also engorges psychic space in a manner which renders it 
impossible to "find" emotional material that truly belongs to him or her.  It is, thus, in the very 
nature of (emotional) oppression, that the interrogation of such oppression, incorporating the 
exploration and "real-ising" of self, is precluded.  The individual, instead, may remain psychically 
"baffled" by the chaotic, indeterminate amalgam of emotional responses and exogenous 
attributions, with the (perhaps lifelong) lack of accurate mirroring rendering these indiscernible 
from one another.  This psychic substrate is, needless to say, richly fertile ground for the seeds of 
self-doubt and self-blame sown by individualising disablist ideology.  The options available to 
disabled persons in responding to this constant hail of projections are probably dictated by 
socialisation, yet all involve a compromising of the self.  The continuous rebuttal of projections is 
likely to evoke ascriptions of the stereotype of the "embittered", "aggressive", "uncooperative" or 
"maladjusted" disabled person, bringing isolation, whilst still locating the individual within the 
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meaning-splits forged by cultural responses to disability.  Further, as we shall see (see Disability 
and loss, p.302), the evacuation from psychic space of the "vulnerable" projections of others 
often leads to a "baby and bathwater" situation, in which much of one's own, unseen struggle – 
and hence, parts of oneself – are also jettisoned.   
 
Having thus considered elements of my experience of countertransference, and aspects of 
"process" within the development of the psychotherapy group, I turn in the following chapter to 
the conceptualisation of "content" material which emanated from group discourse.   
